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

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ARE ALL TRUTHS ANALYTIC FOR LEIBNIZ ?

Though Leibniz never referred to, much less categorized all the true propositions into, analytic and synthetic propositions, attempt has been made to evaluate his views on true propositions in terms of analytic and synthetic propositions. Since the days of Couturat and Russell it has become the prevailing view that for Leibniz, all the true propositions are analytic. Recently it has been controverted by Hide Ishiguro in her book *Leibniz's Philosophy of Logic and Language.* She advocates that it cannot be properly held that, for Leibniz, all true propositions were analytic; but she does not examine it in detail.

The purpose of this paper is to throw some further light on this controversial problem. It will trace the historical development of Leibniz's thoughts about true propositions and show that the views held by Russell and Couturat were not altogether unfounded. Instead, they were based largely on his earlier position about the true propositions. The later stance which he takes is quite different from the earlier. Even so, the answer to the question ' Are all truths analytic for Leibniz ? ' will largely depend upon what is being understood by " analytic ". Besides, it also involves the recently much discussed problem of ' conceptual relativism '. The terms ' definition ', ' concept ', ' containment ' etc., which have been used by Leibniz are very crude and their sense differs considerably from the meanings they have found in the subsequent philosophical writings, which, *inter alia,* deal with the distinction of analytic and synthetic propositions. Though in view of the conceptual relativism, it is not proper to evaluate Leibniz's views on true proposition in terms of analyticity and syntheticity which involve quite different notions of definition and concept etc., nonetheless, in so far as

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it is possible, an attempt would be made to elicit the answer of the above question in the light of the main conceptions of analyticity.

I

It is generally believed that Leibniz subscribed to the view that all propositions were basically of subject–predicate type; those which were apparently not so, could be reduced to that form. This view is quite unpalatable. Nonetheless, to discuss the matters within Leibnizian setting, we can posit it. Those who cannot reconcile to it even for this *adhoc* purpose can see the discussion proceeding within the stint of genuine subject-predicate type of propositions.

The view that in every subject–predicate type of true proposition the concept of predicate is somehow contained in the concept of subject is one to which Leibniz adhered all along. There is no contrary evidence to it. But whether he also thought all the true propositions to be identical is a point of debate. If we go through his writings in the chronological order, it appears that in the beginning, he maintained that the view that all true propositions were identical was a natural consequence of the concept–containment theory of truth to which he was committed.

According to his earlier position, it is possible to demonstrate by the analysis of the terms of the propositions that every true proposition is identical. In a short article captioned 'Primary Truths' written c. 1686, he writes–

" All other truths (except primary truths i. e., identities) are reduced to primary truths by the aid of definition – i. e. by the analysis of the notions; and this constitutes a priori proof, independent of experience....

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The predicate or consequent ... is always in the subject or antecedent and this constitutes the nature of truth in general, or, the connexion between terms of a proposition. In identities this connexion and inclusion of the predicate in the subject is express, whereas in all other truths it is implicit and must be shown through the analysis of the notions in which a priori demonstration consists ...

There at once arises the accepted axiom 'there is nothing without a reason, or, 'there is no effect without a cause'. For otherwise there would be a truth which could not be proved a priori. i.e., which is not analysed into identities; and this is contrary to the nature of truth, which is always, either expressly or implicitly, identical." [1]

This long excerpt proves that at one stage Leibniz thought that all true propositions were in fact identical and those which did not appear to be so could be reduced to the identical ones by the analysis of the terms of true propositions.

But if all true propositions were to be identical, their opposites were bound to be contradictory. A natural consequence of it was that all true propositions were necessary. And this was precisely the position to which Leibniz used to subscribe before he thought to make some room for contingency in his philosophical position. In one of his writings he has confessed it.

"I used to consider that nothing happens by chance or by accident..... So I was not far from the view of those who think that all things are absolutely necessary".[2]

To accommodate contingency he made a shift from his earlier position. While still sticking to concept-containment theory of truth, he repudiated that all true propositions were identical or, for that matter, could be reduced to identities by some sort of

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analysis. He classified all true propositions into two categories; necessarily true propositions and contingently true propositions. The necessarily true propositions are either identical or can be resolved into identities by the analysis of its terms but the contingently true propositions cannot be resolved in this way and this is not simply because contingently true propositions are more complex than, but have the same sort of internal structure as, necessarily true proposition. The contingent propositions are altogether different sorts of beasts. The way in which the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of subject in a contingently true proposition is altogether different from the way in which the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of subject in a necessarily true proposition. In other words, we can say that the relation (of course, other than the relation of mere containment) which the concept of predicate bears to the concept of subject in a contingently true proposition is altogether different from the relation which the concept of predicate bears to the concept of subject in a contingently true proposition.

In a necessarily true proposition the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of subject in such a way that when its terms are subjected to analysis, it becomes evident how the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of subject; but in a contingently true proposition, even if we continue to analyse its terms endlessly, it wouldn't be possible to show that the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. Let alone human beings, in the case of contingent propositions, even God cannot demonstrate by any sort of analysis that the concept of predicate is contained in the concept of the subject. For at least in principle, it would make the contingently true propositions identical and thereby necessary which they are not. God knows them a priori by intuition and not by demonstration. Thus, it becomes evident that according to the later position of Leibniz, a contingently true proposition, notwith-

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standing the fact that the concept of its predicate is contained in the concept of its subject, is not identical. To substantiate the above contention some passages from his writings (c. 1689) are being quoted below.

" But in the case of contingent truths, even though the predicate is in the subject, this can never be demonstrated of it, nor can the proposition ever be reduced to an equation or identity. Instead, the analysis proceeds to infinity, God alone seeing not, indeed, the end of the analysis, since it has no end – but the connexion of terms or the inclusion of the predicate in the subject ... ... " [3]

" ... ... truths are sometimes demonstrable or necessary, and sometimes they are free or contingent; the latter cannot be reduced by any analysis to an identity ... ... " [4]

Much more are contingent or infinite truths subject to the knowledge of God; they are known by him, not by a demonstration (indeed, for, that would imply a contradiction) but by an infallible vision." [5]

" ... ... there must be truths which are not reduced by any analysis to identical truths or the principle of contradiction ... " [6]

" In the case of contingent truth, even though the predicate is really in the subject, yet one never arrives at a demonstration or an identity, even though the resolution of each term is continued indefinitely." [7]

It is not infrequent for philosophers to take different positions on a problem during their philosophical development; but as a rule, we take them to hold the views they have arrived at eventually. Leibniz's case should not be thought as an exception to it.

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II

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that according to the later and final views of Leibniz...

(1) A proposition is true If and only if the concept of its predicate is somehow contained in the concept of its subject.

(ii) Not all propositions are identical or for that matter can be recuced to identities. There are necessarily true propositions which either are identical or can be reduced to identities by the analysis of the terms of the propositions and also are there contingently true propositions which are not identical and therefore it is impossible to reduce them into identities by any sort of analysis.

Now I propose to examine whether, for Leibniz, all the true propositions are analytic on the basis of three main conceptions of analyticity.

1. If we take analytic propositions to be identical propositions or those propositions which can be reduced to identities by the substitution of definitions in place of the terms of the propositions, or those propositions whose negations are self-contradictory, it is evident that not all propositions are analytic. On this difinition of analyticity, only necessary propositions emerge as analytic.

2. On the contrary, if we take analytic propositions to be those propositions which are true by virtue of the meanings of the terms of the propositions and also we take Lebnizian complete concepts for the meanings of the terms, the idea that, for Leibniz, all the true propositions are analytic, seems to be somewhat promising.

3. One more conception of analyticity which is often cited is that analytic propositions are those which do not provide us

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with new knowledge. On the basis of this conception of analyticity it can be said that, for all practical purposes, contingently true propositions do provide us with new knowledge. They can be known by us only through experience. Thus, for human beings, contingently true propositions are not analytic while in the case of God, since He is omniscient and knows all truths a priori, the question of new knowledge does not arise.

From the above discussion, it is clear that even if we ignore the problem of conceptual relativism, it is difficult to draw forth a forthright answer of the question we had started with. Nonetheless, it can be said that, for Leibniz, not all the true propositions are analytic in the sense of being identical (the sense in which most of the commentators on Leibniz have held them to be). Even if we take the second definition of analyticity which is based on the meanings of the terms, condoning the fact that one would hardly be prepared to accept Leibniz's complete concepts as meanings of the terms, the claim that, for Leibniz, all the true propositions are analytic seems, at best, to be dubious; for the term ' analytic ' has very close affinity with the term ' analysis ', unless, in a purported analytic proposition, it is possible, at least in principle, to analyse out the concept of its predicate from the concept of its subject, the epithet ' analytic ' appears to be a misnomer. *

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T. R. KANAUJIA

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NOTES

* My thanks are due to Professor R. R. Verma for her valuable criticism of an earlier draft of this paper and her suggestions to improve it.

1. Leibniz : *Philosophical Writings* (ed.) by G. H. R. Parkinson pp. 87–88
2. *Ibid* p. 106
3. *Ibid* p. 109
4. *Ibid* p. 110
5. *Ibid* p. 111
6. *Ibid* p. 111
7. *Ibid* p. 97

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THE NYAYA DEFINITION OF CAUSE : A CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY

The law of causation is regarded by the Naiyāyikas as a self-evident principle. It is the principle on which the entire metaphysical system of the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣka realism rests.

The Naiyāyikas believe that between the cause and the effect there exists an invariable temporal relation (antecedence and sequence). The law of causation is, for the Naiyāyikas, nothing more than a law of sequence. The essence of causality lies in the uniformity and necessity of this sequence.

A cause can be defined as "that which invariably precedes the effect, and is not merely accessory to but is necessary for the production of the effect".[1] It is an invariable and unconditional antecedent of an event. Thus, the first essential characteristic of a cause is its antecedence (*pūrvavṛttitva*). The second is its invariability (*niyatapūrvavṛttitva*) and the third its unconditionality (*ananyathāsiddhatva*).

Pūrvavṛttitva means that the cause is temporally prior to the effect. The Naiyāyikas do not agree with those who maintain that the cause is necessarily simultaneous with the effect. An event takes place at a particular time only by succeeding what is regarded as its cause.

The Naiyāyikas, however, recognise that there are some cases in which the temporal relation is more than mere succession. The cause in these cases remains present till the occurrence of the effect. The antecedence of the cause again implies that it is different from the effect. We can have a relation of before and after only when there are two distinct events.

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But is antecedence alone a sufficient ground for causality? If antecedence alone were enough to determine a cause, yarns could also become the cause of a jar. A donkey may be present by chance just prior to the production of a jar. The presence of the donkey is undoubtedly a definite prior event, yet it would be absurd to regard it as the cause of a jar. The donkey is not the cause because its antecedence to the jar is accidental. This is why the Naiyāyikas include the criterion of invariability (*niyatapūrvavṛttitva*) for ascertaining a cause. Udayana in his *Nyāyakusumāñjali* defines cause as the invariable antecedent of the effect[2]. In *Tarkasaṁgraha*[3] also cause is defined in the same way. The cause is invariable in the sense that it never fails to be an antecedent. If the effect is, the cause must have been, and if the cause is not, the effect will not be. To regard every antecedent as a cause is to give rise to the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. There must, therefore, be an invariable relation between cause and effect.

Again the Naiyāyikas argue that mere invariability of an antecedent does not suffice to constitute it as the cause of what succeeds. The Naiyāyikas, therefore, modify the definition by adding the qualification *ananyathāsiddhatva* (unconditionality)[4]. Haridāsa Bhattācharya, a commentator on the *Kārikās of Nyāyakusumāñjali*, defines cause as the unconditional and invariable antecedent of the effect[5]. Unconditionality and invariability are indispensable for *kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva* or cause-effect relation. The cause must be independently necessary for the occurrence of the effect. Its antecedence to the effect must not be conditional on something else. Neither the potter's father nor the colour of clay is the cause of the pot, because they are not unconditional, though invariable they are. The sound produced by the stick or by the potter's wheel invariably precedes the effect, but it is a co-effect.

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In order to determine the cause of an event, the Nyāya eliminates all kinds of accidental antecedents or *anyathāsiddhas* which are not causes in the strict sense of the term. *Anyathāsiddhas* are so called because their antecedence with reference to the relevant effect is not direct but otherwise established. The Nyāya considers all such antecedents as irrelevant and superfluous as these are not independently necessary for the production of the effect. Viśvanātha, following Vardhamāna, mentions five types of *anyathāsiddhas*[6]. Gangeśa and some later wtiters recognise only three types of them.

The specific class character and special quality of the causal antecedent (for instance, *daṇdatva* and *daṇdarūpa*) are unnecessary antecedents as these have no direct bearing on the production of the effect. Eternal and all-pervading substances like *ākāśa* are irrelevant antecedents as their antecedence to any event is inevitable. The cause of a cause or remote cause is also an unnecessary antecedent. The potter's father does not stand in a causal relation to the pot. Finally, the antecedents which are not independently necessary for the production of the effect, are not regarded as causal conditions. According to Viśvanātha, this last *anyathāsiddha* alone can serve the purpose of the rest[7]. In fact, the fifth kind of *anyathāsiddha* exhaustively explains the nature of an unnecessary antecedent.

"We thus see that the fundamental element in the conception of causal antecedence is not merely mechanical invarlability but also independent relevancy. Such relevancy follows directly from unconditional necessity. A cause is independently or unconditionally an invariable antecedent".[8]

In Western philosophy, we find that Hume defines cause as an invariable antecedent. Causation is for him nothing more than an invariable sequence. There can be a serious objection to such

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a conception of causation. If causality is nothing more than an invariable sequence, then night must be the cause of day and day the cause of night, since these phenomena have invariably succeeded one another from the beginning of the world. But, in fact they are not causally related. The succession of day and night is conditional on the occurrence of other antecedents. Day invariably precedes night without being its cause, for the sequence between the two can be adequately explained with reference to their common cause... the diurnal revolution of the earth. The above example brings out the importance of the notion of necessity or unconditionality in the definition of a cause.

Among Western thinkers, J. S. Mill gives a definition of cause which is very similar to that of the Naiyāyikas. "The cause of a phenomenon", according to him, "is the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and unconditionally consequent".[9] Like the Naiyāyikas, Mill also emphasises the idea of unconditionality. In the words of Mill. "The notion of cause involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the terms necessity, it is unconditionalness. ... ... Invariable sequence, therefore is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional".[10]

Invariable sequence, however, does not subsist between a consequent and a single antecedent. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents. A real cause is the whole of the antecedents. In the words of Mill, "The cause is the sum-total of the conditions positive and negative taken together"[11]. Like Mill, the Naiyāyikas also believe that if the effect is to follow invariably, the cause must be a complex group—a collocation of all causal antecedents. Clay alone cannot be regarded as the cause of a pot; clay together with the accessories, such as the potter, the wheel, the stick etc. serves as

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the cause. The Naiyāyikas regard such a complex group of antecedents as a cause only when the different conditions constituting the group co–operate in such a manner that the effect cannot fail to follow immediately.

The main distinction between Mill and the Naiyāyikas is that what the Naiyāyikas call cause is termed as condition by Mill. According to Mill, clay, stick, wheel and the potter etc., are the positive conditions of the effect pot. From the Nyāya stand–point, there is, however, no objection in regarding any of the conditions as a cause, even though it is not necessary followed by the effect. The cause of Mill corresponds to the causal group or *kāraṇa–sāmagrī* of the Naiyāyikas.

In connection with the comparative discussion of the Nyāya definition of cause and that of the Western thinkers, another point should be mentioned. The Naiyāyikas, we have seen, emphasise the antecedence of the cause to the effect. The cause is held to be temporally prior to the effect. This is clearly in accordance with what we see in our common practical life.

Most, but not all, Western thinkers regard cause as antecedent to the effect. Aristotle mentions four types of causes of which the final cause is not antecedent to the effect. It is rather consequeut.

The concept of temporal precedence of cause has been criticised by many modern thinkers. Radhakrishnan remarks, "The Naiyāyika lays stress on antecedence, which, strictly speaking, is logical and not chronological. The sum is the cause of light, and the two, the cause and the effect, are simultaneous. The real cause continues as long as the effect does, and the existence of the cause, before or after the effect is unnessary..... The Naiyāyika exaggerates the importance of antecedence *pūrvabhāva* for causality".[12] Russell, an advocate of the pure regularity

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theory, remarks, "It is customary only to give them name 'effect' to an event which is later than the cause, but there is no kind of reason for this restriction".[13]

A. E. Taylor is also against this view of antecedence of the cause to the effect. "The principle of causation", according to him, "cannot be empirically established by an appeal to the actual course of experience. Actual experience is certainly not sufficient to show that every event is absolutely determined by its antecedent condition".[14] The causal process is continuous according to Taylor. If causation be thought of as discontinuous or if we accept a gap between the antecedent and the consequent, there remains nothing to correlate them, and the causal process completely breaks down. The canse and effect are not distinct events but earlier and later stages in a continuous process. So, any dividing line drawn mentally to mark the boundary between the cause and the effect is purely arbitary. Bradley also believes in the continuity of the causal process. Causation, according to him, is "really the ideal reconstruction of a continuous process of change in time. Between the coming together of the separate conditions and the beginning of the process, there is no halt or interval. Cause and effect are not divided by time in the sense of duration or lapse or interspace. They are separated in time by an ideal line which we draw across the indivisible process"[15].

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the continuity between the cause and the effect. According to them, the cause must be separated in time from the effect, however small the period may be. They do not seem to realise that a break of even a moment between the cause and effect raises various logical problems regarding their connection. Without being bothered by logical subtleties, the Naiyāyikas base their theory on empirical data and are guided by the dictates of common-sense.

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The Naiyāyikas hold in order to be qualified for a cause an antecedent must be *niyata* (invariable) and *ananyathāsiddha* (unconditional). It is to be seen whether the adjunct ' unconditionality ' makes the adjunct ' invariability ' redundant. The adjective—' *ananyathāsiddha* ' is intented to eliminate all accidental antecedents and as such can be construed as carrying within its fold the sense of ' invariability ' also. But there are some cases in which, the only way of eliminating accidental antecedents like a donkey etc., is through the criterion of invariability. The adjunct ' invariable ' however, is not sufficient to remove all the unnecessary antecedents. This is why the adjunct ' *ananyathāsiddha* ' or unconditionality is added to the definition of the cause. Both invariability and unconditionality are, therefore, essential for an unambiguous definition of cause.

Tarabag,
Burdwan

MANJUSRI BHATTACHARYYA

NOTES

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (New York : The Macmillan Company, London ; George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Eighth Impression, 1958) Vol. 2, p. 92.
2. *(Kāranatvam) (Kāryānniyatah pūrvabhāvah.* The *Nyāya-Kusumāñjali* of Udayana with four commentaries : The *Bodhani, the Prakāśa, the Prakāśikā* and *Makaranda* respectively, by Varadarāja, Vardhamāna, Megha Thakkura and Ruchidatta with notes by Dharmadatta, ed. Padmaprasāda Upādhyāya and Sri. Dhundiraja Shāstrī. 1957, p. 203.
3. *Kāryaniyata pūrvavṛtti Kāraṇam.*
Tarkasaṁgraha of Annambhatta with the Autor's *Dīpikā* and Govardhana's *Nyāya-Bodhinī*, ed, with critical notes by Y. V. Athalye and M. R. Bodas, Bombay, Sanskrit series No. LV., 2nd. edition, 1918, Sect. 38, p. 25.

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4, *Anyathāsiddhi–śūnyasya niyata pūrvavartitā.* Visvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana, *Bhāṣā-parichheda* with *Siddhānta muktāvali,* ed. Pañcānan, Shāsirī, Calcutta, revised edition, 1377 (BS), Kārikā, 16, p. 102.

5. *Kāraṇatvam ananyathāsiddhaniyata Pūrvavartibhāvaḥ.*
The *Nyāya Kusumāñjali* of Udayana with the sanskrit commentary of Haridasa Bhattacharya, ed. Ãcārya Viśveśvarva, The Chowkhamba Vidyā Bhavan, Vārāṇasī-I, 1962 Kārikā, 19, p. 85

6. *Yena saha pūrvabhāvah, kāraṇam adāya vā Yasya /*
Anyaṁ prati pūrvabhāve jñate yat pūrvabhāvavijñānam //
Janakaṁ prati pūrvavartitāṁ aparijñāya nayasya gṛhyate /
Atiriktam athāpi yad bhaven nityat āvaśyaka pūrvabhāvinaḥ//

7. *Eteṣu pañceṣu anyathāsiddheṣu madhye pañccamo' nyathāsiddha āvaśyakas tenaiva pareṣām caritārthatvāt*
Ibid., On kārika, 22, p. 115.

8, Sadananda Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya–Vaiśeska Metaphysics,* Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona–4, 1947. p. 287.

9. J. S. Mill, *System of Logic,* Great Britain, New Impression, 1961, p. 222.

10. *Ibid* , p. 222.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 217.

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13. Bertrand Russell, *Our Knowledge of the External World* (George Allen and Unwin ltd., Ruskin House, London, 1952), p. 229.

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Methuen and Co. Ltd., London, 1961, p. 167.

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RUSSELL ON LOGICAL CONSTRUCTION

1. Introduction

This paper, as the title indicates, is concerned with Russell's method of "logical construction" in philosophizing. At one time Russell claimed that the supreme maxim in scientific philosophizing is : "*Wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities*" (RSP. 148, emphasis Russell's. cf, LA. 326; *OKEW*, 106). Whether this maxim is true of all scientific philosophizing is a debatable point, but it is true of Russell's philosophy, at least, during the period 1914–1927. Much of his philosophical activity during this period was devoted to putting this maxim into practice. His first application of this method was confined to the philosophy of mathematics. But soon he realized that the method has a much wider field of application.[1] In mathematics the method has been employed to sweep away "the useless menageries of metaphysical monsters with which it used to be infested" (RSP. 148). In RSP, *OKEW*, UCM and other places the same method is employed to sweep away physical objects in so far as they are more than a class of sense-data. At different times Russell takes each of the following, among others, to be logical constructions : space, time points, instances, matters, electrons, protons, common sense physical objects, minds, etc. However, in this paper I shall try to give a synoptic account of Russell's construction of physical objects only.

The overall problem of Russell's construction of physical objects is *epistemological* : to explain how physics and common sense objects are knowable. The problem arises from the fact that we usually suppose that our khowledge of physical objects, such as, chairs, tables and the rest (even that of physics such as

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molecules, atoms, etc.), is completely empirical, based entirely on data experienced in sense-perceptions. But what actually does observation reveal to us? "Nothing .. except immediate data of sense, certain patches of colour, sounds, tastes, smells, etc. with certain spatio-temporal relations" (RSP. 139). At the same time physics says that the "contents of the physical world are prima facie very different from these : molecules have no colour, atoms make no noise, electrons have no taste, and corpuscles do not even smell". (ibid). In addition to this, there is a huge gap between the supposed physical object and the immediate data of the sense. Now if the claims of physics and common sense to be empirical are to be justified then somehow or other we have to bridge the gulf between physical objects and sense perceptions: that is to say, there must be some correlation between physical objects and the immediate data of the senses. But how is this correlation known? There may be two ways; either there is some principle known *a priori* assures us, for example that our sense-data have causes other then themselves, or else the objects of physics must be reinterpreted as "functions of sense-data". (ibid. 140); that they are logical construtions out of sense-data. However Russell finds that he has to reject the first option on the ground that, if adopted, "physics ceases to be empirical or based upon experiment and observation alone" (ibid.).

Russell's aim is to show the viability of the second alternative. So the process of the construction is the *reverse* of the process of physics i e.. instead of giving sense-data in terms of physical objects we "give physical objects in terms of sense-data" (*ibid*). It seems, then, that one of the philosophical consequence of such construction is phenomenalism, the doctrine that physical objects are logical constructions out of actual and possible sense-data. Ayer[2] claims that during his constructionist period Russell abandoned his causal theory of perception (which he

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held during the petiod 1911–1913, and again reverted to after 1927) for a version of phenomenalism. In a paper entitled " On Russell's Brief But Notorious Flirtation with Phenomenalism "[3] Salmon shows that Russell's acceptance of the phenomenalist position does not involve his rejection of a causal theory of perception. But I argue, in this paper, that Russell *does not really accept* the phenomenalist view of external objects, although his view is close to phenomenalism.

2. *What is Logical Construction ?*

Ever since he enunciated his " supreme maxim ", Russell clearly defined neither " logical constructions " nor " inferred entities ". He even shows no particular interest in mentioning clearly what the method of logical construction is He expresses it in the from of a maxim. But, as a matter of fact, the maxim does not occupy him much. The reason is, perhaps, due to his idea that the best way to understand the nature of a method is to apply it and to watch rather than formulate it in general precepts. As he says, "it is only in application that the meaning or importance of a method can be understood" (SMP. 109).

The word "construction" in "logical construction" is highly *misleading*. This is partly because Russell never quite explains what he has in mind and partly because he uses the notion in a wide variety of ways. Usually we use such word in talking about physical object, such as, a machine is said to be constructed out of its parts, a house out of wood and bricks, and so on. But in Russell's use "construction" involves nothing of this kind. In fact, it has nothing to do with the *production* of anything.[4] As a qualifying epithet of construction the word ' logical" in "logical construction" is also misleading. It tends to suggest that logical construction is simply a matter of logic. This, in fact, is not true. There is no denying the fact that Russell's philosophy has a strong *bias* for logic. He assigns to logic the most central place in

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philosophy. In *OKEW* (42) he describes logic as the "essence of philosophy", and elsewhere philosophy is said to be "indistinguishable" faom logic (SMP. 180). Every "philosophical problem, when it is subjected to the necessary analysis and purification is found .. to be ... logical" (*OKEM.* 42). Logic "becomes the central study in philosophy", because it provides "the method of research" (ibid. 243). This logic he applies to the problems of the relation between physics and perceptions. However, logic alone is not sufficient for logical construction. It has to have other materials on which logical operations can be applied.

At any rate, the expression "logical construction" is an unfortunate one. It tends to obscure more than to reveal its meaning. At times Russell replaced it by the expressions "logical fiction" (*IMP.* 45, 137: *OKEW.* 116; PLA. 253: *AM.* 306), "symbolic fiction" (UCM. 125). But these substitutions prove more obscure than the original. They tend to give the impression that in calling an object a logical construction Russell really maintains that it is imaginary or fictitious. This is far from truth. As Ayer comments :

> What one must not say is that logical constructions are fictitious objects. For while it is true that the English State, for example, is a logical construction out of individual people, and that the table at which I am writing is logical construction out of sense-contents, it is not true that either the English State or this table is fictitious, in the sense in which Hamlet or a mirage is fictitious.[5]

To construct a table logically is not to *deny* its reality. It is, on the contrary, to show that the table is analysable exclusively in terms of what is known to be real, as such, does not involve any hypothetical entity to which its ordinary analysis is always found to refer.

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There is a general sense in which "logical construction" is used as an equivalent of what is denoted by an incomplete symbol.[6] There is, of course, some justification (cf. PLA. 253' 262) for such interpretation, but as a whole "logical construction" is not to be used as an equivalent of "incomplete symbol" (because the one is what the other denotes). Such an interpretation, as Shaffer rightly mentions,[7] *blurs* the distinction between logical constructions and the putative denotations of descriptions. However, the most important case of "logical construction" is that it is a class of appearances which has been artificially constructed to have certain properties. In Russell's language, a construction is "nothing but a certain grouping of certain 'sensibilia'" (RSP. 161); it is nothing but the class of appearances which have been grouped as appearances of single object, say a table.[8] Such an use of "logical construction" is inspired by two principles, *viz.* the principle of abstraction (*OKEW.* 51), and Occam's razor (*OKEW.* 122; RSP. 148). The principle of abstraction is more accurately called the principle which dispenses with abstraction. Its aim is to clear away metaphysical entities, entities that can never be given in experience. Occam's razor, on the other hand, is a *theoretical economy*. The razor is embodied in the formula, *entities are not to be multiplied without necessity*. The reason is that the more you stick your neck out the more chance is of its being chopped off: "you run less risk of error the fewer entities you assume" (PLA 222). So the razor insists on the ideal of philosophizing with minimum assumptions, minimum ultimate existents and minimum vocabularies to avoid any possible risk of error.

3. *Elements of Construction*

According to Russell, if physics and common sense physical objects are to be verifiable, then the contents of the physical world as conceived by physics and common sense must be

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logical constructions out of the ultimate *empirical* entities. So before the construction begins Russell has to determine what are these ultimate empirical entities which are to be used as elements for constructions. In *PP* (which is *not* a constructionist work), Russell employs the Cartesian method of doubt to disclose the ultimate wholly empirical entities of common sense objects. It is interesting to notice that the *PP* itself opens with the question "IS THERE ANY KNOWLEDGE in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?". As Morris Weitz has rightly pointed out,[9] this quest for certainty is the distinctive inquiry of constructionism. So the elements out of which physical objects have to be constructed must be indubitably certain. Russell expresses this attitude in the following passage :

> Things we have got to take as premisses in any kind of work of analysis are the things which appear to *us* undeniable... to us here and now, as we are ... and I think on the whole that the sort of method adopted by Descartes is right : that you should set to work to doubt things and retain only what you cannot doubt because of its clearness and distinctness, ... (PLA. 181).

During his constructionist period, Russell uses the Cartesian principle as an adjunct of his "supreme maxim". In *PP*, the application of this principle reveals the ultimate wholly empirical entities. They are sense-data : the most undeniable entities of sense-perception (*PP*. 8). Russell accepts, completely, his *PP* views of sense-data and gives sense-data the most privileged status in his construction since they are "the hardest of hard data" he can discover in our experience (*OKEW*. 78) They are "all that we directly and primitively know of the external world" (RSP. 141). And what is more, sense-data are regarded to be indubitable on their own account and do not have to depend on

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anything else. He regards "their existence as the ultimate certainty on which all knowledge of what exists must be based".[10]

Russell thinks that *ideally* a "complete application of the method (of logical construction) which substitutes constructions for inferences would exhibit matter wholly in terms of sense-data, and even we may add, of the sense-data of a single person" (RSP. 150). But Russell finds himself unable to construct physical objects in terms of actual sense-data alone. Sense-data, being particulars and actually experienced, fail to fill those gaps where there is no observer So he "gave up the attempt to construct 'matter' out of experienced data alone, and contented (himself) with a picture of the world which fitted physics and perception harmoniously into a single whole" (*MPD.* 79). He introduces unsensed *sensibilia* to do this job. He gives "the name *sensibilia* to those objects which have the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data, without necessarily being data to any mind" (RSP. 142). Thus all sense-data are sensibilia *but not vice versa*. Unsensed sense-data or sensibilia are potential sense-data.

There is a *seeming* inconsistency (which, in fact, is not) in admitting sensibilia as being on the same level as sense-data. Since sense-data are actual data in sensations, they themselves must be mental. Hence nothing like them could exist at a place where there is no experiencing mind. But this view is *not true*. Russell holds that though "the fact of being a datum is mental" the sense-data are *not* mental.[11] They are *physical*. The "actual data in sensation, the immediate objects of sight or touch or hearing, are extra-mental, purely physical and among the ultimate constituents of matter" (UCM. 123). Their relation to a perceiving mind is that, as objects of sensation, they are causally dependent on some person's sense-organs, nerves, and brain.[12] When a sensible becomes a sense-datum, the mind is said to add nothing to it. "If my body could remain in exactly the same

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state in which it is, although my mind had ceased to exist, precisely that object which I now see . would exist, although of course I shall not see it, since my seeing is mental" (UCM. 125). Now sensibilia are said to be on the same level as sense–data by virtue of their physical status. They are physical on the ground that each sensibile, whether or not it is a datum to some one, would exist even if there were no mind to perceive it (RSP. 144).

There is another *seeming* inconsistency in introducing sensibilia. Russell's method of construction demands that both physics and common sense objects should be interpreted as logical constructions out of *actual empirical, noninferred* entities. The only relevant noninferred entities are actual sense–data. So how can Russell allow himself sensibilia which are inferred entities ? Does not this contradict the "supreme maxim" ? However, Russell's constructionist policy *does not abolish* all inferred entities, but only, as Stebbing points out, [13] risky and unnecessary inferred entities. I believe that this fact was paramount in Russell's mind when he prefixed the phrase "wherever possible" to his maxim of philosophizing. He surely does not intend to abolish any inference whatsoever. All his "somewhat elaborate constructions are designed to reduce inferred entities to a minimum".[14]

So the postulation of unsensed sensibilia in constructions does not contradict Russell's "supreme maxim" of scientific philosophizing, since the "wherever possible" clause *implies* that if it is not possible to replace inferred entities by constructions then we are *forced* to admit the inference to an entity. However, if we are forced to depend upon inferred entities, two guiding principles should be kept in mind :

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1. The inferences should always be made perfectly explicit and should be formulated in the most general manner possible.

2. The inferred entities should be similar to those the existence of which is given, rather than, like Kantian things-in themselves, those which are wholly remote from sense-data (RSP. 150).

Such principles justify the postulation of unobserved sensibilia, since we find them indispensable.[15]

In *OKEW*, where Russell's aim is the same as RSP, to construct physics and common sense physical objects; Russell maintains that only valid elements of constructions are the wholly empirical ones i.e., sense-data. As he says, "in so far as physics or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sene-data alone" (*OKEW*. 88–89). And again, "the only justification possible (of physics) must be one which exhibits matter as a logical construction from sense-data" (*ibid.* 106). So in *OKEW* Russell is nearest to the ideal of solipsism. This is another way of expressing that *OKEW* is Russell's most extreme exhibition of constructionism.[16]

In UCM Russell tends to drop the term "sense-data", altough he mentions it. The primitive empirical entities become "particulars" (UCM. 124) which conveniently includes the sense-data of myself. But as to their status, with relation to mind, he is indifferent. They are "extra mental, purely physical, and among the ultimate constituents of matter" (UCM. 123). It is not quite clear whether the statement that sense-data are among the ultimate constituents of physical world is equivalent to the inclusion of unsensed sensibilia as members of this class, or whether it simply means that sense-data (of which a subject is directly aware at a given moment) are the only constituents of physical

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objects. Ideally, physical objects should be shown to be logical constructions out of the actual sense-data of one person, and "establish physics upon solipsistic basis" (RSP. 250). But Russell has never pushed construction thus far. So he has to include unsened sense-data among the ultimate constituents of of physical objects.

I think that Russell *cannot* maintain, what he calls, " a comp lete application " of his method of logical construction, because some how or other he has to let in sensibilia (inferred entities) in his philosophy. Sensibilia function, I believe, not only as elements of constructions, but also as a principle of *integration* between Russell's empiricism (which he shares with classical British empiricists) and realism. To some extent he holds both these positions. His philosophy is a form of empiricism in the sense that it starts with the data of senses having been taken as " hard data " out of which physical objects are constructed.[17] His philosophy is also a form of realism viewed as an answer to the question of how the knowing mind is related to the thing known. Russell's realism suggests that the knowing object can exist *independently* of its being known. Now if Russell's empiricism is committed to finding the basis of knowledge in experience, then it would appear to be an obvious self contradiction to uphold realism. It is at this point that sensibilia become a means of reconciliation in that it is by their help alone that Russell can avoid the contradiction. Admitting that sense–data, appearing in sensing as an object, can also exist unperceived, Russell can *bridge* the gulf between his realism and empiricism.

4. Construction of Physical Object

Following the lead of Occam's razor, Russell identifies an object of common sense with the whole class of sensibilia, or as he also calls them, " appearances ". But he realizes that such

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an identification gives rise to the following obstacle : an object, say this table, may appear differently to different people but it is also true that these different appearances of the table cannot *co-exist* at the same place. He writes :

> A given table will present to one man a rectangular appearance, while to another it appears to have two acute angles and two obtuse angles; to one it appears brown, while to another, ... it appears white and shiny. [But] these different shapes and different colours cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same place, and cannot therefore both be constituents of the physical world (RSP. 146).

Russell, then, tries to overcome such an obstacle by distinguishing between *private* and *public* space. A private space is constituted by the spatial relations in which sensibilia stand to each other. It is a space in a given perspective.

The concept of " perspective " in logical construction is very important for Russell. Imagine that a group of people is sitting in a room. Russell contends that no " two of these people have exactly the same sense-data " (RSP. 147). Even when " we say that two people see the same thing, we always find that, owing to a difference of point of view, there are differences, however slight, between their immediate sensible objects " (*OKEW*. 95). What each person sees is slightly different from what every other person sees. We might, therefore, say that each person perceives physical objects from their own point of view. These various points of view are called by Russell " perspectives ".[15] We may define a perspective as all the sense-data present to a perceiver at one time. However, this cannot be a satisfactory definition since Russell wishes to define " perspective " without introducing the notion of a percipient. He allows for the possibility that there are perspectives of which no percipient is aware (RSP. 152).

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Each perspective has its own private space.[19] Each one is a three-dimensional world in which various data have spatial relations to one another. It constitutes a private space in the sense that no "place in the private world of one observer is identical with a place in the private world of another observer" (*ibid.* 147). This follows, according to Russell, from the fact that no two perspectives have any element in common, "for places can only be constituted by the things in or around them" (*OKEW.* 95).

In addition to private space, there is also, according to Russell, the space in which the perspectives themselves are located. This space is, what Russell calls, "perspective space". "Perspective space is the system of 'points of view' of private spaces (perspectives),... These private spaces will each count as one point, or at any rate as one element, in perspective space' (*ibid.* 97). Perspective space can be constructed out of perspectives and the relation of similarity which holds among them. As Russell says :

> By moving, and by testimony, we discover that two different perspectives, though they cannot both contain the same 'sensibilia', may nevertheless contain very similar ones; and the spatial order of a certain group of 'sensibilia' in a private space of one perspective is found to be identical with or very similar to, the spatial order of the correlaed 'sensibile' in the private space of another perspective. In this way one 'sensibile' in one perspective is correlated with one 'sensibile' in another. Such correlated 'sensibilia' will be called 'appearances of one thing' (RSP. 152–53).

From this concept of "perspective space" Russell develops a theory along the line of Leibniz's monadology. The result "is a world of six dimensions, since it it is a three-dimensional series of perspectives, each of which is itself three-dimensional"

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(ibid. 154). To show how this theory works, Russell gives an example with a penny in which it is assumed that the same penny appears in an infinite number of different perspectives where the penny being itself identified with the class of its actual and possible appearances. Let us see how a three-dimensional order can be given in perspective space.[20] Consider the appearances which a penny presents in various perspectives. In a majority of these perspectives the penny appears to be circular. These perspectives can be said to lie on a straight line. Then the perspectives in which the penny presents a straight edge appearance can be said to lie on a plane. In this case the line will be perpendicular to the plane. This way the third dimension is introduced into perspective space.

Now it is possible to show how a momentary common sense object can be given a difinite location in perspective space From our penny example, we see that the perspeetives in which the penny presents a circular appearance can be said to lie on a straight line in perspective space on which the appeaeance of the penny is elliptical. The intersection of these two lines can be taken as the location the of penny in perspective space (*OKEW.* 98–99; RSP. 153–54). Russell argues that the success of this method is due to the empirical fact that "any other 'thing' than our penny might have been chosen to define the relations of our perspectives in perspective space, and.. experience shows that the same spatial order of perspectives would have resulted" (*OKEW.* 98. see also RSP. 154).

In the above construction the six dimensional character of space is very important, since it allows Russell to give a coherent picture of the world from the view point of both physics and perception. As to the discovery of six dimensions he comments:

> There were several novelties in the theory as to our knowledge of the external world which burst upon me on New

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> Year's Day, 1914. The most important of these was the theory that space has six dimensions and not only three (MPD. 79).

We have seen that, according to Russell, sense-data are physical entitties. We have also seen they are private to each perceiver. Now with the discovery of the six dimensional character of space, the difficulty of regarding sense-data as part of physical objects is overcome, and the way is made clear for the construction of physical objects from sense-data. After discovering the six dimensional character of space Russell can allow to each sensibile two places : (1) the place which is the point of view of which the sensibile is a member i.e., the place *from* which the sensibile appears ; and (2) the place where the "thing" of which the sensibile is a member is located i.e., the place *at* which it appears. Prior to the discovery that sense-data could exist in two places, it seemed impossible that data which are essentially private could provide any dependable information about physical objects.

So far we have been concerned with Russell's construction of momentary physical objects. The construction has to be extended to permanent physical objects allowing them to change through time. But Russell wants to reject the view tnat there is some unchanging substratum (in the Lockean sense) underlying the series of changing appearances through which the object persists. He gives two reasons for such rejection :

(a) the notion of such an unchanging substratum is unverifiable; and

(b) such a supposition violates the principle of Occam's razor.

To illustrate his points for constructing permanent physical objects Russell gives the following example : Let us consider a

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wall-paper in the room. Over a period of time it will present a series of changing appearances. Its colour will gradually fade away. Now common sense takes the wall-paper as one thing, which in some sense remains the same throughout the passage of time and changes which it undergoes. " But ", Russell insists :

> what do we really *know* about it? We know that under suitable circumstances—i. e. when we are, as is said, " in the room " — we perceive certain colours in a certain pattern : not always precisely the same colours, but sufficiently similar to feel familiar. If we can state the laws according to which the colour varies, we can state all that is empirically verifiable; the assumption that there is a constant entity, the wall-paper, which " has " these various colours at various times. is a piece of gratuitous metaphysics (*OKEW.* 111-12).

Now Russell maintains that if what we believe is to be empirically verifiable, and at the same time if we are to follow the lead of Occam's razor, the only satisfactory procedure is to identify the permanent physical object with the series of its appearances :

> To say that a certain aspect is an aspect of a certain thing will merely mean that it is one of those which taken seriously, *are* the thing Everytning will then proceed as before : whatever was verifiable is unchanged, but our language is interpreted as to avoid an unnecessary metaphysical assumption of permanence (*ibid.* stef 112).

Therefore the permanent physical object is to be identified with some series of its appearances But there is an obvious difficulty in defining the permanent physical object as with any object) as the series of its appearances. It lies in the fact that it seems *prima facie* unlikely that it can escape the charge of circularity.[21]

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If Russell cannot remove the circularity from his construction of physical objects, then his whole programme of replacing inferred entities by logical constructions collapses. But how to do this ? This can be done if it is possible to specify, without mentioning the physical object, the set of appearances which would be called the appearances of the thing. Russell realizes that to have a satisfactory definition of a permanent physical object, we need a criterion for grouping the appopriate sense-data ... a criterion which will not involve the notion of "being appearances of the same thing" (*ibid.* 113).

To avoid circularity Russell initially uses two rough and approximate criteria *viz*, similarity of sense-data and continuity among the members of a series of sense-data (RSP 170–73; *OKEW.* 113–16). But he soon realizes that they do not provide him with much help by not mentioning the physical objects. Mere similarity or resemblance will not do, for "as the *Comedy of Errors* illustrates, we may be led astray if we judge by mere resemblance. This shows that something more is involved, for two different things may have any degree of likeness up to exact similarlty" (*OKEW.* 113). Russell further contends that even continuity is not a sufficient condition for identifying a permanent physical object, for there are instances for continuous change which are cases of the change of one thing into another. As he says :

> It is true that in many cases, such as rocks, mountains, tables, chairs, etc , where the appearances change slowly, continuity is sufficient, but in other cases, such as the parts of an approximately homogeneous fluid, it fails us utterly. We can travel by sensibly continuous gradations from any one drop of the sea at any one time to any other drop at any other time (RSP 163. cf *OKEW.* 113–14).

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So similarity of sense-data and continuity among the members of a series of sense-data are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for taking a group of sense-data to be " of " the one thing. In addition to these he needs " conformity with the laws of dynamics " (*ibid.*). Russell seems to suggest that if any given sense-datum is to belong to one thing and one thing only, then it must be the case that there cannot be alternative ways of grouping sense-data such that the resulting groups obey the laws of dynamics This is certainly *too strong* a requirement and Russell, of course, feels that it " would be very difficult to prove that this is the case ". However, he passes this point simply by *assuming* that " there is only one way " of grouping sense-data (*ibid.* 164). Therefore, physical objects are *" those series of appearances whose matter obeys the laws of physics "* (*ibid.*, emphasis Russell's. cf. *OKEW.* 11[5]–16).[22]

5. *Russell's Rejection of Phenomenalism*

As I have mentioned in the Introduction it is sometimes supposed that in 1914 Russell adopted a view of physical objects along phenomenalist lines To show how far this is true, let us first see what "phenomenalism" means. Phenomenalism, in its strict sense, is "the view that are only percepts" (*A. Matter.* 209), that is to say, there are only appearances or sense-data. It tries to reduce material objects solely to be a collection of actual sense-data. But in an extended sense it is the view that "material objects are nothing but collections of actual and possible sense-data".[23] On such view no physical object is different from the class of actual and possible sense-data, therefore, statements about the former can be translated (without any loss of meaning) into statements about the latter.[24] A phenomenalist wishes to maintain that physical objects are merely abstractions in the same sense as the average tax payers are abstractions. The average tax payer is not a particular persisting man who

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subsists in some curious way. We may call the average tax payer a logical construction of all tax payers, meaning that any statement about the average tax payer is a way of expressing certain facts about particular tax payers. Every statement which appears to be about the average tax payer can be translated (without loss of meaning) into statements about particular tax payers. To say that the average tax payer pays Tk. 1000 is to say that if the taxes of all tax payers were added up and then divided by the number of tax payers the quotient would be Tk. 1000.

During his constructionist period Russell in various places, talks as if he were maintaining a phenomenalist position. Here are some of the passages :

> The real man too, I believe, however the police may swear to his identity, is really a series of momentary men, each different one from the other, and bound together, not by a numerical identity, but by continuity and certain intrinsic causal laws. And what applies to men applies equally to tables and chairs, the sun, moon, and stars (UCM. 123).
>
> ... *in so far* as physics or common sense is verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data (*OKEW*, 88–89).
>
> ... the one thing seen at different times by the same or different people must be a construction, being in fact nothing but a certain grouping of certain ' sensibilia ' (RSP. 161),
>
> And again :
>
> ... the table which is neutral as between different observers (actual and possible) is the set of all those particulars which would naturally be called ' aspect ' of the table from different points of view ... these particulars ... jointly *are* the table that a similar definition applies to all physical objects (*AM*. 98–99).

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Physical objects are nothing but collections of sensibilia. They do not persist but only misleadingly present the " illusion of persistence " in much the same way that a moving picture presents the illusion of persistence : " the cinema is a better metaphysician than common sense, physics, or philosophy " (UCM. 123).

There is no denying the fact that all the above passages have some obvious phenomenalist flavour. But I believe that in these passages Russell is talking very *loosely*, he does not *mean* anything which is phenomenalism. For in " Physics and Perception "[25] Russell clearly denies that he ever really accepted phenomenalism. To quote from " Physics and Perception " :

> I have never called myself a phenomenalist, but I have no doubt sometimes expressed myself as though this were my view. In fact, however, I am not a phenomenalist.[26] For practical purposes: I accept the truth of physics, and depart from phenomenalism so far as may be necessary for upholding the truth of physics. I do not of course, hold that physics is certainly true, but only that it has a better chance of being true than philosophy has. Having accepted the truth of physics, I try to discover the minimum of assumptions required for its truth, and so come as near to phenomenalism as I can. But I do not in the least aceept the phenomenalist philosophy as necessarily right, nor do I think that its supporters always realize what a radical destruction of ordinary beliefs it involves.

The same type of denial appears in his " Reply to Criticisms ",[27] where he points out, " Mr. Boodin quotes a passage from me according to which it appears that at a certain time I thought only percepts are real. This was a technical hypothesis which I was

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trying to make logically adequate". I think that Russell's rejection of phenomenalism is rooted in his strong adherence to realist interpretation of physics. As he says, "an honest acceptance of physics demands recognition of unobserved occurrences".[28]

What Russell honestly tries to stress is that there may be something more than sense-data, actual and possible, but we have no *reason* to affirm it. His main point is *epistemological*, that the assertion of physical objects over and above collections of sense-data "introduces an element of unverifiable dogma" (*OKEW*. 153). This means that the denial of such objects also introduces the same dogma. Therefore, to accept phenomenalism is also to accept more then the evidence warrants us in accepting. As Russell says :

> Those things (objects of physics) are all of them, as I think a very little reflection shows, logical fictions in the sense that I was speaking of. At least, *when I say they are, I speak somewhat too dogmatically. It is possible that there may be all these things that the physicist talks about in actual reality, but it is impossible that we should ever have any reason whatsoever for supposing that there are*(PLA. 271–72, emphasis added).

Russell finds no reason either to accept or even to reject phenomenalism. Either position is metaphysical and should be avoided in order to reduce the risk that our knowledge is fallacious. He writes :

> I always wish to get on in philosophy with the smallest possible apparatus partly because it diminishes the risk of error, *because it is not necessary to deny the entities you do not assert*, and therefore you run less risk of error the fewer entities you assume (*ibid.* 221–22, emphasis added. see also RSP. 148).

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This passage also suggests that you run less risk of error if you refrain from denying that there are physical objects over and above the collection of sense-data.

It should be noted here that Russell *does not deny* that ordinary objects exist in the external world; what he denies is that we have any *good reason* for affirming their existence. So he simply avoids affirming their existence His avoidance is motivated, I believe, by Hume's views with which he has most in common and the result of an application of Occam's razor : wherever possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities Since our direct experience is never of anything beyond sense-data, or what Hume calls sense-impressions,[29] any belief in actual objects outside sense-data must rest upon inference which, Russell agrees with Hume, can never be satisfactorily *justified.* But since Hume was unwilling to abandon empiricism he embraced scepticim to be the only remaining rational option (although Hume rejects scepticism on psychological grounds). Recognizing the limitations of empiricism Russell, unlike Hume, rejects scepticism and finds his job one of reconstruction. So based upon the Humean sceptical arguments, Russell rejects the view of objects in the external world as inferred entities, all our talks of which may be wrong; rather he substitutes a method of treating them as constructed wholly of elements which in the final analysis, are reduced to sense-data.

It is true that Russell sometimes expresses that a physical object "is to be regarded as", "may be conceived as" (UCM 124), and "may in fact be identified with" (RSP. 147) a collection of actual and possible sense-data. This view, although methodologically very close to phenomenalism, is not obviously phenomenalistic. It is a hypothesis which might well be true, but there is no reason to believe that it is. This much is certain that physical objects are, *as if they are,* collections of sense-data. The

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justification of such an "as if" clause is that it is only *practical* to treat a physical object as nothing but a collection of actual and possible sense-data, since this is the simplest way of investigating its truth.*

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NOTES

Key to Abbreviations

PP —— *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), Oxford, 1982.

OKEW —— *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), London, 1969.

RSP —— "The Relation of Sense-data to Physics" (1914), in *Mysticism and Logic*, London, 1953.

SMP —— "On Scientific Method in Philosophy" (1914), in *Mysticism and Logic.*

UCM —— "The Ultimate Constituents of Matter" (1915) in *Mysticism and Logic.*

PLA —— "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (1918), *Logic and Knowledge*, London, 1956.

AM —— *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), London, 1971.

LA —— "Logical Atomism" (1924), *Logic and Knowledge.*

A. Matter — *The Analysis of Matter* (1927), New York, 1954.

MPD —— *My Philosophical Development* (1959), London. 1975.

* This is a slightly modified version of a paper written during the winter of 1985. I am very grateful to Dr. Nicholas Griffin (McMaster) and Dr. Douglas Odegard (Guelph) for their invaluable comments and suggestions on the earlier version.

1. In doing so Russell was much influenced by Whitehead. Whitehead made him aware of the "central problem..of the relation between the crude data of sense and the space, time, and matter of mathematical

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physics " (*OKEW*. 7–8). Whitehead also made Russell aware of "the whole conception of the world of physics as a *construction* rather than an inference" (*ibid.* 8). Russell is generous in acknowledging Whitehead's debt : "I myself cannot claim originality in the application of this method of physics, since I owe the suggestion and the stimulus for its application entirely to my friend and collaborator Dr. Whitehead" (RSP. 149–50).

2. *Bertrand Russell*, (New York 1972), ch. III, esp. pp. 72–82.

3. *Russell*, no. 16 (1974), pp. 13–20.

4. On this point see A. J. Ayer *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge* (London, 1961), pp. 231–32; John Wisdom. "Logical Constructions I" *Mind*, vol. 40 (1931), p. 195.

5. *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York, no date), p. 63. See also C. A' Fritz. *Bertrand Russell's Construction of External World* (London, 1952), p. 217; John Wisdom, "Logical Constructions I", pp. 194–95.

6. L. S. Stebbing has this notion in mind when she gives the following interpretation : if *X* is what is referred to and "*S*" is the symbolic expression used to refer to *X*, then we may say that *X* is a logical construction if "*S*" is an incomplete symbol. See her *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (New York, 1961), p. 157.

7. J. A. Shaffer, *A Study of Philosophical Analysis With Special Reference to Russell's Analysis of External World* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1952), p. 133 n.

8. This definition does not give "logical construction" full generality. But it could implicitly limit the method of logical construction to the case of physical objects— which Russell does not want. However, since I am concerned, in this paper, only with logical construction of physical objects, this definition, at least, serves my purpose.

9. In "Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy", in P. A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (La Salle, Illinois, 1971, 5th edn.), p. 106.

10. Bertrand Russell, "The Nature of Sense-data— A Reply to Dr. Dawes Hicks", *Mind*, vol. 22 (1913), p. 79.

11. B. Russell, "Letters to the Editors", *Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 12 (1915), pp. 391–92. See also his "The Nature of Sense-data— A Reply to Dr. Dawes Hicks", p. 78.

12. "Letters to the Editors", p. 392.

13. "Constructions", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 34 (1933–34), p. 18.

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14. "Reply to Criticisms" in P. A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*, p. 708.

15. W. T. Stace has argued that the postulation of unsensed sensibilia is on the same level as the postulation of physical objects. See his "Russell's Neutral Monism" in P. A. Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. pp. 351–384, esp. Sec. IV. Stace's view seems to be a complete mistake. The status of unperceived sense-data and physical objects are *not* same. If they were, then why should Russell hope to substitute inferences for logical constructions out of actual and *possible* sense-data. The difference between inferred sensibilia and inferred physical objects become clear from Russell's assertion that all sensibilia have the same physical and metaphysical status as sense-data (RSP. 142). While physical objects are *by nature* unobservable, unperceived sensibilia just happen to pass unobserved. And as we have seen, altough unperceived sensibilia are unobserved, their nature would not have to be changed if they were to be observed.

16. Morris Weitz, "Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy", p. 107

17. Russell's philosophy may well be called empiricism in some other senses also.

18. The number of perspectives may be infinite. We may suppose that there are infinitely many points of view from which one could look out upon the world (cf. *OKEW*. 95).

19. Each perspective has also its own private time, the time in which my data have temporal relations among themselves (cf. UCM. 134–35)

20. Distance in perspective space can be defined in terms of the similarity of perspectives. "In case that similarity is very great, we say the point of view of the two perspectives are near together in space" (*OKEW*. 96). Thus given any three perspectives X, Y and Z, X can be said to be nearer to Y than it is to Z if X is more similar to Y than it is to Z.

21. A. J. Ayer, *Bertrand Russell*, p. 80.

22. I think, now Russell is in another difficulty, *viz.*, the notion of laws of physics seems to presuppose the notion of being a material object in the very sense to be analyzed.

23. A. J. Ayer, *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge*, p. 231. Ayer admits that this is a misleading formula. He further suggests that it is more accurate to characterize phenomenalism as the view that material things are logical constructions out of sense-data.

24. For a somewhat similar view of phenomenalism see R. B. Braithwaite, "Propositions About Material Objects" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (henceforth *PAS*). vol, 38 (1937–38), pp. 275, 286; D. G. C.

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Macnabb, "Phenomenalism", *PAS*, vol. 41 (1940–41), p. 67; A. J. Ayer, "Phenomenalism", *PAS*, vol. 47 (1946–47), p. 169.

25. *Mind*, vol. 31 (1922), p. 480. This paper is a reply to C. A. Strong's "Mr. Russell's Theory of External World", *Mind*, vol. 31 (1922), pp. 307–20.

26. There is another, and perhaps more important, sense in which Russell is not a phenomenalist. For a strict phenomenalist sense-data are *private* and *mental*, but for Russell they are *public* and *physical*. According to the phenomenalist (linguistic) physical object statements can be translated into sense-data statements without any loss of meaning. Now if we follow a strict phenomenalist root, statements about physical objects must be translated into statements about private, mental sense-data. But in Russell's case they must be translated into public, physical sensibilia statements. However, a separate question is involved here, i. e., whether Russell himself understood "phenomenalism" in this way. On the basis of Russell's published and unpublished works (at the Russell Archives, McMaster), it appears to me that the answer is "no".

27. *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (ed. P. A. Schilpp, p. 718.

28. *Ibid.* 701.

29. Whereas Hume thought sense-impressions were mental entities, Russell maintains that sense-data are physical *not* mental.

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THE DILEMMA OF AVIDYA

Multiplicity exists in and through a conscious experience of it. Both epistemologically and metaphysically, the Advaitin explains this (seeming) duality by means of his 'key-concept' called *avidyā*. Epistemologically, the Advaitin expains the subject-object dichotomy and the problem of truth and error by the concept of *avidyā*. Metaphysically, the Advaitin explains how *Brahman*, which is One and non-dual, appears as many; how *Brahman* and the soul seemingly differ; how *Brahman* is distinguished as *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa;* and the seeming plurality of the universe, all by the concept of *avidyā*. Ethically, there is the problem of bondage and freedom. Everywhere one turns, this doctrine of *avidyā* rears its head. Proclaiming that in truth there is only one indivisible Reality, the Advaitin attempts to explain one's experience of diversity by this concept called *avidyā*.

So important is this concept, that it has been characterized as the corner-stone of Advaita. Critics of Advaita have gone to the extent of portraying Advaita as *māyāvāda* and the Advaitin as a *māyāvādin*. Doing this, the critics have mistaken the means for the end. Advaita is really *Brahmavāda* – which is the substratum for the seeming plurality. The means utilized by the Advaitin for explaining how the non-dual *Brahman* appears as multiplicity is the principle of *avidyā*.

Nonetheless, critics of Advaita have said that Advaita's concept of *avidyā* leans to a logical dilemma. If *avidyā* is a real entity, then the Advaitin's non-duality falls. Yet, to say that it is an imaginary entity is to destroy the very doctrine of *avidyā* itself. Illusion itself cannot be illusory.

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Rāmānuja is the most famous exponent of this criticism. He subjects the doctrine of *avidyā* to a seven-fold objection (*sapta-vidhā-anupapatti*) in his *Srī-Bhāṣya*. It is in his third objection, called *svarūpa-anupapatti,* that this dilemma most clearly surfaces. Rāmānuja asks : What is the very nature of *avidyā* ? What is its ontological or metaphysical status ? Is it real (*paramārtha*) or is it unreal(*aparamārtha*) ? He bases his attack on what is called the 'logic of the excluded middle'. He places the Advaitin between the horns of a dilemma. He offers him an either/or proposition. Either *avidyā* is real or unreal - the consequences of which, in either case, are particularly damaging to the Advaitin's position.

Rāmānuja contends that if the Advaitin says that *avidyā* is real, then it leads to dualism. Why ? The question may be posed : If *avidyā* is real, is it the same as, or different from, *Brahman* ? If it is real and different from *Brahman,* then there will exist two reals. Yet, if *avidyā* is real and identical to *Brahman,* then *Brahman* becomes responsible for the illusory world appearance. *Brahman* is eternal and thus, the world appearance will also be eternal. Liberation will be an impossibility. The real is eternal and thus not subject to sublation.

Rāmānuja continues the attack by saying that the Advaitin must therefore accept that *avidyā* is unreal. If this is the case it means that either : *Avidyā* is unreal as the cognizer (*draṣṭā*), as the cognized (*dṛśya*), or as the cognition (*dṛṣti*). Why ? According to the Advaitin, the entire empirical world is conditioned by, supported by *avidyā*. The *vyāvahārika* world is due to *avidyā* and experience is always thought of in terms of these three - the *triputī* of cognizer, cognized, and act of cognition.

Now, in regards to *avidyā* being unreal as *dṛṣti,* it cannot be. Why ? The Advaitin says that knowledge is one. He says that

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knowledge is the Self and has no distinctions in it. Thus, for *avidyā* to be *dṛṣti*, there would have to be two types of knowledge. But knowledge, according to the Advaitin, is of only one type and thus this possibility must be ruled out.

To push the advantage home further, Rāmānuja adds, suppose the Advaitin says that cognition is unreal—the Advaitin cannot accept this but for the sake of argument; suppose he does—the Advaitin's position is still untenable. There will then be no substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for *avidyā*. By the Advaitin's own definition, every error must have a substratum. As well, if the Advaitin says that *Brahman* is cognition (*dṛṣti*), and cognition is unreal, then *Brahman* is also unreal. This will put the Advaitin right into the camp of Sūnyavādin.

Further, if cognition is unreal, what is it that makes it unreal? There must exist another factor which makes it unreal. If the Advaitin says that that factor is *avidyā*, then he is committing the fallacy of circularity in reasoning. Thus, we find that the Advaitin is left with the unenviable choice of either contradiction or infinite regress.

The next aspect of the argument that Rāmānuja offers against the unreality of *avidyā* is called his *mūla-doṣa* argument. Taking the cognizer, the cognized, and the cognition together, *Rāmānuja* says: The Advaitin claims that the distinctions between the knower, the known, and knowledge arise due to *avidyā*. If all three arise due to *avidyā*, and all the three are unreal, then what is it that is responsible for this *avidyā*? The Advaitin claims that everything is unreal. How does this unreal *avidyā* arise? What is the cause? No matter what answer the Advaitin offers for the cause of *avidyā*, one can always ask for its cause. Thus, the Advaitin will be involved in an infinite regress. *Rāmānuja* does not let up the pressure. The Advaitin cannot say that *avidyā*

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does not have a cause, for, if the world has a cause, then *avidyā* must have one also. The Advaitin may argue that *avidyā* is beginningless (*anādi*), and hence there is no need to postulate another defect (*doṣa*) to account for its manifestation. No. If *avidyā* is *anādi*, it only means that it is not caused by anything and on that ground it cannot be said that it is not dependent upon a defect. *Avidyā*, being illusory, must depend on a defect for its appearance even though it is beginningless. If it can manifest itself without an object, it is real like *Brahman*. If it needs a defect to manifest, then it leads to infinite regress. If it is both real and unreal, then it leads to a logical contradiction.

The doctrine of *avidyā* seems to put the Advaitin between the horns of a dilemma. There are two ways that he can effect an escape. One of the ways, which I will take up later, is to set up a third alternative, heretofore unpresented by the critic. Besides being either real or unreal, the Advaitin can set up a new truth value, *anivacanīya*, which cannot be said to be either real or unreal. The other avenue open to the Advaitin is to escape between the horns of the dilemma–not by solving the dilemma, but by avoiding it altogether. To stray into the maize which is *avidyā*, and to grapple with it, is to become more and more enmeshed in it, sinking deeper and deeper into the mire which it is.

Advaitins do this escape in several ways. The Advaitin posits that *avidyā* is not an inherent characteristic of the Self. When an individual realizes that this is so, then the real nature of the Self will stand revealed and liberation will be the result.

To ask the status of *avidyā* is a futile and inconsequential question. Like the Buddha before him, Sankara knew that the problem was not 'who shot the arrow; what kind of wood it was made from; etc.,' nor, 'what is the status of *avidayā*,' but

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rather, the solving of the immediate problem at hand. Answers to metaphysical questions will not solve the real difficulty – that of liberation itself.

"Whose is this ignorance, it may be asked". The Advaitin replies, "Yours, since you ask". But according to the Advaitin, the critic replies, 'I am *Brahman*'. The Advaitin replies, "If that is so, then you must know that *avidyā* is no one's".

The Advaitin says that *avidyā* does not belong to the self. If it did, *avidyā* would be in the category of knowers instead of the category of things known. If one perceives *avidyā*, one cannot possess *avidyā*. The critic replies by saying that 'he is ignorant, he truly does not know'. Doesn't this demonstrate his ignorance through *avidyā*? Yes, his ignorance is perceived, but no, he does not possess ignorance. It is self-contradictory to say that a man both perceives a thing distinctly (ignorance) and that fact is in error. He is not in error concerning the fact of his perception.

By what *pramāṇa* will one connect *avidyā* and the Self? Perception obviously cannot do it. In regards to inference, how can one connect the two? At the time that you, the knower, know *avidyā*, the thing which is known, you certainly cannot also know the connection between yourself and it, for *avidyā* is related to the knower solely as being an object of one's knowledge. Nor can one imagine a knower of the connection between the knower and the *aviayā* nor a knowledge having such a connection for its content, for one should then have to admit an infinite series. If one's connection with the known is known by a knower, then another knower may be set up, and another of that knowledge, on *ad infinitum* But if *avidyā* is the known, or, anything else, then the known is simply the known. Similarly, the knower is simply the knower; he cannot become the known.

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Such being the case, the Self, which is the knower, is never affected by entities dependent upon *avidyā* or *avidyā* itself.

The horns of the dilemma have been avoided. *Avidyā* is not said to be real – it is not said to be unreal – and yet it has not affected the Advaitin. Whatever may be the status of *avidyā*, the central issue is the attainment of *mokṣa*. This the Advaitin keeps his eye upon, and thus the teaching.

The other option open to the Advaitin to avoid the horns of the dilemma was to bring out the implications of *anirvacanīya*. It is a third alternative to the dilemma about the status of *avidyā*. *Avidyā* is not of the nature of *Brahman*, nor is it something other than Brahman. It is not real nor is it unreal. It is neither *sat* nor *asat*.

Earlier it was shown how *avidyā* could not be real, for it would then destroy the Advaitin's thesis of non-dualism. Nor can *avidyā* be of the nature of *Brahman* for *Brahman* is self-luminous, (*svarūpa-jñāna*). Nor can it be other than *Brahman*, for there is no second to *Brahman*. Nor can it be real and unreal (*sat/asat*), for that would violate the law of contradiction. If *avidyā* exists, there will be a limitation upon *Brahman*, and, if it does not exist, the appearance of the world cannot be accounted for. It is said that *avidyā* is real enough to produce the world and yet, at the same time, it is not real enough to constitute a limit to *Brahman*. Therefore, the Advaitin calls it *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa* or *anirvacanīya* or *mithyā*.

This *anirvacanīya* is said to be different from both the real and the unreal. The criterion of the real, according to the Advaitin, is that which never suffers sublation. *Avidyā* is sublatable and thus cannot be real. The criterion of the unreal is that which is never experienced. However, *avidyā* is an object of one's experience, and thus not unreal.

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The critics of Advaita are quick to respond. They say, ' why do you call it other than the real or unreal ? Instead, why not say that it is both real and unreal '. Since *avidyā* is cognized, call it real. Since *avidyā* is sublatable, call it unreal. Instead of *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*, it would be more appropriate to call it *sadasat-svarūpa*.

This, however, the Advaitin objects to. He will find fault with the very criterion itself and thus demonstrate the untenability of such a position. The Advaitin asks, can you give an example to prove and support your criterion that what is cognized is real ? You claim that *avidyā* is *sat* (the *pratijñā*). Therefore it is cognized (the *hetu*). Whatever is cognized is *sat*, e.g., ??? (the *udāharaṇa*). This shows that your syllogism cannot give a single example that I would agree to, and, without being able to do such, your thesis fails. You cannot posit *Brahman*, for *Brahman* is not an object to be cognized. Nor can you cite an object to fulfil your own criterion. This is because no matter what object you select, I maintain that all objects are illusory—just because they are cognized.

As for the other aspect of your thesis, that *avidyā* is unreal, this too is untenable for the reasons you cite. What is unreal can never be sublated. The totally non-existent is never cognized and what is never cognized, never experienced, can never be sublated. Negation presupposes affirmation such that what is denied must first be experienced. So, it is wrong to hold that avidyā is *sadasat-svarūpa* and not *sadasad-vilakṣaṇa*.

The Advaitin's concept of *avidyā* does not involve a self-contradiction. The real and the unreal are not contradictories, but contraries. The facts of experience cannot be overlooked. The concept of *anirvacanīya* is an experienced fact and must therefore be accepted. The supposed incompatibility with the

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law of the excluded middle cannot be employed to conceal the facts of experience. Sublatability is the mark of the non-real but existence is not the criterion of the real. In other words, existence, when used in a discussion regarding the nature of the real and the un-real, is not the true logical contradictory of non-existence. Hence there is no contradiction in holding that *anirvacanīya* is not non-existent and yet it is not real. The relation between existence and non-existence is not on a par with the relation between the real and the unreal. One thinks that this concept violates the law of excluded middle because it is wrongly supposed that, since the unreal is what does not exist, real is that which has existence. However, it is a mistake to suppose that the definition or criterion of the real and the unreal are logical contradictories.

It is said that *anirvacanīya* involves a contradiction (*vyāghāta*-infringement on the law of the excluded middle). How is it possible for everything to be *anirvacanīya*, neither real nor unreal, and yet to think that this concept itself is somehow outside of 'everything'? How can one ask such a question about the indefinable ? By definition, this concept is neither real nor unreal. Where is the vantage point by which one may step outside the concept to ask whether it, itself, involves a contradiction ?

According to Advaita, the presentation of the false is a fact of experience. The word '*anirvacanīya*' merely expresses this fact in language. To call it a contradiction is, among other things, impossible to prove. Why is it a contradiction to say that a thing is unreal and yet produces an effect ? Why not say instead that it is a contradiction to say that a thing is real and produces an effect ? Contradiction can be determined only by an analysis of one's metaphysical standpoint. Thus, the difficulty is of criterion, not even to mention their application. Unreal rope-snakes produce palpitations, sweating, even death, while the

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real is generally taken to be that which undergoes no change in its nature.

Thus, we see that the dilemma of *avidyā* turns out to be on an equal footing with *avidyā* itself. The dilemma does not exist except in the minds of those who are mistaken and beguiled by the multiplicity of the universe. A clear understanding of the true status of *avidyā* reveals its real nature (as neither real nor unreal).

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CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC LAWS

1. Introduction

Inspite of all the anticausalist interpretations of the recent advances of theorltical science, the concept of causation still holds a significant position in the domain of science. Here causation means the connection among the objects, events, or processes that take place in natural world, and the term science will include all the empirical sciences such as natural and social sciences as well. Scientific knowledge is conceptual reconstruction of reality whose laws are the projections of laws of immanent patterns of being and becoming. This conceptual reconstruction is rendered by sciences by means of scientific laws. "It will be necessary to distinguish between laws (whether of nature, thought, or society), and law statements. The former will be defined as the immanent patterns of being and becoming, the latter as the conceptual reconstructions thereof." [1] A law statement is a general statement and if it is confirmed by means of observation and experience and also by an appropriate method of science, we call it a scientific law. Therefore the aim and function of all sciences is to discover and establish the scientific laws. " The fundamental concept for science is thus scientific law, and the fundamental aim of a science is the establishment of such laws." [2]

The principle of causality is one of the fundamental laws of empirical reality. In empirical world there is a perpetual flow of flux of event, processes etc. Everything in the world comes into being out of something and transforms into some other thing. Thus change pervades everywhere in the world. But this existing change and transformations in the world is not chaotic. There is an uniformity or orderliness in the world. The changes

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or transformations that take place will follow certain principles or regularities. This is so because objects, events and processes in the world are related to each other. Therefore determination is an essential aspect of empirical reality. Therefore our knowledge of empirical world will also contain the concept of this determination, for it constitutes an essential aspect of empirical reality. Causation is a variety of determination. Determination does not exhaust with causation, " Causation is only one among several categories of determination." [3]

The uniformity of relations among objects, events and processes in nature are asserted by laws. Natural laws or scientific laws are the conceptual reconstructions of existing uniformities of natural things. An element of determination will also characterise the laws of nature. There are various types of reletions among natural things. Causal relations are a variety of such relations. The causal relationships among the objects, events or processes of nature are objective and real ones. Natural objects which occur in a causal sequence are related to each other in a determinate manner. Therefore we call the causal relation as causal connection where the term 'connection' implies the necessary occurrence of an effect when the occurrence of its cause takes place. The uniformities or regularities of certain natural things which are linked as cause and effect are asserted by causal laws.

In this context the following problems may arise : How can we characterise a scientific law ? It is meant to say that what specifications we can offer to claim a statement, that reflects uniformities of natural world, as scientific. How the regularities or uniformities pertaining to causal sequences of natural world are dealt in scientific enterprise ? The characterisation of specific features of causal laws and also that how causal laws are related

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to other natural laws in the domain of science is another problem to be analysed.

2. Nature of Scientific Laws

The basis of scientific activity lies in observation and experience and it also includes experimentation in course of verification of the observed phenomena. In our day-to-day life we observe many things taking place around us. By the way of understanding such happenings, we state them in the form of statements. Thus our knowledge of experience is expressed in the form of statements. These statements are called empirical statements. Most of the statements made by us in our day-to-day life are empirical statements. Empirical statements are concerned with matters–of–fact. Some of them are conceptual reconstructions of particular things and others are of the general features of objects. This second type of empirical statements are called universal statements. These are generalisations about particular instances and so they are also called general empirical statements. These general empirical statements are made either about essential characteristic features of a class of objects or about a relation in between two or more objects, events or process, possessing definite properties which will enable them to stand in such relation with each other. "The one thing upon which everyone agrees is that it always includes a generalisation, i. e., a proposition asserting a universal connection between properties. It always includes a proposition stating that every event or thing of a certain sort either has a certain property or stands in certain relations to other events, or things, having certain properties."[4] But all general statements are not scientific laws. 'Copper always expands on heating' is a general statement which is considered as a scientific law. Generality is a characteristic feature of a scientific law. "Generalisation, therefore, is the origin of science.... All these laws are generalisations: they

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say that certain implication holds for all things of a special kind."[5] Some of the general statements which are to be considered as laws are lawlike and they are called lawlike statements. These lawlike statements are testable hypotheses. If tney are verified in experience and experimentation and confirmed by an appropriate method of science, then they will be regarded as scientific laws. "Whenever a law statement is a general and testable (not necessarily tested) hypothesis, and whenever it has been forwarded in accordance with the (fluid) standards of scientific method, we may call it a scientific law."[6]

A scientific law is simpler in the sense that it can be stated by means of possible smallest number of terms and conditions. The extent of applicability of a scientific law to the wide range of matters-of-fact under consideration is dependent on its degree of simplicity. It is meant to say that while constructing a scientific law a limited number of terms and conditions, that possess higher possible scope of generality, are taken into consideration. The other occurrences which are taking place simultaneously along with the instances that are under observation are disregarded, while formulating a law. For instance while stating the law that 'Water boils at 100°C temperature under sea level atmospheric-pressure', we disregard other conditions like the metallic character of the kettle used, source of temperature etc. It is constructed and verified by considering only a fewer terms such as the condition of water (whether it is pure or not), atmospheric pressure (whether it is equal to sea level atmospheric pressure or not), and the degree of temperature (whether it is reached to 100°C or not). This law is applicable to all instances of the kind unrestrictedly, if the conditions led to its construction are fulfilled. "Most laws of physics are, though they may seem very technical, are simple in the sense that the uniformities they assert hold good regardless of outside conditions : in other

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words in stating them you can disregard most of the things that go on in the universe."[7] Scientific laws are discriptive in nature. They do not prescribe anything about the occurrences in the natural world. The happenings in the world will follow them. They are not made, but they are discovered by observing the real things occurring in the world. "Laws of nature are descriptive : they describe the way nature works."[8]

Scientific laws have the forms such as 'All A is B', 'if A happens then B follows' etc. These are also stated in such forms as 'For any X, if A is X, then B is X.' General statements expressed in such forms consist of antecedent conditions and consequent conditions. Some univesal statements state merely a matter-of-fact concomitance. For example 'All cows are white,' is a general statement which cannot be considered as lawlike statement. It is asserting only a non-essenttial feature of a class of the animals and so the connection between antecedent ('All cows') and the consequent (whiteness of cow) conditions is not stronger. This is mere assertion of the contingent instance of observation or matter-of-fact concomitance. This type of statements are called accidental universals and the universality is accidental universality. Lawlike statements are not accidental universals. In the form of a lawlike statement there will be stronger link in between antecedent and consequent conditions. This connection possesses an elemennt of necessity. Since a lawlike statement is about the actual occurrence of essential traits of objects of nature, this necessary relation between the antecedent and consequent conditions is physical one. It means the conditions stated in the lawlike statement are related to each other in such way that one of the conditions asserted will physically necessitate others to occur. In, 'copper always expands on heating' the heating of any piece of copper will physically necessitate its expansion. This statement is universally valid for past,

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present and future instances of copper. "Universal conditionals understood in this way are frequently described as universals of law or nomological universals, and as expressing a 'nomic' universality." [9]

A law of nature is an universal empirical proposition which is applicable to all the members of a given class without exception. For example : 'All metals are electric conductors,' is a scientific law that is applicable to all the cases of instances of the kind of things i.e, metals, without any exception in all times. Therefore exceptionless generality is a necessary feature of a scientific law. Non-lawlike statements are not applicable to the instances of class of things which are not considered in evolving and formulating them, where as lawlike statements will have their applicability to those instances which are not accounted as evidences as the time of their formulation. Therefore it seems that unrestricted generality is a necessary character of a scientific law. "It is plausible to require lawlike statements to be unrestricted universals..... But though unrestricted universality is often as a necessary condition for a statement to be a law, it is not a sufficient one." [10] Sometimes unrestricted universal conditionals are empty of facts regarding their anticedent conditions. In such cases we cannot consider it as a law of nature. Suppose that there are no unicorns existent and say, 'all unicorns are fast runners'. In this statement antecedent condition, 'the existence of unicorns', is not supported by any evidence; in other words there is no object in the world in support of the antecendent condition in the statement. Therefore it cannot be regarded as a scientific law. Newton's first law of motion states that, 'A body under the action of no external forces maintains constant velocity.' But here we find no body or object in the world that is not acted upon by external forces. This law is an element of the system of laws that have substan-

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tial evidence in support of them. Therefore eventhough this law has no direct evidence the evidence is provided to it indirectly by virtue of its place in the system of laws, which have direct evidential support in favour of them. If the evidence that stood in support of an unrestricted universal statement exhausts its scope of prediction, then it cannot be considered as a law of nature. A law of nature is not only a mere description of things that are observed, or subjected to observation, but also predicts the other unobserved things of the class or kind, for it includes the essential traits of a class of things under consideration. " Accordingly, for an unrestricted universal to be called a law it is a plausible requirement that the evidence for it is not known to coincide with its scope of prediction and that, moreover, its scope is not known to be closed to any further argumentation."[11]

It is often claimed that unrestricted conditionals or lawlike statements in general and causal laws in particular state a logical necessity. But in fact these universals of law or causal laws are empirical in content and do not involve logical entailment as that of valid deductive argument, i. e., truth of conclusion entails the truth of it's premises '. Antecedent and consequent conditions in nomological universals or universals of law, are not in a logically necessary relation. Since these universals of law or causal laws are conceptual reconstructions of empirical world, no contradiction arises in conceiving contraries to them. It means formal denial of a lawlike statement or scientific law is not self-contradictory. For instance, no contradiction arises in conceiving that ' copper always does not expand on heating '. If there is any element of logical necessity involved in lawlike statements it will be demonstrably self-contradictory to conceive their contraries.

Laws of nature will provide a base to contrary-to-fact conditionals or subjunctive conditionals. A subjuntive conditional is

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an assumption of the possible consequence of course of events in the absence of the actual occurrences of events under consideration. A subjunctive conditional may be formulated as 'if' 'a' were 'p', then 'b' would be 'Q', or If 'a' had been 'P', then 'b' would have been 'Q'. The statement that ' if the photo–string were broken, the photo would be fallen to ground ' is a contrary–to–fact conditional In this case in fact the photo string is not broken at all. It is stating the possible condition or state of the photo in the absence of the photo–string that is tieing it to the wall. Logical structure of lawlike statements can be known by means of contrary–to–fact conditionals. They will help in " analysing grounds, upon which their truth or falsity may be decided." [12] Justification of contrary–to–fact conditional or subjunctive conditional by means of natural law itself implies that laws of nature do not involve any logical necessity. " In the first place, none of the statements generally labelled as laws in the various positive sciences are in point of fact logically necessary, since their formal denials are demonstrably not self–contradictory." [13]

Laws of nature or scientific laws are not certain in the logical sense. There is ao logical certainity in scientific laws, for logical certainity characterises analytic statements such as ' a triangle is a three sided figure '. Scientific laws are contingent truths. It does not mean that scientific laws have nothing to do with logic. In fact in sciences some laws are deduced from higher level laws by theorltical means. We should not consider that establishment of scientific laws is a matter of purely empirical affair. Logic is used as sharpening the tools which unearth the structure of empirical reality, and reconstruct it in our conceptual framework in the form of scientific laws. Scientific laws are empirical in content in the sense that, " the objective validity of such theorl-

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tical results cannot be ascertained by purely logical means: only experiement can help to decide (though never irrevocably) about their condition as natural laws." [14]

3. Causal Connections in the Domain of Science

" Everything stet is a perpetual state of transformation, motion, and change." [15] Causation accounts for this existing change or transformation and motion in empirical world. The happenings, events, processes that are taking place in natural world are not chaotic. If the occurrences of nature are mere chance factors we will have no knowledge of them. There is an uniformity or orderliness in the world. Everything in the world exists in certain definite relationships with other things There are number of complicated aspects regarding the transformations and changes of objects in the world. But everything is conditioned by its environment in a wide range of relationships with other objects around it. " .. ..processes taking place under a wide range of conditions, we discover that inside of all of the complexity of change and transformation, there are relationships that remain effectively constant." [16] Science will discover the laws of nature by the way of conceptualisation of the existing regularity in the world. Scientific laws are evolved in the process of discovering the existing orderliness in the world. Causality will account for the uniformity of change or transformation of the phenomena of nature. So natural laws are in one way or other related to the concept of causality. " It is the object of science to discover order in the world. This is done by finding and formulating laws of Nature So there must be a relationship between causality and the laws of nature." [17]

It is clear from the above discussion that every-existent thing in the world is conditioned. It is meant to say that a thing will occur under certain conditions only. Conditionalness is an essen-

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tial aspect of the existence of objects in the world. If conditions leading to the occurrence of an event follow definite patterns, then they are in conformity to law. It means that whenever the conditionalness is regular, it can be termed as lawfulness. Every process, event or occurrence will take place in accordance with certain objective laws. So phenomena of nature are determined in accordance with some objective laws. This principle of universal lawfulness is an essential component of determinism. Lawfulness does not exhaust the determination. Laws are only the " forms or patterns of determination—and this is one of the reasons why determinacy is not synonymous with lawfulness. " [18] " Inshort, since the chief aim of science is the search for explanation, and application of Laws, if we wish to build an ontological theory of determination having a scientific ground, we have to qualify bare conditionalness as the peculiar mark of determinism, we have to admit that not mere conditionalness. but regular conditionalness. that is, lawfulness, is an essential component of general determinism. " [19]

Every object, event, or process in nature will come out of some object, event or process. Nothing will comes out of nothing. Everything in the world will have its origin in something and transforms into something else. " There are neither obsolute beginnings nor obsolute terminations, but everything is rooted to something else and leaves in turn a track in something. " [20] This is called as principle of productivity or genetic principle. This productivity principle or genetic principle puts restrictions on principle of lawfulness. In natural world there are certain instances of objects occurring in an unlawful way. Therefore genetic principle is independent of the principle of lawfulness. Both the principle of lawfulness and the genetic principle constitute essential aspects of determinism So determination principle can be stated as " Everything is determined in accordance with

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law by something else, this something else being the external as well as the internal conditions of the object in question."[21] This principle of determination will be confirmed by future investigations in Science. It is so because this principle is evolved out of, and substantiated by, scientific research. Hence the principle of determinism as it is stated here is an assumption of science.

This principle of determinacy is a general statement of determinism, this will include all types of determinism including causal determinism. Causal determinism is a special case of this general determinism. Statistical, teleological, and dialectical determinacies are some other cases of determinacy principle. "Causation (efficient and extrinsic) is only one among several categories of determination."[22]

On-going discourse reveals that all scientific laws will be in confirmation with the determinacy principle. This principle will not put any a priori restrictions on the formulations assumed by scientific laws of change. It is also regarded as a general determinism that encompasses all sorts of determination of natural things. By now it is clear that scientific law are conceptual reconstructions of the regular conditional occurrences of things in the world. Each law consists of antecendents and consequents. Since causation is also a case of determinism, causal statements accounting for the change or transformation will also possess the general features of regular conditionalness or lawfulness, and genetic character as those of other scientific laws. Therefore the determinacy principle or statement of general determinism, which is in confirmation with other scientific laws, will provide a ground to evolve an appropriate formulation of causation in the domain of science. Like other lawlike statements the causal statements will also assert a sort of relation in between antecedent and consequent conditions of the natural

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processes taking place in empirical world. The antecedent condition is ' cause ', and the consequent one is ' effect '. The relationship between the cause and the effect in a causal nexus is determinate one which will physically necessitate the occurrence of effect, whenever its cause comes into being. Therefore causal relationship is termed as causal connection. Uniformities of these causal sequences are asserted by causal laws. " In the first place, the relation is an invariable or uniform one, in the sense that whenever the alleged cause occurs so does the alleged effect. " [23]

If we analyse the uniform, dependent occurrences of events, processes or transformations taking place in empirical world, certain criteria of causation, to claim a law as a causal law, can be evolved. ' Whenever an electric spark is passed through a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen gases it explodes ', is an instance of causal law. In this case ' passing of electric spark into the mixture of oxygen and hydrogen ', is antecedent condition and ' explosion of the mixture ', is consequent condition. This can be formulated as whenever the antecedent happens, the consequent follows it. It is meant to say that whenever the cause occurs the effect follows. One possible formulation of this statement, as it is done by empiricists, is as follow :

' If ' C ', then ' E ' always '———I

This is regarded as an ideal formulation of the causal laws in the context of science. " In fact, by a causal law the scientist understands a relation of the form ' if–then ', with the addition that the same relation holds at all times. " [24] They considered it as the ultimate formulation of the causal relations that exhausts all meaning of causation. " ... ... if–then–always, is all that is meant by a cusal relation. " [25] In the formulation ' I ', ' C ' stands for certain conditions which will lead to the occurrence of the effect ' E '. Whenever the set of conditions repre

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sented by 'C' are fulfilled, 'E' will follow it. This concept of conditionalness contained by this causal formulation is also a requirement for any kind of scientific law. The formulation also implies that the conditions for which the 'C' stands, are existentially prior to the consequent condition 'E' in the succession of the conditions. This is termed as existential succession or Asmmetry. The term 'always' in the formulation implies that the relation between 'C' and 'E' is invariable relation. The causal connection obtains invariably and so the connection between cause and effect is necessary one. This causal necessity is not logical necessity, for causal statements are empirical statements, and the causal connection is a synthetic connective. Here necessity means exceptionlessness or regularity, that implies the causal bond, is valid without exception to all cases covered by a specific causal law or statement. "The" "understanding" of a causal relation is not a process of logical reasoning; what is called causal necessity is absolutely different from logical necessity (which is nothing but identity)." [26] Therefore the formulation 'I' contains of conditionalness, existential precedence of cause to its effect and necessity or constancy. "...the statement If 'C', then 'E' always is shown, upon analysis, to contain three notions that are usually associated with causality : the conditionalness peculiar to lawfulness, the existential priority of the cause over the effect, and lack of exception." [27]

Can this formulation exhaust the meaning of causal determinism ? The answer to this question is 'No'. Since causal determinism is a case of general determinism which has productivity as an essential component of it, and the formulation, 'If' 'C', then 'E' always', does not possess any concept of productivity principle, and gives way to the possibility of multiple causation, this formulation is inadequate to stand as a criterion to causal determinism. For every cause there will be only one

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effect. Cause and effect are in 1 : 1 correspondence. They are connected to each other unambiguously. This character of causal bond is termed as 'uniqueness' or 'lack of ambiguity'. This trait of uniqueness is not common to all scientific laws. For instance statistical laws do not contain the conception of uniqueness. To include this trait into its fold the formulation 'I' has to be stated as follow :

'If 'C', then (and only then) 'E' always'——II

This formulation which contains the conception of 'uniqueness' indicates that the necessary and sufficient conditions constitute the antecedents in the causal connection. Still this formulation is inadequate one, for it fails to account for the important character of causation, the principle of productivity. Causation is a category that accounts for change or transformation of entities in the world. Change in the world takes place by the way of production of certain entities from certain other entities. Consequent conditions in a causal statement are produced by their antecedents. The relation between cause and effect is determinate and essentially asymmetric because cause has the efficacy by means of which it produces its effect that results in the form of change. In other words, change produced in certain entity is caused by certain other antecedent entities which are existentially prior to the former one. "The most general idea of cause, then, is that which produces, and thus accounts for, some change."[28] Causal production is not the only case of production; just like causal determinism is a particular case of general determinism, causal production is a particular instance of production. "Causation is a particular case of production, the latter need not be restricted to causal production or to any other special form of generation."[29] To include the conception of productivity into the fold of the concept of causation the formulation 'II' can be stated as follows :

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'If 'C' happens, then (and only then) 'E' is always produced by it'———III

This formulation contains the essential components of causation category such as : " Conditionalness, uniqueness; one-sided dependence of the effect upon the cause; invariability of the connection, and productivity or genetic nature of the link." [30]

We can conclude from the foregoing discourse that both scientific laws and causation are confirming the principle of determinacy whose essential components are principle of lawfulness and principle of productivity. There are various varieties of scientific laws like statistical laws, taxonomical laws and developmental laws etc. All these varieties of scientific laws will confirm the principle of determinism. But causal determinism is a special case of general determinism which accounts for the transformations or changes taking place. Causal determinism provides the ground for stating the criterion of causation. Hence the criterion evolves here in the formulation——'III' is based on causal determinism in particular and principle of determinism in general. Therefore this criterion of causation category is related to laws of science in certain-respects. The determinate relation among the objects, events, and processess undergoing transformation in regular sequences in the world are stated in the form of causal statements. Causal connections among the things are asserted by causal laws. These causal laws will satisfy the basic requirements of a scientific law such as regular conditionalness or lawfulness and contains the concept of genetic principle or principle of productivity. Apart from this, these causal laws will satisfy the other requirements which are peculiar to the causation category such as uniqueness or unambiguity, existential priority of cause over its effect, constancy etc. Therefore causal laws are a special kind of scientific laws. Causal ws and scientific laws are not exclusive to each other. Some

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scientific laws are causal laws and some other scientific laws are non-causal. This is clear from the following assertions : "...not all laws of nature are causal".[31] "...causal laws are only a species of the genus scientific law".[32] Statistical laws are exclusively non–causal. Certain laws of thermodynamics are ambiguous. It is difficult to differentiate them into causal and non-causal laws. There are some laws like, 'Aquaregia dissolves gold', and certain other mechanical laws, are causal laws. We conclude that science is not dispensed with causation. Certain aspects of empirical reality covered by science are rendered by means of causal laws. Therefore the concept of causation is inseperable from, and thus very significant one, in the domain of seience. "Scientific research, the chief aim of which is certainly the discovery of laws, does not dispense entirely with the cause concept, and the science contains both causal and non–causal laws, as well as laws having a causal range." [33]

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RUSSELL'S THEORY OF INCOMPLETE SYMBOLS *

I

Introduction

This paper is concerned with Russell's theory of incomplete symbols whose conclusion is that such symbols have no meaning in themselves, but obtain a meaning in a context with other symbols (OD. 42–43; *PM*. 66; *IMP*. 173–74; PLA. 253). In Russell's work there are three distinct kinds of incomplete symbols. They are (1) descriptions (both definite and indefinite) (2) mathematical symbols (such as, expressions for putatively referring to classes, numbers, relations, etc.), and (3) symbols of physics (such as expressions for points, instances, particles of matter, and even ordinary objects like chairs, tables, houses, trees and the rest, are also reduced from actual entities to incomplete symbols). Since it is not possible to deal with all of them in a short paper, I shall focus on the first kind, that of descriptions.

According to Russell, a descriptive phrase, such as "the author of *Waverley*" means "nothing in isolation" (*PM*. 67), and therefore, is an incomplete symbol. In *MPD*, Russell defends such conclusion by using a proof. The proof is as follows :

> The central point of the theory of descriptions was that a phrase may contribute to the meaning of a sentence without having any meaning at all in isolation. Of this, in the case of descriptions, there is precise proof : If, 'the author of *Waverley*' meant anything other than 'Scott', 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' would be false, which it is not. If 'the author of *Waverley*' meant 'Scott', 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' would be a tautology, which it is not. Therefore,

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> 'the author of *Waverley*' means neither 'Scott' nor any thing else ... i.e. 'the author of *Waverley*' means nothing. Q.E D. (*MPD*. 64–65).

The proof has been the subject of a considerable amount of philosophical controversy. Many commentators[1] think that the argument in the proof is fallacious, because it equivocates on two different senses of the word " means ". The proof has also its defenders.[2] R. K. Perkins suggests that the word " means " in the proof unequivocally means " names ", so Russell's conclusion should be interpreted as saying " 'the author of *Waverley*' names nothing ", and when it is so understood, the argument does, in fact, work.[3] I agree with Perkins that Russell uses the word " means " in a technical sense of " names " and that this argument is *not* fallacious. I believe that the main thrust of Russell's proof is directed to show that though description seem to function like names, in fact, *they do not*, a thrust which is best served when his argument is understood the way Parkins suggests.

II

What is an Incomplete Symbol

Russell defines an incomplete symbol as one " which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain contexts " (*PM*. 66. See also OD. 42–43; *IMP*. 170; PLA. 253). A few pages later he explains that " their *uses* are defined, but they themselves are not assumed to mean anything at all " (*ibid*. 71).[4] Russell continues, " [t]hat is to say, the uses of such symbols are so defined that, when the *definiens* is substituted for the definiendum, there no longer remains any symbol which could be supposed to represent [what the definiendum seems to represent] " (*ibid*. 71–72). Let us consider the sentence : " the round square does not exist ". According to the superficial grammar " the round square " occurs as a significant

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grammatical unit out of which the sentence is constructed, the subject of a subject–predicate sentence. But according to the logical grammar such sentences are never of subject–predicate form and there is no grammatically well formed part corresponding to " the round square " in superficial grammar. Accordingly, the sentence " the round square does not exist " is analyzed as " it is false that there is an object x which is both round and square " (*ibid.* 66). In this analyzed version there is no single expression that grammatically or semantically corresponds to " the round square ". Now we can say, roughly, that a symbol s is an incomplete symbol in a sentence p iff s has, at least, the following characteristics :

1. s occurs in p as a distinct grammatical element which is classified (in the narrow sense) as an apparent grammatical subject or object; and
2. the result of a proper analysis of p yields another sentence q which contains no grammatically significant element (phrase) corresponding to s (and even, the resulting sentence q may not be of subject–predicate form).

Russell's earliest treatment of incomplete symbols is contained in his famous paper OD where the expression "incomplete symbol" is not used. In this paper he considers description as a species of denoting phrase. A denoting phrase is a general term preceded by one of the six words i.e, "a", "any", "all", "some", "every" and "the". Russell calls them denoting phrases both in OD and in *P. Math.* But in *P. Math* (55–56), he maintains that "a phrase containing one of the above six words always denotes." According to this view, the phrase "a man" means a concept *a man* which denotes a certain combination of all men. But in OD Russell has no space for denoting concepts. Rather he uses quantification to take care of all denoting phrases. The main thesis of Russell's theory of denoting phrases is that such

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phrases "never have any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has meaning" (OD. 43). Thus a proposition whose verbal expression features the denoting phrase "a man" (which Russell also calls an indefinite or ambiguous description), and whose general form is "C(a man)", means "'C(x) and x is human' is not always false", in which we do not find "a man" occurring. "This leaves", Russell says, "'a man', by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal expression 'a man' occurs" (*ibid.*).

Definite descriptions have the grammatical form of "the-so-and-so", which Russell symbolizes as "$(\imath x)\,(\varphi x)$" (*PM*. 30); "$(\imath x)$" is the iota operator and "(φx)" represents a propositional function. "The" is always used with the implication of uniqueness, i.e., that there is one and only one individual which satisfies the function represented by "(φx)". The uniqueness condition can be expressed as :

(a) $(\exists x)(y)\,[\varphi y \equiv (y = x)]$

(a) reads "there exists an x such that for any y, φy is true when y is identical with x, but not otherwise. (a) is also the definiendum of

(b) $\mathrm{E}!\,(\imath x)\,(\varphi x)$

(b) reads "the x satisfying φx exists" (*ibid.*).

III

Names and Descriptions

According to Russell descriptions are not names. Before we show why descriptions are not names, let us first see what Russell means by a name. Russell has distinguished between two types of names ; " grammatically proper names " (or " mere names ") and " logically proper names ". He characterizes a grammatically

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proper name as follows : " 'Scott' is merely a noise or shape conventionally used to designate a certain person; it gives us no information about that person and has nothing that can be called meaning as opposed to denotation " (KAKD. 212). A logically proper name is said to have " a meaning by itself, without the need of any context " and it directly represents an object (*P.M.* 66). For the initial exposition, Russell treats "Scott" as a logically proper name.[5] Any sentence in which "Scott" occurs indicates a proposition which contains the actual entity *Scott* as a constituent (*ibid.*). Furthermore, the object named by a logically proper name is always the *logical subject* of the proposition (OD. 51) even when the name is not the grammatical subject of the sentence in which it occurs. In *IMP* (p. 174), Russell also characterizes a logically proper name as " a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its meaning (denotation), and having this meaning in its own right, independently of the meaning of all other words ". A logically proper name, therefore, must have the following features ;

a. It is a simple symbol.

b. It directly designates an individual.

c. Since a name is directly referential, it has no meaning other than its referent.

d. It has a meaning independently of the meaning of other words.

To show why descriptions are not names let us take the example of a definite description, e.g., " the author of *Waverley*". It is not a name for the following reasons :

1. One of Russell 's arguments that " the author of *Waverley*" is not a name is as follows : " A man's name is what he is called, but however much Scott had been called the author of

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Waverley, that would not have made him be the author; it was necessary for him actually to write *Waverley*, which was a fact having nothing to do with names" (KAKD. 212).

2. A name must be a simple symbol, that is "a symbol which does not have any parts that are symbols" (PLA. 244 cf. *IMP.* 173). "The author of *Waverley*" is not a name because it is a complex symbol which "contains parts that are symbols" (*ibid.*). It contains four words as its parts, and when the meaning of these symbols is determined, the meaning of the whole phrase is given (*ibid.* 244–45). And since "the author of *Waverley*" is composed of other symbols, its meaning is a function of these symbols.

3. An identity sentence both of whose terms are names is *trivial* if true, such as "Scott = Scott" or even "Scott = Sir Walter" (when we are using "Sir Walter" as a name not as a description of "Scott"). But an identity sentence one of whose terms is a description can be non–trivial and true, such as "Scott = the author of *Waverley*" (OD. 55; *PM.* 67; KAKD. 210; PLA. 245–46; *IMP.* 174–75). So no description means the same as any name.

4. In *PM*, Russell gives an argument which is an extension of argument (3), wherein the point of view, which this argument is intended to refute is characterized as follows: "It might be suggested that 'Scott is the author of *Waverley*' asserts that 'Scott' and 'the author of *Waverley*' are two names for the same object" (*PM.* 67). He further continues that "what would be required for its [Scott is identical with the author of *Waverley*] truth would be that Scott should have been *called* the author of *Waverley*" (*ibid.*). But "if he had been so called, the proposition would be true, even if some one else had written

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Waverley; while if no one called him so, the proposition would be false, even if he had written *Waverley*" (*ibid.*).

5. There is *no empty name,* but there may be empty descriptions. "[I]f '*a*' is a name it *must* name something : what does not name anything is not a name, and therefore, if intended to be a name, is a symbol devoid of meaning" (*IMP,* 179). The semantic function of a name requires that it has to have a *bearer,* "a name has got to name something, or it is not a name" (PLA. 243). But the semantic function of a description leaves open whether or not it has a bearer, i.e., a denotation. One can understand a description without knowing what its denotation is, or even whether it has one. But one cannot understand a name without knowing what its denotation is. A sentence containing no denotation such as "the present king of France is bald", can be used meaningfully to say something false.[6]

6. We can make a further distinction between names and descriptions. Russell holds that "*a* exists" (where "*a*" is a logically proper name) is meaningless (*IMP.* 178), but not so with descriptions. He seems to suggest that since "*a*" is a logically proper name, "*a*" directly represents or denotes the entity *a* which is the meaning of "*a*". Thus if *a* did not exist, "*a*" is either meaningless or not a proper name.[7] Consequently, Russell considers "*a* exists" as neither true nor false, but meaningless.

7. Russell also gives another closely related reason for why descriptions are not names and are incomplete symbols. This is because what they are supposed to refer to are not really "constituents of propositions" (PLA. 248). That is to say, there is no actual entity which we may call denotation. A description or the denotation of a description is *not* considered as a constituent of the sentence in which it occurs. This is a consequence of the fact

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that we may utter true and significant propositions which deny the existence of any entity, e.g., "the round square does not exist". This proposition could not be true and significant, which it is, if "the round square" had to be an actual constituent of the proposition; since, if there were no round square, it would not certainly be a constituent of any proposition.

IV

Russell's Proof

Russell maintains that incomplete symbols are "things that have absolutely no meaning whatsoever in isolation but merely acquire a meaning in a context" (PLA. 253). The notion of having no meaning in isolation is fundamental in Russell's theory of incomplete symbols and is clearly intended to be applicable to both definite and indefinite descriptions. But what does Russell mean by "having no meaning in isolation"? In discussing "the author of *Waverley*" as an incomplete symbol, Russell points out that if we understand the meaning of its constituent symbols we then understand the meaning of the entire phrase (*ibid* 244) So as a complex symbol, there is a sense in which "the author of *Waverley*" does have a meaning. Russell also shows that a logically proper name, such as "Scott" has a meaning *by itself*, in the sense that its meaning is an individual entity which is a *constituent* of a proposition to which it belongs. Now since Russell maintains that a description does not stand for a constituent of a proposition, it seems that the fundamental sense of "having no meaning in isolation" is this. "The author of *Waverley*" is, then, an incomplete symbol because its meaning is not an individual entity which it names.

In the Q. E. D. passage (cited on p. 1) Russell proves that definite descriptions are *not* names and that they have no meaning at all in isolation. Russell's proof has two premises :

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1. If "the author of *Waverley*" meant anything other than "Scott". "Scott is the author of *Waverley*" would be false, which it is not.

2. If "the author of *Waverley*" meant "Scott", "Scott is the author of *Waverley*" would be a tautology, which it is not.

Therefore, "the author of *Waverley*" means neither "Scott" nor anything else i.e., "the author of *Waverley*" means nothing, Q. E. D. However, those critics who contend that the proof equivocates on two different senses of the word "means", and is fallacious, argue as follows :

a. If the word "meant" is being used in the sense of "referred to" in both (1) and (2), then, (1) would be true whereas (2) would be false.

b. But if "meant" is being used in the sense of "sense" in both (1) and (2), then (2) would be true whereas (1) would be false.

c. Now if (1) and (2) are both true, then "meant" must be used in two different senses : (1) would be using "meant" in the sense of "referred to" and (2) would be using "meant" in the sense of "sense".

Therefore, Russell's argument in the proof is an instance of the fallacy of equivocation due to the confusion of sense and reference.

If we interpret "meant" in (1) as "referred to" in its ordinary sense, then Russell's argument does, in fact, break down in (2). But if we interetpret "meant" to mean "named", then it seems that the argument can avoid that confusion. Accordingly, (1) and (2) should be interpreted as follows :

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1a. If " the author of *Waverley* " named an individual other than the individual which " Scott " names, " Scott is the author of *Waverley* " would be false, which it is not.

2a. If " the author of *Waverley* " named the same individual which " Scott " names, " Scott is the author of *Waverley*" would be a tautology, which it is not.

Therefore, " the author of *Waverley* " neither names the individual which " Scott " names, nor anything else ... i.e., " the author of *Waverley* " names nothing, Q. E. D.[8]

The same type of argument can be found in *PM*. As Perkins states, " the argument as it occurs in *My Philosophical Development* is a paraphrase of essentially the same argument which originally occurred in *Principia Mathematica* nearly fifty years earlier ".[9] The *PM* argument runs as follows :

> (A) 11 phrases ... containing the word " the " (in the singular) are incomplete symbols : they have a meaning in use, but not in isolation. For " the author of *Waverley* " cannot mean the same as " Scott ", or " Scott is the author of *Waverley* " would mean the same as " Scott is Scott ", which it plainly does not; nor can " the author of *Waverley*" mean anything other than "Scott", or " Scott is the author of *Waverley*" would be false. Hence " the author of *Waverley* " means nothing (*PM*. 67).

The same argument, I believe, occurs in *IMP* where Russell formulates the proof as follows :

> A proposition containing a description is not identical with what the proposition becomes when a name is substituted, even if the name names the same object as the description describes. " Scott is the author of *Waverley* " is obviously a different proposition from " Scott is Scott " : the first is

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> a fact in literary history, the second is a trivial truism. And if we put anyone other than Scott in the place of "the author of *Waverley*," our proposition would become false, and would therefore certainly no longer be the same proposition (*IMP.* 174).

In all versions of the argument Russell wishes to establish that descriptions differ from proper names and that they have no meaning in isolation. So the conclusion of the Q. E. D. argument, "'the author of *Waverley*' means nothing", means simply that "the author of *Waverley*" names nothing, since it is not a proper name. If it were, then "Scott is the author of *Waverley*" would express something trivial, which it does not. What it expresses is something *contingent*, since Scott might not have written *Waverley*. Russell further insists that if we substitute "Sir Walter" for "the author of *Waverley*" (where "Sir Walter" is being used as a proper name, not as a description of the person having that name) in that case "Scott is Sir Walter" will also express a tautology. As he concludes :

> ...so long as names are used *as* names, "is Sir Walter" is the same trivial proposition as "Scott is Scott'. This completes the proof that "Scott is the author of *Waverley*" is not the same proposition as results from substituting a name for "the author of *Waverley*", no matter what name may be substituted (*ibid.* 175).

I believe that it is more beneficial to Russell when the meaning of "means" in the proof is interpreted as "names". This helps him to exclude such entities as 'the round square", the golden mountain "the present king of France", etc, more easily (which originally inspired him to the theory of incomplete symbols), from his universe. When the argument is so understood, Russell can really show how such incomplete symbols can be meaningful

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in context without naming or designating any subsistent entity. He expresses this intention by maintaining that such symbols have no meaning in isolation, and that it is *not necessary* for them to name or denote anything in order to contribute, what they do, to the meaning of the sentences in which they occur.[14]

V

Resolution of Incomplete Symbols

We have seen that both definite and indefinite descriptions are incomplete symbols. Now we should show how they obtain a meaning in a context with other symbols. Let us begin with an indefinite description and see how it can be resolved into a meaningful symbolic context. Consider the sentence

(1) Scott is wise.

(1) is a value of the propositional function

(2) x is wise,

Another sentence

(3) A man is wise

also appears to be a value of (2), which, in fact, is not the case. "A man" in (3) is an indefinite description or an incomplete symbol having no meaning in itself. However, a meaning can be given to every sentence in which "a man" occurs. But this meaning will not contain any entity *a man* as an actual constituent. Accordingly, (3) becomes

(4) (x is a human & x is wise) is sometimes true.

"(x is human & x is wise)", in (4), is a propositional function closed by the assertion that it is sometimes true. (4) provides the meaning of (3), it also shows that "a man" does not mean an entity, and by means of the property, human, assigns "a man" a meaning in context. (4) also shows that the gramma-

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tical subject of (3) is not its logical subject. When analyzed, (3) is found to be an assertion about a propositional function.

A definite description, say, " the author of *Waverley* " which can be symbolized as " $(\imath x)\ (Wx)$", according to Russell, " is always an incomplete symbol " (*PM.* 67). Before we see how to resolve or analyze such symbols in meaningful symbolic contexts, let us first see why Russell says that they are *always* incomplete symbols. Consider the sentence;

(5) Scott is the author of *Waverley*

which we can write in the form of an identity sentence,

(6) Scott = the author of *Waverley.*

(6) can be abbreviated as

(7) $S = (\imath x)\ (Wx)$.

Let us imagine that " $(\imath x)\ (wx)$" is a complete symbol. In that case it is either a predicate or a name. Now since (7) is an identity sentence and would not obey the rule of grammar if " $(\imath x)\ (Wx)$" claims to have meaning in the way in which a predicate does have meaning. So " $(\imath x)\ (Wx)$" in (7) is not a predicate,

If " $(\imath x)\ (Wx)$" is a complete symbol, then it has to have meaning in the way in which names have meaning. If so " $(\imath x)\ (wx)$" must be interpreted as standing for a particular object c, in this case, an author. And c is either Scott or else c is some other object. If the latter is admitted, then the proposition expressed by (7) is false, since an identity relation holds only of an object and itself. However, since (7) expresses a true proposition this case is eliminated. So the object c has to be Scott. In that case the proposition expressed by (7) becomes (8) Scott = Scott,[11].

But (8) expresses a truism, a triviality whereas (7) does not. Now Russell seems to suggest that any theory that implies that

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(7) and (8) are synonymous should always be unaceeptable. So the assumption that "$(\imath x)(Wx)$" is a name is also eliminated and with this our original assertion that "$(\imath x)(Wx)$" is a complete symbol comes out to be false for all time.

Russell gives the analysis of (7) as

(9) $(\exists c)[(x)(Wx \equiv x = c) \,\&\, S = c]$

(9) says that there is exactly one author of *Waverley* and that one is Scott. This sentence is not a simple identity sentence, although it becomes a satisfactory paraphrase of (7). There is no part of (9) that corresponds to the occurrence of "$(\imath x)(Wx)$" in (7). The most important thing about the analysis or resolution of definite description is that it does not consist in the analysis of the descriptions themselves, but the propositions in which they occur.

In *IMP*, Russell suggests another way of the analysis or resolution of propositions containing definite descriptions. This way is to see what circumstances would render them false (*IMP*. 177) Let us again consider our proposition (5). (5) is certainly false if

(10) *Waverley* had never been written;

(11) several people had written *Waverley;* or

(12) the man who wrote *Waverley* is not Scott.

According to Russell, in order to resolve (5) we need only to negate the conditions of falsity of (10), (11), and (12) So (10) becomes

(10a) "x wrote *Waverley*" is not always false, i.e., at least one person wrote *Waverley* $[(\exists x)(Wx)]$.

(11) becomes

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(11a) "if x and y wrote *Waverley*, then x and y are identical", is always true, i.e., at most one person wrote *Waverley* [$(x)\{Wx \supset (y)[Wy \supset (x=y)]\}$].

(12) becomes

(12a) "if x wrote *Waverley*, then x is Scott" is always true [$(x)(Wx \supset Sx)$].

The conjunction of (10a), (11a). and (12a) may be taken as defining what is meant by the proposition "Scott is the author of *Waverley*".

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NOTES

Key to Abberviations

References to Russell's works are given in brackets after passages cited. These references are abbreviated as follows :

P. Math — *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) New York : W. W. Norton & Co., no date.

OD — "On Denoting" (1905) in *Logic and Knowledge*, ed., R. C. Marsh, London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956.

PM — *Principia Mathematica* (1910, with A. N. Whitehead), vol. 1. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1950, second edition.

KAKD — "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (1911) in *Mysticism and Logic*, London Penguin Books, 1953.

PLA — The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918) in *Logic and Knowledge*.

IMP — *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (1919) New York : A Touchstone Books, no date.

MPD — *My Philosophical Development* (1959), London : Unwin Book, 1975.

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1. A. R. White, " The Meaning of Russell's Theory of Descriptions ", *Analysis*. vol. 19.6 (1959), pp. 8–9; W. V. Quine, " Russell's Ontological Development " in Ralph Schoenman (ed.), *Bertrand Russell : Philosopher of Century* (London, 1967), pp. 310, 312. Russell's argument (pre – *MPD* versions) has also been attacked by some critics who are representatives of what is sometimes called (loosely) as the " ordinary language " school of philosophy. See P. F. Strawson " On Referring ", *Mind*, vol. 59 (1950), p. 328; Gilbert Ryle, " Meaning and Necessity ", *Philosophy*, vol. 24 (1949), p. 70: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, 1958, 2nd. end), p. 40.

2. R. K. Perkins, " On Russell's Alleged Confusion of Sense and Reference " *Analysis*, vol. 32.2 (1971), pp. 45–51; W. K. Wilson, " Incomplete Symbols and Russell's Proof ", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 10 (1980), pp. 233–50.

3. " On Russell's Alleged Confusion of Sense and Reference " p. 47.

4. In this passage Russell is discussing symbols for classes, which are also incomplete symbols.

5. But elsewhere Russell treats " Scott " as an abbreviation for description (PLA. 200) or a truncated or telescoped description (PLA. 243), and therefore does not directly refer to an individual which is an object of acquaintance. As he writes : " A name, in the narrow logical sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquainted, because you cannot name anything you are not acquainted with " (PLA. 201). Since " Scott " is not an object of acquaintance, it cannot be a logically proper name. However, in the present context, we are not concerned with this analysis of proper name,

6. On the surface, the point that there can be no names without bearers but that there can be meaningful descriptions without denotations seems to establish only that denotationless descriptions cannot be treated as names. But this is *not* what Russell, in fact, makes. The point extends more widely to a general contrast of semantic function between names and description.

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7. Russell seems to take over the position (that it is meaningless to ascribe existence or non-existence to items referred to by a logically proper name) directly from Frege. See Frege, *The Foundation of Arithmetic*, tr. J. L. Austin, (Oxford, 1953) p. 65; "On Concept and Object" in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.), *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford, 1970), p. 50.

8. R. K. Perkins, op. cit., p. 47.

9. *Ibid.* p. 46.

10. A. J. Ayer, "Bertrand Russell as a Philosopher" in J. E. Thomas & K. Blackwell (eds.), *Russell in Review* (Toronto, 1976), pp. 182-83.

11. By Russell's own account (8) can also be derived from (5), but it is not the same proposition. cf. *IMP* (p. 174).

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SABADA PRAMANA

In Indian Philosophy, there are in all six *pramāṇas* or methods of knowledge. They are *pratyakṣa* (perception) *Anumāna* (inference), *Upamāna* (comparison), *Arthāpatti* (postulation), *Anupalabdhi* (non–cognition) and *Śabda* (verbal testimony ?). But all these six methods of knowledge are not invariably accepted by all the schools of Indian Philosophy. *Śabda Pramāṇa* is admitted only in four different schools, namely, *Sāṅkhya, Nyāya, Advaita* and *Mimāṁsa.* Again all the four are not unanimous about the nature of *Śabda Pramāṇa.* They widely differ in their explanation of what *Śabda Pramāṇa* is. *Sāṅkhya* and *Nyāya* accept *Śabda Pramāṇa* signifying verbal testimony as a source of knowledge, but not as a source of valid knowledge. According to them, the word 'knowledge' stands for both–valid and invalid, proved or unproved cognition. Any assertion, whether true or false, is regarded by them as a source of knowledge, while the validity or truth of the knowledge is said to be due to other methods like inference, etc. According to them an authority is a source of knowledge, because it gives you informations. In most cases we believe the verbal testimony of the authority as true, but when doubt arises, we have to remove the doubt by inference, etc. From this it is clear that these philosophical schools are only saying that every cognitive assertion has a truth claim, establishing its truth claim has to be validated or established by the application of standard of truth. But there is a formal sense in which the word 'knowledge' implies truth. To say that 'I know this so and so to be the thief' is to assert that my statement is true. You cannot say that X is the thief, but what you are asserting might not be true and he may not be the thief. Assertive statements are logically different from problematic statements You cannot say

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that you know X to be the thief, yet he may not be. Somebody is and may not be the thief–this is logically untenable, when strictly interpreted, the combined statement is a self-contradiction. But many things which are now accepted as true, are subsequently discarded. That is how our knowledge grows. The Sun's going round the earth was accepted as true earlier and it is now replaced by the theory that the earth goes round the Sun. So knowledge and doubt concerning that knowledge, cannot be entertained simultaneously. So one who claims knowledge claims that he knows it to be true. As long as doubt is not settled, the truth-claim of the proposition has not been settled and one cannot be said to have known at all. But there is no contradiction in accepting something to be true and subsequently raising a doubt about it. Once the doubt is raised, the truth-claim is withdrawn. The *Sāṁkhya–Nyāya* distinction between the source of knowledge and validity of knowledge only draws our attention to this distinction between receiving an information from an authority and then testing its truth. But the way in which they have made the distinction is misleading.

Mīmāṁsā on the other hand accepts verbal testimony which is authoritative in character. For them, the sole purpose of language is to give directions about action. All assertions, according to them, are injunctive in character. The Vedic statements prescribing actions to be performed have to be accepted. If a sacrifice is to be performed, you have to perform it in the manner prescribed in the vedic statements which are authoritative in character in this regard. All Vedic statements which do not prescribe directly, they do so indirectly, and, therefore, are auxiliary true injunctive statements. Even non–vedic statements, according to these philosophers, are also ultimately injunctive in character; they do prescribe action in the ultimate sense. When somebody asserts that 'the king is going over there' he is implying you ought to stand up and show respect as otherwise

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you would incur his displeasure. So all statements, whether vedic or non–vedic are injunctive, either directly or indirectly, and therefore, are authoritative in character.

Now, what *Mīmāṁsaka* is claiming about prescriptive or action–prescribing statements of the Vedas and, for that matter of all scriptures is that they are authoritative in character. One has to look to the scriptures for the guidance as to how a religious action is to be performed, what is right method for that, etc. An action is rightly conducted or wrongly conducted. Right conduct in this sense is a conduct prescribed in scripture. Scriptures are authoritative in respect of right manner of performing religious duties. But the Mīmāṁsakas are making an unrestricted wide claim, when they say that all statements are ultimately action prescribing. This claim is unfounded and unacceptable. They fail to distinguish the logical differences between statements of commands and statements of facts. A factual statement is either true or false, whereas a statement of command is neither true nor false. A command is to be obeyed or disobeyed at one's own risk. The action, prescribed by the command, may be rightly performed or wrongly performed But a fact stating statement is not rightly true or rightly false; it is only true or false This distinction was clearly pointed out by Kant in the West, who made the distinction between theoretical and practical reason. Śaṅkara makes the distinction very clearly. He points out that prescriptive statements are *" Puruṣa Vyāpāra tantra "*. A man has a choice in doing it or not doing it. obeying the command or disobeying it. He cannot just refuse to do the action and yet say that he has obeyed. An assertion about the command, to have been obeyed, may be true or may be false, but the action prescribed, is neither true nor false. If you actually perform the action, and assert that you have performed it, then your statement is true. So he declares that factual statements are true, not bacause an authority has said it to be true.

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The statement is true if there is an affair correspondiug to it. This is what he means by saying that truth of a statement is not dependent upon the will of an authority; it is dependent upon how things are in the world. The truth is, therefore, fact-dependent, not authority-dependent. *Śabda Pramāṇa* is, therefore, not accepted by him in the sense of verbal testimony or scriptural testimony. Whatever is certified by an authority to be true is not necessarily true. He rightly points out that a thousand scriptures cannot make a pot a cloth. A pot is a pot whether scriptures declare it to be so or not. So truth is not authoritative by nature.

If Śaṅkar does not accept *Śabda Pramāṇa* in the sense of authority or varble testimony, what then does he mean by it? What Śaṅkar and his followers mean by the word *Śabda Pramāṇa* can be gathered from their philosophical treatises. In Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya*, there is no separate chapter-wise discusson on the method, nature and object of philosophical knowledge. In course of his *sūtra*-commentaries, he stops at places to elaborate sometimes about method, sometimes its application and results. About the method, his clearest pronouncement is as follows :

The cognitive forms of language are to be logically analyzed in the form of arguments which lead to the establishment of the truth of the *Śruti-Vākhyas*. His chapter on *Adhyāsa* illustrates how this method of logico-linguistic analysis (*Śabda-Prarrāṇa*) has been applied throughout the commentaries to establish his philosophical views or results, which according to him, are asserted in the *Śruti-Vākhyas*. This chapter on *Adhyāsa* does not contain commentaries on any of the *sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. It is Śaṅkara's own contribution which is given in the first chapter where he shows that a critical analysis of judgmental forms reveals its incompetence, for knowing real on its own

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nature. In these forms we try to know the 'that' by means of the 'what', the real by means of an unreal abstract concept. A judgment about the empirical factors involves memory and memory is not an infallible source of knowledge. All such judgments, therefore, are corrigible. Every such judgment applies a concept, learnt and remembered from previous cases, to the present case in the form of judgment – "This is silver". Such application of the concept involves the possibility of misapplication. Accordingly some of them are pronounced to be true, others false. The assertion 'This is silver" is sometimes true and sometimes false. In case of erroneous judgment, it is obvious that the concept does not signify existence, it is therefore unreal, a mere name and a form. When I realize the mistake, I do not cancel the entire judgment. "That" which is judged, remains steady, but the "what" by means of which the "that" is judged is cancelled. I say "This is not a silver, this is a shell". All these three assertion together illustrate that negation affects the predicate and it is predicate alone which is replaced in the correcting judgment. The predicate "silver" is replaced by the predicate "shell". The judgment is never open to the possibility of correction, but the subject, however, is steady. So in every judgment, there is an eternal and non-eternal element. A part which is changed and is incorrigible and a part which is corrigible and changed. So a judgment is compounded of two elements, the real and the unreal. It is the linguistic analysis which makes us aware of the eternal and non-eternal elements of every judgmental form. The form means "This is a so and so". The "that" of the judgment points in the direction of the real, and the "what" in the direction of the unreal. The form of the empirical judgments cannot be, therefore, the forms of true knowledge. True knowledge is knowing the thing as it is on its own form, but not knowing it by means of a "what". The form of the empirical judgment is, therefore, not the form of *vidyā*.

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It is the form of *avidyā*. Philosophical knowledge is therefore different from empirical knowledge. Their methods are different. Methods of empirical knowledge are perception, inference etc., but that of philosophical knowledge is logico-linguistic analysis (*śabda*). Empirical methods are of no avail in non-empirical matters and *śabda* or logico-linguistic analysis is of no avail in empirical matters. So the empirical distinction of the truth and false assertions is logically unsound. Both of them are based upon an application of the abstract to the concrete. In both, the judgments "this is silver" and "this is shell", an abstract concept like the silver and the shell have been applied and each of them has been applied on the basis of perception. From the stand-point of logic, both the judgments are of the same level. Either both should have been accepted to be true or both should have been rejected as false. If you do accept the latter as true and the former as false, it is because of the latter being useful in the practical commerce of life and the former not being so useful. Practical utility is not the standard of truth but the standard of practical commerce of life. Such judgments, again, when true can give us only relative knowledge, but not absolute knowledge. When I say, the water is hot, it is so, only in the relation to my skin, not absolutely. The same water may not appear to be hot, when I have temperature, or to an animal with very thick skin. Such knowledge is, therefore, conditional. Instead of saying that the water is hot to my skin, I assert that the water is hot as if it is unconditionally so. So all such empirical judgments have a misleading form. It is really a riddle or a *māyā* that the relative is taken as absolute, the unreal abstract as the real character of thing. Such true judgments are action-oriented, not truth-oriented. If the thing in the world hots my skin, I avoid it, but if it feels soothing to my skin, I keep it. This usefulness in the practical conduct of life is falsely taken as the measure of the truth, representing the true nature

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of the thing. *Avidyā* is taken as the *Vidyā*, the false as the truth. This is really *māyā* or puzzlement, that the unreal is taken as the real. Knowledge by means of concept is practically useful but theoretically untenable. In such judgments, a false is imposed upon a real *adhiṣthāna*. This *adhiṣthāna* is existence, consciousness and bliss. By this Śaṅkara means that each one of our concepts is unreal and corrigible, but existence, consciousness and bliss are ever accepted as being ultimate condition of all other conceptual judgments. The entire variable conceptual system rests upon some invariable ideas which are the end points of this conceptual system. They belong to the periphery. They are formal concepts, but not empirical concepts. They support the system of abstract concept and make it possible for empirical judgments to be pronounced. The 'this' implies the existence in the form of a relative *adhiṣthāna*. It is already particularised and located is space and time system. Space and time are a priori forms, but utilisable in the empirical or posteriori place. The 'this' in the judgment does not simply mean existence, but it also implies consciously recognised existence. The 'this' is not only pointed out to be there, but is consciously known to be there. So in this judgment, the unconditional ideas of 'existence, consciousness' become conditional ideas by appearing in space and time and thereby becomes able to be *adhiṣthāna* of the objects of abstract concepts. If the conditions of space and time be removed, then the *viṣayī* of the empirical judgments becomes the absolute existence–consciousness. The 'this' of the empirical judgments is not only firmly rooted but is known to be so rooted. Since it remains steady and does not become affected by the additional removal of the abstract predicates, it is said to be self-concrete. When the same 'this' is estimated to be a snake, then the concept is cancelled to make the room for correcting predicate 'rope'. This addition / removal and fresh addition does not affect 'this'. Removal does not dismiss the 'this', nor replacement in-

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creases it. Removal and loss is sorrowful, addition and acquisition is pleasurable since substraction and addition do not affect the self, 'this', the subject, the real is said to be beyond sorrow and pleasure. It is blissful existence and knowledge. The *sat-cit-ānanda* are the invariable ideas which sustain the variable concepts of empirical judgments. They make communication possible, but are not communicable. They make the empirical knowledge possible, but are not among the empirical knowables. So the Brahman is said to be indescribable unknowable as the abstract unreal object is said to be knowable. The *Satcidānanda* is true, the manifested world is name and form by means of the abstract concept is said to be false. The 'this' in the form of 'silver' is only apparently true and real but not absolutely real. So Saṅkara has clearly shown that the logico-linguistic analysis of judgmental or propositional forms is the only method of the Philosophical knowledge. It is a non-empirical method and is suitable for the knowledge of the non-empirical. By the logico-linguistic method, we know the logico-linguistic Brahman, the Absolute which sustains the relative but is transcendent to it. The invariable idea of consciousness-existence-bliss constitutes the end-points or *adhiṣṭhāna* of the variable manifestation of name and form.

The Padārthas or the meaning of the Pada or words :-

The word 'cow' means the concept cow. In assertion, this is a cow. The things and their qualities of the external world consist of things and qualities, but the non-empirical is neither a thing, nor a quality. It helps in understanding the world consisting of things with qualities, but itself is neither a thing nor a quality.

Now we will see how other *Advaitins* like Vidyāraṇya and Dharmarāja elaborate this method and apply it to reach the philosophical conclusions. Vidyāraṇya says that *Śabda Pramāṇa* consists of three parts – *śravaṇa, manana* and *nididhyāsana.*

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Śravaṇa means determining the meaning of the philosophical statements like " the *Ātman* is to be known. " The knower of *Ātman* crosses over the ocean of sorrow ". The *Ātman* being known, everything becomes known ". Only understanding the meaning of philosophical statements by means of six marks like introduction, conclusion, repetition, uniqueness of subject in the sense of its being hitherto unknown, etc., are illustrative as to how meaning of sentences is to be comprehended.

Manana means following the arguments by means of logico-linguistic analysis, leading to bringing out import of *Vedānta* statements (*mananaṁ nāma vedānta vākya grāhaka nyāya anuśilanam*). So *manana* means following the arguments which establish the logical conclusions. Vidyāraṇya's statement is here identical with Śaṅkara's definition of the method as logico-linguistic analysis on the judgmental forms leading to the establishment of philosophical statements contained in the *Śrutis*.

The third part, *nididhyāsana* signifies following the arguments with great concentration, so that possibility of philosophical knowledge will be admitted and other assertion that it is impossible will be removed (*saṁbhāvanā asaṁbhāvanāvā*). But *śravaṇa* does not mean hearing, *manana* does not mean meditation with concentration. They are parts of one concrete whole of the method of logico-linguistic analysis for the purpose of establishing philosophical conclusions of the *Upaniṣads*.

Now let us see how Vidyāraṇya applies these methods to reach philosophical conclusions which contain necessary and absolute but not contingent or relative truths. By analyzing the logic of our language. Vidyāraṇya asserts that there must be negation in every language. Without negation, no language is possible. A language in which there are only affirmations will not yield anything like knowledge. Knowledge is a body of organised system and this

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systematic character shows that knowledge does not consist of a catalogue of assertions. A system must be coherent. If I simply have a number of assertions like 'this is black', 'this is white', 'this is cow', 'this is a goat', the 'this' must be referring to something excluding others and this exclusion must be performed by negation. The 'this' of which the predicate 'cow' is asserted, must be different from the 'this' of which the predicate 'goat' is asserted. So they must be relative objects, each excluding others, something becomes the 'this' as distinguished from other references. This exclusion of others or negation is the very basis of what is called knowledge. The 'this' is a 'cow' as distinguished from other 'this' as asserted in 'this is a goat'. If the 'this will be the same, then the two propositions would not mean anything, one would not know which one is true and which one is to be accepted. In order that one may be accepted and the other be rejected, these two statements must not mean the same.

So different spaces and different times are the very condition of knowledge. Vaidyāraṇya says space, time and number are the very basis of all intellectual growth. These are the pervasive features of language which are present and must be present in order that knowledge may be possible. This is an absolute truth about the world. Any world comprehended by any being must consist of distinct things in space and time. When the two statements that 'this is a cow' and 'this is a goat' are about the same object of reference, they must be mediated by a negative statement in between, otherwise there would be no knowledge and there would be intellectual blindness (*Jagat andhatva*). If I do not cancel the first one, I cannot accept the other one. Negation makes it possible for the correction and growth of knowledge. We grow rejecting false ideas and accepting what apparently appears to be true, which may be subsequently corrected by being cancelled with a 'not' inserted in it. Then the

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empty place is replaced by a fresh predicate. This shows the contingent character of empirical knowledge. There is here lying burried a necessary truth about the world. Even though these assertions are made in different moments of time, the subject is not changing. Subjects of our assertions are not changed in all these times and only our characterisation of it is being changed. So it is a necessary truth about the intelligible world, that it must consist of things which do not change. Only the qualities change in time. Identity of the subject and differences of quality is a necessary condition of all intellectual growth for the practical conduct of life. It is a necessary condition of intelligibility that the substance must not be allowed to be changed. So here we find a feature of the world which is most pervasive and is necessarily so. So philosophical assertions are ontological assertions ('Ontā' or being of the logical structure of our language). This is a condition of meaningful employment of language and also possibility of our knowledge. This is known by depth-grammar which is not manifested on the face of the assertions. This is known by logical reflection. This also explains why negation cancels the predicate, not the subject. Anybody who thinks the total change like the Buddhists, according to Vidyāraṇya, does not understand, what they say. Even though water, sands, trees and banks of the river are every moment changing, the river is not admitted to have changed thereby. It is the river of which the properties are changing. But the river is the same inspite of all these changes of properties during the entire period of discourse about it. It is an ontological truth about the world. This condition being asserted, intelligible discourse of the world is possible. This, therefore, must always be with the periphery of language, not with the field of language. This is not an empirical assertion about the facts of the world, but assertion about the condition of all empirical assertions. It is that by means of which change is intelligible and for that very reason,

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it itself is not a changing phenomena. This is exactly what Śaṅkara holds about change. So what these philosophers are pointing when they say change is apparent but not real is that change can be understood only with regard to qualities of things not with regard to things. These philosophers do not deny the fact of change, they are only drawing our attention to the logical condition which makes change intelligible. They admit the fact of change only by drawing our attention in philosophical discussion to the logic of depth-grammar of our language of change. In such cases the understanding not being turned outward to recognise empirical facts but is turned upon itself to see its own organizational principles. That is why philosophy is called '*antarmukhī vidyā*' and empirical science is called '*bahirmukhī vidyā*', that is what is known when understanding is turned outward and what is known when it is turned inward upon itself. For this reason, first, they call '*aparā vidyā*', and second, they call '*parā vidyā*'. This fact is brought to our attention by Dharmarājā. According to him, language has two functions– '*vyāvahārika tattvavedakatā*' and '*pāramārthika tattvavedakatā*'. A language can inform us to know both inner and the outer. In one we know what is practically useful without knowing its theoretical basis, whereas in the other the theoretical basis. But this knowledge has no empirical relevance Philosophy and science, therefore, are entirely independent. Scientific knowledge is not incomplete and philosophical knowledge does not complete it. None of them has any supremacy over the other. Philosophy is not supreme science nor is science a distortion of philosophical knowledge. Logico–linguistic analysis (*śabda*) is not on par with other empirical methods like perception, inference, etc. It cannot be used to get factual knowledge of the world like perception, inference, etc. It does not, therefore, signify any authority. A medical expert can tell me what I am suffering from, what germs cause a particular disease, where they grow

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and how to eliminate them. The authorities in different sciences, may be accepted for empirical matters, for scientific informations But they are of no avail in philosophical knowledge. So *śabda* means not verbal testimony of an expert, but the logico-linguistic analysis of discourse delve deep to know what lies at the base. Philosophy, thus, is knowledge of the ground or the *adhisthāna* and not about the *adhyasta* or the empirical.

Before concluding, we must understand what Dharmarājā says about *Śabda* or *Āgama* or *Śruti pramāṇa*. He defines this as thus :

"When a sentence is analysed to see the relation between its different meaning elements, the knowledge gained in this analysis is not contradicted by any of the other empirical methods. Such a sentence becomes the method of a kind of knowledge. This knowledge is philosophical knowledge and its method is logico-linguistic analysis (*Yasya vākyasya tātparya-viṣayībhūtasaṁsargo mānāntareṇa na bādhyate tat vākyaṁ pramāṇam*). This means analysis of the logical form of assertions gives philosophical knowledge. Here the content or subject-matter of the assertion has been left out, and, therefore, the truth of this knowledge cannot be examined and contradicted by empirical methods which are meant for testing empirical content or matters of fact, asserted by the proposition. Philosophy is not empirical but logical. Understanding the logic of our language is its goal. Empirical matters can be known by empirical methods, logical matters can be known by the logico-linguistic methods. Thus exclusion of the matter and attention to the form is the first condition of philosophical enquiry. This is what is meant by the technical term '*viṣaya vairāgya*'. This *viṣaya vairāgya* is not renunciation of the world; it only means withdrawing the attention from the matter and attaining to the form of *vākya* or *vacana*. Philosophy is formal whereas science is factual or material.

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We can now conclude this essay in examining the conditions of meaning of a sentence and the philosophical reflections made on this by Śaṅkara. One of the conditions of meaning is fulfilment of expectancy (*ākāṁkṣā*). When the language is used by a speaker, it arouses some expectation in the hearer. Complete sentence must satisfy this expectation. Now Śaṅkara asks "Can this expectation at all be satisfied by any isolated sentence or a group of sentences ?" Every sentence arouses expectancy in the hearer which cannot be fulfilled unless all facts about all things are stated and this is impossible. When somebody says he is going to perform a sacrifice, the hearer expects to be informed about what kind of sacrifice, who is going to perform, who will be the priest, what is the name of his father, from where does he come etc., large number of questions can be aroused in the hearer. So we do not fulfil the expectancy in all respects unless we speak every thing about all things. In the practical field we may be satisfied by one or two querries being satisfied. But theoretically speaking the expectancy cannot be satisfied unless we speak everything about all things. This shows that meaning is a completed whole and discourse is a unity. This oneness of meaning implies that reality is one and indivisible. Dividing the indivisible and making separate assertion about it is a practical necessity, not an ultimate truth. So not knowing the fact of the world but understanding the logic of our language in what is done by Śaṅkara as a Philosopher. His method consists of a critique of language, not the practical employment of it for making assertions about the facts, in the world. Since in philosophy, we do not make statements about facts, but try to see their ground. Philosophical language cannot be communicated. Philosophy tries to see how communication becomes possible. It does not say things about the world. Here understanding understands its own nature and does not try to understand the nature of things other than itself. Understanding one's own nature is direct and im-

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mediate as distinguished from mediate knowledge about another thing through the mediation of a third thing called the method. I know things in the world by means of perception or inference. Here knowledge, method and object are three different things. But in philosophy, understanding its method and the object are one. Understanding which is of the nature of reason employs reason to know its own nature. Here knowledge and the object are identical. Truth and reality are identical. Truth is not about an object which is other than truth. This direct immediate knowledge is called '*Darśana*'.

We may do well to repeat what we have said earlier *Śabda pramāṇa* means logico-linguistic analysis of discourse. It is a method only for philosophical knowledge and has no application in empirical matters. Philosophy is formal, not factual. It tries to see what rises at the periphery on ground of meaningful employment of language, but does not employ language meaningfully to make intelligible statement about the world. Philosophical facts are ontological facts or logico–linguistic facts and not emperical facts about the world. Logical facts and matters of facts are two different sorts of facts. The methods of knowing them are, therefore, entirely different. Logico–linguistic facts can be known by logical analysis of discourse, but empirical facts can be known by empirical methods. Their sphere and methods being entirely different their boundaries must be kept distinct. Philosophy cannot be a science and science cannot be philosophy. Philosophy is no part of science and science is no part of philosophy. None of them is inferior or superior to other: they are only entirely different from each other.

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CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS ON THE HUMAN SELF, GOD, AND INDUBITABLE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

René Descartes (1596-1650) has been criticized as being unable to achieve any substantial truths by way of his methodic doubt. Some philosophers believe that this difficulty is sufficient to act as a support for general skepticism, since, logically, the method requires that each step taken be subjected to doubt. Others claim that his method leads to solipsistic skepticism, since he allegedly must prove God's existence in order to establish the existence of anything outside his mind. For methodic doubt requires constant attention and a continuous development of truths, one upon another. Because man is imperfect, he is incapable of such constant attention (he eats, sleeps daydreams, etc.); so it is supposedly necessary for Descartes to posit God's existence and role as the preserver of truths in memory. Descartes' elimination of doubt through the presupposition of God's existence is referred to by scholars as the "Cartesian Circle," since he abandons his own methodological requirement of the clear and distinct idea in order to overcome the alleged skepticism inherent in his method. I propose to show that *Meditations on First Philosophy*[1] is an attempt by Descartes to reconcile his rationalist philosophy with his apparently conflicting voluntarism and with his adherence to certain theological principles. To this effect, I will demonstrate that proving God's existence as the source of all true knowledge is Descartes' principal aim, since, for Descartes, man alone can be certain only of his own existence as a nonmaterial thinking thing. Further, I will show that his whole methodology is designed to support this goal. Whether his proof of God's existence is justified as part of a methodological requirement will be pointed out later in the critique.

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With this objective in mind, I will proceed as follows. First, I will briefly outline the conceptual background from which Descartes' theory of knowledge emerged. Second, I will summarize some of the main points in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Next, I will analyze his epistemology as it is built on his goal of establishing God as the source of all truth. Finally, I will make a critical discussion of Descartes' attempt to prove God's existence and that of the external world, which I hope will lead to some needed clarifications and revealing observations.

A review of his theory of knowledge is necessary before any critique can be initiated. In his lifetime, Descartes was immensely concerned with finding a structure for true knowledge. As Reginald O'Neill states in his *Theories of Knowledge*, "Descartes was a religious man, capable mathematician, and a serious thinker who was appalled by the Scepticism and Atheim of his Contemporaries." [2] That scientific claims and other widely accepted opinions were found to be doubtful led Descartes to question all of his beliefs in the hope of finding an indubitable truth as a basis for absolute knowledge. His belief that God is the creator and provider of certain knowledge led him to proffer *Meditations on First Philosophy* as a rational proof of God's existence as the foundation of all human knowledge. It also gave him an opportunity to express his views on the mind as a non-material substance. While Descartes is recognized by many as the father of rationalism, his emphasis on God as the source of all true knowledge demonstrates the major role that voluntarism plays in his epistemology, a point which has been overlooked and, hence, not widely discussed. For Descartes, there can be no certainty beyond that of the self as a thinking thing, without God, since only God's existence as the preserver of true intuitions recalled from memory can overcome his doubt.

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In his effort to establish a sure foundation for certain knowledge, Descartes elected to employ a series of meditations. In the first meditation,[3] he turns inward upon himself in search of a clear and distinct truth upon which to build. After great deliberation, Descartes discovers that he cannot doubt his own existence, since he has the capacity to doubt. This true idea is demonstrated by his famous dictum, "I doubt.. ergo I think... egro I exist."[4] Descartes' concept of a clear and distinct idea involves a conscious awareness and intuitive grasp of an unambiguous idea; in this case, himself as a thinking thing. More specifically he defines a clear idea as one that is "present and apparent to an attentive mind," while he views a distinct idea as one that "contains nothing but what is clear."[5] For Descartes, the only potentially clear and distinct ideas are those which are innate but are assumed to be divinely derived.

In the second meditation,[6] Descartes hopes to show that the human mind is more easily known than the body. He believes that he has a more clear and distinct idea of himself as a thinking thing than he has of exernal bodies, despite the commonly accepted notion that what is visible to the senses is most clearly and distinctly known. He begins his argument by defining 'body' as a thing that has physical characteristics; that can be perceived by the external senses; that can be moved by something other than itself; and that cannot move itself.[7] At least on analytical grounds, Descartes is justified in ruling out the idea that he has a body, since his definition of the term does not coincide with what he knows himself to be thus far—a nonmaterial thinking thing.

Turning next to an examination of the self and its attributes, Descartes discovers that, though he is aware of the powers of nutrition, walking, and perception, these faculties cannot belong

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to him, since they require a body. At this point, Descartes concludes that all he still knows of himself is that he is a thinking thing— "a thing that doubts, wills, refuses, imagines, and perceives."[8] Here it is significant to note that the characteristics he attributes to the thinking thing are essentially functions of a conscious mind.

Because he does not yet know whether other bodies exist as an empirical possibility and yet knows that he himself exists as a nonmaterial thinking thing, Descartes determines that knowledge of his own existence is not dependent on material things, at least as a conceptual logical possibility. Even though his imagination brings forth images in his mind whose truth Descartes cannot determine, still he knows clearly and distinctly that he is a thinking thing. Whether his essence consists of something more than a thinking thing is an issue which Descartes resolves by arguing that he does not know what more he might be, since he does not have a clear and distinct idea of something more. However, the possibility exists that he was aware of something more and that this more is the transcendental ego, whose existence is commonly recognized to have been identified by Kant and Husserl as being unknowable, except through its acts.

Descartes cannot rid himself of the idea that material objects are known with the utmost distinction, so his argument moves to an examination of a piece of wax, in the hope of settling this question. He discovers that the appearance of solid wax is unlike that of melted wax, whence the question arises as to what he knows distinctly about the nature of wax. It is clear to Descartes that what he knows distinctly about the wax does not pertain to its sensible characteristics. Nor can his conception of the wax in his imagination be what he knows distinctly, for there is an infinite number of ways the wax can be made to appear.

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Descartes concludes that it is his mind alone which understands the nature of the wax. He adds that the clearness and distinctness of his intuitive cognition of the wax is dependent upon the amount of conscious awareness (i.e., attention) that he directs toward it. Because the senses and imagination cannot differentiate clear and distinct ideas, Descartes asserts that it is his mind alone which grasps the real nature of corporeal objects. And since his own mind is most clearly and distinctly present to him, Descartes is now confident that there is nothing which can be known more clearly and distinctly by the mind than the mind itself.

In the third meditation,[10] Descartes expresses doubt about his methodological criterion that what is clearly and distinctly intuited is necessarily true, since he connot help but wonder if there is an evil demon who deceives him. Before inquiring into the possible existence of an evil demon, Descartes examines the nature of thought, which eventually leads him to two proofs of God's existence. He begins by identifying three basic types of thoughts—volitions or emotions, judgments, and ideas. He defines an idea both as the form of a thought and as an image that is present to the mind.[11] Descartes also determines that truth and falsity pertain only to judgments, primarily when the mind judges that an idea has a corresponding external source. As to the immediate source of these ideas,[12] he states that some of them are innate, some seem to be adventitious (i.e., derived from external sources),[13] and some seem to be fictitious (i.e., produced within himself). Descartes also claims that adventitious and fictitious ideas, which arise from no planned cognitive activity, clearly have less objective reality than innate ideas, which are inherent in the mind and which must be summoned up.

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Next, Descartes examines his idea of God as the most perfect being. In an ontological argument similar to St. Anselm's[13] he suggests that, since he can summon up the idea of Perfect Being in his mind, and since this idea is greater than his idea of imperfect man, God must necessarily exist as the objective being of the idea of Perfect Being. To further substantiate this proof, Descartes offers a cosmological argument, wherein he asserts that man cannot possibly be the standard of perfection he strives to match, since man errs, sins, and doubts. Descartes adds that it is absurd to think that man would question his own values and behavior unless the very idea of God was within him (innate) and divinely derived. Also, since he hold the view that the cause of anything must be greater than its effect, Descartes asserts that the cause of his clear and distinct idea of Perfect Being must be Perfect Being. Finally, Descartes claims that God cannot be a deceiver, since God is Perfection, which precludes all negative traits.

In the fourth meditation,[14] Descartes' main purpose is to explain the nature and occurance of human error. He states that human error, which is the result of man's finite nature, consists in a privation of knowledge. Descartes argues that, insofar as he was created by God, there is nothing within him which can cause him to be deceived; yet, since he is not God, he does not have all of His perfections. According to this view, the will, through which we are endowed with the idea of God, can make correct judgments about an unlimited range of ideas. However, since the will makes correct judgments only about those ideas which are perceived by the intellect, the will sometimes chooses to judge ideas which the intellect does not clearly and distinctly understand. Thus, human error is not, properly speaking, caused by the imperfection of the will and intellect, but instead by the fact that the will's domain extends further than that of the intellect, which is the immediate source of ideas to be judged.

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In the fifth meditation,[15] Descartes establishes the possible existence of the external world and offers another demonstration of his ontological argument for God's existence. From his clear and distinct intuition of triangles, and other geometric concepts, Descartes concludes that these ideas are innate in his mind, as Plato advocates in the *Meno,* in which Socrates demonstrates the slave boy Meno's ability to recall and understand the notion of triangle. His knowledge of the true and unchanging nature of triangles, etc., leads him to a similar demonstration of God's existence. Accordingly, Descartes argues that, because he cannot think of God without having a clear and distinct idea of Him, God must necessarily exist as the objective being of this idea. For it is a contradiction to acknowledge the necessary truth of his clear and distinct idea of God and to deny His objective existence, as St. Anselm before him had shown. As he continues to meditate on the grounds as to why a clear and distinct idea of God is necessarily true, Descartes realizes that all his knowledge, including all clear and distinct innate ideas depends on God, for, without God, all his claims to knowledge would be subject to doubt. Because man cannot progress in his intellectual activities unless he moves forward after finding clear and distinct ideas, he risks making errors. For once his thought moves away from the clear and distinct intuitions he has used to determine the truth of an idea, man's certainty regarding the truthfulness of that idea is committed to memory. But his knowledge of God as the preserver of truths in memory provides man with certainty, for through this knowledge, all man's doubts about his knowledge of other things are dispelled.

In the sixth and final meditation,[16] Descartes hopes to prove the existence of the external world and explain the duality of man as a being composed of mind and body. Although mind and body are of completely different natures, he describes their

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relationship as a mutual interaction analogous to the way a captain (mind) and his ship (body) work together. While imagination seems to be the basis for establishing the existence of the external world, Descartes discovers that this faculty requires an act of intuition. Since intuition, which is characteristic of a thinking thing, enables him to understand the idea of a material body without its presence, Descartes concludes that imagination is not essential to his nature and, hence, leads only to the probable existence of the external world.

Unable to establish the indubitable existence of the external world through his analysis of the faculty of imagination, Descartes turns to an examination of sense perception. He recalls that in the past he had accepted the Aristotelian–Thomistic[17] view that there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses and that this view leads inevitably to skepticism, since the senses alone yield only confused ideas.[18] Yet he observes that through his senses he has an immediate awareness of things for which his consent is not required and which he is unable to control.[19] Descartes is aware that he possesses a body and that he involuntarily experiences pain, pleasure, and a multitude of other sensations. Further, he states that these 'ideas of the senses'[20] which he experiences are so much more vivid and lively than the ideas of his meditations and memory that he cannot help but feel that they are 'caused' by an external source. Here, Descartes seems to anticipate what is called a causal theory of perception. However, since only innate ideas which have been clearly and distinctly preceived are certain, the truth of these ideas of the senses must remain in question. It is revealing to note that the expression 'vivid and lively', which Descartes uses to describe sense perceptions, is characteristic of Humes's later theory of perception, according to which all of our ideas are derived from distinct and separate

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sense impressions. Yet, while Descartes uses his ideas of the senses to confirm the existence of material objects, Hume understands the existence of material objects to be probabilistic, since inferences about their existence presuppose a causal connection between ideas of the senses and those alleged material objects.

Continuing, Descartes asserts that sensory awareness necessarily requires the presence of material objects, since the senses act as a conduit for incoming sense impressions and since to have sensory awareness is to presuppose something perceivable by the senses. He argues that God cannot be the immediate source of ideas of the senses, since the senses can lead to error; so the immediate source of ideas of the senses is their corresponding external object. Here it is important to note that Descartes does not actually attribute error to the senses. Rather, he states that errors occur when the will makes judgments about sensory input which the intellect has not yet, or cannot, identify clearly and distinctly (i.e., sensory input which is beyond the range in which the intellect can operate). Further, Descartes claims that God has endowed him with a very strong propensity to believe that given any ideas of the senses, he can trace their immediate source to a corresponding external object. Thus, he reasons, since God is the ultimate source of all true ideas and, being perfect, cannot deceive him, he ought to embrace this belief. Finally, since God is the ultimate cause of nature, and since his experiences in nature teach him that he has a material body, Descartes claims that it is pragmatically and rationally imperative that he trust nature's integrity.

Satisfied with his proof of the existence of the external world, Descartes moves on to an explanation of man's duality. He likens his relationship with his body to that of a captain living aboard a ship, since each recognizes the needs of his vessel and directs

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its activities. Just as the ship relies on the captain for the fulfillment of its needs and functions, so, too, does Descartes' body rely on him for the fulfillment of its needs and functions. What this analogy shows is that the pragmatic dependence of the body on the mind is like that of the ship on its captain. It also demonstrates Descartes' mechanistic view of the human body. However, since this description is an anology, which relies on a figurative comparison, its value lies solely in its ability to conjure up a picture in the mind which will aid the reader in his understanding of the proof. Descartes adds that the feelings (ideas of the senses) which he experiences in his body are really nothing more than a 'confused way of thinking',[21] which results from the mutual and pragmatic interaction of mind and body. He points out that it is reasonable for errors to occur, given the imperfect 'unity' and not always clearly demarcated interaction of two such distinct substances. While Descartes recognizes a sort of composite unity, which is the result of the body's pragmatic dependence on the mind, he insists that he is essentially a nonmaterial thinking thing. For, it is the nature of a thinking thing to be a nonmaterial substance, whereas it is the nature of the body to be an extended, or corporeal, substance. Finally because of its special nature, Descartes asserts that the mind, can, at least conceptually, exist apart from the body.[22] Thus, Descartes allows for the possible independent and separate existence of the mind.

Having shown Descartes' attempt to prove the nature and existence of God, man, and the external world, I would now like to proceed to a critical discussion of this attempt. My ensuing critique will be based on the following points: (1) Descartes does not *actually* have a clear and distinct idea of himself; (2) having a clear and distinct idea of God is inadequate to prove His existence; (3) positing God as the guarantor of true

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intuitions recalled from memory leads to the questionable possibility of attributing error to Perfect Being; (4) establishing God as the source of his clear and distinct idea of God leads Descartes to commit the fallacy of circular reasoning (i.e., the Cartesian Circle); (5) human error is caused primarily by man's composite nature, not by the mind; and (6) Descartes avoids voluntarism by giving unlimited will and limited intellect equal status as our only modes of thought.

Concerning the first point, it is essential that Descartes' theory of clear and distinct ideas be analyzed, since the sole criterion of his method is that only clear and distinct ideas arrived at through conscious meditation are potentially true. Descartes first considered making clear ideas the only criterian for truth, but was dissatisfied with their lack of certainty, so he added the requirement that they also be distinct. He defines a clear idea as one that he is able to summon up from his mind and which he cannot mistake for some other idea, while a distinct idea is one that contains no unclearness. As C. S. Peirce points out, distinctness, understood in 'logical' terms, is equivalent to 'contained within the definition of.'[23] Thus, since *cogito egro sum* in an analytic truth, Descartes cannot provide us with any information about himself that is beyond the formal notion of a thinking thing. Acoordingly, Descartes asserts that nothing more can be said than that he is a nonmaterial substance whose whole essence is to think. He arrives at this conclusion based on two observations that he makes. First, he has a clear and distinct idea that, as a nonmaterial substance, he cannot be understood apart from his one attribute of thought Second, he conceives himself to be unextended and, thus, wholly distinct from the body within which he resides. As Gassendi notes, it is questionable whether Descartes really knows himself clearly and distinctly, given his inability to explicate the nature of thinking

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substance.[24] Peirce adds that the problem may rest in the fact that Descartes never makes a distinction between *actually* clear and distinct ideas and *seemingly* clear and distinct ideas; he trusts self–consciousness to be infallible.[25] It is significant to note that the assumption that conscious awareness is infallible is a notion common to Catholicism and other advocates of introspection, wherein a person is advised to appeal to his conscience for proper guidance. The problem arises as to how Descartes can establish the existence of any physical reality if he is, in fact, a nonmaterial being. Unless he can find a convincing proof of the way in which a nonmaterial being can acquire knowledge of coropreal substance, Descartes will be forced to accept the skeptical conclusion that certain knowledge is unattainable.[26]

With respect to the second point of criticism, Descartes searches for an answer to the problem of how he can acquire knowledge of the external world in his idea of God as Perfect Being. He claims to ascertain the necessary existence as God from the clear and distinct idea of God which he is able to summon up in his mind. However, according to his own methodology, his idea of God will be clear and distinct only as long as he is in the meditative state. Since Descartes cannot meditate indefinitely, his idea of God will be subject to doubt, because he will no longer be able to distinguish *actually* clear and distinct ideas from *seemingly* clear and distinct ideas. Descartes feels that he can still be sure of the truth of God's existence, since God, as Perfect Being, ensures the constancy of his world and, hence, the truthfulness of previously clear and distinct ideas recalled from memory.[27] Although this argument may be made in defense of Descartes, I believe that he has overlooked the fact that his memory in particular instances can be erroneous. This oversight results from his reliance on God as Perfect Being and as the guarantor of true intuitions recalled from memory. To this

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effect, S. V. Keeling points out that "Descartes provides no suitable guarantee for its (memory's) truthfulness, since we do have erroneous memories.[28] This is demonstrated when we often have memories of events which never took place and a lack of memories of events that did take place.

Concerning the third point of criticism, Descartes' assertion that God ensures the truthfulness of clear and distinct ideas recalled from memory creates one more problem for him to overcome. For, this assertion, combined with his failure to provide a suitable guarantee for the memory or, at least, a method to distinguish memories of intuition from memories of non-intuitions, leads to the questionable possibility of attributing error to Perfect Being, who, by definition, can only be the source of perfection.

With respect to the fourth point of criticism, that in his effort to prove God's existence Descartes commits the fallacy of circular reasoning, it is important to note that Descartes feels that only a perfect being can be the ultimate source of a clear and distinct idea of perfection. Descartes claims that God must be the source of his clear and distinct idea of Perfect Being, because the source of an idea must be more perfect than the idea itself. Since man errs, sins, and doubts, he cannot be the source of his idea of God; nor can a deceiving demon be its source, since deception is an imperfection. Descartes' search for a certain truth which would provide him with knowledge of the physical world and allow him to escape the skepticism toward which his method was leading was unsuccessful. For, while he posited God's existence as a necessary presupposition for the removal of doubt, Descartes then proved His existence by going outside the parameters of his methodlogy. The truthfulness of his innate idea of God, which allegedly originates in God, was ascertained by the unconfirmed

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proposition that God guarantees the truthfulness of clear and distinct intuitions. Thus, Descartes was, indeed, guilty of circular reasoning and should have ended his struggle to find a foundation for certain knowledge suspended in solipsistic doubt. This solipsism can be defended, to the extent that it can be a source of certainty for Descartes, as long as he is willing to refrain from using language to refer to things beyond what he can personally experience, but which he can show through some other activities and modes of practice.[29]

With respect to the fifth point of criticism, Descartes lopsidedly attributes human error primarily to the will. While he admits to the existence of a composite being called 'man', Descartes describes himself as being only that part of the composite known as the mind, which serves to direct the activities of the body. However, his explanation of human error conflicts with this description. Descartes attributes real error to his will when it makes judgments about ideas which are not clearly and distinctly perceived by his intellect yet he blames this lack of clearness and distinctness on man's contingent status as a composite being. Descartes describes himself, in Platonic terms, as a mind trapped within a body, at least until the body's demise. He claims that it is because the nature of mind and body are so distinct that their interaction yields confused ideas. Now, if Descartes is going to be consistent, he must hold that the composite being is primarily responsible for errors. For, he admits that there is nothing within him that can cause him to be deceived or misled, and that the senses are not actually responsible for error either (i. e., they only occasion error). Thus, since Descartes, as mind, must be united with a body if he is to confirm his innate knowledge of the physical world, and since most errors concern judgments about the physical world, human error must be attributed to each member of the composite being.

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While Descartes may consider himself to be essentially a thinking thing, on contingent grounds[30] he must accept that he is empirically connected to his body for a lifetime and that, in this lifetime, error must be attributed to both his mind and his body.

With respect to the sixth and final point of criticism, Descartes' statement that the will plays a primary role in human error seems to contradict his rationalist philosophy. By describing the will as having unlimited power, he appears to be positing the intellect as a secondary faculty. Descartes elucidates this apparent contradiction in a later work, *Principles of Philosophy*, where he states that "we possess only two modes of thinking: the perception of the intellect and the operation of the will."[31] AS C. S. Peirce points out, the will is distinct from thought; while doubt is the motive for thought, the goal of thought is belief, which is established by an act of will.[32] Because Descartes may not actually have a clear and distinct idea of himself, he erroneously concludes that all of the functions of the mind are functions of thought. It is dfficult to understand how he can justify his claim, within his own system, that the will has equal status with the intellect, for it is through the will that we receive our idea of God. Further, the will's freedom to choose correct judgments seems to be superior in nature to the intellect's limited ability to apprehend ideas clearly and distinctly. I believe that Descartes makes this assertion because he does not want his rationalism to be mistaken for voluntarism, and that he is justified in doing so, to the extent that the will makes correct judgments only about ideas which are clearly and distinctly apprehended by the intellect. Still, to the extent that the will can be thought of as the faculty of 'choosing to believe', and not as true mode of thought, it can be argued that Descartes is, indeed, a voluntarist, though a voluntarist cloaked in rationalism.

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In conclusion, Descartes, like many seventeenth century scholars, wanted to reconcile accepted theological principles with the apparently conflicting new discoveries made by the scientific community. Thus, he was concerned with two important issues: proving God's existence and finding a foundation for certain knowledge. As a serious Catholic, Descartes felt that a philosophical proof of God's existence was needed to squelch the attacks of atheists, who espoused a purely mechanical view of the world. As a philosopher, he needed to find an argument that would discredit the skepticism and determinism which were popularized by this mechanistic world view. Descartes thought that he had found a solution to both of these problems in his *Meditations on First Philosophy*, but, for reasons I will now reiterate, his effort was unsuccessful.

First, Descartes' methodological assumption that conscious awareness is infallible led him to accept as a clear and distinct idea of himself an idea which only seemed clear and distinct. Because having a clear and distinct idea is the primary criterion of his method, Descartes' whole 'rationalist' epistemology lies on a foundation whose certainty is questionable. Second, this insufficient criterion forced him into solipsistic skepticism, since it prevented him from establishing any certainty beyond that of his own existence as a nonmaterial thinking thing. Third, this solipsism required him to presuppose God's existence as the only adequate source of truth. But Descartes did not satisfactorily prove God's existence. First, in claiming that his idea of God includes the knowledge that God ensures the truthfulness of clear and distinct ideas recalled from memory, Descartes overlooked the fact that his memory in particular instances can be erroneous. Second, in positing God as the guarantor of true intuitions, Descartes also allowed for the questionable possibility of attributing error to Perfect Being. Third, in claiming that

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God is the source of his clear and distinct idea of God, Descartes committed the fallacy of circular reasoning, for which he has gained notoriety in the philosophical world. Hence, since Descartes did not satisfactorily prove God's existence, he should have ended his search for a certain foundation for truth suspended in solipsistic doubt

Finally, from his description of himself as a nonmaterial thinking thing, and his emphasis on the will's role in human error, it is clear that Descartes hoped to overcome the impending determinism and mechanism brought on by science, as both Hobbes and Chomsky have pointed out. Since Descartes had a purely mechanical view of the body, he tried to establish his nature and existence independent of body. This allowed him to attribute error to the will's freedom to choose wrongly. But an accurate explanation of human error must attribute error to both mind and body, according to their participation in the composite being. Though man's status as a composite being may only be contingent, Descartes could not maintain his independent and separate existence, as mind, during his body's lifetime. Hence, there can be no genuine dualism in Descartes' theory of man.

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ARTHAPATTI AS A PRAMANA

The number of *pramāṇas* accepted by each school or system differs, but that is not going to be my point of concern in the present paper. I am concerned here with *Arthāpatti* accepted as separate *pramāṇa* in the school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā and Advaita Vedānta. *Arthāpatti* is one of the varieties of *parokṣa pramā* and *pramāṇa*, which, though looks like *Anumāna*, is really different from it.

Prabhākara regards 'doubt' as the starting point of *Arthāpatti* – there are two cognitions obtained through two *pramāṇas*, which are both true in themselves. But they appear to be contradicting and this contradiction gives rise to the doubt about the truthfulness of each. And this doubt is resolved by supplying another fact.

To support Prabhākara's position I cite an example :–

The light is not on.
The switch is on.
∴ There must be defect in supply of current.

I perecive that there is no light in the room and also that the switch is on. Conflict or doubt arises between these two propositions, which are true in themselves. The doubt is resolved by presuming that there must be defect in the supply of current.

According to Kumārīla, *Arthāpatti* arises when there is contradiction or conflict in mind (not doubt like Prabhākara) and we try to free the mind from it, by discovering a presumption which dissolves the conflict. For example, on hearing that " Devdatta, who is fat, does not eat during the day " we at once conclude that he must be eating at night, because the conflict arises in being fat and not eating in the day; it follows by *Arthāpatti* that he eats at night. [1]

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The epistemic situation can be represented as follows :–

1. Devadatta's absense at home –	Conflict arises. It is resolved by *Arthāpatti* i. e., by presuming his being somewhere outside.
2. Devadatta's being alive –	

Thus, in *Arthāpatti* two *pramāṇas* are involved. The two propositions are true in themselves and both these *pramāṇas* which lead to *Arthāpatti,* cannot be specific. For, if they are specific, they cannot be reconciled – so one of the conflicting *pramāṇas* should be general and one specific. [2]

Arthāpatti is accepted as a separate *pramāṇa* by the Mīmāṁsakas because they are basically interested in exegetical problems where a need arises to reconcile apparently coflicting statements, all of which are to be accepted as true.

Another school which accepts *Arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa* is Advaita Vedānt. It was necessary for this schol to accept it as a separate *pramāṇa* because its approach to the empirical world could be explained and justified only on the basis of *Arthāpatti.* The whole of multiplicity is a mere appearance, and to regard the world as real is due to ignorance or *avidyā.* The day our ignorance is removed by knowledge, we realise that this phenomenal world is not real. Reality is just one and that is *Brahman.* To prove their philosophy, so many presumptions had to be made, by having certain things in our direct perception and proving the others by presuming them. So they accepted *Arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa,* and denied its subsumption under *Anumāna,* (like Naiyāyikas who subsume *Arthāpatti* under *Kevala Vyatirekī Anumāna*).

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The Vedānta view is very close to the Prabhākara's view of *Arthāpatti*. So I will not go into the details of Vedāntic view.

Mīmāṁsakas accept *Arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa* because of their concern with exegetical problems and Vedāntins accepted it because of their concern, more with mataphysical problems, though a metaphysical system is incomplete without a theory of knowledge or epistemology.

Arihāpatti is a separate *pramāna*. It can be pointed out that in *Arthāpatti* there is no relation of implication. That is, the fact to be explained is independent of the fact on the basis of which it is being explained. Though some Indian Philosophers point out that " Arthāpatti is a case where the basic truth functions, in such a way that implication and disjunction are combined for drawing an inference "

But it seems that *Arthāpatti* cannot have an implication relationship, because in the given example to say that –

I. Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during the day, and

II. Therefore, he eats at night

Both the statements are independent of each other and are true in themselves, whereas in *Anumāna* there is a relationship of implication, as for example

" If there is smoke on the hill
then there is fire on the hill. "

This point can also be explicated with the help of a truth table.

There is smoke on the hill – p
There is fire on the hill – q

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If we apply the truth table of $\supset$ [3] then in the case of *Anumāna*–

p	$\supset$	q
T	T	T
T	F	F
F	T	T
F	T	F

Here in the second case when p is true and q is false value of $\supset$ is false, and we do not fall into any difficulty or confusion because " if there is smoke on the hill, then there is fire on the hill. "

But if the above truth table of $\supset$ is applied to the example of *Arthāpatti* –

> If Devadatta is fat and he does not eat during the day, then he must be eating at night then the formal structure will be as follows :–

$$(p \,.\, \sim q) \supset r$$

where –

Devdatta is fat – p

Eats during the day – q

Eats at night – r

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then the truth table of the above formula –

p	·	~	q	⊃	r
T	F	F	T	T	T
T	F	F	T	T	F
T	T	T	F	T	T
T	T	T	F	F	F
F	F	F	T	T	T
F	F	F	T	T	F
F	F	T	F	T	T
F	F	T	F	T	F

In the above truth-table we find that in the fourth line the value of ⊃ comes out to be 'F'. But in the case of *Arthāpatti* the truth value of ⊃ should be tautologous, because if it is not tautologous, and is contingent, then the whole purpose of applying *Arthāpatti* falls to the ground, as the purpose of *Arthāpatti* is to resolve the doubt or conflict. But in the above truth-table in the fourth line the doubt or conflict is not resolved because the truth value comes out to be 'false'. Also, in the of *Arthāpatti* the two propositious are the result of two *pramāṇas* which are true in themselves, but appear to be conflicting, and the conflict should be resolved, which is not the case in the above truth table. Hence, the relation of implication does not hold in the case of *Arthāpatti.*

It may be observed from an insight into the development of the contemporary world that life situations now a days are

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becoming more and more complex, and the need of accepting *Arthāpatti* as a separate *pramāṇa* has become more pronounced. For example, if we look into the field of science, law, etc., we find that presumption has been, and is playing a very important role. To illustrate, when a scientist is faced with a problem, which arises as a result of what he observes and some already established facts, he makes certain presumptions to solve the conflicting problem.

Moreover in the present day life pattern, *Arthāpatti* may be given a wider interpretation than was given to it by its propounders. If we allow to let the meaning of *Arthāpatti* expand its range, then we find that it is being used not only to resolve doubts or apparent conflicts, but also situations in general, e.g. scientific and legal complications are resolved by making certain additional presumptions. To support this, some examples from the field of science and law may be cited here.

Taking an example from the field of science –

Seasons change,

The sun is the centre of the solar system.

Seasons occur due to rotation of earth round the sun.

∴ The earth is tilted.

In the foregoing example, scientists observed that seasons change in a year. They also knew that the Sun is the centre of the solar system and that seasons occur due to earth's rotation round the Sun. But they were faced with the problem as to why seasons do not change uniformly all over the world. To resolve this conflicting situation, they brought in an additional fact that either while revolving around itself or rotating around the Sun the earth is tilted along its axis. So, a whole process of presumption was involved for the purpose of solving the conflicting situation. Ruling out other unhelpful and unsatisfactory

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presumptions the most appropriate presumption was established to be the solution of the problematic situation, viz., in the above example –

'The Earth is tilted along its axis.'

Thus, it may be surmised that presumptions play a very important role in scientific inquiry as well. Without certain presumptions, which are relevent, being made, a scientist is unable to satisfactorily explain conflicting situations. From this it may be held that what are called hypotheses or conjectures is science are nothing else but presumptions (taken in their wider sense), which may be proved or disproved.

Switching now to the field of law, one of the major premise of law is that every one is presumed to be aware of all the laws – the presumption of awareness resolves various conflicts which may arise when after committing a crime, an offender pleads ignorance in court.

Moving a step further, in the Indian Evidence Act, the disputes in court are adjudicated also through a process in which court relies, to a great extent, on the method of presumption. Specifically outlined, there are three facets of presumption process :–

1. *May Presume :* It is provided by this Act that the court *may* presume a fact; it may either regard such a fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved or may call for proof of it.

2. *Shall Presume :* It is directed by this Act that the court *shall* presume a fact; it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved.

3 *Conclusive Proof :* When one fact is declared by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the court shall, on proof

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of the one part, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow the evidence given for the purpose of disproving it.[4]

In the first case the court may or may not presume. The discretion lies with the court. The presumption would be operative but rebuttable.

In the second case, there is a binding upon the court to presume. The court is bound to presume–but what it presumes is rebuttable.

In the third case, the presumption of one fact is made to prove the other, and there is no scope for its being disproved as no rebutting evidence can be adduced. It is irrebuttable.

The aforesaid third type of presumption is *Arthāpatti* in the wider sense.

To support this third type of presumption, certain examples may be cited from the field of law.

Birth During Marriage : Conclusive Proof of Legitimacy

The fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, is a conclusive proof, that he is the legitimate child of that man.[5]

If a man and wife are divorced, and a child is born within two hundred and eighty days after the dissolution of marriage, the mother remaining unremarried, shall be a conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man.[6]

Another example from the field of law, where presumption plays a very important role, is one of the provisions made for divorce–

If a woman files in a petition for divorce, on the ground that her husband has not been staying with her and has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those

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persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive, then the court presumes that the person concerned is dead, unless someone affirms to the contrary. If someone affirms the contrary then the burden of proof lies on the person affirming it.[7]

So, here also presumption plays an important part. Like this we can find many examples in the legal field where on certain presumptions certain decisions are taken.

Thus, *Arthāpatti* has relevance and importance in the contemporary world. *Arthāpatti,* which was accepted by Mīmāṁsakas and Advaita Vedāntins as a separate *pramāṇa* in their philosophical framework, and was given an independent status, was no doubt rejected by Naiyāyikas, because it did not fit in their philosophical framework. But on the basis of the foregoing discussion we can say that the formers's (Mimāṁsa and Vedānta) point of view is more acceptable.

Stated in nutshell, we may therefore say that to understand the range of human thinking and its relationships to persons, objects, and cosmos in general, the ways of knowing should be taken in their wider range. Subsuming all the methods of knowing under *pratyaksa* or *Anumana* does not solve many of the present day problems. It is desirable that due credit should be given to Mīmāṁsakas and Vedāntins, who gave importance to *Arthāpatti* and accepted it as a separate *pramāṇa.* They were the ones, who realised that so many conflicts, doubts and situations cannot be resolved without the help of *Arthāpatti. Anumāna* cannot solve them, and *Anumāna* and *Arthapatti* are different.

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NOTES

1. "Arthapattirapi drstah Srutovarthonyatha nopapadyate ityarthakalpana Yatha jivate Devadatte grhabhavadarsanena bahirbhavasyadrsta kalpana," *Sabara Bhasya*, (trans. G. N. Jha, 1973) 1.1.5.

2. "Sarvatra carthapattau sadharanasadharana pramanavirodha eva samagri," *Nititattvavirbhava* of Cidananda, (ed. P. K. Narayana Pillai 1953) p. 158.

3. '⊃' (Horse-shoe) is a Logical Constant used for implication or entailment in symbolic logic.

4. Govt. of Indla, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, *Indian Evidence Act, 1872* Section 4.

5. *Ibid*, Section 112, "Unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other."

6. *Ibid.*

7. Govt. of India, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs *Hindu Marriage Act, 1955* Section 13 (vii) and *The Evideace Act, 1872* Section 108.

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SARTRE ON HUMAN FREEDOM

Traditionally the notion of freedom with its different philosophical aspects is taken as 'human freedom'. Human freedom is important as much metaphysically as ethically. Ethically it is the freedom of will directed toward an action (inclusive of not to do an act) which is known as human freedom. Sartre, the great French philosopher, is in favour of the equation i. e., freedom = human freedom = intentional action. In this paper I shall try to discuss the Sartrean notion of human freedom.

'Freedom', in a word, is another name for 'withdrawal from nature'. By 'Nature', we understand the system of events governed by the law of causality, so that what belongs to 'Nature' is either a cause or an effect or 'cause' in relation to an effect or an 'effect' in relation to a cause. The withdrawal from nature is indicated in the questioning, nihilating and imaginative activities of man. As a questioning being, man has a permanent possibility of dissociating himself from nature. Man is free from nature, for he is no part of the causal-series. In Sartre's language freedom is the nihilation of the 'in-itself' by the 'for-itself'.

According to existentialism, human existence is prior to essence. In Sartre's language existence precedes his essence"[1]. It is the first principle of existentialism. According to them, man alone is *completely free* to act, because he is not determined. Only objects are determined. It is called in Sartre's language 'Pour Soi (the for itself). Man is what he *makes* of himself, instead of being *made*. Human existence should he understood through man's action. Action is the first condition of freedom. Without action freedom is meaningless. Man *acts*, whereas events *happen*. So an action is the expression of human freedom.

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Action, in existentialism, is in principle intentional. Intentional action means that action which is self-consciously performed by the actor. Goldman said, "Intentional acts are often acts that the agent *wanted* to do, indeed *wanted* to do for their own sake"[2]. In existentialist point af view, without intention any action is just an event. Event just *happens* or takes place. But, to act without intention is really not to act at all. For Example, a smoker who by mistake sets fire to a house does not act, because he does not perform the act intentionally.

Any action presupposes an objective lack. Sartrean concept of lack is lack of "something". This lack of something is not *absence* of an object conceived e.g., by a realist of the *Nyāya* pursuasion. According to existentiallsm, this something remains not in the world of facts or actuality, but in the realm of possibility. So the lack which is at the heart of consciousness is a lack of complete possibilities; and it must always remain unsatisfied as long as a being is conscious. This is the import of Sartre's famous statement that "man is condemned to be free"[3]. Only an action can actualize it.

Sartrean concept freedom is not described ordinarily as we describe something possessing a particular essence. Freedom has no essence. Essence is a-priori and given. But freedom is not *given.* It *makes* itself as an act and we can understand this freedom through the acts. It is not the quality or property of human being. It is the very root of their being.

Jean Wahl mentions that "the Sartrean doctrine of freedom has a number of peculiar features. To begin with, Sartre maintains that if a being is free, he is always free, in all situations, under all circumstances. In classical theories of freedom, we are said to be free at certain moments and not free at certain others. But Sartre tells us that "if man is free, he is always free"[4]. That is to say, freedom is involved in every structure of human existence.

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It is not, however, enough to know that one is free to act. For, one loses his freedom if he does nothing. Action is the only thing that enables a man to exist. Thus, an action is the expression of freedom.

In freedom, man is provided with a supreme opportunity to give meaning to his life, which hence before has been an empty shell. In the course of giving meaning to his life, he looks upon his whole world as meaningful. Freedom is, therefore, the very core of and the door of an authentic existence.

Freedom is not the freedom of any one individual; it is freedom of man as such in so far as man is man, i. e., so far as man exists. But since every man is free, each one's freedom is dependent on others' and *vice–versa*. Similarly, Prof. Wahl also mentions that some sort of analogy could be drawn between the Sartrean doctrine of freedom and the Kantian idea of the universalization of the maxim in the *Critique of Practical Reason* in choosing a mode of behaviour for myself. I choose it in a way for all men; I decide that all men ought to behave in such and such a fashion in a particular situation. Hence, man is responsible not only for his own action but also for that of others.

So, Sartre truly said that 'freedom is not only a blessed right but also a curse and a yoke'. Every man is free and yet has responsibilities. According to Sartre, "what happens to me happens through me and I can neither affect myself with it nor revolt against it, nor resign myself to it. There are no accidents in life. What happens suddenly has not come from outside; rather it has come from within me".[5] Any action depends on me; it is done by me and it is for me. Thus, every man is free and responsible for his action. If something bad happens, nobody except the agent himself, is really to blame as much as if anything that is good

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happens. Because the intention behind the action is the intention of the agent himself. Nobody, except the agent himself, is to be praised or blamed, man being completely free and every action being intentional. Man carries the burden of the result of his choice, whether good or bad. That, perhaps, is the best interpretation of a concrete man.

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NOTES

1. *Existentialism and Humanism*, London, Methuen, 1955, p. 52.
2. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, *A Theory of Human Action*, Princeton University press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976, p. 50.
3. *Being and Nothingness*, London, Methuen, 1976, p. 439.
4. *Philosophies of Existence*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969, p. 60.
5. *Being and Nothingness*, London, Methuen, 1976, p. 554.

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MAYA : THE GREAT VEIL

Plato's analogy of The Cave in the 5th century B. C. is a western example of concepts that have been common to Hindu metaphysics for perhaps a thousand or more years. In Book VII of Plato's *Republic*, a story is told of a subterranean cave inside of which were many people. Restrained by fetters since childhood, they sat in positions such that they were forced to direct their eyes at the shadowy images that played upon the wall before them. They had no knowledge of the fire behind them, or the wooden and stone image archetypes. They were equally ignorant of the existence of the puppeteers who played the images before the firelight to project the silhouettes upon the cave walls. To these spectators, reality consisted of an incorporation of ideas about the world based on these ersatz sensations. Even though one of the group was allowed to leave the cave, his struggle and consequent enlightenment was greeted by fear and suspicion by the others who remained below. It is probable that Plato's contact with merchants, travellers and philosophers from the East fueled this concept of a world composed of shadowy images conceived through ignorance. Plato's analogy, carried on the wings of eastern mysticism, became buried beneath the weight of Atomism, Mathematics, Geometry and Astronomy. It was not until the 17th century that western minds again began to seriously investigate the possibility that what was around them in the world of sense objects was open to skepticism and critical doubt. René Descartes first popularized in western Europe the idea that perception and apprehension of an external body may not necessarily have any roots in truth at all. We all might believe and behave as if we have genuine knowledge of material objects, while in fact we may be living a great delusion. Berkeley was to carry that idea even further when he denounced the existence of

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any material substances. He claimed the outer world to be no more than a vision of conceptions based on a series of ordered sense impressions carried within ourselves. Spinoza took things a step further by postulating that all that exists are either extensions, attributes or modes of only one real, true substance: God. This monistic view of reality is deeply embedded in eastern religions and is an aspect of the great veil of delusion the Hindus call Māyā. This work will attempt to lift the veil ever so little as to allow a glimpse of light to enter the discussion. My tool will be the works of various authors and commentators, each with their own interpretation of Hindu metaphysics based on ancient sanskrit writings. Not only are difficulties posed by the variations of viewpoints (even Śaṁkara's interpretations are argued), but also that such abstractions are often difficult to handle within the context and limitations of language. As a whole, understanding of reality as the Supreme Reality lies beyond intellectualization and semantics. It is a knowledge which is felt rather than verbalized. Intuitive and personal, objectification of this concept falls short of its true essence.

In commot Hindu metaphor, *Māyā* is like the desert mirage which disappears as soon as one gets closer; it is the rope which lies in the dirt which is mistaken for a snake; the shell which appears yellowed when seen through tinted glass. The word *Māyā* comes from the root mā which means "to measure, to form, to build."[1] In the ancient writings of the *Upaniṣads,* it is often referred to as ignorance *(avidyā*). In the more recent works of the *Bhagavad-Gītā, māyā* is *Prakṛti,* the differentiated matter from which all delusions of duality are born and in which the ignorant take refuge *Māyā* has many names as the Creator Himself Referred to as the Relative Reality; infatuation with the material; the World of Appearances; the "World Show"; the All Deceptive; the Illusion; the Delusion; the Phantasmagoria,

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Māyā takes on the embodiment of phenomenal reality as a world of constant flux and change expressed in a multitude of forms. It is a world composed of spatio–temporal divisions stuctured in causal relations. Spiritually, it is man's paramount quest to unchain himself from a life amidst *māyā*, where everything appears to be either "this" or "that". The result is that he still lives surrounded by, though untouched by, *Māyā's* powerful grip, much like a spectator who watches but is not a part of the game. Using his intellect and cognitive capabilities, he can break out of his self–perpetuating prison to seek liberation (*mokṣa*) through enlightenment and unification with the All One, *Brahman*. His avenues for this pursuit are prayer, meditation and the selfless service to all mankind. In contrast, failure to take the righteous path leads to a continuing struggle with lust (kāma), anger (*krodha*), violence (*himsā*), greed (*lobha*), pride (māna), egoism (*ahaṁkar*), illusion (*moha*), and attachments or infatuation to material objects (*māyā*). When a man's mind is bathed in *māyā* and he clutches to it as if it were his god, the evil tendencies in his nature will be passionately manifest in his motives and actions Thus, he will only find bondage (*bhāva*) to the beginingless cycle of birth and death; a carousel called *saṁsāra*. By the power of *mahānāyā*, the great delusion (*mahāmoha*) descends. Release can be found by leading a pure life which transcends the temptations of *māyā* amidst the impurities of the world; "like the lotus in water, rooted in it, yet untouched, should be the yogi's ideal."[2] It is the cessation of all desires, complete control of the body and mind to realization of total amity with the cosmos, the Changeless and Absolute Existence, the Infinite One.

When man worships and prays to a God with attributes (*saguṇa*), as if this were His true essence, he is worshipping a personal God (*Parabramha*), and he is living in *māyā*. By proje-

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cting specific characteristics such as goodness, power, willfullness, or benevolence onto God, man is projecting limitations. By claiming that He has form or extension, that He is *Viṣṇu, Śiva,* the sun or the moon, man or beast, mountain or stream, is to be living in the realm of *māyā*. Finitude is imperfection, which is not *Brahman*. God as a conditional, relative and manifested form is only a reflection of His true essence. As such, for this man, his God is an illusion. In His Absolute Wholeness, *Brahman* is beyond phenomenology, name, form, distinctions and diversity *(nirguṇa)*. Impersonal and dispassionate, *Brahman* defies boundedness. However, all distinctions in the form of attributes which emanate from *Brahman* are really manifestations of Him as the Infinite. Just as the heat cannot be separated from the fire, the two are inseparable, though not the same. Despite seeming attributes, indivisible wholeness remains preserved amongst the plurality of the world of appearances; "This is full, that is full, from fullness fullness proceeds. It we take away the fullness of fullness even fullness then remains." [3] What men call many, the wise recognize as the One. "Yet the ignorant do not know him, for behind the names and the forms he remains hidden." [4] *Brahman* as simultaneously residing in all forms and also as a "thing-in-itself" is only a cognitive marker to the true essence of *Brahman* as identity-in-difference, unity-in-diversity; a merging of the unclassifiable. Attempts to clothe *Brahman* in description is only one of the many misappreshensions of those living close to *māyā*.

When a man relates towards sense or material objects as to let them be the cause or guide of his behavior, this is a delusion When he distinguishes between one thing and other things, this from those, he is living in *māyā*. This causes man to see the world as composed of distinct and separate entities, bounded by limitation. He, therefore, senses, relates to and intellectualizes his

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world as a collection of material parts. He perceives these parts as having varying degrees of interrelationships. As a result, he sees only a minute part of the greater, whole picture This pluralistic view of the cosmos within the confines of empiricism is the fruit of ignorance *(avidyā)* and the food of dreams.

Within this false outlook man perceives himself as a separate entity as well. This leads to individualism, egoism, and a sense of having personal rights. Not only is his point of view subjectively limited, but he also imagines himself possessing a uniqueness and an independence from others. This fosters a need to protect himself from the loss of autonomy, to safeguard it when threatened, and strive towards maintaining its individuation. Such a position is the breeding place of evil amongst men. Caught in a polarity of opposites, the duality of right and left, me and them, I and Thou, the lone self remains buried deep within the sheaths of the material world, shackled to a selfish destiny. Although the soul is not an aspect of the material world, its true nature as the Universal Self remains hidden from conscious view when obscured by desire and delusion. Views of selfhood, the world, and even God are a psychological constructs of personal character which mirror the state of man's mind.

As stated above, *māyā* takes on many forms; all which serve as a blockade to real human happiness and true bliss. Also, it has been noted that the responsibility for this achievement lies upon man's own shoulders by choosing to take up the path in search of truth and enlightenment which lies outside the realm of *māyā* Beyond this relative reality in which man finds only fear, pain, ignorance and fleeting transitory happiness is Absolute Reality of pure, unending Consciousness and Bliss. It is represented by the idea of non–duality *(advaita)* (as opposed to the numerical implications of monism or unity (*aikya*)), and its doctrine is espoused most avidly by Śaṁkara's *Vedānta*

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philosophy some 800 years before Descartes. In Śaṁkara's view, *māyā* is a logical conclusion within the context of the Brahmanic view of Being; the sense objects of the material world exist not but in man's own imagination–like the desert mirage it is an illusion. His standpoint is one which states that the only absolute existence without qualification is Brahman. He alone is pure Being, the real of the real *(satyasyasatyam)*. It is only the ignorant blindness of the human mind which creates the illusion. The later *Upaniṣads* may give support to Śaṁkara's metaphysical doctrine. However, this view has been challenged as a gross misinterpretation by other commentators such as Pratima Bowes. For her, 'unreal' does not mean 'non-existent,' but instead should be metaphorically translated in the ancient works as 'not relevant.' What *is* an illusion is man's belief in his self isolation and that ultimate human happiness rests solely on his cravings for the fleeting pleasures of the material world. For Radhakrishnan, māyā is a concept which signifies the fragile nuances of the universe; "*Māyā* does not mean that the empirical world with the selves in it is an illusion, for the whole effort of the cosmos is directed and sustained by the one supreme self, which though distinct from everything is implicated in everything."[5] It is a distinction between the real and the Ultimately Real in which the former is but a symbol of the latter. Edwin Burtt's contention is that if the empirical world were an illusion, it would be completely nonexistent when the illusion is removed. Further, an unreal world would not exhibit the relative constancy that remains such that even though the "snake" is dispelled, the rope still remains. Thus, for Burtt, māyā is a case of mistaken identity, a delusion For these interpreters, the qualified empirical world as it appears to one who is awake exists in the middle level between the unreal and the re l. Below is the world of hallucinations and above, the world of the transcendent superconsciousness.

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The ultimate reason for the appearance of the phenomenal world seems to be a mystery (Is it a test ?), a sort of great cosmic riddle. There seems to be no answer for the riddle. (Indeed, some contend that it is a nonsensical questian to ask !) Magical and tricky, the implications for some is that the world need not be taken seriously; that it is only God's play (*līlā*) or some kind of purposeless frolic in which He plays with Himself. Like a cosmic dance, the endless flow of pure consciousness and vitality gently pours forth to envelope the world in form of ceaseless–self expression (*śakti*) God is the Great Cosmic Magician (*māyin* means magician) who conjures up a world of appearances which befuddles and deceives the sleeping as if under a spell. Like lures thrown out by fisherman, *māyā* glitters in the false refractions of the materialistic and pleasure seeking aspects of human life, hooking those who swim in darkened waters. This mere spectacle thus presented is embodied within the Supreme Reality: a superimpositon within which the shadow conceals the Real. To Śaṁkara, *māyā* does not belong to Brahman and He is not a part of this great cosmic deception; it is the creation of the unillumined human mind For others Brahman must be the creator and efficient cause of all mind, matter and *māyā*. Although "*Brahman* does not exist as an empirical object–for instance, like a pot or a tree–but as an Absolute Existence, without which material objects could not be perceived to exist. Just as a mirage cannot be seen without the desert, which is its unrelated substratum, so also the universe cannot exist without *Brahman.*"[6] Max Weber suggests that the world is 'created" through *māyā*. It is presented by some kind of demi–urge, a demonical creature called *Īśvara,* behind which the Absolute Reality is concealed. This idea incorporates the other sense of *māyā* as the power of a god or demon to produce illusory effects. In another interpretation, this demon may well be the subconscious stratification of the human

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personality; bringing us full circle with Śaṁkara's subjective projection of illusion upon the real world. In the *Gītā*, this *Īśvara* is God with attributes, the personal God that is recognized as the Omnipotent Sovereign One, the cosmic consideration of most men

In the *Upaniṣads*, the Lord created out of himself the world: There was created *Prāṇa*, the primal energy embodied in the sun. Also created was *Rayi*, the giver of forms which is the moon. From *Prāṇa* and *Rayi* together is created food, seed and the creatures and more. All is the Universal Soul However, the *Upaniṣads* do indicate that God is the creator of the illusion when Śrī Kṛṣṇa says;

> "Now, one should know that Nature is illusion
> And that the Mighty Lord is the illusion–maker" [7]

Though direct usage of the world "*māyā*" is rare in the *Upaniṣads*, it is found throughout the *Bhagavad-Gītā* in ample and extended form In the *Gītā*, the power of *Brahman* is manifest in the primal matter which is called *Prakṛti*, synonymous with *māyā*. *Prakṛti* is composed of the three forces or guṇas. All creation is subject to the three kinds of consciousness and/or determination. Either *Sattva* the shining, *Rajas*, the passionate; or *Tamas*, the ignorant will dominate the nature of a being. Man can choose which of the three to foster and cultivate, since the *guṇas* are subject to change and transition as part of the shifting relative world; its mutable as well as it's cyclic nature. Describing the cosmos as it undergoes recall during the 'Night of *Brahma*' Smith says, "Thus like a gigantic accordion the world swells out and is drawn back in. This oscillation is a permanent fearure of existence; the universe will have no beginning and no end." [8] Alternating between potentiality and expression, the

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world is like the Eternal Breath drawn in and out as timeless immortality where all guṇas go from equilibrium to their various dominations over all things.

When one expresses devotion in relation to the personal levels of worldly existence as a worshiper of a deity-in-human-form, one is said to be on the plane of bhakti. One need only to note the multitude of such gods in everyday Hindu life to be convinced of its popularity. Part of the manifested philosophic concept of *Saguṇa Brahman,* māyā is personified in several goddesses Śaṁkara wrote poetry in praise of such a one : the Goddess (*Śakti–Māyā–Devī*), the Mother of the World There are also the mythologically inspired goddesses *Durgā* and *Mahādevī*. Both are associated with *śakti, prakṛti* and *māyā,* thus encompassing both creation and delusion. The wife of *Śiva, Mahādevī*, is the great goddess identified as a "powerful, active, dynamic being who creates, pervades, governs and protects the universe." [9] She represents a positive attitude towards the world, and like *Saguṇa Brahman,* can assume a thousand names and forms.

Durgā is the cosmic queen who bewitches the creatures she has created as she displays and amuses herself. She is said to have once deluded demons so that *Viṣṇu* could slay them. As warrior goddess and demon slayer, even in battle, all is just sport in the game. Her many arms in motion, she brings a barrage of weapons upon her hapless victim. A vision of action and power, her form is crowned with a face of calm and strainless composure. Effortlessly working her seplls on others, it is said in the tale told by the *Devī-māhātmya* that *Durgā* even held powers over *Viṣṇu* by keeping him unconscious, numbed and deluded. She was *Viṣṇu's māyā*. But like *Mahādevī, Durgā* is also viewed as a positive force as creator, protector, and sustainer of the world.

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There are also ancient tales where the power of *māyā* is utilized for the victory of good over evil. One such is the story of the god *Indra*, who, by using the veil of *māyā*, disguised himself as a mild Brahmin. He then made his appearance among the demonic titans (antigods) who at that moment were bu ildin a towering pyramid, reaching high into the heavens, they planned to climb atop the edifice then act to seize power and command of the universe. As the inoffensive *Brahmin, Indra* merely removeg some of the lower bricks in the tower, causing the structure to collapse in a heap and the demons along with it. Another Vedic myth described how Indra used the power of *māyā* to turn himself into a horsehair to elude his pursuers in battle. In light of these stories, it becomes evident that *māyā* represents a double edged sword.

Now that we have recognized the creation of *māyā* and man's relationship to it, it seems that our next step is to examine how to triumph over *māyā* and its stultifying grip. First is the triad of **purification** of the body and mind **concentration** and meditation upon the truths and, **identification** with that truth. Important is the recognition that the aim for all human life is in self–definition Though surrounded by the finite, the soul aspires for the infinite. What is necessary is to attain the ability to discriminate between the finite and the infinite. With descrimination, one is able to pass through the world of appearances without affection to it. Indifference to worldly pleasure or heavenly delights, the bonds of addiction are broken. Through the two holy paths of right knowledge (*jñānayoga*) and right action (*karmayoga*), all will become clear and certain as enlightenment wipes away the dust which covers the lens of the mind's eye The mind is able to become the mirror of divine reflection. Upon discovery that man's hidden self is actually identical with the Universal Self, dispelled are delusions of the

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isolation, separateness, and individuation which foster selfishness. What follows is the attainment of man's spiritual destiny through life's highest achievement ; knowledge and complete devotion to the One. By becoming unselfish and compassionate to the all of which one is a part, one turns to the selfless service of others. Through self effort and discipline of mind, body, thought and action, freedom from the mutable and the material is spiritual liberation. Salvation is achieved when one seeks to know, and apprehends, the one Truth through the removal of ignorance. Knowledge alone saves and the veil is lifted. It is knowledge which is not thought, but discovered; an experience of pure awareness. Through it, one can transcend the slavery to falsehood and achieve liberation. Saved from the suffering of rebirth into other lives, pluralities are dissolved and full realization of the self as a oneness with *Brahman* is acknowledged. " The *guṇas* are released from their agitation in this vortex, and the disturbance in this individual dissolves. "[10] He has found release.

In ancient India, life was filled with an ominous atmosphere of threat, danger, suspicion, intrigue and murder as kingdoms were fought for, and battles won or lost. From within, feudal lords sought to increase land, wealth, power and status. If those who strove for conquest and power were not in actual combat, even so they were engaged in a continual " white " war of nerves. Though heavily armed, they felt endangered, remaining ever watchful for surprise The subterfuge which men played upon others joined alliance with māyā and became the controller of men. Life was marked by sudden changes, the possibility for death and disgrace. From without, sweeping tides of invading armies such as the Aryan and Nordic invasions came and were absorbed. In the wake of a people's blood and strife, it is no surprise that the metaphysical concept of *māyā* is incorporated

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into the national religion. Out of man's hands, *māyā* presents itself as the great veil. In man's hands, it takes on cruel dimensions of man's indignity to man as a powerful weapon of worldwide proportions. In todays world of political diplomacy we watch the folly of man try to delude himself into oblivion. Only those who can see beyond the delusions of both man and māyā will be free of the destruction.

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NOTES

1. *Philosophies of India* by H. Zimmer, p.19.
2. *Religions of India* by Singh Talib, p. 152.
3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, V. 1. 1.
4. *The Upaniṣads*, p. 80
5. *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, p. 27,
6. *Three Ways of Asian Wisdom*, p. 53.
7. *The Sourcebook*, p. 91
8. *The Religions of Man*, p. 72.
9. *Hinda Goddesses*, p. 135.
10. *Philosophies of India*, by H. Zimmer, p. 330.

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DUHKHA : ADVITIC PERSPECTIVE

Every activity of Man, be it mental, bodily or verbal, arises from his inborn desire to solve the basic problems of life. Philosophical activity, generally spoken of as philosophisation, also pertains to man's basic thinking, analysis, conceptualisation and solving process regarding the problems of life. A basic and concrete example of this is found in the Indian Philosophical tradition, which has direct relevance to the problems of human life. It is mainly concerned with seeking solutions to the primary problems, which infest man and mankind. It is aimed at leading man to the promised land of bliss. This promise is best expressed in its ideal of *Mokṣa,* which is its Summum Bonum. Any rational person is bound to immediately raise the most basic question of Why *Mokṣa* ? Why should man strive for this higher form of pleasure ? Are not the empirical pleasures available here good enough ? Are not the scientific means sufficient to gain these pleasures ? Why should one opt for the difficult means nf philosophical inquiry ?

In Indian thought, *Mokṣa* negatively refers to a state of freedom from *duḥkha.** It is essentially the problem of *duḥkha* that has motivated the Indian Philosophical thought process in particular, and universal philosophisation, in general. They wanted to analyse and find out the origin, cause and means of annihilating *duḥkha.* For *duḥkha* is the common lot of all men born on this mundane planet. It is towards the removal of this *universal duḥkha* that all philosophical inquiry in the Indian scene is directed

No doubt, science and technology has come out with various 'innovate means' of overcoming some of the empirical problems of pain, which trouble men It also at times helps in generating

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some empirical pleasures. But these pleasures are evanescent. They lack the potency of being ever present. It has also created new varieties of *duḥkha*. For instance, Nuclear energy can be used both for peaceful and destructive purposes. But majority of the countries in the world are bent on making use of this boon to produce bombs to destory mankind. They plan to purchase freedom from suffering by generation of more suffering yet to come. Is it not a paradox ?

Another basic problem is regarding the lack of 'certainity' and 'finality' in these prescribed means For instance, a person suffering from fever, takes a few tablets prescribed by a doctor. No doubt, he is cured. But is this offered cure permanent ? No. It does not guarantee that he will never again suffer from fever throughout his life–span. The element of 'finality' and 'certainity' in the means of overcoming *duḥkha* can only be found in philosophical wisdom.

In this paper an attempt is made to present the Advaitin's analysis of *Duḥkha*, in four sections. 1. What is *duḥkha* ? Its metaphysical status; 2. Why does man undergo these experience of *duḥkha* and *sukha* ? How is *duḥkha* produced ?; Types of *duḥkha* and its causes. 3) Means of overcoming *duḥkha*. 4) conclusions.

I

What Is Duḥkha ? Its Metaphysical Status :

The Advaitins define *duḥkha* as that experience arising in the body out of its contact with an unfavourable object [1] Śaṅkara in his *Vivekacūdāmaṇi, śloka* 105 [2] clearly states that when the sense–object contatct is favourable it becomes *sukha*, and *duḥkha* in contrary circumstances. He observes that from the waking state till one's ultimate release *(mokṣa)* all experiences of sukha and *duḥkha* are the creations of the *Jīva*. [3] These experiences

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are the characteristics of the mind and not the real self; just as a lady enjoys a different kind of relationship with different people. For one she is a wife, for other a friend, a mother to a son, a daughter, a daughter, a daughter–in–law etc. The person remains the same; only the relationship changes. [4]

The experiences of *sukha* and *duḥkha* arising out of sense object contact purely exists in the mind. It is out of the mental modification arising from the different permutations and combinations of the three *guṇas* viz, *Sattva, Rajas* and *Tamas*, of the Universe, [5] that produce these experiences. The sāttvic modifications are detachment, fortitude, liberty etc., [6] they produce *duḥkha* [7] The *rājasic* mental modifications are desire, love for objects, attachment, greed; [8] which produce *duḥkha.* [9] The *tāmasic* modifications are delusion, fear etc, [10] which are base and produce experience of pain." [11]

Śaṁkara opines that these experiences of *sukha* and *duḥkha* are real only from the empirical level *(Vyāvaharika)* but not from the transcendental level of reality *(pāramārthika sattā)*[12] for the world and its experiences are unreal from the transcendental level. As against the above position of Śaṁkara, we have Rāmānujācārya, the founder of the *Visiṣṭādvaita* school, who holds that the experiences of duḥkha and sukha are really real. He goes to the extent of granting reality even to the experiences of dreams.

The duḥkhas that man undergoes in the empirical realm is threefold : *Ādhyātmika, Ādhidaivika* and *Ādhibhautika. Ādhyātmika* are of two kinds viz, physical *(śārīrika)* and mental *(mānasika)* The physical pains are those which affect the body For these arise from the body's contact with or attack from agencies such as diseases etc. These agencies also affect the mind

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(manas) and produce neutral pains. *Ādhidaivika* arise from supernatural agencies, whereas *Ādhyātmika* are those caused due to other creatures on the earth. [13]

A. Why does man undergo these experiences of Duḥkha and Sukha ?

Man under the influence of delusion, perceives plurality instead of unity underneath It arises when the mind is disturbed, wavering and unsteady. Śaṁkara contends that this plurality is not real. It is unreal. It is purely apparent. It is unreal and apparent from the transcendental level but as far as empirical level is concerned it is real. It forces the mind to perform karmas, which produce experiences of sukha and duḥkha. These experiences, Saṅkara observes, dominate worldly life (*saṁsāra*) and entangles him to the chain of repeated births and deaths.[14]

B. How does this process of producing Duḥkha take place ?

Man (*Jīva*) who is full of qualities, unsteadiness etc., starts thinking that 'this is I' and 'that is mine', arising from the false identity between *ātman* and the body. This results in the binding of the infinite atman with the finite *ahaṁkāra*. This influences and guides jīva to perform karmas leading to bondage and resultant suffering, the causes for which are avidya and *adhyāṣa*. *Jīva* under the influence of these two vicious principles acts and experiences the world of plurality and the *duḥkha* within.

D. Types of Duḥkha :

Śaṁkara observes that the *Duḥkha* that *jīva* undergoes in this world can be grouped into the following three heads viz., i) Cognitive *duḥkha*, ii) Conative *duḥkha*, and iii) Emotive *duḥkha*.[15]

i) Cognitive Duḥkha :

Cognitive *duḥkha* results from the superimposition of *adhyāsa* on the *jīva* of cognizership (*Pramātṛvam*). Under the influence

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of *adhyāsa* the *jīva* perceives the pure undifferentiated *Brahman* as a manifold objective reality. *Jīva* under its influence develops the false impression of being both the agent and enjoyer. He conceives the notion of I and mine. This notion of 'I' and 'mine' is not confined to the self, but extends to the whole of the body including the sense–organs etc. Śaṁkara opines that *adhyāsa*, which produces this superimposition, is the effect of the cause *avidyā*. *Avidyā* he refers to as the root–cause of all the mundane suffering. [16]

Adhyāsa, Śaṁkara observes, covers the total of experiences both objective and subjective. It starts from birth and continues till death unless the *Jīva* attains true wisdom. The basic characteristic function of *adhyāsa* is to bring about the transfer of the subject and its qualities to the inert object and *vice–versa*. It brings about the mutual transfer of qualities between the subject and object. In this process there is the association of consciousness viz., the subject 'I' with the inert matter, the object which is pure unconsciousness. Both are totally opposed as darkness and light. Śaṁkara opines that adhyāsa is nothing but a case of grand illusion, just as the rope–snake illusion. [17]

The *Jīva* under the influence of *adhyāsa* performs a number of *karmas* which is guided by erroneous intellect. He experiences *Brahman*, the pure *sat-cit–ānanda* not as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss, but as having an objective reference. For all empirical judgements are mere propositions involving a subject–object relationship. He opines further that these relations are only empirically valid. They are unreal when compared to the transcendental level of reality. These subject–object empirical experiences reveal the untrue, unreal nature of the object. Their true real nature is hidden by the āvarana function of māyā. [18]

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Hence, the *Jīva* attaches himself to the unreal, untrue, temporal objects of the mundane world which appear to him as pure existence, pure consciousness and pure bliss. This results in the *jīva* undergoing untold suffering. For, these objects are non-permanent, undergoing change every moment. It is full of fleeting moments of bliss, which are essentially full of suffering in their ultimate analysis.

ii) Conative Duḥkha:

Conative *duḥka* like cognitive *duḥhka* is caused by *adhyāsa*. The *Jīva* under the influence of *adhyāsa* forms the wrong conception that 'I am this', 'This is mine' which are purely ego-centric notions; with the birth of ego or *ahaṁkāra* of the form 'I' and 'mine' the *Jīva* assumes itself as being both the agent and enjoyer of *saṁsāra*. Śaṅkara further contends that *jīva* is made up of desire only.[19] It is these desires which determine the nature of *karmas* he performs. It leads man to getting attached to the mind, the sense-organs, the body and so on. There are different kinds of desires like the desire for wealth, desire for sons, desire for worldly pleasure etc. There are as many karmas as there are desires. He refers to the desires of life as the chief motivating factor for all other desires and their activity. It is the experiences from these karmas which produce pain and suffering. He refers to this desire as one of the most important causes for main's duḥkha on this planet.[20]

It is these deluded cognitions of man that offer wrong objects of desire such as wealth, sons and so on. To satisfy his desires man does not hesitate to use any methods or means. He gives up all his rational thinking about employing ethical means, for he is more concerned about attaining the end. In the present day materialistic world every man aspires to become rich by hook or crook. Man, in this venture, may achieve success or failure. If he fails, he laments and grieves and undergoes

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untold suffering While under going this experience of suffering, he plans evil means like killing to gain his goal or destroy other's happiness. These sinful activities result in accumulation of karmas, he remains enmeshed in this tangle of saṁsāric web i. e. life. [21]

iii) Emotive Duḥkha :

According to Śaṁkara emotive *duḥkha* is interlinked with other two kinds of *duḥkha,* which involves a process of knowing and willing. All these sufferings arise from the activities of the mind. All the three are naturally dependent on one another. [22]

Jīva under the delusion of being both the agent and enjoyer' performs all the actions or karmas, which are guided by the forces of *adhyāsa.* The motive for all these karmas is to gain sukha. But being products of wrong cognitions and conceptions, it results in more confusion in the mind. The confusion is regarding the means and the end. For instance, when one's son, wife or family members are ailing or rejoicing, one thinks that he is sick or happy. Man identifies himself and his feeling with the other worldly objects. It is due to this false identity that man is ready to adopt any means, bad or good, inhuman or human, ethical or unethical, to attain his goal. His prime concern is to attain the goal This fact is all the more clearly perceivable in the present day materialistic world where murder or deceit is a matter of degree. The present day man has touched a rock–bottom when ethical issues are taken into analysis

The confusion of wrong 'ends' and 'means' causes the production of experiences and feelings full of suffering. For, these experiences are full of dualities. Thc dualities of feeling being–attraction and aversion, pleasure and pain, hope and fear, and so on. These dualities bind man emotionally and cause emotive suffering and resultant pain. It is also termed as the 'suffering of the heart'.[23]

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Śaṁkara contends that there are different types of emotive duḥkha depending upon the degree and intensity of suffering each feeling generates. For instance, the duḥkha caused by the *'tāmasic'* impulses of the mind such as sex etc., cause more suffering than those *duḥkhas* caused by *rājasic* 'impulses.' He further observes that with the *jīva's* attachment to the object, he also develops a fear and anxiety that he may be deprived of something. there may be inpediments in his possessing these objects etc. The net result of all such feelings is that the *jīva* undergoes a chain of bondages and along with it a load of pain. It is mental *duḥkha* which leads to physical *duḥkha* Śaṁkara observes that it is man's desire for the pleasant sensual contact and the aversion for the unpleasant which fuels the chain of feeling and resultant experiences of sukha and *duḥkha.*

The different types of duḥkha that Śaṁkara speaks of emanates from the false sense of identity of pure consciousness *(ātman)* and innert matter (body).[24] This erroneous identity, a product of wrong cognition and conception, can be dispelled by acquiring right knowledge *(jñāna)*. Right knowledge about the true nature of the self and its relationship, i e., *Brahma–jñana* alone can lift the screen of ignorance which mistified by *māyā* is taking man for a ride into the abyss of endless births and suffering. Therefore, it is right knowledge and right knowledge alone tnat can help man free himself from the clutches of unending suffering of *saṁsāra.*

III

Śaṁkara after having identified the cause for suffering as the ego or *ahaṁkāra* or 'I' proceeds to dismantle this false mirage and establishes unity in the place of duality, which is the eternal truth. He advocates the path of *jñāna* for attaining mokṣa. But this does not mean that *Karma* is not essential for attainment of *mokṣa.* He no doubt recognises the importance of Karma-

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yoga in the search of perfection, for unless the body and the karmic forces generated by it are not brought under control the mind will not be able to concentrate and attain *Brahma-jñāna*. He has assigned *karmayoga* a secondary status in the path of mokṣa. It forms the preparatory ground or stage, which any aspirant must learn to conrol not only his body but also the feeling generated by them. He should be able to develop universal out-look in all his actions and thoughts. The seeds of egoism should be destroyed, without leaving any trace behind. It is only after satisfying the karmayoga conditions that the aspirant can consider himself eligible to enter the path proper .e., *Jñāna-mārga*.

The path of *Jñāna-mārga* consists of three stages, viz, *1) Śravanā, 2) Manana* and *3) Nididhyāsana,* [25] In the stage of *Śravanā*, the aspirant confines himself to the study of the ancient scriptures and texts under the able guidance of a guru. In this context, the meaning and significance of the person selected as 'guru' is stressed upon by Śaṁkara, The 'guru', he contends, should not only be a person of good character, wellversed with the text but should essentially be one who has realised the truth. For he alone will be able to lead you to the final goal–liberation or *Mokṣa*. The aspirant in this stage hears the receitation of the holy texts and grasps the meaning of the verses i. e. *Sūtras*. He gets himself acquainted with the different philosophical doctrines which explain the process of births and deaths apart from imparting right knowledge about the real nature of the *Jīva*. In the stage of Manana the aspirant tries to ponder over the utterances of the texts He meditates over the sayings and teachings of the saints and tries to find out the inner implications using his reasoning power. The conclusions which he arives at, he puts forward for discussion among his fellow aspirants and to the guru to test the validity of his conclusion, The ensuing debate

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and discussion is purely based on facts but not guided by any bias or deceit. This exercise helps the aspirant to think and reason out logically the facts stated in the texts and grasp their truth. In the stage of *Nididhyāsana,* the aspirant, after having gained an insight into the truth, starts to meditate on it He concentrates on the truth gained in order to enlighten himself about the various aspects of the truth. He realises herein, that the atman is identical with *Brahman.* The correct import of the *Mahāvākya* viz., ' Tat tvam asi ' is grasped by the aspirant. The aspirant who has gained this epistole of right knowledge is termed by the *Vedāntins* as *Jīvan-mukta,* the one who has realised the eternal truth, one who has conquered the endless expanse of *saṁsāra* and has reached the land of eternal bliss

Conclusion :

Śaṁkara in his treaties on *Duḥkha* has highlighted the fact that it is ignorance which forms the main cause of all human suffering, a fact which upto date remains true. For, the present day man is concentrating on creating more avenues of suffering in the name of scientfic progress. There is still time for man to redeem himself from this quagmire, if he can spare some thought on his true nature and purpose of this life.

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NOTES

* The Sanskrit word '*duḥkha*' has been translated variously by different philosophers depending upon the connotation. It is generally understood as suffering, which covers evil and unhappiness of all kinds, i. e., sickness, old age, grief, misery, woe, anxiety, fear, dread and frustration. It previously meant bodily pain and despair. There is no specific word in English which can convey the complete meaning of tne word *duḥkha.*

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2. viṣayāṇāmānukūlye sukhi duḥkhi viparyaye – *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, Śloka 105/1 : by Śankāracārya, Tr. Swami Madhavananda, 1978, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta.
3. Jāgradādi vimokṣāntaḥ saṁsāro jivakalpitaḥ *Pañcadaśi* IV–20/1.
4. bhoktṛdhi vṛttināṇātvāt tattadbhogo bahudheṣyate – *Pañcadaśi* IV–23/1.
5. śānta ghorāḥ tathā mūdhāḥ manaso vṛttayastathā, vairāgyam kṣāntirandāryaṁ ityādayaḥ śānta vṛttayaḥ – *Pañcadaśi* XV–3.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Pañcadaśi* Chapter XV–13/2.
8. tṛṣnā śneho rāga lobhā ityādya ghorā vṛttayaḥ – *Pañcadaśi* XV–13/2.
9. ghoramūdha dhiyoḥ dukkham – *Pañcadaśi* XV–24/1 and vide *Ślokas* 14 and 15.
10. sammoho bhyamityādayaḥ kathitā mūdhā vṛttayaḥ – *Pañcadaśi* XV–4/2.
11. *Pañcadaśi* XV–24/1 and Vide Śloka 16.
12. tasmāt praśastiḥ vapuṣosya jāgare – *Vivekacūdāmani.* Śloka 89/2.
13. saṁsāradvane tāpabhavanukeeranam prodhtthmythā : kṛthanam jallākashya manubhuve bṛttnata prabhramytam – *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, Śloka 580/1.
14. pumāmanābhānaṁ mohādahamiti śaṅram kalayati – *Vivekacudāmaṇi*, Śloka 140/1.
15. B. S. II–3, 17 and 18 & B. G. XIII, 22.
16. *Vivekacūdāmaṇi*, Śloka, 145. bijam saṁsṛtibhūmijāsya tu tamaḥ..... nānākarma samudbhavaṁ bahuvidhaṁ bboktātra jivāḥ khagāḥ – and *Śloka* 146.
jvñānamūla bijambhadanam....jñāmaphidharadhi dukkha, pravāhaṁ jñayatatta murthyam / 146.

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17. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on *Brahmasūtras*, I. 1. 1.

18. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, Śloka 113/1
Eṣāvṛtinamh.....anyatāṁ

19. B. U. IV, 4, 5 and 6.

20. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* Śloka 313.
Vāsanāvṛddhitaḥ kāryavṛddhyā ca vāsanā I
vardhate sarvathā puṁsaḥ saṁsāro na nivartate II

21. atrānātmanyahamiti.....avati viṣayaiḥ tanubhiḥ kośakṛdvat, *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*-137/

22. B. S. S. p. 428
ataścāvidyākṛto yaṁ tapyatāpakabhāvo na pāramārthika ityabhyupagantavyam.

23. B U. II, 45 and IV. 5. 6.

24. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*-137/1

25. śravaṇāditrayam tadvat....bodhasyaite trayomatā ḥ-*Pañcadaśi*, VI-27

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THE CONCEPT OF UNIVERSAL RELIGION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

Today, when the entire human society is infested with dogmatism, secterianism racialism, and casteism, the very world 'universal religion' may sound very strange. The emergence of the cult of terrorism in recent years, has stunned the world with senseless violence. The extreme diversities in human nature and race have caused extreme divisions in society which always result in conflicts and clashes leading to much distress and agony. Religious faith, humanism and secularism seem to be loosing their ground. The whole social order is at the point of crumbling, inspite of the unprecedented efforts of the authorities to save it.

If the society is to be saved from the catastrophe, it is to be done only by implanting the universal belief in the society. A society can take a sigh of relief only under the shade of a universal religion, though it sounds absurd in the present conflicting situation, when religion itself is the apple of discord. However, the very basic requirement for a universal religion is a universal mind which transcends the limitations of space and time. It presupposes the feeling of universal brotherhood where one's identification with the whole world is felt. Here there is no room for secterian prejudices and pride. A ray of hope seems to appear in horizon. To be convinced of it some relevant questions are to be settled, for example, what is religion ? what is universal religion ? what is Vivekananda's concept of such religion ? The question is also as to whether it is only an ideal or is it practical ? The mode of its practicability is also to be decided. With this background we will see first in brief the nature of religion.

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If we dive deep into the meaning of true religion, it is revealed that, religion is, essentially and fundameutally the effort to realise the Ultimate Reality, which we may call God theologically. The very realisation that one Universal is expressing itself in the universe, the individual spirit is that SPIRIT, everything is He in disguise, makes man a true religious person. Realization in the maximum degree of the innermost nature of human being is the core of true religon. It is the flowering of the inner spiritual being of the human being. As Dr. Radhakrishnan observes, "The basic principle of the *dharma* is the realization of the dignity of the human spirit. The knowledge that the supreme spirit dwells in the heart of every living creature is the abiding root principle of *dharma*".[1] So religion is the rediscovery of the innermost nature of man. Every great religious personalities of the history, like Christ, Buddha, Mahavira, Śaṅkarāchārya of the ancient time and Ramakṛṣṇa and Vivekananda etc. of the modern time echo the same principle of religion. So, "The realization and manifestation of divinity in man constitute the heart of religion".[2]

The concept of 'universal religion' seems to be recent in origin but the idea of it can be traced in the most ancient Vedic religion where the rishies proclaim, "Ekam sat, viprah bahudha vadanti". The Reality is only one though named differently. The Ultimate Reality underlying all the religions, is one universal though time, culture and language have coloured it differently. Obviously the essence of universal religion consists in accepting the fact that 'my god and your god are one and the same, differing at best only in name' and not in that 'my god is the only true god and you must accept Him.' So, universal religion is not numerical unity. The moment it becomes one it will not be called universal Unity in vareity is the mode of universality. To universalise, religion has to be individualised. As Galloway

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remarks : "... in individualizing religion we are at the same time univresalizing it. For by individualizing is here meant construing religion as something inward and personally realized; as men have the same spiritual nature they can partake of the same religious experience".[3] 'Hence universal religion in appealing to the spirit appeals to men without distinction of class or race".[4] The salvation offered by it is open to all. Historically too, universal religion originated when man was becoming conscious of personal character and his desire was turning towards porsonal destiny, distinct from that of the nation of which he was a citizen. Essential principle underlying it was teaching about life, its meaning and its end Thus, more the religion becomes personal, inward and spiritual more it becomes universal. Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, claim themselves to be the universal religion because they have been personally founded.

Swami Vivekananda being the staunch supporter of the vedantic philosophy and religion, spun all his thoughts and activities around it. Following the Vedanta, he declares that Reality is only one which is vibrating in everything and is being revealed by everything. Ishvar, Allah Christ are its name and different religions are only different ways of reaching It. The principal religion is thus the realization of the fact that the Supreme is dwelling in everything So, according to Swamiji, "Religion comes when that actual realization in our own souls begins."[5] As such, "Religion is realization, not talk, nor doctrine, nor theories however beautiful they may be. It is being and becoming, changed into what it believes."[6] The innermost core of religion is very significant and every other details of rituals and mythologies are secondary in nature. They may vary according to the difference of culture and history of the races and still they are the ways to realize the Ultimate Truth.

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This concept of religion forms the basis of universal religion. It is not one creed or dogma to be accepted by all, according to him. It is on the other hand a belief that Reality is only One. The universal truth remains the same inspite of being called by different names and worshipped through different modes. Then question may arise as to the validity of the existence of the different religions found in the world. Are we going to deny and discard all the religions in order to establish a universal religion ? Can we ever establish universal religion or is it already existing ? Vivekananda, in trying to answer these questions, gives his concept of uoiversal religion.

According to him all great religions of the world, for example, Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam have existed since many years and are spreading and multiplying and flourishing together inspite of their differences. Scientifically speaking, their very continuity indicates that these possess some intense life power and force in them Religiously speaking, he says, "Had it been the will of wise and all–merciful Creator that one of these religions should exist and the rest should die, it would have become a fact long long ago." [1] So claims of any religion that truth is only its domain and all others are false cannot belong to one religion only This is proved by the fact that all these are surving together

Moreover, Swamiji appreciates and encourages variations as they are the indications of life, new thought and activity. Clashes of thought can provoke new thoughts. There is always an individual behind some sects and movements, thinking according to his mental capacity and environment. Such variations in thought is bound to culminate in emergence of different sects. If we all are to think the same thought there would really be no thought to think upon. We would be like Egyptian mummies looking vacantly at each other. Swamiji analysing the contents

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of religion observes, philosophy, mythology and ritual as the most significant aspects of it. But, he believes, that not a single content is of universal type. In fact, variation in thought in religion is quite natural for him, and will last till there are menta and environmental variations. Thus the question persists as to the essence of a universal religion ? Is universality of religion an existent fact or not ?

To answer this Swami Vivekananda puts other question : are all religions really contradictory ? And the answer is negative. They are according to the mental capacity of different persons. Truth being vast has many aspects. So, only one religion, at a time can not reveal all aspects of that vast truth. For example, Mohammadanism has the message of universal brotherhood, Christianity has a message of morals and Hinduism has the message of spirituality for the people of world. Negatively taken, these different aspects appear as contradictory But viewed positively, they are supplementary to each other. Even the different stages and the experiences of religions, according to him, are also not false and contradictory. They are the varying stages in the evolutions of the fundamental truth. Swami Vivekananda gives a beautiful analogy to this fact from our life, "The child may develop more than the father, but was the father insane ? The child is the father plus something else." [8] The different photographs of a church taken from different angles may differ; still they represent the same church. Similarly, the many religions existing in the world represent the same Ultimate Reality.

The universal religion for Vivekananda does not mean either universal creed and dogma or a universal from of religion which would represent all the religions of the world at one time. This would according to him, be like the case of keeping only one coat for all to fit in. It would be most absurd as it does not take

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cognisance of physical differences. Concept of one religion would also ignore the mental difference which is a fact. All the existing forms are not denied and only one religion is not imposed. Universal religion therefore, according to Vivekananda, consists in realizing the fact that all religions of the world are expressing the same Truth in different ways. All of these should be revered and respected equally. This should not be confused with mere toleration because toleration implies some negative element in it. It is simply to allow some religion to exist inspite of the fact that it is detected as wrong which is not good. Not to tolerate but to rever and respect should be the motto. Swamiji declares, " I accept all religions that were in the past, and worship with them all. I worship God with everyone of them, in whatever form they worship Him. I shall go to the mosque of the Mohammedan. I shall enter the Christian's church and kneel before the crusifix; I shall enter the Buddhistic temple where I shall take refuge in the Buddha and his law, I shall go into the forest and sit down in meditation with the Hindu who is trying to see the Light which enlightens the heart of everyone ".[9] The revelation of the truth is continuously going on. Some truth has been revealed and still infinite of them are to be revealed. So, he offers salute to all the prophets of the past, of the present and to all those who are to come in future. Consequently, it is our duty not to interfere the growth of any other religion but to help these in their growth according to their own laws. The motto of universal religion is that a person should be raised from his level to the higher and the highest without criticising and considering his level. Universal religion, being constructive, is not triumph of any religion and destruction of others. Everyore has got the right of preserving one's individuality by growing according to one's law Hastings Rashdall rightly remarks that " It is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Jesus Christ and not incarnate at all in any one else ".[10] Thus

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universal religion consists in the policy of assimilation, harmony and peace, and not in destructlon and dissension. Swamiji clearly advocates, " Do I wish that Christian would become Hindu or Buddhist would become Christian ? God forbid. " An ideal religion would be, according to Swamiji, the synthesis of all the four elements i. e., karma, jñāna, bhakti and meditation. This combination being an ideal one will be the nearest approach to the universal religion. " If there is ever to be a universal religion it must be one which will have no location in place or time, which will be infinite, like the God it will preach, and whose sun will shine upon the followers of Krishna and of Christ, on saints and sinners alike. It will be a religion which will have no place for persecution or intolerance in its polity. which will recognize divinity in every man and woman, and whose whole scope, whose whole force, will be centred in aiding humanity to realise its own true divine nature ".[11] Catholicity would be the true element of a universal religion.

Now an important question arises in this context as to whether such a universal religion is ever possible or not ? And Swamiji sees the light of hope in Hinduism. Here, Hinduism does not mean Brahmin religion but the religion of the Vedānta which accepts all the possible forms and modes of religion and sees truth behind every form. He finds in the Vedās the treasure of the universal law which includes everything in its bossom. " From the high spiritual flights of the Vedānta philosophy of which the latest discoveries of science seem like echoes, to the low idea of idolatory with its multifarious mythology, the agnoticism of the Buddhist and the atheism of Jainas, each and all have a place in the Hindu religion ".[12] He was very much hopeful of the Vedānta being the future religion for every person in the world. But Vivekananda's hope that the Vedantic religion can be universal religion seems to be biased The grounds

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which he claims for it to be universal religion are not strong. It can claim to be a practical universal religion only when its beliefs, practices and mythologies will be accepted happily by head and heart of all the religious people of the world. Definitely this is not to a reality as supremacy of any one religion is not the core of universal religion. Religion is the matter of inner conviction and no external imposition would succeed So Vivekananda's effort in framing universal religion through Vedantism would result again in making it one more religion besides many existing forms before hand. Mere giving a new name 'universal' to the one with the new interpretation will hardly make it universal in the real sense of the term. So, the attempt to establish such universal religion would be force. Theoretically we may frame such concept but it would hardly be of any practical value. We have seen so many wars, fights etc. on the name of religion. It has more divided than bound inspite of its objective of binding together. So, the ideal of universal religion which will embrace the whole globe and consequently the hope that there would be no violence, terror, destruction of humanity, bloodshed and enmity then would be a dream only.

So, it sets us to think again and again of the solution to the above problem. We have to seek those values on which the structure of a universal religion would be raised. Certainly it is not the temper of sympathy or tolerance towards the other religions. Perhaps one has to learn to respect the fundamental truths and faiths. Qualities of accommodation, adjustment, understanding are to be strengthened. All these can prepare a modern man to face the challenges thrown by present deviation of religion.

We have seen that universality of a universal religion is not numerical oneness. It is an attitude towards religion. It is a way of life. The recenttrend of study of comparative religion offers

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great opportunity in strengthening the concept of universal religion. The great religions and philosophical personalities of the East and the west have exchanged and shared their beliefs and realised that every religion has some common element, that each and every religion has some truth and therefore value. No religion is final and absolute. Religion touches human experience on every side. Any human experience is never a finished product. The depth in experience is due to its being prospective and not retrospective. It requires new meaning and interpretation according to the changing intrinsic needs of the time. So it is subject of continuous change and growth to higher and higher degree towards Reality. This belief provokes inter–religious understanding and this will lead to universal brotherhood for, "A society can be remade only by changing men's heart and minds."[13]

Really, comparative religion is the ground on which universal religion can flourish. Only it can widen the horizon of thought and lead to universal mind which is the great need for universal religion.

The ideal of universal religion is of immense value in modern times. Any permanent and everlasting influence on the basic values of men and society can be brought by this type of religion alone. The world brotherhood, the equality of all men which is the main issue of the present time cannot be attained by outer force, but by inner feelings of oneness and sacredness of the individual personality. Love and equality which are the demands of the world brotherhood and main issue of peace would flow from this feeling because, "The common wealth of humanity has no written constitution, it is based on the community of ideals, freedom and dignity of the individual."[14]

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The evolution of a complete human civilization and a world culture can be accomplished by the ideal of universal religion alone

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THE LANGUAGE OF SWARAJ : AN ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

It was a debatable point in the past (and is so even today perhaps) whether men produce history or whether they themselves are products of history. However, if, avoiding both the extremes, it is assumed that there is a dialectical relationship between human beings and their history, that each of them greatly affects the development of the other, then it is quite certain that study of the eminent personalities or leaders is a very important part of historical studies generally.

Scholars are indeed occupied with the problem of analysis of leadership; and it has been considered from sociological, psychological, political and economic points of view. Studies of particular leaders have also been undertaken by various scholars. However, most of such studies, in spite of being very valuable, seem to be lacking in a certain aspect, which I will explain shortly. In these attempts, the thoughts and activities of the concerned leaders are studied rigorously but these studies are limited generally to the contents of thoughts and actions of the leaders. Apart from the content oriented approach the thoughts and actions can be studied from an altetnative approach, i.e., the method oriented approach. This latter approach remains rather neglected in the leadership studies. This is not to say, of course, that no attention has been paid to the ways and means and the methods through which a man can establish himself as a leader of certain people, but certainly very little attention has been paid to the language element which is vital in thoughts and also, in a sense in the activities of a leader.

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A large portion of writings and speeches of eminent personalities, especially political leaders, is basically directed towards educating or persuading the masses in some particular direction. They want their followers to adopt their ideas and theories and then to act in harmony with those ideas and theories. For this purpose, they try to persuade their followers to accept their views in different ways. One of the most important way of doing this is the way of linguistic communication.

It will be very interesting and at the same time useful too, to explore the ways in which the dominant leaders use language to direct and persuade the people. This will throw light on an important aspect of emergence of leadership, i. e., the aspect of creating and establishing a mass following, without which no one can acquire the position of a leader. One important way of creating mass following is the way of persuasion, particularly the way of communicative persuasion.

I

The study of the ways and means of persuasion can be called the study of rhetoric, if we follow Aristotle. This paper is an attempt to discover the importance of rhetoric in the development of leadership by way of analysing a particular piece of rhetoric; i. e, a speech by Lokamanya Tilak

Unfortunately, rhetoric, due to its persuasive character, is generally thought of as some kind of irrational propaganda, an eloquent but dishonest way of describing things. This is expressed in a Latin saying which says that rhetoric is the way of projecting what is false and hiding what is true. The discussions of oratory have generally emphasised the nonrational persuasive aspect af rhetorical discourses.

However, it was Aristotle who presented rhetoric as a kind of rational activity in his work called *Rhetorica*. This work is said

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to be the earliest complete treatise on the subject and also the most systematic one. [1] For Aristotle, rhetoric, if used rightly, has a functional value, as the right use of rhetoric gives effectiveness to what is true and what is just.

Let us consider briefly, Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric with his peculiar way of viewing rhetoric. [2] For Aristotle, rhetoric is not merely playing upon emotions and feelings of the audience, that is, it is not a totally nonrational activity, but rather, it seeks to win rational assent from the audience, in a 'rational' manner. According to Aristotle, arousing of various emotions is not an essential part of rhetoric, but rhetoric in the strict sense is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is rational, as it is a sort of demonstration, and demonstration in rhetoric is enthymeme, a sort of syllogism according to Aristotle.

Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic and like dialectic it is not confined to any particular subject, but can be applied to all subjects, because the function of the rhetoric is to discover the available means of successful persuasion in any given subject. Rhetoric differs from dialectic in that, it has to start from the opinions and views of the particular audience which it tries to parsuade, whereas dialectic starts from the generally accepted views and beliefs. Rhetoric is not a science, as it is not concerned with any definite class of subjects, but is technical, in the sense that it is a faculty of observing the means of persuasion in any given subject.

Following Anfinn Stigen, Aristotle's discussion of rhetoric can be brought under his own philosophical framework of the four–fold causation. [3] According to Aristotle every product has four causes. The final cause, the material cause, the efficient cause and the formal cause. [4] If we look at the rhetorical speech–act as a product we can specify the four causes which have produced it.

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We may start with the final cause itself. For rhetoric is defined by Aristotle, in terms of its final cause or end, which is that of persuasion. The need for persuasion arises, because even if the true and the just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, sometimes the decision of the judges goes against them. This is either because the speaker is not successful in projecting the truth or because the type of audience is such that it cannot follow the instructions based upon exact knowledge.

In such cases, persuasion is needed. There are, according to Aristotle, three modes of persuasion, each related to one element of the speech-act. There are three elements of a speech-act, namely (i) the speaker, (ii) the speech and (iii) the audience. Accordingly, one mode of persuasion depends upon the character of the speaker, another upon the proof or apparent proof provided in the speech, and still another upon the frame of the mind of the audience. Therefore, conviction about the truth is produced by the speaker who uses his personal influence, argues skilfully and knows the beliefs and attitudes possessed by the audience.

The material cause of rhetoric can be said to be the audience, in the sense that the speaker works upon the emotions, attitudes and dispositions of the audience through his speech in order to persuade them in a certain direction. The speaker has to argue from the premises accepted by the particular audience whom he wants to persuade. He has to understand their emotions and must know their causes and the ways in which they are excited. For then only will he be successful in appealing to his audience.

The efficient cause of the rhetorical speech-act is the speaker himself. He is not only an efficient cause in the sense of being one who actually produces or delivers a speech, but also in the sense of influencing the audience with his character. For, according to Aristotle the personal character of the speaker plays an

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important role in persuasion. It is not enough for successful persuasion that the orator must argue skilfully and the the audience must be in the right frame of mind but also that the character of the speaker should look right. Aristotle specifies good sense, good moral character and good will as the three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character. If the audience is made to believe that the orator possesses all the three characteristics, the possibility of successful persuasion increases.

Lastly, what remains to be considered is the formal cause of the speech–act, that is the speech itself, which contains various types of arguments and proofs. This part of Aristotle's discussion is very important because it is here that Aristotle makes explicit the rational procedures involved in rhetoric.

Aristotle divides the arguments used in rhetoric into two kinds. The first is called the Enthymeme, while the second is the example. While the former corresponds to the syllogism in the dialectic, the latter corresponds to the induction in dialectic. There can also be apparent enthymems as there are apparent syllogisms. Enthymemes are arguments based upon probabilities and signs (signs can either be fallible or infallible). There are two types enthymemes (i) positive proofs and (ii) refutations. While arguing from examples, proof of a proposition is based on a number of similar cases. While giving examples the speaker may either mention actual facts or 'invent' some facts, which can be called either illustrative parallels or fables. The enthymemes and the examples must deal with what is contingent, because the matters on which we deliberate have alternative possibilities and there can be no deliberation about what happens necessarily. The common topics for arguments are the topic of 'possibility and impossibility' (of an action or a course of action, in the past or in the future) and the topic of degree ('a' being *better* than 'b').

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Apart from the factors of rhetoric which have been considered so far, Aristotle also discusses 'style' of speech in details, because for him "it is not enough to know what we ought to say, we must also say it as we ought".[5] Aristotle emphasises that style should be clear and appropriate avoiding both meanness and undue elevation. He explains the uses and functions of metaphors and maxims in a speech. He argues that in order to make our speech graphic, we must aim at antithesis, metaphor and actuality. While discussing the arrangement of parts of speech, Aristotle argues that a speech, in any case, cannot have more than an introduction, a statement of the case, an argument and an epilogue.

One peculiarity of Aristotle's discussion of rhetoric is his distinction between three kinds of rhetoric namely, the deliberative or political, the judicial or forensic and the exhibitory or ceremonial. This division of types of thetoric is based on the division of three kinds of hearers, as Aristotle believes that it is the audience that determines the end of the speech. The types of audience are as follows (i) members of an assembly; (ii) judges and (iii) observers and corresponding to these three are the three kinds of oratory. These types of oratory can also be distinguished from the point of view af their objectives or from the point of view of the time to which they refer or from the point of view of the speech itself. We will consider the three above-mentioned kinds of rhetoric in the reverse order in which they are mentioned.

The aim of the judicial oratory is either to attack or defend a given individual. It is necessarily concerned with the past as it talks of an action as either having been done or as not done. The speaker in the law suit aims at proving either justifiability or unjustifiability of some past action. All other considerations enter only as subsidiary concerns. The speakers, here, must know

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three things, namely (i) nature and number of the incentives to wrong doing; (ii) the state of mind of wrong-doers and (iii) kinds of persons who are wronged and their condition. He must also have the knowledge of just and unjust actions and their kinds. He has to use the 'non technical means of persuasion,' as Aristotle calls them, such as laws, witnesses contracts, tortures and oaths. The style of forensic oratory requires high finish in details. The suitable argument for forensic speech is the argument from enthymeme, since the need for the proof of the statement of the speaker is much greater in this kind of oratory.

The ceremonial oratory of display aims at either praising or blaming somebody. It is chiefly concerned with the present, since it is with regard to the present state of affairs that somebody is praised or blamed. Considerations about past and future are not of primary importance even when they appear in the speech. The aim of exhibitory speech is to establish the honourability or its opposite of a person. The orator must possess knowledge about virtue and vice, about noble and base, for a person is blamed or praised on the basis of these. The style of such an oratory is the most literal one.

The third type of oratory, namely political oratory is essentially directed towards urging the audience to adopt or to avoid a certain course of action. It is only in the future that a certain action is to be carried out. Thus political oratory is obviously concerned with the future. The chief goal of political oratory is the establishment of the proposal as being expedient or useful. Although other considerations like justifiability or nobility of the proposal sometimes do enter in, these have only secondary importance.

The public speaker must have the knowledge as to what the particular audience, to whom he is addressing, regard as being

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good or being useful, and on the basis of such a knowledge he should try to show that his proposal falls within the category of what they consider as good. According to Aristotle it is more important in political oratory than in the other two kinds of oratory that the personal character of the speaker must look right and that the audience must believe in the good will of the speaker, since these add greatly to the orator's influence and put the audience in the right frame of mind.

Aristotle argues that the style of political oratory should be like 'scene-painting,' without high finish in details. Argument from exmple is highly suitable for political oratory. If the examples are historical parallels, then the persuasive influence of the argument increases greatly because it is generally assumed that the future will resemble the past in many aspects.

Introduction, as a part of the speech, is hardly required in political oratory according to Aristotle, although he does acknowledge the fact that in certain cases the need for an introduction may arise. Similarly, narration also is only occasionally required in political oratory and if there is narration in the speech, it is in the form of recollection of the past events in order to make better plans for the future.

Aristotle argues that political oratory is more difficult than the forensic oratory since the former deals with future and it has no basis of laws which the latter has. The matters on which all of us deliberate and on which political orators deliver speeches are the following : (i) ways and means, (ii) war and peace, (iii) national defence, (iv) import and export and (v) legislation. For Asirtotle, political oratory is a nobler business and is fitter for a citizen than the forensic oratory.

This is a brief exposition of Aristotle's *Rhetorica* which emphasises the rational character of rhetoric. The purpose of

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presenting this brief sketch of the *Rhetorica* is twofold. First of all, by removing the misconceptions about rhetoric, it provides us with a more reasonable, rational account of rhetoric. Secondly, if an attempt is to be made, as suggested in the introduction of the paper, to assess the role of rhetoric in the development of leadership, Airstotle's theory of rhetoric provides, at least initially, an excellent theoretical base for such a study. The next part of this paper tries to apply the Aristotelian schema of rhetoric to a speech, which in Aristotelian terms can be called an instance of political oratory.

II

As Aristotle has suggested the matters on which we deliberate, are essentially contingent in nature, they present us with alternative possibilities. We have to choose from these possibilities and then act accordingly. In such situations, every alternative has some merit and demerit and the choice can hardly be unanimous, for different persons assess merit and demerit differently. The need for persuasion arises in this sort of situation.

The need for deliberation and persuasion is especially great when the society is in the process of transition, for there are many alternatives which confront the society in the period of transition. In Indian history the period of British domination over India was such a period of transition. India's confrontation with alien power and culture had challenged her long cherished beliefs and views, her socio-economic systems and her philosophies. The challenge provided stimulation for a re–thinking, a re-understanding of India's past development and its relation with the present and the future. This period witnessed the emergence of many great Indian politicians, social reformers and philosophers. Lokamanya Tilak was one of the greatest Indian leader of the British India.

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Lokamanya Tilak 's thoughts and activities have been carefully studied by many eminent scholars. But, what was said about the studies of leadership in general is also true of the study Tilak 's leadership. The use of linguistic techniques in the socio-political propoganda has been seldom considered. It is both possible and desirable to study the use of rhetoric in all the persuasive writings and speeches of Tilak. But since this is clearly beyond the limits of this paper, I have chosen only one particular speech by Tilak, hoping that perhaps this will suggest a possible way in which such a study can be undertaken.

The selected speech " The Present Situation " was delivered at Gauri Vilas Compound in Madras on the 27 th April, 1918 under the presidentship of Mrs. Annie Besant.[4] The speech was mainly concerned with the British Government 's demand for greater assistance from the Indians in the war efforts, and their strong refusal of the demand for Home Rule by the Indians. Tilak was one of the prominent leaders who had put forward the demand for Home-Rule. He had founded his Indian Home-Rule League in 1916, two years after the outbreak of the Second World War. In order to strengthen its propaganda at home, the Home-Rule League wanted to send a deputation to England to place the demand for Home-Rule before the British authorities in England. Tilak was a member of the delegation. However, even after issuing the passports to the members of the delegation, the Government stopped the delegation at eleventh hour at Columbo, and the deputation had to return to India. It was on his return journey to Pune, that Tilak delivered this particular speech at Madras.

At the time when the speech was delivered, the Indian nation was faced with the problem of cooperating with the British-Raj in the great war. The Indian opinion on this matter was not unanimous but most of the political parties were atleast outwardly

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not against cooperation with the British. The disagreement was largely about the conditions on which such a cooperation should be extended.

The Indian National Congress was also divided into two groups, one of which insisted for an unconditional support. This group was the group of moderates and Gandhi was one of the chief spokesman of this group. Though, these people from the Congress had accepted the goal of Home–Rule, they thought that it was unfair to put conditions on the government in a critical war situation. They also hoped that if an unconditional support is offerred in the hour of need, the government may recognise the loyalty of its Indian subjects and may grant responsible government to India after the war.

On the other hand, there was another group which wanted to offer only a conditional support. This group consisted of the members of Tilak's "Indian Home–Rule League" and the members of Mrs. Besant's "Home–Rule League in India". This group thought it right to pressurise the government while it was in need of Indian assistance.They were sure that if they offer unconditional support in the war, after the war they will be able to make only negligible progress on their way to Home–Rule. It was strategically important for them to make the government accept their demand before a promise of whole hearted support was given. Both Lokamanya Tilak and Mrs. Besant worked enthusiastically to muster support for the Home–Rule demand throughout India. Such was the political atmosphere in the country when the speech under consideration was delivered.

It is interesting to note, that in the speech there are references to almost all the matters of deliberation, enumerated by Aristotle except that of import and export. Thus, in the speech we find references to war and peace, to national defence, to ways and means and also to legislation.

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When we think about the final cause of this speech we have to consider the intentions of Tilak or the objectives to which the speech was directed. The first and foremost objective of Tilak's speech was to make the people 'see' the need of the hour and then to activate them in such a way as to force the government to accept the demand for home-rule or the demand for *Swarāj*. Tilak was commited to the goal of *swarāj* long before he founded his Home-Rule League.

Although, since the last two decades of the nineteenth century Tilak was a prominent leader in Maharashtra and was actively participating in the national politics as a member of the Indian National Congress, it can be reasonably argued that it was only after the partition of Bengal, in 1905, that his influence as a leader was realised on the national scale. From this time, Tilak openly and fearlessly advocated the goal of *swarāj*.

Tilak's conception of swarāj was of the government which works according to the will of its citizens. In his analysis of the difference between self government and good government, he made it explicitly clear that there can be swarāj (self-government) even if the rulers of the country are foreigners.[7] For him, self-government was desirable than good government. He was well aware of the distinction between *swarāj* and *swatantratā* and had argued that achievement of *swarāj* is the nearest step to achievement of *swatantratā*.[8] In his campaign for Home-Rule he argued that "the demand that the management of our (affairs) should be in our hands is the demand for *swarāj*."[9] Time and again he made it very clear that India wanted to remain within the Empire, and that the demand for home-rule was not the demand of throwing the British out of the country. He strove to achieve *swarāj*, because *swarāj*, according to him, was not only a right, but was a *dharma*, a moral obligation by which not only an individual but a society should abide itself.

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Thus, achievement of *swarāj* was the goal of Tilak's activities, and this particular speech is but an instance of his commitment to that goal.

Coming next to the efficient cause of the speech we find that the speaker, Lokamanya Tilak, possessed all the three characteristics namely, good sense, good moral character and good will, which according to Aristotle inspire confidence in the speaker's own character. Tilak's scholarship was established through his works such as *The Orion, The Arctic Home in the Vedās* and *The Gitārahasya*. Although in such works, one witnesses philosophical dimension of Tilak's personality, Tilak was not a merely speculative theorist; he was essentially a political activist. Throughout his life he struggled hard for the principles which he had cherished. Even the hardships of jail and old age could not deter his march on his path towards his goal. It was Tilak, who, after his release from Mandalay in 1914, gave a new life to the then almost inactive, weakened nationalist movement in the country. In all his works we find a fine blending of theory and practice. Through his scholarship, sufferings and sacrifices, he had won the respect and love of his countrymen. Thus, when the Home-Rule campaign was in full swing, Tilak's patriotism and statesmanship were well established. It is but natural, then, that the influence of Tilak's personal character on the audience must have been very great.

We seem to have almost no resources available to understand the material cause of the speech, that is the audience. As far as I know, no historical material is available about the particular audience which attended this lecture and therefore we know practically nothing about the reactions and responses of the audience. However, what can be said about the audience and its attitudes and dispositions is that, since the speech had been delivered in Madras, where Mrs. Besant's Home Rule League

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had a strong hold, most of the hearers must have been those who knew fairly well the objectives of the League, and who were supporters of or at least sympathisers with those objectives. Thus, it can be argued that the background of the audience and their acquaintance with Tilak's reputation must have put it in the right frame of mind, so much so that Tilak had to make no efforts to prove his good will towards them.

The effects of the war on the Indian society had been far-reaching and the whole net-work of the pre-war social–economic and political life was greatly disturbed. The majority of the Indians were not very sympathetic towards the Rāj, though outwardly they did profess their loyalty. In fact many of them even desired that the British should be defeated in the war. Thus, against the cry of the moderates for wholehearted support to the *Rāj*, Tilak's steadfast stand on the question of Home–Rule and his strategy of pressurising the government, when it was in need, must have appeared very attractive, practical and feasible to the audience. For the audience, Tilak was perhaps one of the very few leaders who really knew and understood the popular opinion and feeling towards the war, and who had the courage to put forward the public demand fearlessly and also had the ability to channelise the public opinion in the right direction.

Let us now proceed to analyse the formal cause or the form of the speech, the various arguments that are used and the interconnections among these arguments. The first thing that strikes us when we consider the speech from this point of view, is that the speech is a genuine instance of rhetoric as a kind of rational persuasion. Thus, it easily fits into the Aristotelian schema of rhetoric as rational persuasion. There is very little effort in the speech to play on the emotions of the hearers, in a non–rational way. It will make no sense to argue that the speech in no way provoked any kind of emotions at all, for any persuasion does

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give rise to a conviction and to the related emotions. What is important is the manner in which this is achieved. In this speech, as I have already mentioned, there is nothing of the sort of irrational propaganda, which Aristotle calls "the talk about non-essentials." Aristotle argues that in a political debate "there is no need ..... to prove anything except that the facts are what the supporter of a measure maintains they are." [10] I think, this particular speech by Tilak is a perfect example of such a political debate. Throughout the speech, we find rational arguments being put forward in a lively, forceful style, accompanied with examples and narration of the facts whenever necessary.

Let us now examine the nature of the arguments and examples. The main argument in the speech can be reformulated in the following manner :

"India will certainly assist the British *Rāj*, in its war for liberty and democracy, but that will be only after she has been granted Home-Rule, since this is a psychological necessity of the Indians and such a necessity has already been recognised by the British Empire, in the case of Ireland".

Aristotle suggests that argument by example is highly suitable for political oratory and here, we find that Tilak takes full advantage of Ireland's case as a crucial example. The people of Ireland had been fighting for home rule for a long time, and when the British needed Irish assistance in the war, Home-Rule was granted to Ireland. The President of the United States of America, Mr. Wilson had also put a pressure on the British Government by making it clear that unless Ireland was granted home rule, American help will not come forth in the desired quantity. Due to such internal and external pressures, the Empire was forced to grant Home-Rule to Ireland.

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It is no wonder then, that Tilak relies heavily upon this 'historical parallel' as Aristotle would call it and reminds his audience again and again that home-rule is not an impossibilty, it has been granted to Ireland and on the same principle it should be granted to India also. In order to put additional weight to his main argument, Tilak uses various types of sub-arguments which in Aristotelian terms can be called as, arguments based upon correlative ideas, arguments based upon laws of human nature, arguments based upon psychological principles, arguments based upon inconsistancy of the contemplated action with a past action, so on and so forth. As has been suggested already, technically, the argument from the example of Ireland falls within the Aristotelian category of 'illustrative parallel.'

Coming to the enthymemes used in the speech. We find that Tilak uses both positive proofs and refutations. Thus, when he argues that it is a psychological necessity of the Indians that they should feel that they are fighting for their own motherland and if this need is neglected then the Indians will fight like mere mercenaries, he is giving a kind of positive proof. On the other hand, he uses refutation when he refutes the claim that the problem of home rule cannot be solved in a critical war situation, pointing to the case of Ireland. An interesting point to note about the arguments is that they are used both against the government and against the Indian moderates, who were merely echoing the view of the government.

As political oratory is mainly directed towards the future, Tilak's speech also is necessarily concerned with the future course of events, in spite of his detailed account of the past events and the description of the national and international situation. For, as Aristotle suggests, this narration comes only in order to have better plans about the future. In his references to the futures

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Tilak examines the possiblility or impossibility of various proposals put forward by the government and also of his own proposal of agitation Thus, he prophesies 'the bureaucratic solution' which the government is likely to propose and the impotency of the 'packed up war conference'. And with regard to the plan of action which he proposes for the masses he optimistically suggests that if people act firmly for Home-Rule, it will certainly be given to them. He also considers 'matters of degree' when he argues that what the government will offer to the Indians, will not amount even to $^1/_4$ of what is expected.

Aristotle has enumerated twenty-eight topics or lines of argument on which enthymemes can be built. It is impossible to present the full list of topics here. Therefore, I will consider only those topics which have been used by Tilak in the speech. I have already mentioned some of these arguments at the beginning of my discussion of the formal cause of the speech. In addition to these, Tilak also uses the technique of defining crucial notions in order to suit his own argument when he specifies his own understanding of the term 'loyalty' and argues that there is nothing disloyal in reminding the government of a basic psychological principle. He also uses another line of argument suggested by Aristotle, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents and motives of people for doing or avoiding the proposed actions. He then proceeds to argue, that to fight for home–rule and to achieve it is not at all impossible and it is not even much difficult if the people put all their strength in this fight. He also makes the audience aware of the adverse effects which they will have to face, if they do not fight. Similarly, he attacks the government by pointing out to the inconsistency of the actions of the government. He criticises the government which, on the one hand openly admits that Home-Rule was granted to Ireland in conso-

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nance with the wishes of President Wilson, and on the other hand strongly condemns the effort of some Indians to represent their grievances to President Wilson. He condemns the war conference which did not include many prominent leaders like the President of the Congress as 'some humbug to get the government scheme passed at that confererence.'[11]

At the end of the analysis of the speech, let us have look at the style of the speech. We find that the language used is so transperent and appropriate that it becomes neither obscure nor odd. The language is not at all flowery or full of ornamental epithets but seems very natural, using the coloquial and common words. And this enhances the chances of persuasion, because, as Aristotle says "naturalness is persuasive, artificiality is the contrary".[12] As there is no deliberate effort of playing on the emotions of the audience, similarly there is nothing in the speech whcih purposely tries to build a good image of the speaker himself.

Although in the speech, Tilak hardly uses metaphors he does use some maxims, such as "ten mercenary men are not equal to one patriot" or again "the favour of the Providence enables a cripple to cross a mountain" etc. We also find use of interrogations on many occasions With regard to the arrangement of parts of speech, it can be seen, that the speech in neatly arranged into introduction, statement of the case, the argument and the epilogue. Narration of facts, which according to Aristotle is rarely needed in political oratory, is frequently used in the speech in order to make the audience fully aware of the situation and then to decide about the future plan.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have tried to analyse a persuasive speech of Lokamanya Tilak, in the Aristotelian framework of rhetoric, in order to work out the feasibility and desirability of the study of

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rhetoric as an important aspect of leadership. I am certainly aware of the fact that such a limited study does not bring forth all the implications and limitations of the project of studying the use of rhetoric by eminent leaders and then examining the importance of uses of rhetoric in leadership development. But as I have already mentioned, this paper is only a beginning attempt to suggest a possible way of undertaking such a project and a few suggestions for further studies can be made on the basis of this.

First of all, let us be clear that even though Aristotle talks of rhetoric only as a kind of oratory, there is no reason why one should limit rhetoric only to the spoken words and not extend it to the written words too. For, writings of various leaders do have persuasive character. This will perhaps bring about some alterations in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric, but it will certainly do no harm to the main structure of his theory. If it is possible to build a general framework of rhetoric which will include both written and spoken words, then obviously this will provide us with more material to work upon in the proposed project, and a fuller study of linguistic persuasion can be attempted.

Secondly, we will have to consider whether Aristotle 's list of three kinds of rhetoric is really exhaustive. For, it seems possible that in a period of total transition, the need for persuasion may arise in different areas which will consequently give rise to different sorts of persuasion. Thus, the rhetoric required for advancing social or religious reform will be quite different from political rhetoric. Or again, a leader like Gandhi will use a totally different kind of rhetoric in his attempt to reconstruct a society.

If we will be able to discover varieties of rhetoric, this can also lead to a comparative study of these varieties, in terms of their success in persuasion. Initially at least, it seems that political persuasion is not as difficult as sociocultural persuation.

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This can be seen in the debate between the social reformers and politicians of the pre–British India.

To conclude, these are the few possibilities of working out the proposed project. There can also be many more possibilities which will have to be explored. It will be certainly desirable to undertake such a study, which will throw light upon hitherto neglected aspects of leadership development.

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NOTES

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2. Aristotle – *Rhetorica* – trans. by W. Rhys Roberts in *The Works of Aristotle*, W. D. Ross (ed.). Vol. XI.
3. Anfinn Stigen – *The Structure of Aristotle's Thought : An Introduction to the Study of Aristotle's Writings*, Oslo, 1966.
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9. "*Demand for Home Rule*" – *Samagra Lokamanya Tilak*, Vol. 7, p. 510.
10. Aristotle, *Rhetorica* – Book I, C. I,
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HOBBISM AND THE AFRICAN MORAL TRADITION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Hobbes's Moral thoughts are products of civil strife and war. At his time, the two main political power-brokers : the Royalists and the parliamentarians argued and differed on what tradition allowed and also what was naturally just. They had different opinions about what could go as tradition and what was required of natural justice. It is important at the out-set to note that Hobbes " cared nothing for tradition and had his own peculiar account of natural law. " [1] For Hobbes, power ought not to be divided. It is also pertinent, at this juncture, to know that Hobbes rejected Descartes' distinction between matter and mind. Rather he was attracted by materialism of Gassendi [2] All these are fundamental to his moral standpoint :

> But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good : and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. [3]

For him therefore, good and evil are not qualities inherent in things or actions but are only signs revealing how persons who use the signs feel about the things or actions they apply them to. The proper object of every man's will is therefore some good to himself. Hobbes was of the opinion that the argument by both the Royalists and the Parliamentarians was absurd and he concluded that " the war was not worth fighting. "

However, Hobbes contends that imagination makes man interested in another's good. Man, for him, is by nature self-regarding and can never be otherwise. [4] In regard to this, he presents us with a sentence that can be left to speak for itself:

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"That which men desire, they are also to LOVE : and to HATE those things for which they have aversion." [5] Benevolence are, according to Hobbes, manifestations of self-pity and self-love. His moral conclusions are the same. Without social discipline, man would be wholly selfish.

Hobbes denies that human society is natural. In a note to chapter one of his own English version of *De Cive*. he says :

> Wherefore I deny not that men (even nature compelling) desire to come together. But civil societies are not mere meetings, but bonds, to making whereof faith and compacts are necessary; the virtue whereof to children and fools and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects is altogether unknown; whence it happens that those, because they know not what society, is cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefits it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in infancy, are born unapt for society... wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature but by education. [6]

According to Hobbes, by reflecting on his experience, man discovers that if he is to have peace he ought to observe certain rules in his dealings with other men whenever he has sufficient grounds for believing that they will do so too. Furthermore for Hobbes, "To obey, is to honour, because no man obeys them, whom they think have no power to help, or hurt them. And consequently to disobey, is to dishonour. To give great gifts to a man is to honour him; because it is buying of protection, and acknowledging of power. To give little gifts is to dishonour; because it is but alms, and signifies an opinion of the need of small helps." [7] As a maxim of prudence Hobbes's natural law is no moral rule. This is because as a maxim of prudence, it is our

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interest to follow and is therefore not obligatory in the sense that a moral rule is Furthermore, from Hobbes's account we come to conclude that a man consents whenever he obeys because he thinks that he has more to lose than to gain by not doing so; the allegiance of man to man rests on consent, on a covenant express or tacit. But this does not square with empirical facts of human societies However Hobbes did not distinguish between moral and legal obligation. For Hobbes, man is not obliged to obey rules unless breach of them makes him liable to punishment either by God or by man Morally speaking, Hobbism is therefore a conception of human-nature as essentially materialistic, deterministic and egoistic. It conceives morality as a device discovered by men for securing the maximum degree of self-preservation. In a penetrating phrase, Hobbes characterises life in what he calls " State of nature " as being solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. " To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. "[8] The point at issue between Hobbism and the African moral tradition is : In what sense is morality natural ? The state of affairs in the " State of nature " cannot continue if men are to survive. Recognising this, Hobbes conjectures, men agree among themselves to erect and abide by a set of rules which serve to govern their conduct. They agree to abandon the attempt to satisfy their desires ad libitum in order to avoid the harmful consequences of attempting to do so. This agreement forms hobbism (morality of a society essentially materialistic). Morality thus develops in Hobbism from the recognised need for peace. The compact creates moral obligation–an artificial creation, as it were.

The African Moral Tradition

Africans distinguish between good and evil. They reject and condemn such acts as stealing, adultery, incest etc., on the grounds

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of the destructive effects they have on life force. Above all forces., the Africans recognise a higher force or Being-God-who knows, assesses and judges all human acts.

The African moral tradition associates with and coordinates everything under the all-embracing concept : vital force-the Pivot of African metaphysics. As a result, it has room for neither situation ethics nor ethical relativism. In all acts or ethical judgments, the African knows that he is not a lone being. He sees himself as " a cog in a wheel of interacting forces ". As such, he feels and thinks that all his actions and words do not influence him alone. They affect the whole community from which he derives his own existence. He is aware that the action of forces follow immanent laws and as such the influence of forces or beings are not to be employed arbitrarily. Hence :

> The Bantu admit-and they are thoroughly convinced – that man can by an act, an attitude, or by his mere manner of being, of which he remains unconscious, bring harm upon the ontological order of forces and consequently do harm in this way to his neighbour.[9]

Morality therefore consists in " what to do and what to avoid in order to preserve, increase and strengthen the vital force in himself and others of his clan "[10] contends the traditional African. African morality takes into consideration the community of vital or life forces in deciding the goodness or evil of all human acts; the departed are the guardians of morals for they are interested in what is going on in their living families.

In the life of the community each individual member has right to life force. Therefore when a person's well-being or life force is disturbed or weakened through an evil act of another, a reinstatement of the former's well-being must be effected. The restitution is not measured in terms of material loss but rather in

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terms of vital force or joy of life lost. Such a mataphysical kink is deemed to have upset the ontological harmony of the world and the community in particular. Hence when an individual commits an abomination, say incest or murder, the community feels concerned because " Breaking of taboos is seen as endangering the ontological equilibrium of the group; the perfect harmony which ought to exist between the physical and religious dimensions of life. An act which disrupts this order, effectively breaks the overall harmony, just as a stone thrown into a pond breaks up the reflections one could previously see in water. "[11] A reparation is therefore needed. However, in accordance with hierarchy of forces, to reinstate the well-being of a higher vital rank (eg. a chief) demands more than that of a being of a lower vital rank (eg. an ordinary member of the community).

For the African moral tradition every act which is against the increase, the strengthening of life force, or against the ordered hierarchy of forces is accounted as ethically and morally bad. An act is accounted ethically if it can be characterised as ontologically good. This is why in the traditional society, all acts and usages (eg. murder, adultery, abuse of office etc) which are counter to the metaphysical well-being of the clan are accounted as abominations. For example, murder is evil because the traditional African feels and thinks that outsiders are equally God's people; therefore the diminution and destruction of an outsider's (not to talk of a kinsman's) life involves a disturbance of the ontological order. In accordance with the ontological cobweb relationship, punishment for the disturbance is not only meted to him who disturbed the order but also to the entire community or clan. Murder, stealing, suicide, and other similar acts are evil and immoral. They are against the Divine law. All moral standards in African ethics therefore depend on things ontologically understood.

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From the foregoing, we know that for African Ethics or moral tradition, the "Summum bonum" to which all men must aspire is the performance of those acts which will enhance the ontological well-being of their community. This is the basis of all ethical concepts. African moral tradition is therefore metaphysical ethics because it emphasises the innate harmony between man and the universe and it respects the mechanism of the interaction among beings. More importantely it can be described as "ethical communalism" because it has as its centre-piece the community or the group. Most importantly, from the discussion so-far, we come to grip the basic characteristics of the traditional African morality. We are better able then to see the contrast between that morality and the views I have branded "hobbism".

African moral tradition is rooted in the people's conception of reality or ontology. It is neither a product of strife nor that of war; rather it is that of harmony. Morality accords with what is ontologically understood or moral. There is intimate relationship that exists between the canons of law and the rules of morality on the one hand, and the principles of philosophy on the other. Consequently, "an act or usage will be characterised as ontologically good by Bantu and that it will therefore be accounted ethically good; and at length, by deduction, be assessed as juridically just." [12]. For the Traditional African Morality what is good is therefore that which makes for social and ontological harmony and ultimately culminates in the overall well-being of the entire humanity.

For the traditional African, man is essentially moral. To say that man is essentially moral, is to say that even if man's actions are sometimes not moral, his nature is always moral. Differently stated, in traditional African world-view, essence and existence are not really distinct. If true, as I am inclined to maintain, man has the possibility of moral insight. Edeh [13] ably illustrates this

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by his analysis of the Igbo concept of man For the Igbo, man is the principal focus of the visible world. This fact is exhibited by Igbo names eg. *Maduka* – meaning man is the greatest. *Ndubisi* – human life is supreme etc. Edeh goes further to analyse the Igbo meaning of *Mmadu* – meaning man or human–being. For the Igbo, he maintains, *Mmadu* – is derived from *mma di*– meaning the good that is. That is to say that man having been created by God, is a product of his maker, the highest good. [14]

The source of African traditional morality is divine. God is the law giver. The moral code is an ordinance of reason and is solely for the common good. This explains why societal laws cannot be separated from morality. However, though for the traditional African law is not identical with morality, there is an intimate ontological relationship between them. Being divine in source, African morality tends to have universal validity. It is also to a large extent objective morality : " Objective morality to the Bantu is ontological, immanent and intrinsic morality. Bantu moral standards depend essentially on things ontologically understood. " [15] (However there could be some element of subjectivity.) Much importance is attached to hierarchy of forces in the African theory of beings or forces. As a rule a person of a lower rank, status or age commits an offence against another person or being of a higher rank or age. One may also offend against a person of the same status. But never or rarely does a person or being of a higher status do what constitutes an offence against a person or being of lower status. This means that what is in this instance considered evil or offensive functions from a low level to a higher level. This is the philosophical understanding concerning what constitutes evil in the context or relationships. For the traditional man, something is considered to be evil not merely because of its intrinsic nature, but by virtue of who does it to whom and from which level of status.

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However, the universality of the validity of the traditional African morality has been challenged. The attacks are telling but not fatal. The doubt as to the universality stems, I think, from empirical observations of some traditions in Africa. It is our contention that though there might be some variations, but in essentials the practices or usages are the same. For Hountundji and others of his school, the descriptions offered by Tempels and Kagame as African philosophy are mere myths. For him they are not "logical", neither are they "rational" speculations. Yet it is important to remind us that great philosophers hold that philosophical knowledge is not only gained in rational but also irrational ways eg. by intuition, insight and introspection. What is "logical" or "rational" vary with ontologies. For instance, the African mind follows paradoxical logic whereas the western mind is atuned to its traditional three laws of thought. Further, in reaction to the critics, philosophy need not follow the method of science. We need not collect samples of morality from the whole of African, then analyse how they cohere before we generalise.

To effect compliance, there is no need for coercion as far as African traditional morality is concerned. Even Hobbes maintains that "Reason discovers the content of these rules, and God's command that men shall obey them makes them obligatory."[16] Each member of the society understands the mores since they are ordinances of reason. Characteristically, if the traditional morality is broken, the breaker of it, if he recognises that it is a moral rule, and that he has broken it, "condemns" himself for doing so. One does not look upon it as a moral rule just because others would blame one for breaking the rule. Self condemnation is quite different from the fear, regret, embarrasment etc one may feel when one breaks a rule of the Hobbesian moral code.

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In terse, Hobbes maintains that ' Covenants without the sword, are but words and of no strength to compel man at all."[17]

The departed, according to the African tradition, are the guardians of morals with God at the apex. The breaking of laws or order or ethical codes whether by an individual or by a group, is ultimately an offence by the cooperate booy of society. The guilt of one person involves his entire household including his animals and property. And since each member of the traditional society has his place and has his right to life force, to well-being and happiness, any infractions of the traditional morality demands sanctions so as to reinstate the lost life force or joy of life suffered by the affected members of the society. Consequently, it is the loss in force, in joy of life that is evaluated independently of material considerations,[18] whereas Hobbism measures liability by the material damage effected, For the African therefore,

> All customary law that is worthy of the name (all that is law and not toleration of abuses) is inspired, animated and justified from the Bantu point of view by the philosophy of living forces, of growth, of influence and of the vital hierarchy. The validity and strength of the customary law of primitive peoples reside in its foundation in their philosophy. [19]

But for Hobbism, all obligations and all moral distinctions are constituted by compact. If so, antecedently to such compact, all actions and states of affairs are morally neutral. Hobbes failed to appreciate this. Rather he maintains that " subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies, even against them that lawfully invade them. "[20] Then what makes the compact moral ? On the other hand, granted that moral judgments are intuitive, as contend the traditional African, our moral judgements could conceivably have been other than they are. For example, it

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could have been possible for us to possess a moral sense different from the one which approves selfishness and disapproves altruism. Then a fundamental question that could be raised against the African standpoint is why the variations of moral standards from culture to culture granted that there is human nature ?"[1] However if nations are substituted for individuals, the Hobbesian account of morality in the state of nature fits exactly. Observably, each nation strives in its relation with others to satisfy its own interests.

Any infringements of the traditional African morality attract sanctions. Sanctions are either external or internal. From the Hobbesian account of morality, sanctions have to be external. These are the actions of others in relation to acts of which they approve or disapprove. Since the laws issue from the Sovereign, sanctions are to be external for them to be effective. Internal sanctions are those applied by the actor to himself. They are either positive or negative. The African moral tradition lays much stress on this. On the negative side, it is often the case that a person who has done wrong in others ' eyes has also done wrong in his own, and experienced accordingly unpleasant feelings of guilt, shame, uneasiness, remorse, or self-accusation, As a result any infraction of the law is quickly and of necessity propitiated by not only the offender but also the whole community in recognition of the ontological cobweb relationship immanent in the traditional society. But according to Hobbism, a person may persist in action of which everybody around him clearly disapproves because of an inner conviction that he is right and they wrong. This is easily the case with the sovereign from whom the rules issue. Herein lies the subjectivity of the Hobbesian account of morality.

Furthermore, in so far as the traditional African morality can appeal to something other than naked coercion, it is said to

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have legitimacy. By legitimacy we mean consensus that the authority–God–(or the departed) possess its power rightfully. What is fundamental to legitimacy with regard to traditional morality is the acknowledgement that in the last resort the decision on what is right or wrong belongs to the people whose good the laws are meant to serve and who, as it were, have the power to enforce the laws. But in Hobbism the power to enforce lies with the sovereign–the Leviathan. African morality is based on traditional authority – the authority whose legitimacy is based on some such justification as "since time immemorial," or "since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." It is the type to which the authorities of traditional chiefs and council of elders belong. For Hobbism, authority is either based on rational legal institutions or on the charismatic qualities of the sovereign.

On Voices of Dissent:

However many may argue that a people's moral ideas are frequently confused and inconsistent. They submit that a people may think it a sacred duty to protect, say, a particular type of snake whereas the next neighbourhood cherishes the same as an essential part of diet. Then how can one frame a guide to conduct to these people (howbeit Africans)? This is a major challenge to the works of Tempels and Kagame." Further they maintain that it is rare for what is termed moral consensus to prevail throughout society ie. for everybody's moral ideas to be identical. In response, this paper is of the view that even though there might be variations, in essentials, morality in a society tends to be identical. The differences may stem from the details. For instance, ecological differences might bring about the variations in the type of animals or trees revered. Yet one fact is evident: that certain trees or animals are revered and sacred. In a similar note, just as there was no consensus before the

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philosophies of Locke, Hume and Berkeley were branded British so there have to be no consensus before a description termed "African morality" could be accepted as philosophical, valid and African.

Admittedly moral ideas change. This paper has been focused mainly on the traditional setting; changes are taking place all over Africa. These certainly have a bearing on traditional morality and philosophy: shaping them and being shaped by them.

Conclusion :

The African moral tradition denies that men are basically motivated by desire; but rather asserts in contrast that men often have rational bases for their actions. Even when motivated by desires, such desires are not necessarily egoistic. Men are therefore not by nature always selfish. It does not follow that only the creation of compact, as contends Hobbism, will guarantee their living peaceably with each other. Men today abide by moral rules, but they do not contract to do so.

Hobbesian account of morality is essentially materialistic whereas the traditional African morality can be referred to as metaphysical ethics. The source of the traditional morality is divine while that of Hobbism is human. Hence the traditional morality is objective morality whereas Hobbism can be aptly described as subjective. The central focus of Hobbism is the individual whereas it is the community that is the focal point of the traditional morality which in other words could be termed "ethical communalism".

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2. *Ibid*, p. 117.
3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1957) p. 32.
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9. Tempels, *op. cit*, p 134.
10. Onyewuenyi, "Is there an African Philosophy" in The *Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976. p. 527.
11. Tempels, *op cit*, p. 133.
12. Tempels, *Ibid.*, p. 121.
13. Cf. E.-M. P. Edeh, *Towards Igbo Metaphysics*, (Chicago : Loyola Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 97–102.
14. Some Igbo dialectical groups refer to human beings or man as *ndi ife*– meaning the source of light or good (or literally meaning the people of light).
15. Cf. J. S. Mbiti, *African Religions and Philosophy*, (London : Heinemann, 1977 . pp. 206–208.
16. John Plamenatz, *Man and Society* Vol. I, (London : Longman, 1979). p. 123.
17. *Ibid*, p. 134.
18. J. Jahn, *Muntu* (New York : Grove Press Inc , 1961) p. 116, Jabn narrates a typical example.
19. Temples, *op. cit*, p. 122.
20. T. Hobbes. *Leviathan*, (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1925) p. 142.
21. We had attempted a solution to this question; that inspite of the variations, the underlying principles are the same.
22. See Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*, chapter 5.

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PHILOSOPHY AS THE SCIENCE OF MAN : DAVID HUME

David Hume conceived of Philosophy as the 'science of Man' (T42)[1] or the 'science of human nature' (E5)[2]. He also regarded it as 'a complete system of the sciences built on a foundation almost entirely new' (T43). The 'new foundation', for Hume, consists in the principles of human nature [the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operation (E14)] which not only provide a basis for organising the moral sciences in a scientific way, but also 'undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy, which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and a cover to absurdity and error'. (E16)

Thus Hume's conception of philosophy as the 'science of Man' is both critical and constructive in its outlook. In its critical aspect it points out the 'error and absurdity' of the traditional systems of philosophy and asks us to remove them, once and for all. The traditional systems of philosophy, as Hume points out in the 'Introduction' to the *Treatise of Human Nature*, are dissatisfying in more than one ways. Their dissatisfying features are :

First, the traditional systems of philosophy have all been raised on a metaphysical foundation which is too weak (T41). A philosophical system usually includes within itself all the different sciences, moral as well as theoretical. Whereas moral sciences like the theory of the understanding ('Logic', according to Hume's terminology), Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics, Religion, etc., directly come within the scope of a philosophical system philosophical principles also have their bearings on the theoretical sciences like Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, etc., indirectly. With a view to bringing these different sciences together, philo-

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sophers indulged themselves on abstruse metaphysical speculations to invent fictitious concepts and principles, and moral sciences, in particular, were woven around those fictions. Though the moral sciences deal with such subjects as directly touch upon life, metaphysical principles and concepts are getting us into no-man's land, i.e., a realm of being which is farthest removed from life. But if the moral sciences thus get away from life, they are bound to lose their appeal to mankind. As Hume writes in the *Treatise* :

> 'From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those who profess themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of literature'. (T42)

Also in the first *Enquiry*, Hume sounds words of warning against philosophy losing human significance,

> 'Indulge your passions for science, says she, but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society'. (E9).

Again,

> 'Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy be still a man'. (E9)

Secondly, the traditional systems of philosophy are lacking in 'coherence in the parts' (T41). A system of ideas is a network in which the parts are tied together by a logical thread. In the absence of such a logical thread the parts fall inconsistent to each other. It is found that in most of the traditional philosophical systems, the theory of soul or self, the theory of knowledge, ethical theories, the theories of the aesthetics, political theories, etc., run their different ways. It indicates that the systems are lacking in sound logical reasonings. In place of logical reasonings, metaphysical reasonings prevail upon them.

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> 'By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended' (T42).

Since metaphysical reasonings have no fixed direction, it is no wonder that moral sciences floating along the stream of abstruse reasoning run at cross purposes with each other.

The third dissatisfying feature of the traditional philosophical systems, according to Hume's observation, is 'the lack of evidence on the whole' (T41). It did not occur the to mind of the great system–builders the idea that a system should contain, among other things, a theory of evidence. They did not see to it that speculative ideas and principles could not be treated as evidences for a dispute. As a consequence, philosophical disputes could not be decisively settled. Disputes multiplied, and even the most trivial questions did not escape controversy. Indeed, in the field of philosophy there was nothing in which men of learning were not of contrary opinions. Philosophy looked like a battle–field where only mock-battles are fought.

After Hume has given a spirited account of chaos and confusions, errors and absurdities, of traditional philosophy, he promises to reorganise philosophy on a new basis and in a new way.

Though Hume expresses his dissatisfactions with traditional philosophy in strong words, he approves of the traditional notion of philosophy as a system of the sciences. Now, if philosophy has to be a system, then it must have, as its foundation, principles on which all sciences are dependent in some measure or other. In this regard, Hume thinks, the principles of 'human nature' are the ideal choice. Moral sciences like Logic (the

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theory of the understanding), Morals, Criticism (Aesthetics), and Politics, directly deal with one aspect or other of human nature.

> 'The sole end of logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas : morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments : and polities consider men as united in society and dependent on each other. In these four sciences of *Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics*, is comprehended almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind' (T43).

Not only the moral sciences, even theoretical sciences like Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, have a dependence on the knowledge of man 'in some measure' (T42). In the first place, these sciences 'lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties' (T42). In the second place, they make use of certain fundamental concepts, such as, the concepts of space, time, sbustance, cause, etc., the meaning of which cannot be clarified except by making them refer to the principles of human nature. In this way, 'all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature' (T42), and the principles of human nature serve as the foundtion of a comprehensive philosophical system.

For Hume, philosophy has to be a science as well as a system of the sciences. A science has, among other things, a subject-matter and a method of enquiry. Hume not only replaces metaphysics by the principles of human nature as the foundation of his new philosophical system, he also replaces the speculative method of enquiry of traditional philosophy by the experimental method of enquiry.

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> 'And as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to science itself must be laid on experience and observation.' (T43)

Hume observes that his predecessors like Lord Bacon and some late philosophers in England had conceived of the idea of the experimental method of enquiry, and the use of this method brought results to natural sciences. But if natural sciences could be profited by the newly devised experimental method of enquiry, 'there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution' (E14). The challenge, in this regard, was thrown by Newton, at the end of the *Optics* (1704), and Hume was one of the Philosophers of the Enlightenment who accepted it saying. 'If natural philosophy in all its parts by pursuing the inductive method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds of moral philosophy, will also be enlarged'.

According to Hume's conception of the experimental method the enquiry proceeds from particular evidences of experience to the general principles, and from less general principles to more general principles, till the principles become so general that any further generalization would force us to go beyond the evidences of experience. Philosophy, or for that matter, no science 'can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded on that authority' (T 45).

Philosophy, however, as Hume observes, has a peculiar disadvantage in collecting experiments on its subject. Natural tendencies of the mind, dispositions, sentiments, feelings, etc., cannot be artificially produced. They have to be reflected upon as they act or occur, and reflections may disturb their natural conditions to such an extent that just conclusions cannot be

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drawn from them. To remove these difficulties the 'science of Man' should collect data from a conscious observation of human life, from man's behaviour in company, in affairs and in pleasures (T 48). From what Hume says about experiments, it may appear that he is speaking of a behavioural science, but that is not the case. Hume's 'experiment' is a kind of reflection on experiential processes, and his so-called experimental method is the other name of experiential method. [3]

Hume criticises the traditional philosophy for lack of evidence on the whole. So he gives a clear indication as to what should serve as evidence for his new science. Nothing should be treated as evidence for his 'science of Man' unless it is given in experience. However, the physical or the real objects as they appear to be given in our experience cannot be treated as evidences for the 'science of Man'. After all, Hume's science seeks to draw general conclusions or principles about human or mental nature. Therefore, physical nature, which is dissimilar to mental nature, is not count as the realm of evidence for Hume's science. In order to bring nature within the scope of the 'science of Man', Hume reduces it to the framework of mind – nature as the experience of nature. Once nature is thus reduced, it becomes a totality of perceptions. Perceptions of the mind are divided into impressions and ideas. Impressions just occur in the soul without further introduction (T55) and their causes are 'perfectly inexplicable' (T327). Impressions are copied by the mind, either as ideas of memory or as ideas of imagination. Among the compositional elements of the ideas those that are found in impressions are regarded as foreign elements and the residual elements are regarded as human resources. If a supposed idea lacks in both impressions and human resources, it is regarded as a simple fiction, unsupported by evidence.

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The main objective of Hume's 'science of Man' is to discover the human resources as are involved in our understanding of nature, in moral and aesthetic perceptions, in social relations, in religious beliefs, and in the ideas with which our sciences operate. In this regard, Hume's approach to traditional philosophy is critical. He also criticises modern science for offering a false interpretation of its metaphysical foundation.

The traditional philosophers, being led by their passions for speculations, completely overlooked the human subject with which we are most intimately concerned and which is the central subject of discussion for a philosophical treatise. Speculations, however, gave way to experimental enquiry in modern science. Experimental enquiry is that complex form of intellectual activity which gradually evolved, and though the founders of modern science were able to practise it with spectacular results, the metaphysical foundation of this newly developed method was only imperfectly understood by the practitioners of science. Sometimes even they attributed their success to a false metaphysics. We refer to Galileo in this connection.

For Galileo, the laws of science are the laws of nature, and nature presented herself to Galileo as on orderly system whose every proceeding is thoroughly regular and inexorably necessary. This necessity in nature follows from her fundamentally methematical character. Nature is the domain of mathematics. Galileo says :

> 'Philosophy is written in that great book which ever lies before our eyes – I mean the Universe – but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols, in which it is written, this book is written in the mathematical language, and the symbols are traingles, circles, and other geometrical figures without

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whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth"[4]

We become familiar with nature through our senses. But she does not disclose her reasons and methods of operating to the senses; mathematical demonstrations alone furnish the key to unlock her secrets.

Galileo's method of mathematical demonstration implicitly follows the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which falls in line with the Platonic distinction between the real and the phenomenal. Qualities, such as number, figure, magnitude, position and motion, which cannot be separated from bodies– qualities which also can be wholly expressed mathematically – are primary qualities. All other qualities are secondary, subordinate effects of the primary on the senses. Real nature is composed of primary qualities only, and the laws of nature are the laws regarding the primary qualities. The success in science depends on our ability to resolve the world of sensible experience into the world of mathematical objects, i.e., the permanent qualities and to valid conclusions from them.

But, if real nature, according to Galileo's metaphysics, is mathematical nature, then human mind, whose resources are understanding, emotions, passions, sentiments, will, etc. (and which cannot be reduced to mathematically determinable simples), is excluded from primary or real nature. Thus a very fine mind that Galileo indeed was could not yet find a berth in nature's scheme.

Galileo relegated man secondary to nature. Newton went forward and replaced man by the Divine. He thought that a discourse on God is within the provision of his science and that his mechanics constructs a demonstration for God's existence.

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Reality, for Newton, is composed of matter, motion, and God, but man as mind has no place in it. The philosopher could not reconcile himself to this unseeming metaphysical conclusion of modern science, and in Hume, we have that philosopher's reaction. He wrote philosophy to vindicate man's position of honour, both against the apathy of traditional metaphysics and against the false metaphysics of modern science.

Hume's 'science of Man' tries to bring home the truth that the world as we know it in our day–to–day life, the world with regard to which our sciences have been accomplished, is not the world standing out there on its own right; it is the world that draws reference to man, and therefore, it is man's nature. For example, we unquestioningly accept the world as the world extended in space and occupying time. The things of the world are related to one another by virtue of necessary causal relationship. The world is either internal or external, and everywhere it is a substantive world. But philosophic reflections show that there is no real substance either in the internal world or in the external world, and that no necessary connections hold objects together. What we call 'substance' is nothing but a complex idea formed in the mind due to associations, and associative tendencies are 'the original qualities of human nature' (T60). Similarly, though the notion of cause involves the idea of necessity, 'the source of necessity is the mind itself' (T216) and not any extra-mental reality. Further, space and time are not properties of impressions, the originally given materials, rather they stand for the 'manner' of distribution of those sensations (T83). This 'manner' is not anything real unto itself; it is a human quality. Again, the perception of the external world takes place due to concurrence of some of the qualities of sensations with the qualities of the mind. The qualities of the mind are natural propensities of the imagination

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to ascribe a continued existence to those sensations which exhibit 'constancy' and 'coherence.' Not only that the world takes the shape of nature due to certain human qualities, but also that the ethical, aesthetic, social values, etc., directly derive their significance from human nature. In all this, nature bereft of human qualities is empty demonstrated. Philosophy as the 'science of Man' or the 'science of human nature' filters out those human qualities which are saturated in our world of the natural attitude of mind, and thereby wins a place for man in nature's scheme.

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NOTES

1. In the body of the Paper 'T' stands for David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature*, followed by page number from E. C. Mossner's edition of the work, Pelican Book, 1969.
2. 'E' stands for David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, followed by page number, from L. A. Selby-Bigge's edition of the work, Third edition, revised by P. H. Nidditch, OUP, Oxford, 1975.
3. Antony Flew, *Hume's Philosophy of Belief : A Study of His First Enquiry* (London : Routlege and Kegan Paul, 1961), p. 25.
4. *Opere Complete di Galileo Galilie* Firenze, 1882, Vol. IV, quoted in E. A. Butt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, Second Edition 1932), p. 64.

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MAN AND SOCIETY : A KAUTILIAN AND HOBBESIAN PERSPECTIVE

This paper attempts to interpret some significant strands of Kautilian and Hobbesian Concepts of man, Anarchy and Monarchy. Both Kautilya and Hobbes were the products of their age and it was their cultural environments that were responsible for the culmination of the *Arthaśāstra* and the *Leviathan*. Both seemed to have lived in a period of historical necessity, where change seemed necessary and inevitable. For Kautilya, Nandas' rule had led to lawlessness within society as well as external threat which would lead to anarchy. He, therefore, placed Chandragupta Maurya on the Magadha throne and enforced the Brahmanical order with reference to the nature of man and the structure of society. Whilst with Hobbes the conditions prevailing in England in the 17th Century were one of theological anarchy, wherein, there were pockets of authority formed by the different sects which had mushroomed as a result of protestantism. To prevent this anarchy Hobbes established a Civil Society by taking away man's freedom allowed in the state of nature and by making him submit to a political will which would restore order in society. The prescription for the problem reflects the differences in the cultural aspects of the two civilizations.

Kautilya gives full credit to the Brahmanical order of social coherence, inter-dependence and social obligations. A very interesting feature of the Brahmanical order is that it envisaged two forces within society which regulate the social order. One is the impersonal law of *dharma* and the other is the empirical control of the king. The relationship between the two is a matter of controversy. Followers of the *Dharmaśāstra* normally give precedence to the prescribed *dharmas*. Kautilya at times gives

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precedence to empirical reasoning in case of conflict between the two. However, in general he accepts that *dharma* and the empirical decision of the king, if taken rationally, would cohere with each other.

The word *Dharma* has been derived from the Sanskrit word *dhṛ* which means to uphold, to support, to nourish. [1] *Dharma* in Hinduism signifies what upholds and nourishes the social order. Consequently, it represents at the social level what *ṛta* represents at the cosmic level in vedic terminology. [2] Varuṇa, the god of moral reality, binds man to his responsibility or *dharma* by his twofold fetters. The monarch is supposed to ensure the proper functioning of *dharma* (law and order) for the wellbeing of his people Inversely, his *svadharma* is the protection of the people. *Ṛta* in the Vedas signified a perfect but incomprehensible order which governed each element in the cosmos. Similarly *Dharma* also encompassed each and every aspect of social living and was operationalised in terms of *varṇāśrama dharma.* Hinduism in its concern for social living worked out the *svadharma* of the individual primarily in terms of *varṇa* and *āśrama dharma.* Whilst *varṇadharma* was group oriented *āśrama dharma* pertained to the individual's stage in life. The framework operating within both, however, was *puruṣārthas,* in the sense, so as to regulate and establish an equilibrium between man's four goals, namely, wealth and health, satisfaction of desires, need for social living and transcendental yearning as *Mokṣa.* Kautilya subscribes to all the above themes in his political theory, as propounded in the *Arthaśāstra.* He accepts the *puruṣārtha* theme, when he talks of the importance of 'social happiness' or well being of all, even in terms of pleasure and wealth. [3] The key contribution of the *puruṣārtha* scheme is that it takes into account and legitimizes all aspects of man as a socio-empirical reality. It acknowledges the desire for material well being as legitimate and

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a necessary part of human life. It also acknowledges the importance of man's passions and emotions including sexsual desire and considers their satisfaction as a legitimate activity. At the same time, it does not percieve man as a bundle of emotions and desires and emphasises that social living is equally integral to man's life and so are his transcendental yearnings.

The concept of man contained in the *puruṣārthas,* in other words, is holistic in nature and sees man as a rational social spiritual being. It was primarily because of this holistic conception of man that the concern in Hinduism was for establishing an equilibrium between all the four areas of life which necessitiate regulation of each in the light of the other, both at the individual and social level. *Āśrama dharma* tried to bring out this balance at the individual level and *Varṇa dharma* at the societal level. Kautilya following this thinking accepts that the proper well–being of society includes the balancing of both material and spiritual well being.

A proper social order Kautilya considered is one which enhances the material well–being as well as the general happiness of society. Therefore, his (Eudemonistic) approach to *artha*. However, he maintains that *Dharma* and *Kāma* are sustained by *Artha* and hence a special treatment of this subject wherein importance, however, is given to the material well–being of society.

Whilst he recognises the importance of *artha* and *Kāma*, like Hobbes, he realizes the importance of restraint and control of individual desires and passions for the social well–being of society and hence the solutions of both seem similar in this regard, though the process of arriving at this similarity are different because of the inherent cultural differences.

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The enchancement of the King's power was also different. For Hobbes it was absolute monarchy and the coercive power of the King which restrained the people from disarranging the political order. Whilst Kautilya postulated *daṇḍanīti* (power of the sceptre or law and order) for the King yet, restrained him from using it, according to his own will, because his actions were governed by the *Dharmaśāstras*.

Thus, the basic difference between the Kautilyan monarch and Hobbesian monarch is the principle of Discipline achieved through morality. For Kautilya the monarch stood as a moral exemplar signifying a civilizational status, whilst the Hobbesian monarch claimed soverignity as power in a totalitarian state which symbolized the political function as a set of rules. Whilst the Kautilyan monarch was disciplined both externally and internally, externally by the scriptures and internally by the conquest of desires, the Hobbesian monarch was above the law and could be evaluated only from the outside and not from within as he was not geared to being disciplined, and therefore could not pose as a moral exemplar to the political society he controlled.

Since the original Hindu premise was the concept of *ṛta* or cosmic law, their presumption was, order and harmony to be achieved through the principle of restraint. In a similar manner, western thought can be traced back to the Greek idea of logos. Logos etymologically means Speech, Reason and Account. Christian theology accepted the rationality inherent in logos, whilst in contrast the Hindus went to order and harmony both at the cosmic and the social level. The Greeks, with their basic belief in inequality, solved the problem of order through their social and political hierarchy, whilst the Christians started from the fundamental premise of equality since they believed that man is made in the image of god. The basic concept of Equality in

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christianity was, however, spiritual, expressing the fact that men are equal in the eyes of God. Later when this idea of equality was brought down to the empirical level it got conjoint with the idea of equal freedom and liberty.

The two principles, namely of social order, equality and liberty posed a problem seeking a rational solution.

Political philosophy of the 16/17th century is primarily an attempt to grapple with this problem. The Hobbesian solution to the problem was surrender of freedom for the sake of realizing freedom.

Hobbes realised both logical and moral absurdity in man's state of nature which implies perfect freedom and equality. Perfect freedom that is right to do and say what one wants allows no one to enjoy anything because enjoyment presupposes security and security is incompatible with absolute liberty. This is the logical dilemma before man in his state of nature, Hoboes also pointed out another logical absurdity in this situation. The right of everyone to everything, he admitted, contradicts the right of anyone to anything. In other words, an absolute right is at war with itself. The perfect state of nature is morally also problematic. Man as a freedom-loving animal becomes a freedom denier, a freedom hater, because the freedom of others impinges on his own freedom. Hobbes was aware even of a biological absurdity in man's state of nature. Whilst in nature might is right, in a state of perfect freedom even the punniest man can use his cunning to defeat the strongest. Thus, Hobbes realized that social order and regulation that is a civil society is both incompatible to and yet a pre-requiste for human existence. Therefore, the rational solution Hobbes thought of was surrender of freedom for the sake of freedom and he posited an absolute monarch to fulfil that end.[4]

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To control the political order Hobbes made the concept of monarchy absolute as said earlier. King as a mortal God is to rule over men in whom they had submitted their wills. He was given the power to legislate the laws of this newly formed civil society. Hence, the fear of subjectivity on the part of the monarch was an inherent weakness in Hobbesian thought., whilst in Hindusium the law was framed by the *Dharmaśāstras*, an impersonal law that ruled over king and people. Therefore, the King could never be above the law. *Daṇda* even according to Kautilya was to be used with Justice. Kautilya says "For the rod, used after full consideration, endows the subjects with spiritual good, material well–being and pleasure of the senses"[5] Whilst the concept of Justice in Hobbesian terminology was force, as man's basic desires were to be willingly surrendered for peace and prospersity, in Hindu thought curbing of the desires was achieved by *dharma* and internalization of *dharma* in man.

Hobbes further makes man a sensate creature, a bundle of desires and passions, a legacy of the state of nature having a spillover effect in civilized society. This aspect had earlier been taken care of by the catholic church. Now that religion had lost its importance and the 17th century dawned as an age with a scientific temperament ruled by the mechanistic laws of science and mathematics, Man too was considered atomistic and this led to individual freedom, liberty and equality which went against the harmony of the social order, and in turn affected the importance of the political order as well. Therefore, for Hobbes the problem was now to curb this individuality that could in turn lead to a harmony in social relationships. Hobbes created a political system where the emphasis was on restraint and control of desires that would prevent the lawlessness that would thave followed. By this move he gave importance to the political

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order that had replaced the church. This Hobbes achieved by taking away man's inborn freedom and liberty and the concept of equality he turned into equal citizenship to all under the new political system. Whereas man was earlier equal in the eyes of god, Hobbes equated man in the eyes of law. This was achieved by the surrender of the will to the absolute monarch. In the Hindu tradition the idea of freedom, liberty and equality were subjugated by the *Varṇa* scheme of political and social living. Ascetic life and the final stage of *sanyāsa* alone allowed equality and socio–political freedom.

The basic difference between Hinduism and western thought lies in the difference between the holistic and the atomistic view of life. This further governs the socio–political aspects as well. Hence, the differences inherent in both the systems are a natural corollary of their basic world–views

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MORAL STANDARDS : AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE

I

The problem of the character of the moral standard, by reference to which a person judges the rightness or wrongness of an action, is an important probiem with which moral philosophy is concerned. This problem of standards in ethical theories raises two issues, such as (i) we must explain what is a standard in general and (ii) how moral standards differ from standards in other areas such as law, aesthetics etc. More or less related with the second problem is the problem of what is it that enables us to characterize an action as right or wrong ? and again, in what does rightness or wrongness of an act consist ? The second arises from the fact that in the history of moral philosophy different moral standards have been suggested by different schools of moralists. For example, some have suggested that actions are right in the sense of being conducive to pleasure. For some others the moral standard is conceived as good will. Others, again, have supposed that an act is good, if it promotes perfection. For yet another group of philosophers, the true standard of morality is law or laws, agreement with which is essential for the rightness of our acts.

We have to evolve a frame-work in terms of which each one of the standards may be accepted from the points of truth they contain. In other words, the problem in moral philosophy is not merely accepting any one standard and rejecting the others, but rather harmonizing them and giving to each its respective place in our conception of moral life as a whole.

A standard, in general, is a rule (a) which can be applied to the relevant phenomenon and (b) when so applied it enables

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us to decide whether the phenomenon in question comes upto the mark or not. Standards, apart from these two general characteristics, will also have respective special characteristics depending upon the uniqueness of the contexts to which they are applied. Understood in this sense, a standard has both general features and special features. For example, statements in law, morality and art would have certain common features, namely, in each case the standard is appplicable to the relevant phenomenon. This point could be illustrated more clearly, with the appropriate examples of human actions, legal disputes and artistic productions. Secondly, standards also enable us to know the relevant phenomenon. These may be called general features of a standard. But moral standards would differ from the standards in other areas in certain specific features. However, with regard to standards in all the cases a further question may be asked as to how the standards themselves can be justified. Justification of a standard depends upon the kind of arguments which are marshalled in support, and the kind of arguments in morality would differ from those in law and aesthetics.

With regard to moral standards the following have been the major proposals in the history of western ethical theories.

1. Pleasure as the Standard

According to utilitarianism or hedonism, the goodness of actions must be judged by their tendency to promote the highest good of men and the highest good or summum bonum of life is pleasure. In other words, pleasure is the ultimate end or good. This theory is called utilitarianism because according to it actions are to be judged as right or wrong according to their utility i.e., usefulness as means for the promotion of pleasure and prevention of pain. However, in the present context the term 'utilitarianism' may be understood as 'Altruistic hedonism'. Of course,

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it is an acceptable truth that there can be various interpretations of the standard as pleasure.

The most important variation in the utilitarianism standard depends upon the choice between the quantity or quality of pleasure. This is the main point of controversy between Bentham and Mill. For example, Bentham recognises only quantitative differences among pleasures, but Mill has admitted qualitative differences as well. Pleasure differs in quantity as well as in quality. In this context, it is a noticeable fact that Epicurus also referred to the kind of pleasures, but he did not recognise the qualitative superiority of intellectual pleasures [1] Mill, for the first time, in the history of western ethical theories, says that quality is independent of quantity. According to Mill, the highest good lies not in intense or durable enjoyment but in the enjoyment of noble and dignified pleasure may it be of small intensity or duration. Hence, Mill's doctrine is called 'Refined Utilitarianism' in contrast to Bentham's 'Gross or sensualistic Utilitarianism'.

The second, equally important, controversy about this standard is whether the standard should be understood psychologically or normatively i.e., whether human beings as a matter of fact naturally seek pleasure (psychological hedonism) or they ought to aim at pleasure (i.e., normative hedonism).[2]

Again, the third problem arises in the domain of ethical hedonism. Ethical hedonism can be classified as egoistic hedonism and altruistic hedonism.[3] The controversy between the two is about whether the pleasurable consequences should be taken in the first person (i.e., egoistic hedonism) or whether the pleasure of others should be given an equal place (i.e. altruistic hedonism).

2. *Good-will as Standard*

The second major standard that has been proposed is that an action is right if it is due to a morally good will. Intention

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or motivation determines the goodness or badness of an action, not its consequences. Here also, there may be a number of different interpretations. On the one hand, it may be said that the motive is the voice of conscience or moral sense which tells us about the rightness of wrongness of an action. This kind of interpretation is known as the moral sense theory.[4] Moral sense, here, is regarded as an ultimate faculty like sense-perception which can give us the understanding of morality of a particular action. Moral sense is concerned with particular actions. It is intuitive like sense perception. It is not attained by general rules or criteria. On the other hand, it may be said that the good will is determined by a generally universalized rule which can be formulated by reason. This is the positinn of Kant with regard to goodwill.[5]

There are other differences in the moral standard as good-will. On the one hand, it may be claimed that moral will should be abstracted from all pleasurable impulses. Any mixture of desire or pleasure will be incompatible with the pure goodness of the will.[6] On the other hand, for more moderate view, the presence of impulse need not be incompatible with the goodness of the will. Only when desire or impulse determines the will then the will loses its moral goodness.[7]

3. Law as Standard

According to the third type of standard the morality of an action is determined by the form of the act. An act becomes moral only if it conforms to a certain form or pattern. Here the form of law becomes the standard of the moral judgement. But the word 'law' is an ambiguous term. Generally, in the course of our life we come across two kinds of laws, namely, human laws and laws of nature.[8] The human laws can be changed and violated; but, on the other hand, laws of nature are unchangeable

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as well as inviolable. Thus, laws in general may be distinguished in terms of violability and changeability into four following classes, such as (1) laws that can be changed and violated, (2) laws that can be changed but cannot be violated, (3) laws that cannot be changed but can be violated and (4) laws that can neither be changed nor violated. Examples to illustrate the four-fold classification of laws would be political laws, laws of the solar system etc. Political laws belong to the first category, the laws of solar system, laws of day and night belong to the second category, the laws of ethics or moral laws belong to the third category and the laws of nature belong to the fourth category.

Although it is true that a moral law is violable but not changeable, the moralists are at variance with regard to the nature of moral law. On the one hand, the first point of controversy regarding the standard of morality is that it may be taken either as human law or divine law. If the law is taken as human then an action will become moral if it is permitted by the law or prohibited by the law. Thus, there may be two interpretations. According to the first one, whatever the law permits may be regarded as moral. This may be called the positive interpretation of law as standard. According to a different interpretation not performing what law prohibits is moral. This may be called the negative interpretation of the standard. If the standard is taken to be the divine command of God then the divine law may be understood in either of the following two ways : one can hold that the divine command can be comprehended by an individual only by way of revelation in the form of sacred scripture or one can hold the view that the divine command can be grasped by human beings by natural reason. Thirdly, one may also take the position that divine commands are exhibited by the tradition of the religious institutions such as the Church etc. Yet another interpretation of moral law as a

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standard is to take it to be the command of the sovereign. Here the political will becomes the standard of moral action. At this point, again, there may be different interpretations of the standard. One may regard the source of the standard as the sovereign or one may regard such a source to be people themselves. In other words, the difference, here, is between the principle of monarchy and the principle of democracy.

Another important issue about law as a standard is that the formula or principle which determines the rightness or wrongness of an action should either be strictly universal or enable us to distinguish between a person and a group of persons. According to Kant the principle of morality i.e., namely the categorical imperative must be strictly universalizable whereas according to others any standard must make a distinction between individuals and groups of individuals. This controversy is about absoluteness or relativity of the law as a standard.

4. Perfection as Standard

The last important proposal is that an action is right in so far as it promotes the development of perfection of the self and this perfection is to be attained through the self's own, free, rationally regulated effort. It consists in self-realization. In other words, self realization consists in the actualization of the potentialialities–physical, intellectual, aesthetic and moral by its own effort.[9] To put it shortly, self–realization consists in the full development of the special aptitudes with which a person is born in society. Self-realization means the realization of the higher or rational self by regulating or transforming the lower or sentient self. The self, in perfectionism, is the concrete self which is an organic unity of sensibility and reason.[10]

Here also, in the framework of perfection as a standard of morality there is an important difficulty. Perfection or self-

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realization is an ideal. No ideal, by difinition, can ever be realized. Therefore, it may be said that perfectionism does not offer a definite criterion of rightness or wrongness of particular action Since, perfection is the best ideal, perfectionism can be accepted as offering the best moral standard, but not the absolute one.

II

Each one of the standards which we discussed above, certainly, has points of validity. For example, the hedonistic doctrine that pleasure is the only thing which is good in itself is a truism. The contention of perfectionism, namely, self–realization is the highest end of human desire i.e., an ideal that satisfies man's deepest needs or fulfils his true being, is also a valid one. In so far as moral life deals with an individual in relation to other individuals the idea of universalizability and rule–guidedness is necessarily involved. But the notions of universalizability and rule–guidedness are expressed in the notion of law and hence law as a moral standard has a genuine content. Similarly in so far as morality involves not merely outward consequences but also a personal intention, the notion of good-will has relevance. Hence, in any adequate moral theory each one of these standards must be given a due place and recognition. The problem, however, is how we will be in a position to recognise the validity of each one of these four standards. From this point of view the suggestion made by Aristotle in his metaphysics proves surprisingly useful.[11]

Aristotle suggests that in order to have a complete understanding of any thing we must look at it from four points of views. They are, namely, material, formal, efficient and final causes.[12] (The word 'cause' here is to be understood not in the Humean sense of an antecedent event, but rather in the sense of 'a point of view' or 'perspective').

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(a) Aristotle explicates the notion of material cause by the illustration of the formless bronze from which a sculptor fashions his statue. (b) The formal cause is the pattern or structure which is to become embodied in the thing after it is well-fashioned. In the case of the statue it is the plan or the idea of the statue itself as conceived by the sculptor. (c) The efficient cause is the agent which produces the things as the effect. Here in the example of a statue, it includes the will of the sculptor and chisels/hammer etc. used by him. (d) The final cause is the end or the purpose towards which the thing is directed. In the example of sculptoring it is the fully complete and realized statue.[13]

For Aristotle, it is erroneous to suppose that each individual thing has only one type of cause Every thing, whether it be a natural object or an artificially fabricated object, must be explicable by means of all four types of causes i e, material formal, efficient and final. Moving a step further, if we apply this schema to moral action we can say the following :

Moral life consists of various impulses, desires and needs. The satisfaction of the impulses, desires and needs gives us happiness or pleasure. This may be called the material cause point of view and understood in this sense hedonism or utilitarianism is appropriate

But moral action is not merely due to the sensuous impulses or desires. An action becomes necessarily moral only due to certain active will and choice. This will is the efficient cause of the moral action. From this point of view of moral standard it appears as good-will.

The moral action, thirdly, is not merely a singular or concrete action. It also claims to be valid for others. In other words, a morally right action has a certain form which is applicable to others also. This is the formal cause point of view and from

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this perspective 'Law as standard' has its relevance, because a law is the formation of a principle which has general validity.

But finally, moral action is a necessary stage in the development of personality as a whole. Self–perfection or Self–realization is the end of moral action and it may be called the final cause point of view and from this perspective the standard appears as 'perfection' or 'self–realization'.

It, therefore, appears that if we use the Aristotelean scheme of four causes we may have a framework according to which all the four standards can be given their respective places and validity.

III

The basic contention of the present paper has been that it is possible to apply the Aristotelean framework of the four causes in our comparative and critical discussion of the standards of moral action. Of course, such an usage of the Aristotelean schema claims a justification on substantial philosophical grounds because any knowledge claim must have the capability of justifying itself when it is called upon to do so. For then only it can be regarded as viable. In the context of the justification of the application of the Aristotelean schema to moral standards an interesting issue arise as to why Aristotle himself does not seem to explicitly use the theoretical framework of the four causes in his 'Ethics' It is obvious that all the four standards which we have discussed were available to Aristotle and his contemporaries. There has been fairly an intense discussion of pleasure as standard by Cyrenaics and others.[14] The Platonic tradition had obviously emphasised self perfection as the ultimate standard.[15] Aristotle himself emphasises freedom of action and deliberation as distinctive features of moral conduct,[16] while the Sophists had developed a theory of morality in the light of human convention or laws.[17]

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In answering the question, posed above, namely, why Aristotle himself does not apply the schema of four causes to his ethics, it may be said that the question itself is partly a historical one and therefore it is impossible to go into all the details at this stage.

But more importantly, we can give two justifications for adopting the framework of four causes : (a) The first kind of justification would be that such a unified framework permits us to recognise clearly the worth and validity of each one of these standards taken by themselves. We have already seen in what respect each one of these standards may claim a measure of validity. Using an unified model, therefore, allows us to recognise this aspect of the matter more clearly and consistently. (b) A second and more important type of justification may also be given. Using the standards in isolation and in opposition to each other may create certain dilemmas for an adequate moral theory. For example, if one has to adopt pleasure as the ultimate standard then immediately one has to face the problem of 'Is–Ought' controversy, for striving after pleasure is a psychological fact of human behaviour. In the usual discussion of hedonism this problem has been discribed as the problem of naturalistic fallacy. Similarly, if one were to use the standard of perfection in isolation then the converse difficulty of giving a basis to the ideal standard in the actual behaviour would arise. (c) Thirdly, the idea of common rules or laws as a standard raises the problem of reconciling the individual and the collective aspects of moral life. In a nutshell, the point is that if we take the standards in isolation, such an abstract consideration would raise the problem of reconciling the different standards with each other. On the contrary, if we use the common framwork, some of these problems may not appear so radically insoluble.

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In conclusion, we would like to suggest how the use of Aristotelean causal schema may help us to respond more positively to some of the above discussed issues. This framework presupposes Aristotle's conception of man and his nature. It is a fundamental principle of Aristotle's theory of man that 'Everything natural has an ideal development and eveything ideal has a natural basis'. For Aristotle, man, by nature, is in pursuit of happiness (Eudaemonia).[18] But in terms of his principle this pursuit of pleasure or happiness presupposes the ideal for man. The ideal Eudaemonia is a life according to virtue in the company of others.[19] Self perfection or the development of the character is itself the ideal development of a natural characteristic of a man. If it is so or to the extent that it is so, in Aristotle we do not find a fundamental contrast between the natural and the ideal. In terms of the four standards the Aristotelean conception of man can be said to be connecting the standard of perfection with the pursuit of pleasure i.e. hedonism. Similarly, for Aristotle, a perfect life is possible only in the community of others Association in the society is the very form in which the individual can realise himself. If so, the standard of law and the standard of perfection can be said to be complementary aspects of the same moral life. And lastly, for Aristotle, each kind of thing has its own peculiarity and specific good. The good for man is achievable only in action and for Aristotle, action necessarily presupposes free-will and deliberations. Without choice and freedom man cannot achieve his own natural good which is a life of happiness according to virtue in association with others. It would, therefore, appear that Aristotle's theory of man, which is the background

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presupposition of the doctrine of four causes, allows us to resolve some of the dilemmas of moral theory.

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LAXMAN KUMAR TRIPATHY

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STUDENTS' SUPPLEMENT

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IS JAYARASI A MATERIALIST?

It is often held by some scholars of Indian Philosophy that Jayarāśibhaṭṭa (an eighth century A. D. Indian Philosopher), the author of *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* belonged to that materialist and hedonist school of philosophy which goes by the name cārvāka, the philosophical tradition originally cultivated by Bṛhaspati and later on nurished by Purandara. But in the present paper, we shall argue, on the contrary, that such characterization of Jayarāśi's thought as specimen of cārvāka materialism with hedonistic morals betrays the basic and fundamental contention of Jayarāśi's work entitled *Tattvopaplavasiṁha*. For this, we propose to put both the view of cārvāka materialism and the principal contention of Jayarāśi's work in nutshell first.

Much ink has been spilled in discussing the nature of materialism in the history of human civilization. Apart from subtle polemics it may be said that materialism (in philosophical circle) tries to explain the origin of life, mind and universe in terms of matter. Matter is just an abstract term which popularly denotes the present stuff of all possible physical things. All objects of our experience are supposed to be made of matter. Eminent materialists somehow agree that physical object is a mixture or compound of a certain number of primary elements of earth, water, fire and air. It says that even the so-called mind is a continuation of matter and refute the idealistic interpretations of life, mind and the universe. Bṛhaspati's system is said to be a classical example of materialism in Indian Philosophy although it has many subtle differences with its western counterpart. It has been accepted by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy that any metaphysical assertion depends upon its epistemological position. The traditional materalistic cārvāka

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philosophy condemned all the so-called instruments of valid cognition with the solitary exception of perception. It denies the reality of all super-sensible entities, say, God, soul, the life-after death etc. The cārvākas are of opinion that the universe is composed of four kinds of material elements (*tattva*) of earth, water, fire and air and the so-called consciousness is an epi-phenomenon or by-product of material elements.

But Jayarāsi in his philosophical treatise openly criticises any kind of theory making it dogmatic and his criticism would easily be applicable to the traditional view of materialistic cārvāka system, because cārvāka thinkers uncritically accept the existence of four material elements of earth, water, fire and air on the evidence of perception alone without scrutinizing the justifiability of perception as a non-defective instrument of knowledge. And this is precisely the task which Jayarāśi makes the central issue of his work He is of the opinion that real implication of many philosophical issues which are overlooked by other philosophers of India, even by Bṛhaspati, may be found in *Tattvopaplavasiṁha.*[1] According to Jayarāśi, even the so-called four types of elements of earth, water, fire and air, when carefully scrutinised, cannot stand. There cannot be any question about others for justification.[2] Jayarāśi considers these as prevalent view of Bṛhaspati's time (*Lokeṣu prasiddhaḥ*). Here Jayarasi does not interpret Bṛhaspati's aphorism but explains his non-hostile attitude towards this.

In his work *Tattvopaplavasimha* Jayarāśi subjects the definition of perception to a searching critical analysis, demonstrates its many logical blemishes (*doṣa*) and finally rejects the justifiability of perception as an instrument of valid knowledge. And with rejection of the validity of perception, the existence of four material elements (earth, water, fire and air) also stands rejected, because it is only through the evidence of perception, holds a

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materialist carvaka, that the existenee of these material elements can be ascertained.

Now it appears that Jayarāśi is not a materialist because, he denies the reality of four basic material elements out of which the objects of sensual pleasure are supposed to be constituted. Again, since there is no faultless instruuent of valid knowledge including perception, we have no legitimate and rational right to know anything with certitude, be it material like four elements (*bhūtas*) or non–material like soul (*ātmā*), liberation (*apavarga*) etc. The inevitable outcome of such a philosophical position is a kind of pure unmixed and thorough–going scepticism, the the upsetting of all assertions or principles and suspension of any judgment regarding our knowledge–claim.[3] Like any thorough–going sceptic, Jayarāśi also does not advance any epistemolological or metaphysical thesis of his own. Again, he meets his philosophical opponents on their own grounds by sqeezing out inner contradictions involved in their own positions and this is precisely the method employed by a sceptic in a philosophical debate. "The doctrine of *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* is equivalent to absolute scepticism, while the doctrine upheld by the Cārvāka is equivalent to materialism. And certainly nobody can be a materialist and a absolute sceptic at one and the same time."[4]

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NOTES

1. *Ye yāta nahi gocaram suraguroḥ*
   budhevipalpā dṛdāh /
   prāpyante nanu tehapi yatra
   vimale pāsandadarpacchidi //
   – *Tattvopalavasimha.* ed. by Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi and Prof. B. C. Parikh, (Baroda Oriental Institute). 1940, p. 125.

2. *Pṛthivyādini tattvāni loke prasiddhāni /*
   tānyapi vicāryamāṇāni na
   vyavatisthante, kim punaranyāni ?
   – *Ibid*, p. 1.

3. *Tadevamupapluteṣveva tattveṣu avicārita ramaniyaḥ sarve*
   vyavahāra ghatanta iti
   – *Ibid*, p. 125.

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A DIALOGUE WITH GOD

Reflections on Atheism, Agnosticism, the Nature of God and Feminism.

Woman : I am most surprized to be meeting you–

God : ... ...

Woman : Your silence is deep... In that silence I forget all my questions, I am simply satisfied.

Another Meeting

Woman : I have come to find that bliss I experienced once before–in your presence. But now I am feeling rather bad... I would like to talk with you please, let us talk.

God : Do you really want my knowledge ?

Woman : Well, I am not sure... There is something in me that says " No. " Aaa, now I see it clearly : I do not want an instant knowledge, I want... to find this knowledge by myself.

I feel rather ashamed of this demand–but this is truly what I want.

Could it be that this very desire stops me, paradoxically, from attaining your knowledge ?

God : No, my child. You won't be punished for your desire. You are simply making your progress slow–still you are coming towards me.

Woman : Can I fulfil my desire (to discover truth myself) and also attain you ? I mean can I have my cake and eat it ?

God : Yes, all this is possible in the universe as I created it.

Woman : I am now realizing my awkward position : I want to ask you for some information but do not want to get

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too much knowledge because that would defeat my project of finding truth.

God : Yes.

Woman : I also suspect that it is not a peculiarity of mine, but all of us, human beings, are in a somewhat similar position : wanting from you a little but not too much–otherwise we would feel deprived of our self–reliance.

God : Yes.

Woman : This is what I have come to suspect when I have been hearing complaints from people : that you do not reveal yourself to them-but in the depth of themselves they must have decided that they do not want a complete revelation from you that they enjoy the process of a slow discovery...

God : ———

Woman : Well, I am giving you my views instead of listening to you. At least, this is the truth about me–I want to be listened. I must have been deceiving myself when I used to think that I wanted to find truth in books or directly from people. This would only deprive me of my part in.. the discovery of truth. I have almost said " in a creation of truth " because whatever I discover has a mark of my individuality on it.

Anyway–I want to discover truth in my own way.

This desire looks untidy to me–what is really wrong with it ?

God : I cannot answer this question because I would be going against your desire. But I encourage you to explore this issue yourself.

Woman : Thank you. As I look at this wish–to discover truth by oneself–I see a strange situation.

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On one hand I feel guilty about it–I sense that it is not a loving act, a loving attitude would be to rejoice with all those who happened to discover truth before me.

On the other hand while approaching the issue in another way I find there is nothing wrong with this wish. I assume that we have freedom of choice. I know that I want to live in this world. I do not see myself as forced to be in this world. The wish under question is also my choice. Perhaps this desire is of such nature that it is impossible to fulfil it (in case discovering truth required a collaborative exercise) or it's fulfilment brings a lot of pain but we do not know in advance. Perhaps in the course of it's fulfilment other people get hurt.

Still, it requires a careful examination whether, in fact, people are hurt because of this wish in me, (or in other people.)

Well I have not proven the desire unholy or neutral... But now since I have been talking a lot and you have not responded I see that our relationship is impoverished.

God : This is the general condition of those in this world. Their communication with me is very limited : I have been listening to all throughout ions but my message to them is not welcome.

Woman : What is this message? We are not equal partners–so perhaps, that is why we do not welcome an unlimited communication.

I can give you my thoughts but if you were to give me your total knowledge there would be nothing left for me to give.

God : Are you only concerned with giving?

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Woman : Well, no... I see now that I have been mistaken. I simply want others to receive my discoveries because it stimulates me.

No, this is not fair. Part of my desire is that my discoveries help others.

God : What if there were no others needing helping, if all "the others" were fully satisfied.

Woman : This is a strange vision. Even though it should be desired and welcomed I find myself rather apprehensive about such a world.. Is it heaven ?

God : ———

Woman : I find this difficulty with Heaven or Nirvāṇa : the descriptions of these states (or places or dimensions) are so incomplete and nebulous that they do not excite my desire in any way. My deep desire and fascination is for truth and knowledge.

Still, a prospect of a world where everybody is fully satisfied has some attraction. However, I suspect that my present preoccupation with my discoveries requires a world of not a total bliss– it requires a world like the one I live in, or a similar, somewhat unhappy world.

I see the paradox– while I am striving to find out if total happiness is possible I require that the world around me and myself, be not fully happy...

Well, I have to look at this issue in a little more depth.

God : ———

Woman : I am going to reveal something to you : as I speak with you I have a feeling that I am really speaking with myself. I am going back to my earlier belief that there is no God who can hear us, there is nobody listening while I am talking.

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God : This is a frightening and lonely experience.

Woman : Even when you say this I suspect it is my own voice- I know this perspective is frightening.

God : Remember, you did not want to listen to me.

Woman : Yes, it seems like a fair consequence of my rejection. Assuming you exist and can unfailingly communicate with us, when I do not want communication with you I may, in the end, come to believe that it is you who do not listen or that you do not exist.
That would be a case of projection.
What is the solution to this problem ? I would like to be listened to and not to feel lonely...

God : What you want you have.
You have been given a multitude of brothers and sisters.
They do listen !

Woman : Aaa, that is right. I am satisfied. Still, I am puzzled about you. I am hearing your voice but I suspect it is my own. I felt a powerful presence before but I do not know who's psesence it was, in my daily life I do not sense you in any way.
I know, it is all according to my choice– I do not desire to have my life altered in any way.
I am just noticing that the way you speak to me seems so much the way I think myself... That leads me to a hypothesis : you are a part of my own thought process.

God : You are wondering at the similarity between yours and my thought patterns Do you want me to speak to you in an alien way– a way which would no be plain to you !

Woman : I understand now.

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God ; Examine a very different possibility. Your scenario was that you were hearing your own voice pretending to be mine.

Another alternative is that you are hearing My voice all the time : what you take to be your thoughts are my thoughts and what you hear as my voice is mine as well.

Woman : Aaa, this is a very interesting idea, and disturbing, too. If it was true what you say I would not be an individual I believe myself to be. I would be leading a false life—believing to have attained some truths through my thought power, but, in truth, it would be you, feeding me your thoughts...

Wait a minute, what about my stupid thoughts and selfish thoughts ?

Could they be yours as well ?

God : I remind you that you receive what you desire.

Woman : In this incredible scenario you would be inventing a heap of rubishy thoughts in order that I (and others) feel satisfied !

This point alone is unbelievable.

Anyway, all this is very exciting. What about "me" ? If it is not me who is producing "my" thoughts-and I have been identifying with my thinking and beliefs-who am I then ? For Descartes a human being was a thinking subject; what is this subject alone, when not thinking ? In this sort of religious scenario a human subject becomes something very difficult to conceptualize.

A religion may teach us that our self is not to be confused with our body; now you are telling me not to identify with "my" thoughts either. What is remaining of me ? Even though deprived of the body

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and thoughts I still seem to be a being, although very enigmatic. Perhaps without a body and thoughts I am more like you...

God : ———

Woman : You are not saying anything!

God : You asked the question who or what I am. What do you think I am ?

Woman : This is a very challenging question.

You know, I am enjoying this conversation with you but in no way does it reveal your nature. Our relationship is definitely not that of God/master and devotee/disciple.

Rather it seems like a relationship between a philosophy scholar/seekar and a benign (and intelligent) layman interested in religious matters.

Is it not funny–such a meeting !

Well, what do I think of God ? The idea of God as all powerful, creator, separate from "the created"– this idea does not appeal to me at all. Many philosophers throughout ages dealt only with this concept of God–attempting to prove or disprove (or atleast make sense of) existence of such a God. The results of these types of philosophical examinations are far from conclusive.

Out of all religious conceptualizations of God I prefer the Hindu concept of *Brahman* which is supposed to be the true self of all beings. In Vedānta there is no place for the duality, God–the world. But I admit this position when treated as philosophical stance has its problems too.

In this scheme one could not speak to God, except in an unreal form. This is a second reason why I do

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not take you to be that, superior God worshipped by religious peoples.

The first reason was that I suspect you were my own invention–that I have been (and still am) hearing my own voice.

In brief: my philosophical intuition and personal inclination lead me away from the concept of supreme God, worthy of worship by inferior beings, such as myself.

God : That is O. K.

Woman : I do not know what to say–I ran out of ideas.

God : But you have so many queries–when alone...

Woman : That is right, now I have forgotten them all...The other issue here is that I am afraid of too much revelation from you. There is still something else and very difficult to admit... I do not really want you–a supreme person, other than me... someone who is all powerful... without faults, I do not see any grounds for an equal relationship with such a super being; I am content with my fellow human beings. This is strange, now I appear to myself as a kind of atheist. By the way–I am able to admit this because I am ninety percent convinced I am talking to myself. It would be terrible to have to face God.

Going back to the issue of atheism, what atheists proclaim is that there is no God, or that there can not be God, or that there should be God but it is an impossibility.

What I am finding in myself is that I do not want God–irrespective of his existence or non-existence.

Perhaps people who call themselves atheists also keep this desire or rather aversion in the depth of their hearts.

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It may be, however, that this aversion of mine originated from a particular image of God–traditional Christian image propagated by the churches. I admit that such an image is only a limited representation of what God might really be.

Woman : It is easy in this respect to be a Buddhist–there is no God to face, there is no threat of somoene's judgement. You still have a goal- spiritual and moral one–without God.

God : Without the presence of God.

Woman : Yes. It must be very strange to feel someone's presence all the time I heard one of my Christian aquaintences talking about it; that she experiences God's guidance unless she is distracted. She could not describe how it did feel, though.

God : Could you imagine how one lives with such a presence?

Woman : Not really. This idea of encountering God as external to me is not very appealing to me–as I have said before. Perhaps only such experience would answer my reservations.

I prefer to view encounter with God as a discovery of one's inner world.

On the contrary the external God is bound to be seen as threatning, alien and finally unwanted.

God : What God do you want, then ?

Woman : It is a brilliant question. Children should be asked this question at school, if they have a religious education class, adults should be asking the same. There are three related questions here : 1) What is God ? 2) What we believe God to be? 3) What God do we want ? The first one has been answered through various scriptures, or revelation. But finally most authorities agree that God is a mystery or the

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ineffable Being, reality never to be conceptualized (or sufficiently conceptualized). Hence the value and validity of the two other questions. Unfortunately religious communities pay attention to their God-regarding beliefs and practices while not addressing explicitly to their desires about the nature of God.

So, here I am answering this issue :

When I said I did not want a God I really meant a particular Judeo/Christian stereotypical image of God. But what about Kṛṣṇa, or Rāma, or Kālī? Personally, I do not find these characters attractive either. All human forms of God would be limited or inadequate: Jesus, for example, does not embody the playfulness or Kṛṣṅa while Kṛṣṅa lacks the sharing of the enormous load of suffering humanity bears which Jesus does.

No one person seemed to possess all good qualities. Moreover, God in human form would usually exclude rather negative characteristics such as lazyness or forgetfulness, but there is a certain charm even in those qualities.

So. finally we will end up with incomplete divinity. If we allow only one personage to embody our conception of God. There is a point, then, in admitting there is a multiplicity of God's manifestation in human form–the case of Hinduism.

But your question was about my own preference.

Well, there is something I have seen in people on occasion–perhaps I cannot fully describe it but I can easily recognize it : it is some quality of love, caring, a quality of peacefulness and humility. This is something I would name "divine." This humility is not humbleness before someone else powerful or because

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of sinfulness; this humility is coupled with strength. I have seen a few people who embody these qualities more permanently and I have seen glimpses of... I would call it holiness, in ordinary people at certain times, perhaps I have felt these qualities in me–on rare occasions.

If there is God–He (or She) must embody those qualities; anyway, I would like God to be such a being who is an embodiment of this type of holiness. But another question is what would I want the relationship of God and myself to be ? If I think of those stereotypical images of God in Judeo/Christian tradition I know I do not want any relationship with such a being. But the image I have just construed out of the most appealling and lovable qualities of people is something which attracts me. I am not sure yet what relationship I would like with such a God. Oh, no, it is easy–obviously I would like these qualities for myself and then I would not need to worry how to face God-from that position of goodness it is natural to relate to anything, it happens spontaneously. This is strange : if I passessed holiness then the questions : What exactly is God ? What relationship would I want with this Being ? becom unimportant.

But the question is relevant to me whilst I am not holy in that sense. Perhaps we could obtain help by asking that Holy Being I know this is what religious people have been doing for millenia–praying for some results or help... I see that I do not want help. Oh, sometime in big misery I think I want help from anybody but that may be illusory. On the whole I want to continue to help myself, to evolve by myself with " a little help from my friends. " But it must be

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a little help. Often I complain that even that little is not given to me. I want a little and I perceive that not enough help is available to me.

From this basis stems my blame on others.

Moreover, it seems unfair if the Great Being was helping me. If someone is too great in comparison with us to accept something from him is like accepting the left-overs the rich leave for their dogs or pigs.

I guess this is an expression of my pride. But this pride only manifests when my point of reference is the All-powerful God of some religious traditions. When I regard those glimpses of holiness I have seen and see God as the Holy then the enormous inequality (me inferior to God almighty) vanishes. Whatever the difference between me and the Holy One-the only relationship which makes sense and immediately comes to mind is that of sharing, of mutuality, in fact-of equality ! Where does that leave me ? Well, I would like to experience more of that holiness either in seeing or sensing it in people or finding it in myself, or to experience it as something which Is, irrespectively of people.

Is, then, my chosen God a Being apart from us ? Not necessarily; it is more clearly conceived as constituitive of us...

But what about Brahman ? That Hindu concept of the absolute – as the absolute of consciousness, bliss and existence, has appealed to me for a long time. It has been a philosophical appeal.

And yet in practice my conception of Brahman made it into an inaccessible reality. I believed that I would have no contact with this reality until I reached the end of my development, say, liberation.

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Thus the remoteness of Brahman made it irrelevant to my daily life and only relevant to my exentnal attainment of the Goal.

Through the mediation of the holy I have a better understanding of the relavence of God, or the Absolute (granting such a Being exists) to my day–to–day existence and to my relationships with people.

I am not implying that Brahman and the Holy would be different realities. Perhaps through the image of the Holy I have grasped for myself some small aspect of what the Hindus call Brahman.

But all this is only speculation – definitely I have no experience of the divine.

God : What about our conversation ?

Woman : This is only a conversation, most exciting and inspiring but I do not find an intimation of the divine, here.

Well, yes... I remember the beginning of our talks... there was something there... an experience I have almost forgotten about.

It was an experience of the most profound and satisfying peace; somehow I did not label this experience – you are right – this was extraordinary – difficult to describe... If there is a realm of the divine my experience was perhaps touching on it.

As for our conversation, it is something human; but then I would not welcome an alien and volatile form of divine wisdom to come in here...

God : In other words – this is your own space ?

Woman : Yes.

...2

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Another Meeting

God : Tell me about your philosophizing. What is the puzzle you work on now ?

Woman : I am contemplating two interesting issues – one more theoretical, the other more practical : the nature of surrender and the divinity of human beings. I guess they are related but I have not yet examined their relationship.

I shall start with the pratical issue.

Christianity says " the Kingdom of God is within you ", the Hindus proclaim the identity of the self with the Absolute and the Buddhists say that Buddha–nature is our real nature.

The conclusion I draw from these religious statements is that there is a divine aspect within people. The challenge is to perceive this aspect in our fellow human beings.

God : It comes down to the idea that nothing is really of people. Everything is of me ; your thoughts, other people's ideas, the energy of human desires...

Woman : This approach is not very helpful. I mean, it is an exciting idea.. but also threatening and ... somehow shameful.

God : You mean that you thought of yourself as a real individual, existing in your own right and suddenly I am robbing you of your subject-hood ..

Woman : Yes. Hmm .. I can see the point you are making–but it is very much a Buddhist notion – that a self does not exist independently ! It is quite mysterious, yet a compelling topic I can approach this issue in the Buddhist way.

What the Buddhists deny is that the self is an

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independent entity. Rather, it exists in dependence on, or in interdependence with, other factors.

Applying these ideas to myself: my very being would not exist now nor in any other moment. Personally I admit that my body exists in dependence on food, air atmospheric pressure etc., my thoughts and feelings I also take to be at least partially dependent on external circumstances. But my "self" seems to exist in its own right: I am "I" regardless of any changes in the body or changes of moods or attitudes. Someone else's self is separate from my self. There is no blending of "me" and "not-me." This is the cornerstone of my world view: there is my self and the other, the "not-me" part of the world. (Is it not what everybody believes ?).

"I" may be influenced by the "non-I" but never loses its sovereignty.

The Buddhist response to this universal mistake—as they call it—is to expose the falsity of this view. Through various techniques-one of them conceptual analysis-an atempt is made to reveal the mistake.

"There is no seperate self" is their conclusion.

This brings us to the issue of emptiness.

Even though many books have been written on the topic of emptiness (emptiness of the self included) this obscure would-be-truth still cludes us, and eludes the practitioners of Buddhism as they admit.

God : Note your own self interest in this status-quo !

Woman : That I am pleased about the elusiveness of emptiness? Yes, I must admit I have vested interest in the world preserving its ignorance. What would I do if everything has been known by most people ?

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Going back to the emptiness notion. The Buddhist view is that the concept of emptiness expresses, or translates into human language, the nature of reality. An intellectual grasp of the idea (i. e. emptiness) is not a goal in itself–it is supposed to lead one towards an experience of emptiness.

The theory of the emptiness of the self is really an identity theory. It states that no unitary self can be found in anything conventionally considered as oneself: the body, thoughts, feelings, acts of perceptions. But it is the particular " human " succession of data of experience which creates a sense of self as well as an image of the self.

What does it all say to me? Well, I will make an unconventional move in the Buddhist frame–work: I'll take Buddha–nature to be the source of the apparent, worldly self. That source–call it real self–is over and above all data of experience.

In other words, the real " me " is beyond me.

So it is appropriate now to approach the subject of divinity of a human being.

We have only a vague idea of what such divinity may ammount to. Whatever it is, it is not what we habitually perceive people to be. I usually see people as something much more ordinary: people as boring, violent, narrow minded, sometimes loving but always with a sense of limitation.

Really a sorry picture.

How to see divine glory in people (assuming it is there)? Mother Teresa has perhaps such a vision: she might say she sees Christ in every person. If this divinity (or holiness) is the truth about people there must be a way to experience it.

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I recall your saying that I get what I want. That would mean that, on the whole, I do not want to see this holiness.

(A long pause)

I value the world where not everyone is holy, where someone can gain and others will lose; the world of danger, of strife, of success and failure. But I also value equality in another context – I value that we are all ignorant to a lesser or higher degree, that we are all fragile and silly.

God : Strange preferences indeed.

Woman : Well... I think I know what you mean : my desires are contradictory.

I want the world of holiness but also the world which allows for injustice – where I can be better than others.

God : How can you have your cake and eat it too ?

Woman : Aaah... this is the most promissing approach. Can I have the two worlds ? I do have one of them – the world of scarsity, of limited goodness, the world with good and evil. The other, holy world would be the same world of ours – understood differently, however. It is Vedānta which provides the best, in my opinion, justification of the identity of the two worlds. Since there is only one Self and this Self appears as a multiplicity all "evil" thoughts and "hurtful" actions cannot really be so – the self acts on itself but is indestructible.

Thus to see the divine glory of the Self in everything and everybody would be the appropriate reaction to the real.

Well, in theory we have two worlds in one, or better : one world seen in two different ways from the two

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different perspectives.

In practice - I only see the first world; the occasional glimpses of the very loving quality in people have not convinced me that this picture applies to everyone at all times.

Finally I must say that only if the world was truly divine and I was to experience it in this way in years to come I could agree that I have my cake and eat it too.

God : May I remind you the principle " you get what you want " ?

Woman : It would mean that I will experience the holiness of the world when I get to desire it.

That seems to be a good arrangement.

God : Everything in the universe is arranged for the best.

Another Meeting

God : Tell me about your current philosophizing.

Woman : Interestingly enough I am deeply attracted to many religious issues – though not to God as a supreme being.

Thus I sense a profound significance – and efficacy in certain religious acts and practices such as surrender, meditation and forgiveness.

I will share with you my reflections on surrender,

Both Hindu and Judeo–Christian/Muslim traditions advocate surrender to God. Even the Buddhists speak of surrender though conceptualized differently : it becomes a giving up of one's selfishness. Although I understand surrender on one level and I admit I do not want to surrender – I suspect however yet another level of understanding. What interests me is the what of surrender : what exactly has one

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to give up in order to accomplish a total surrender ? In the past surrender was often viewed as renunciation of possessions – thus the would–be saints gave away their belongings, (Buddhist and Christian monasticism still adheres to this principle).

Simultaneously another understanding was prevalent in ancient and more modern societies : one has to surrender one's will to God. That meant, I suppose, that one is to do what God wants, not what oneself would want.

My intuition is that it is possible to be more precise in discerning the dynamics of surrender. Do we really have to give up all of our desires, projects and aspirations ?

Perhaps such endeavour is psychologically impossible given that most of us " have " at any time a large number of desires and plans.

Let us consider another possibility : surrender as a change of a certain orientation.

May be surrender requires the giving up of one's selfish attitude.

That would be closer to the Buddhist or Hindu understanding : we have to give up the expectation or desire that what we do should benefit us.

The non-selfish attitude would allow acting for the sake of others, for the sake of duty or for the sake of God. According to this view of surrender it is the selfish attitude which has to go, not necessarily particular desires.

But even here I remain sceptical : what if we cannot really give up our selfish orientation any more than all of our desires ?

Perhaps one cannot by decision or by an act of will

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renounce anything as abstract as one's selfish attitude. From my experience – I have been able to renounce at most one desire on an occasion – each time only because I realized that my desire would not make me happy.

Anyway, I have an intuition that the giving up of one's self–orientation is a misnomer, it is rather a growing out of one's self–orientation.

One does not actively do the surrendering; surrender just keeps happening to one as growing does.

In this case an appeal for people to surrender would not be of much effect : except perhaps when hearing or learning about surrender could create favourable conditions for the process (of surrender) to start or accelerate.

God : What is your own project with regard to surrender ?

Woman : I do not aspire to surrender. I am just trying to understand it...

God : You have to be very careful...

Woman : Oh, is this what you mean – if my undrstanding goes deep enough, surrender may just " happen " to me?

God : Is this not something to do with your fear to receive too much revelation ?

Woman : Yes, you are right – I have a strong belief that to know the truth is to change, to undergo a drastic change. Wow, are you suggesting that to know one's self is to surrender oneself ?

This is an extremely interesting idea. I will put it in Hindu terminology :

When you know your Self you will surrender your self.

To put in plain language : as you get to know your-

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self fully you would have surrendered your false sense of self. This statement follows as an inference from a premise "We are different from what we usually think we are."

The only point for discussion is the "size" of the gap between our self and believed "self."

This point is hardly ever raised in Christian doctrines, the presupposition being that the gap, if there is one, is insignificant. The Hindus, on the contrary, are most explicit here: they posit an immense difference between the two selves. The Self (i.e, our real self) has the highest status: It alone is real, it is limitless, it is bliss, while our believed – selves are limited, changing, subject to unhappiness and powerlessness.

What puzzles me is that no one undergoes an inner transformation upon hearing the Big Gap Story. People remain with the sense of their little self. Here we come to another issue: what is understanding? Understanding, at least in the domain of spiritual knowledge, must be more than hearing and comprehending an isolated proposition.

An effective understanding may consist in grasping the relevance of an idea to various different aspects of our lives.

God : Well then, what is your understanding of surrender?

Woman : The best way I can put it is this: surrender is what happens to you when you are following the right path. The path of self-understanding seems to be one of them.

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(But if I talk to philosophers I will add a few good premises so that the inference is respectable.) *

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NOTE

* A polemic engaging with another Dialogue by Rajendra Prasad in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 2, April. 1985.

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CULTURAL BASIS FOR POLITICAL THOUGHT : A LESSON FROM KAUTILYA AND HOBBES

This article tries to bring out the cultural differences between Vedic thought and the western secular tradition by contrasting the political thoughts of two significant political thinkers of their times, namely, Kautilya of the 4th century B. C. and Thomas Hobbes of the 17th century.

Both discuss the idea of monarchy and the welfare state in political terms and yet, because of their own intellectual and cultural heritage, came out with political systems which were poles apart. Some of the aspects of their heritage as well as the differences in their systems are briefly sketched below, with the conviction that the responses of Hobbes and Kautilya to their times contain lessons for todays India.

Alternate World-Views

In the Indian world view the universe is filled with 'being'. That is, a totality in which every part is connected with every other through the principle of harmony and order. The Vedic world view, therefore, is 'cosmocentric', that is, it is governed by *ṛta*. The thrust is on integration and wholeness.

The fundamental tenets of the Old Testament, however, are based on the duality of Creator and the creation. The Creator is not only apart from but also beyond the rules by which He created the order in the Universe. In other words. He is not subject to the rules by which he systematizes His creation. This idea of duality is visible in the relationship that has been defined between man and nature, where Man is supposed to be the ruler of all life upon earth. This approach is also evident in

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Hobbesian political philosophy. The gap between the 'Governor' and the 'governed' can be traced back to the fundamental belief in duality that is symbolized through Jehovah's relationship with his subjects; and this idea persists in the Hobbesian monarch.

In Vedic *dharma,* on the contrary, order is presumed to exist and the question of who creates the order is not raised. The belief of the Vedic thinkers has been that there is a governing order in the Universe as symbolized by *ṛta,* which also governs itself. In other words, the duality of the governor and the governed is not subscribed to. This cosmic belief of the Vedic thinkers persists at all levels. whether social, moral or political, with the result that at every level each element is interlinked with the other and each is governed by certain rules.

The above differences are partly responsible for the two different conceptions of society; one emphasising an integrative approach and the other viewing society as a group of atomistic individuals.

Political Thought of Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* tried to suggest a political solution to the law and order problem facing 17th century society. That was a period of transition from a spiritual to a secular order. Christianity had established itself as an other worldly religion where order and morality were to be achieved in terms of spiritual values inherent in their beliefs With time it had deviated from its basic spiritual and the temporal in the authority of the Church. In the process it lost both its homogeneity and legitimacy. The result was that a number of sects mushroomed due to religious dissensions and created a law and order problem. To quell this anarchy and to bring about law and order without totally breaking away from the religious

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base, Hobbes re-established the historical tradition of the Old Testament with its concept of Jehovah, as the absolute ruler. The only difference was that Jehovah was constantly in touch with the line of kings he created and they were accountable to him; whilst the Hobbesian monarch, in a sense, became a real sovereign as he was accountable to no one.

For the formation of his political society Habbes also relied upon the theory of natural laws prevalent in his time. These natural laws gave Man freedom, equality and liberty. Hobbes, however, felt that they would destory the harmony of the social order as Man in his natural state was always in a state of war. Therefore, order would have to be imposed by a normative power and by the use of *Daṇḍanīti* or sceptre of the king, for bringing restraint within the society. Hobbes thus granted each citizen security and protection by making him forsake his natural liberty and freedom. He gave Man equality in the eyes of law by making him surrender his will to an absolute monarch. This solution, he hoped, would lead to an organised freedom within the State and peace, prosperity and wealth would be secured by a civil law and the political will of the monarch.

In short, faced with the problems of his age, Hobbes sought a political solution in the biblical idea of an absolute monarch. However, sovereignty as absolute power to judicate, legislate and militate, left sovereign free to be undisciplined and to become a tyrant or create a personal cult. Unlimited power over subjects and lack of a disciplining authority in the Hobbesian system provides the basic contrast between the Kautilyan and the Hobbesian monarch.

Political Framework of Kautilya

Kautilya was the Prime Minister of the Mauryan empire ruled by Chandragupta Maurya. His treatise called the *Arthaśāstra*

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was meant for the guidance of monarchs in the art of statecraft. Unlike the *Leviathan,* the *Arthaśāstra* does not propound an abstract concept of monarchy but a practicable solution of maintaining a healthy society and an administrative territorial unit, as was demonstrated by the Mauryan empire.

Being a Brahmin he followed the dictates of the *Dharmaśāstra* tradition, that is the framework of the impersonal law that governed the Hindu way of life through restraint and control of the self. In other words, he believed in the permanence of the moral order in the Universe. Several treatises of the *Dharmaśāstras* existed; therefore he tried to fortify and justify the importance of *Artha* as the science of polity *(Daṇḍanītiśāstra)* and wealth (*Vārtā*), glorifying it as the source of all the *puruṣārthas.* Along with the science of polity, he also emphasised the importance of *Anvīkṣikī* and *Trayī*. He believed that the eudemonistic apporach to these *śāstras* would enrich society as much as the idealism of the vedic tradition had done. This would induce the utilitarian desires necessary to a man's life by creating a sense of pleasure and 'this worldly' happiness.

Kautilya's task was probably easier than that of Hobbes. The Varṇa system in India had demarcated the boundaries of authority and power. The caste system could be viewed both as a political instrument and as an organizational method of control. The Brahmins were endowed with the power af knowledge and ritual authority, whilst the *rājā,* a kṣatriya by caste, was endowed with administrative authority but limited power as he was ruled by the *dharmaśāstras,* which were largely interpreted by the Brahmins. Therefore, the question of usurpation of roles between the Brahmins and the Kṣatriyas never arose in India. Further, the *rājā's* duty was to maintain territorial interests and to see that the rules and customs of castes and tribes were being properly followed. At the same time he also had to take care

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that his laws were compatible with the rules and customs of the people. Therefore, there was no enforced law but a way of life to be preserved and regulated by the *Varṇāśrama, Puruṣārtha* schemes. Hinduism was never a religion but a way of life that regulated and controlled Man's desires, and this prevented *mātsyanyāya* and the use of force. *Daṇḍanīti* too was within the control and limitations imposed by *Dharma.* Therefore, the *rājā* had to take note of its restraining aspect, and this prevented him from becoming an absolute monarch of the Hobbesian type or developing a personal cult. The *prajā* was given the rights of deposing him if he overstepped his limits. Therefore, the Kautilyan monarch had to stand as a moral exemplar to his *prajā*. He was guided by *dharma* both externally and from within by the control of his desires.

This proves that in the Hindu approach order is inherent and therefore, it only needs to be maintained. In the West, on the other hand, order had to be established and, therefore, it had to be created between seperate and autonomous elements. The holistic concept of *ṛta* at the cosmic level as a principle of harmony in diversity was achieved with the same characteristics on the social level, creating a Weltanschauung.

Weakness of the Indian Constitution

The above discussion suggests that the common concern of both Hobbes and Kautilya was to create a political system that would provide peace and maintain harmony in society without sacrificing economic prosperity. The concern of the framers of the Indian Constitution, at the time of Independence, was no different. They too wanted to bring back India's lost prestige and sought economic prosperity, social cohesion and harmony. However, their response to this problem differed fundamentally from that of Hobbes and Kautilya as they broke away from the traditions in whick Indian society is rooted. Hobbes and Kautilya only shifted

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the thrust from the practices and ideologies dominant in their society at that point of time. Their systems were synchronized with the larger framework of societal beliefs. Hobbes went back to the Old Testament, while Kautilya gave prominence to *Artha* and Power without breaking the framework of the *Puruṣārthas* and *Dharmaśāstras*. In other words, both found an alternative solution within their cultural framework.

In sharp contrast, the Indian Constitution provides the values of Justice, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. Further, by adopting the system of democratic socialism, it lays emphasis only on individual liberty and the pursuit of economic prosperity for happiness. The values which disciplined such endeavour in the past were overlooked. Rights became central in the constitution and the duties were left to be derived therefrom. On the other hand, the Indian heritage had made duties or *dharma* central to social living and rights were only implicitly granted. Perhaps it is due to this variance in the ideals cherished in the Constitution, and the way of life handed down through tradition, that today's Indian Society appears to have lost the spirit of both and the people swing from one polarity to the other according to their convenience.

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NOTES

The ideas discussed in the paper have been gathered from a number of sources. Some of the main sources have been :

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R. Sundara Rajan, Mrinal Miri S. S. Deshpande

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IS CAUSAL RELATION ASYMMETRICAL ?

One of the recurrent themes in the history of ideas has been to locate the position of man in the entire universe, i. e. man's place and relationship with others This constitutes the fundamental basis for an understanding – understanding of both the self and the non–self. One can roughly say that any understanding demands a kind of relationship between two generic entities – one is to be understood in terms of the other. One of the most important ways of understanding the happenings in nature is supposed to be through the causal terminology. Some, even, are of the opinion that proper scientific understanding must be a causal one. In this paper, I shall try to give a short survey of the nature of causal relation. It will be argued that the concept of 'action' plays a significant role in it. My main concern would be to examine the question– Is causal relation asymmetrical ? If so, how we understand it ? Before we try to answer these questions, we should show the problem of treating causality as a conditional concepts.

Once we consider the conditional concepts for an analysis of cause, we are faced with a dilemma regarding the symmetry of the conditional concepts. It is generally agreed that any one conditional concept is sufficient to define all others with the help of some logical operators. That is, once we represent the fact 'p is a sufficient condition for q' by 'Sc (p, q)' and 'p is a necessary condition for q' as 'Nc (p, q)' while 'not–p' by '$\backsim$ p,' we get a series of identities; such as :

'Sc (p, q) = Sc ($\backsim$ q, $\backsim$ p) = Nc (q,p) = ($\backsim$ p,$\backsim$ q).

These naive looking identities are absolutely harmless as far as the logic of conditionals is concerned. But these identities are likely to generate bizarre results if we equate them with causal

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terms. For example, ' My tickling of Ramesh caused him to laugh ' – will logically imply ' Ramesh's not laughing caused me not to tickle him.' It is evident that the nature of causality cannot be explained exhaustively in terms of logical relation like equivalence.

Causal relations are asymmetrical in nature. That is to say ' cause generates the effect ' and not *vice-versa*. It is usually believed that causal priority is to be determined in terms of temporal priority. That is, the cause–item is always prior in time than the effect-item. But if cause is prior to the effect then what lies in–between ? If nothing lies in-between, then how two items are to be related at all ? If there is something, then why that thing is not the cause ? A more modest claim would be to say that the effect cannot precede their causes. But then this opens up the possibility of effects being simultaneous with the cause. In that case, temporal priority criterion fails to account for the causal priority.

The problem of causal asymmetry has been occupying a central stage in the arena of philosophical debate for the last four decades. Some philosophers are of the opinion that there is no special problem in accounting for the direction of causation. They, therefore, think that an account of causation should require the causes to precede their effects. [1] Thus, some are of the opinion that causal relation need not be temporal. They explain the nature of causal asymmetry in terms of " manipulability " or " human action. "

Prof. Georg Henrik von Wright's analysis of causal asymmetry and that of human action opens a new direction of philosophical debate. His great contributions in the logic and theory of human action obviously play a significant role in his analysis of causal asymmetry. In *Explanation and Understanding* [2] and *Causality*

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and Determinism [3] Prof. von Wright has argued for an 'actionist' analysis of certain causal locutions and explained that the actionist concept of causation is supposed to yield the desired asymmetry. He describes a device consisting of two buttons so connected that whenever one button is pressed the other simultaneously sinks, and conversely, yet, asymmetrical relation between the two buttons can be established with the help of 'actionist' concept. Prof. von Wright says that the two button device is this : 'In this case when I bring about q by doing p, p is the cause and not q, and in case when I being about p by doing d, q is the cause and not p.'[4] This suggests that human agency is involved in cases of simultaneous causation.

Prof. von Wright's approach to the problem of 'causal asymmetry' is loaded with the coneept of action. He argues that the problem of the 'causal asymmetry' demands a closer look at the particular causal sitnations and the problem causal of asymmetry cannot be solved on the generic level alone. The universal generalizations, by themselves, cannot suffice as a ground for the asymmetry. If we have two different logical descriptions of the two generic states of affairs 'p' and 'q' then the two statements 'p is the cause of q' and 'q is the cause of p' are quite compatible since they refer to two different causal situations.

It will be more clear, when we explain it by a concrete example. Let us take the case of the gas law. In simple terms, the gas law states that under constant temperature a change in pressure of a sample of gas brings corresponding change in its volume and *vice-versa*. That is :

$$P. V. = R. T.$$

We can visualise the situation both ways, that is, we may bring about a change in volume of the sample of gas by changing the pressure or we may bring about a change in the

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pressure of a sample of gas by changing the volume. Here, one may think that the asymmetry, supposed to be so intrinsic to causal reltion, is being totally contradicted But that is not so. We have mentioned here two entirely different causal situations and not one. Therefore, there is no contradiction as such. 'A change in pressure is the cause of a change in volume' – is perfectly consistent with 'a change in volume is the cause of a change in pressure' as the two statements refer to two different causal situations. [5]

Prof. von Wright illustrates this by an example of two valves. He assumes that two states of affairs–the cause and the effect–appear to have occured simultaneously and yet a causal order is detectable.

It may be made more clear with the help of Prof. von Wright's 'two valves' example According to him, there is a container with two valves, a top one is open–we shall denote it by "$\sim$ p," and the state when the bottom one is closed by "q." Prof. von Wright says that the valves are so connected that when the top valve closes, the bottom valve opens, and *vice–versa*. He further says that the two changes take place absolutely simultaneously. We become curious to know whether they are causally related and if so, which is the cause and which is the effect here.

It is clear that there is some kind of "connecting mechanism" between the valves. But it does not settle the question. So it must be assumed that *We* (human beings) can operate the two valves ourselves; e. g., that we shut the top one by pressing it with our hand and that we can open the bottom one by pulling. We do the first and see the bottom valve opens. We do the second and see the top valve closes. Under the normal circumstances we should feel convinced that the changes are causally

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connected. Moreover, we should think that on the first of the two occasions, it was the closing of the top valve which made the bottom one to open. And on the second occasion, it was the opening of the bottom valve which caused the top valve to close. Thus, the two changes occur, for all we can see, simultaneously; yet we confidently distinguish them as cause and effect. [6]

The causal order is revealed according to Prof. von Wright, through intentional human inference. The only way to distinguish the cause from the effect is by way of " manipulability. " That is, the cause is the one by manipulation of which we can manipulate the ' effect. ' The ' cause ' is that which is amenable to human control more directly than the ' effect ', and the ' effect ' can only be controlled by a control over the cause. It is true that we are acting–it is the direction of causation in human action that enables us to determine the asymmetrical nature of causation in the natural phenomenon.

Prof. von Wright is not in favour of the usual positivistic view that the causal asymmetry can be fully characterised by the temporal asymmetry alone. We find that causal asymmetry is different from the temporal asymmetry. According to Prof. von Wright, the causal asymmetry can be estblished independently, without any consideration of the temporal asymmetry. We illustrate this by an example, where two states of affairs – the cause and the effect - appear to have occurerd simultaneously, and yet a causal order is detectable. For example, consider a bicycle driver on the move. He is paddling and the cycle is moving forward. The fact that the driver is paddling and the fact that the cycle is moving forward are simultaneous. The simultaneity of the facts does not forbid us from differentiating the cause from the effect. The rotation of the rear wheel and the rotation of the paddle are simultaneous and yet we are able to identify che ausal order – the rotation of the rear wheel is caused

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by the rotation of the paddle. So it seems, at the end, we cannot ignore the possibility of simultaneous causation entirely. If we have two states of affairs occurring simultaneously and they are causally related, we must be able to account for the difference between the cause and the effect without any reference to temporal order. This obviously points to the fact that the causal order is quite different from the temporal order.

The asymmetry of the causal relations is to be understood in terms of the capacity to interfere, in terms of human intervention. The event over which we have a more direct control is the cause. We can control the effect only through a control over the cause. At times, we may come across where two events are equally amenable to human control and one causes the other. In such situations we must stick to the particular situation and the cause will be that which has been under the human control more directly in that situation. For an illustration of this point we can go back to our example of the bicycle. In this case, let us suppose that the paddle and the rear wheel of the cycle are moving in reverse direction. It is also supposed that the cycle is an ordinary one. Under the situation, we also know that it is the rotation of the rear wheel that causes the paddle to rotate. By rotating the paddle in the reverse direction we cannot make the rear wheel to rotate in the opposite direction or in the backward direction. It is only by rotating the rear wheel that we can make the paddle move in the reverse direction. This observation clearly suggests that the direction of causality is to be understood in terms of human intervention. The cause factor must be amenable to human control more directly than the effect factor.

Finally, we may conclude that any attempt to understand causality and the causal notions without any reference to the concept of 'human action' seems to be untenable, since the

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relation of cause and effect is to be established in terms of our action and they are usually characterized as an extension of our notions of action. Without human interference, there may only be a regular succession of events; but they are causally related could not be established. Prof. von Wright, therefore, provides a very clear account of both the concept of cause and that of action. He himself at certain places points out that the two concepts are very close and their behaviour in language almost coincides. He clearly sees the similarities in the linguistic usages of the two concepts and consequently finds that the concept of action is needed for the understanding of the notion 'cause'. Thus, we may say that Prof. von Wright's analysis of causation in terms of 'action', not only provides fruitful way out of the problem of causal asymmetry but it may also help us to get a more clear picture of many other problems associated with the notion of causality.

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NOTES

1. Sanford, David H. — "The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship", *The Journal of Philosophy*", vol. 73 (1976) pp. 193–207.

2. von Wright, G. H. — *Explanation and Understanding*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Lodon, (1971), henceforth *EU*.

3. von Wright, G. H. — *Causality and Determinism*, Columbia University Press, New York, (1974) hencefort *CD*.

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4. *EU*, p. 70.

5. See for details, Mackie, J. L. — "Causes and conditions", *American Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 2, (1965), pp. 245-264; reprinted in SOSA, E. (ed) – *Causation and Condition*, Oxford, (1975), pp. 16-38.

6. *CD*, pp. 63-64

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IS A WORK OF ART SYMBOL OF FEELING OR AN IMAGE OF EXPERIENCE ?

In the paragraphs to follow I shall try to make out a case for saying that a work of art is an image of experience. I propose to do this apropos of Susane Langer's *Problems of Art,* wherein she has suggested that works of art is a symbol, and puts forward in the same passage that they are images of feeling I am more inclined to accept the alternative view.

A symbol is a sign which is arbitrarily accepted as standing for something else. An image is something which resembles something else and stands for it because of this resemblance Curiously enough Langer admits the arbitrariness of symbol elsewhere, namely, in her *Symbolic Logic.* My point, however, is that an image of feeling can be an image only if it embodies feelings like those in which it originated, and since feelings do not exist in void, but are evoked by, or directed towards something, the image of feeling which constitutes a work of art will include also something which the feeling is about. Thus to say that a work of art is an 'image of feeling' is inadequate because it fails to take into account the object or idea to which the feeling is directed. Such an association is an experience, and a work of art is an image of an experience in which the representation of feeling plays an essential part. The whole experience is mental, and to try to distinguish in it a physical object and an emotional reaction to it is to dissect a living whole into abstractions.

The crucial question is how the feelings of the artist can be embodied in a work of art. A work of art exists primarily in the mind of the artist. The sense–data, of which it is constructed exist in his mind. The feelings with which they are associated

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are in his mind also. In so far as these feelings are linked with ideas, they again too are in his mind. The work of art in the mind of the artist is a prehension (*a la* Whitehead) of sense-data and feelings with or without ideas, and it makes no difference whether it is fully imagined as conception before the artist begins work on the physical object in which his conception is to be embodied, or whether the conception develops gradually while he works. When the work is complete it is for the artist a finished perceptual object. It may be either set in space like a picture, a statue, or a building, or requiring time for its performance, like a song or symphony. But being a perceptual object it is still an object in the artist's mind.

I should like to distinguish a perceptual object from a physical object. The physical object which is a work of art is one thing and the feelings which it evokes are another. A perceptual object is subjective. A physical object is modified by the artist until it assumes the form which embodies his feelings. It remains available to form representations in the perceptual world of other observers, where, in so far as their senses are acute, and their minds attuned by nature and experience to the mind of the artist, they will find similar feelings of their own embodied. The point is that the artist creates his perceptual object by manipulating the physical objects. The *physical medium* cannot embody the artist's feelings. When the physical object has been modified by the artist's activity in such a way that it evokes in him a perceptual object which as far as possible embodies his feelings, the same physical object, meaning by that the identical one, will tend to create in others, who see or hear it, a perceptual object embodying to a greater or less degree feelings similar to those which the work of art embodies for the artist.

The view I am putting forth should illuminate the creations of images in visual arts. Collingwood (*The Principles of Art*)

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has remarked that people and things look different at them. And accordingly one could speak of works of art which are representations not primarily of objects, but of feelings in relation to objects. Further, I should like to make a point concerning an aspect of visual perception Visual percepts are evoked through the eye, they include other than visual elements because they have long been associated in experience with sense-data obtained through senses. The Nyāya example of *Surabhi Candana* is a case in point. Hence, what seems a simple visual percept is never purely visual, but includes memory traces of other sense-data and is set within the space-time of a perceptual world common to all senses. We shall not appreciate art, whether anciant, or modern, unless we seek to understand it as the creation of images embodying feelings.

Let us now turn to the image making in music. It is a sphere in which the creation of images is more difficult to understand. Music uses time in the same way as the plastic arts use space, and as structures in time musical modes are very complex. It should also be noted that we do not know why music should move us as it does. It may be the case that certain sounds and rhythms by themselves are moving. But the emotions evoked by music are not dependent solely upon simple and primitive rhythms, though these may find a place in the most complex music : they demand the exercise of a highly cultivated power of auditory discrimination, and a mind which can recognise and retain the development of melodies and themes. Marcel Proust (*Remembrance of Things Past*, Vol 2, London, 1951) speaks of an "immeasurable key-board", and keys of tenderness, of passion, of courage, of serenity. Each of these differs from the rest as one universe differs from another. Great musicians awaken in us the emotion corresponding to the themes which they have found. Music is the image of those feelings

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which Proust spoke and of others besides. How it can thus represent them we do not pseeisely know, but its power to do so seems to spring from its relationship to time. Can we not say that music, through it very relation to the structure of time itself, awakens echoes in that mystery which is the essence of our being, our life's transience and the inextinguishable hope that time itself is only a mode of apprehension ?

This brings us to the use of words in poetry. Poetry does what painting, sculpture or music do by using words instead of visual forms or musical sounds. The poetic image is expressed by means of mataphor, and it is of precisely the same nature as the image created in any other form of art. Poetic creations is creation of a particular kind of verbal image using for its purpose the arrangement of words in relation to rhythm, metre, rhyme, resonance, and so on When the poet is successful, using individual images in such a way that the poem as a whole is itself a complex image.

If art is the creation of images, of what are they images? There are many kinds of knowledge. Our knowledge of the physical world is obtained by means of perceptual objects. It is of the essence of knowledge that it should consist of bringing together of a subject and an object. The subject is not only modified by the object, he is modified in such a way that some characteristic of the object becomes part of his consciousness. The subject's perceptual space is a perspective of which he is himself the focus. The products of the creative artist are images of a complex kind. They use sense–data or words to embody or express the feelings of the artist in relation to the ideas or objects which arouse them. They are *thus* images of experiences-experiences of perceptual objects, ideas, and feelings fused together. The artist has the experience with exceptional intensity, and is able to embody them in images, and so communicate

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them. But if other people did not have these experiences in some degree the artist's images would mean nothing to them.

The images employed by art and poetry enable us to apprehend experiences in which object, thoughts and feelings are blended. Art claims only to represent experience without implying that the experience represented has any validity beyond itself. Symbols, in science and religion, claim to refer to the nature of something beyond them namely the universe as a whole. Works of art are images of feelings because they embody feelings. This leads to a generalisation. Feelings *can* give us knowledge. They can give us knowledge of feelings, and only feelings can do so. Images provide representation of many aspects of life than symbols, though symbols may play a part in creating images as words do in poetry. And if feeling is itself a constituent of that which we are seeking to know, we can have true knowledge of it only if feeling is an ingredient in our knowing experience. If the universe itself is of such a nature, we can have no adequate knowledge of it without feeling It is the mystery of beauty that it should be an image of the nature of things. That is perhaps the reason why Tagore said that when the world is looked at through a song, it is *known* properly.

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METHODOLOGICAL REALISM : AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT OF SCIENTIFIC QUEST

Relativism has emerged as a strong current in the contemporary philosophy of science. It is its merit to show that the naive realist view of science is not right. But it does not end up just here. Relativist authors often intend to argue in favour of some form of anti-realism about science. The objective of this paper is to argue to the conclusion that anti–realism can't furnish essential ground for scientific-quest because the methodology of science demands for a realistic presupposition.

Anti-realistic Import of Relativism

Writers like Paul Feyerabend are very clear exponents of anti–realism about science. " Science " in Feyerabend's view–" is much closer to myth than any scientific philosophy is prepared to admit ... ... both science and myth cap common sense with a theoretical super structure. These theories are of different degrees of abstraction and are used in accordance with different requirements of explantion that arise "[1].

Other writers do not vouch for anti–realism so explicitly but what they contend for has essentially an anti–realistic import. Kuhn 's thesis of ' incommensurability of competing scientific theories "[2] implicitly but definitely raises doubt wehther these theories relate to an independently existing reality.

Quine tries to preach–" Total science, mathematical or natural, and human, is extremely under–determined by experience " In his view– " . in epistemological footing the physical objects and gods differ only in degree and not in kind." [3]

We, thus, see that the current of relativism has an essential import of anti–realism regarding science. According to relativism

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scientific knowledge is significant only for it 's explanation of the puzzling phenomena that present themselves in course of our growing experience. How to solve the puzzle is the fundamental aim of scientific enterprise and for this purpose it presents explanations to adjust the solution with our experience. The task of harmonizing experience is the primary goal of science and to know about the reality of Nature is only sub-serviant—according to relativism.

Two Aspects of the Relativist's claim

The relativists, as we see, present a pragmatic picture of science in which it is basically and inseparably related to human interests and aspirations to control Nature. Overall human need for adjustment is high-lighted in this picture and the quest for truth has no significance at all apart from this need. The relativist's claim presents itself in its negative aspect, as scepiticism and, in its positive aspect, as instrumentalism. In the negative aspect they argue that since all scientific theories are fallible, we can never get to the reality of Nature that science talks obout. In the positive aspect, they want to prove that all scientific theories are of instrumental value only.

A brief criticism of both the aspects is to be presented in the following sections

Fallibilism Does not Entail Anti-realism

Scientific theories undergo change over the ages. They are amended or refuted altogether in the light of new discoveries. What was undoubtedly accepted as true once upon a time is found to be false afterwards 'What were ducks turn out to be rabbits.' Moreover, the lately discovered theories also do not bear the guarantee of certainty : they may also prove to be false. If so much uncertainty is attached to scientific knowledge how could it claim to give us a true and reliable picture of reality ?-This

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briefly, is the doubt that almost all the relativists raise about scientific knowledge.

Fallibilism, as Karl Popper has showed, is essentially true of all empirical sciences[4] All scientific conjectures are by their very nature falsifiable and have to be refuted by theories which prove to be more progressive. Thus he admits that 'the quest for certainty is a mistaken quest'. But it would be rash to jump to any sceptical conclusion on this basis. Certainty we might not get but we may get to the truth. We can never be sure that we have reached the truth finally but this does not mean, in any way, that we can't reach truth at all. "On the contrary" - as Popper observes,–"the idea of error implies that of truth as standard of which we fall short".[5]

The point to be noted here is that uncertainty of fallibilism and that of scepticism have significantly different characteristics One is loaded with positive alternatives while the other is empty.

A theory is accepted in science on the ground of sufficient evidential support. Until some strong evidence emerges against an accepted theory no doubts are entertained. And the doubts are entertained not for doubt's sake but to find out what else could be true. Thus, fallibilistic uncertainty is only an interval of taking decision among viable alternatives. It is not the end. But the sceptic's uncertainty is the result of non–sequitor. It is an end.

Fallibilism merely reports about the possible risks of our falling in our attempts of knowing the reality and that no stage is final in this course. But just thereby it presupposes that we are interested in taking such risks. Scepticism, on the other hand, abstains from taking such risks for fear of falling.

The fear of falling in science is the fear of falling short of truth. Truth is the goal towards which the whole scientific venture is oriented. Our chances of falling open up new possibilities of

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our getting nearer to the truth. With every refutation of older conjectures we get nearer and nearer to the truth. Fallibilism, therefore, in no way gives rise to any sceptical or relativist conclusion.

Instrumentalism is Inadequate

Anti–realism in its positive aspect presents an instrumentalist view of science In this aspect, thus, it invites to enquire about whether the instrumentalist view of science is adequate.

It goes without saying that the entities that scientific theories postulate (more specifically in such areas as–atomic physics) are employed for prediction and explanation. But how far it would be right to draw a conclusion on this ground that all such entities are meant for this purpose only? Do scientists regard all theoretically postulated entities as means of explanation and prediction only? The answer is precisely negative. In science all theoretical entities are not treated only instrumentally. Taking an entity as real and taking it only as an instrument of explanation makes a significant difference not only for the practical purposes of scientific research but also to its rationality. This difference has been very significantly presented by Jarret Laplin in one of his recent articles.[7] He has attempted to point out the shortcomings in Van Fraassen's instrumentalist view of science. He finds Van Fraassen's view 'most implaussible' who tries to interpret Millikan's experiment with a charged oil droplet as 'a help to advance electron theory by supplying numerical value to a constant',[8]

Laplin contends that the aim of Millikan's experiment was not to develop some one else's electron theory. His exclusive interest was in improving the methods of measurement of the electrical charge of electrons. He had no doubts regarding the

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existence of electrons. He uncritically believed in the truth of the then electron theory : he believed them to be really existing entities. If electrons are real then learning it's properties with all quantitative precision is a task of first order. This was Millikan's task. He was not concerned with the empirical adequacy of any particular electron theory.

Leplin points out– "What makes the difference within a certain context of research between taking an entity realistically and taking it instrumentally is that in the former alone new discoveries–having no direct bearing on the assessent of any theory–are sought". [9]

Distinction between 'real' and 'instrumental' has been endorsed by science itself. Some theoretical entities are deliberately postulated in science for the sake of instrumental explanations only. Magnetic lines of force, for example, are not believed to be really existent. They are postulated to facilitate understanding of the nature of magnetic force. But some theoretical entities are postulated realistically : they are postulated as 'candidates for actual constituents of the world.' The difference between the two is very important. While the first kind of theoretical entities are essentially made to effect the empirical reliability of a theory, the entities of the other kind need not do so. Researches which are aimed at determining the realistic candidacy of a theoretical entity are made for making new discoveries. The two are very different by their birth.

However, althought it is true that all theoretical entities are not treated alike in science, the instrumentalist's claims raise a significant question regarding the need of methodological seperation of theoretical entites. If what is treated realistically in science could also be explained instrumentally then does not this prove the realistic assumption redundant? Law of parsimony is

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an essential part of scientific methodology. It is unscientific to go on adding entities if one can do without them. Thus, instrumentalists' claim seems to be reasonable. However, it's justification depends on the answer to the question whether it is really possible to dispense with the realistic assumption regarding theoretical entities altogether.

Van Fraassen has attempted to explain Millikan's experiment instrumentally. He intends to show that the experiment does not necessarily require us to postulate the existence of electrons But he fails to notice that any such instrumental explanations are by their very nature parasitic on some electron theory or some of it's substaintial alternatives instead. Fraassen's explanation is not the outcome of the first hand approach to the epistemic situation which inspired Millikan to make an experiment with charged oil-droplet. It is true that his experiment could be associated with some different theory which would have postulated some other entity in place of electron. But postulation of any such existent entity is inevitable. Postulation of any entity named 'electron' could be replaced by postulation of some other entity named x, y or z, but it could not be removed as such. Without any existent alternative the situation would become just unintelligible. Without any such postulation the experiment would lose its significance altogether. In that case it would not be instrumetally meaningful either.

Instrumentalism, thus, can't stand on its own feet. It is, by its very nature, parasitic upon some realistic presupposition. The seemingly justifiedness of instrumentalism does not prove to be justified ineed.

Instrumentalism, therefore, can't cope with the methodological requirement of science. Realism is an essential methodological demand of all scientific quest. The history of progress of science

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forces us to abandon the old naive realistic approach to science but at the same time it also requires essentially a ground of methodological realism to stand–a realism which is needed by its methodology and thereby produces its justification.

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DESCARTES IN THE HEGELIAN PERSPECTIVE

Rene Descartes (1586–1650), the father of modern philosophy, is considered to be the first thinker who constructed a philosophical method possessing the certainty of mathematics. His main aim was to offer a body of self-evident and certain truths to the field of philosophy in order that a philosopher, like the mathematician and the natural scientist, could offer the perfect knowledge of all that man can know. He believed that philosophy, being the mother of all sciences, helps in the development of all other fields of study, such as physics, biology, ethics, arts, medicine, etc,.

Descartes held that philosophies prior to him did not offer self–evident truths acceptable to everyone. He felt that they were hitherto a mere mass of divergent opinions on one and the same subject, since they were founded on unstable presuppositions. They left man in error and doubt instead of yielding clear and certain knowledge. He even contended that there is not a single philosopher–whether ancient or medieval–whose views are not disputed.[1] Therefore, he questioned all authorities in philosophy and strongly believed in the "unique adequacy of each individual's reason for the discovery of truth".[2] He declared that we must dispense with all the opinions of our predecessors and build the edifice of knowledge anew. He held that we shall never become 'enlightened' by acquiring all the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, Acquinas, Duns Scotus and others. On the contrary one can acquire genuine knowledge only by thinking independently. He urged humanity not to be influenced by prejudices and beliefs acquired since childhood. He says that we cannot accept anything as truth on the authority of our parents and teacher. One should take something as true only when one clearly and distinctly perceives it to be so, One has to

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avoid precipitation and prejudgement and begin with the things which are simple and easy to understand and gradually arrive at complex knowledge.[3]

Descartes dispenses four following precepts in order to attain knowledge proper. They are : 1. never to accept anything as true unless the evidence is beyohd doubt, 2. to divide various difficulties into as many parts as possible, 3. to arrange things so that the simplest and easiest ones comes first followed by complex things, and 4. make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that nothing can be omitted.

Descartes believed that these precepts can be helpful in knowing all things as a logical consequence. If this is the case anything that is untrue need not be accepted as true. No truth can exist which cannot be proved by the above precepts

In order to fulfil his ambitious task of laying the foundations of philosophy, and thereby attaining certain and true knowledge, Descartes chose mathematics as the model for his method, because he wanted philosophy to be grounded in *certain* and *indubitable* axioms like mathematics. He maintained that everything that is deduced from the axioms is bound to be certain and truthful. Just as the mathematical statements that twice two is four, and that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles are acceptable without dispute, so also the establishment of similar truths would put an end to countless controversies in the field of philosophy. Descartes held that the discovery of self-evident truth in the field of philosophy will not only prove metaphysical issues like the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the reality of eternal world but will also lay a firm and secure foundation for the sciences.

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THE METHOD

Descartes says that mathematics proceeds from self–evident principles to other propositions that logically follow from them. One begins with simple propositions and passes to more complex ones. Here the method is not only deductive but also synthetic.

Descartes wanted to extend the same method to philosophy and thereby desired to establish an absolutely certain first principle from which philosophy can proceed to new and unknown truths which are equally certain. In his effort to discover an absolutely certain principle, he started doubting everything that is offered to us through senses. He did not believe our sensations, since they may be deceptive In the same way, he doubted the reality of our bodies, actions and the material world as a whole For him, all these phenomena are nothing but illusions conjured up by the senses. He maintained that our so–called waking life may be a state of dreaming All that we know to be real may have been the constructions of some evil spirit which intends to deceive us. Therefore, the world we perceive may exist only in our imagination and it may not have an existence independent of and outside us. Thus, Descates doubts the existence of almost everthing including the demonstrations of mathematics For him, nothing in the world is certain.

COGITO

Though Descartes doubts everything in the world, there is for him one thing that 'is' certain and that is the fact that he doubts. He holds that there can be no doubt about the act of doubting. It would be a contradiction to suppose that which doubts does not exist for doubting implies a doubter who thinks at the time of doubting Thus, Descartes deduces the existence of a thinking substance res cogitans) by reasoning logically from the indubitable fact of doubting. He arrives at a self-evident

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proposition, " I doubt or think, therefore I am," (Cogito ergo sum). For him, to doubt is to think and to think means to be (exist). He claims that this proposition is the first and most certain knowledge and that it happens to anyone who philosophizes independently and in an orderly manner. It is this principle which Descartes took as the starting point of his metaphysics. He uses it as the criterion to test the truth of all other propositions.

GOD

The two main problems that troubled Descartes are the establishment of the existence of God and the external world. As regards the former, he says that existence of God is implied in the very idea or notion of God innate in our mind. The idea of God must have a cause for its existence in our minds, since nothing is uncaused or nothing comes from nothing. So also, idea of God as the infinite and the most perfect being cannot be the effect of a being who is finite and imperfect. The cause must be as great as and as real as the effect. Therefore, we must not be the cuase of the notion of God in our minds. Then the only possibility is that it must have been implanted in us by God Himself, who is infinite and the most perfect God, while creating man in His own image, should have placed the idea in us just as the workman imprints his name on the object he produces. The idea of God would be impossible in the absence of of God. Descartes, therefore, concludes that God must exist by deducing the existence of God from the idea of God. Just as the conception of triangle implies that three angles are equal to two right angles and the triangle in reality has them, in the same manner the idea of God implies His existence in reality. He said, " when I turned back to any idea of perfect Being, on the the other hand, I discovered that existence was included in that idea in the same way the idea of a triangle contains the equality

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of its angles to two right angles—perhaps, infact the existence of the perfect Being is even more evident".[4]

EXTERNAL WORLD

To begin with, Descartes doubts the existence of the external world by saying that it may be an illusion that we see in dreams. The sensations that we have of the external world may be false. He holds that the existence of the world cannot be established from the experiences we derive from it. But at the same time we can not treat it as being absolutely illusory, Instead, we have to find a rational proof for the existence of the world. This is the existence of God. He holds that God induced in us a strong conviction of the existence of the external world. God being Benevolent and Omniscient cannot hoodwink us into the belief that there exists the external world when no such world existed. God is not a deceiver, but a truthful being. And our sensations and experiences are not illusions or hallucinations but realities caused by real bodies that constitute the external world. Descartes claims that God, while creating the external world with certain laws, fixed the notion of its existence in our minds.[5] Therefore, the external world exists beyond all doubt. God is indeed the mechanic who creates, sustains and destroys the world at His will

The Hegeleian Perspective

Though the philosophy of Descartes was very innovative and it was by no means uncontrovertial or unquestionably accepted, his method had many critics. Among them is Hegel. Hegel criticizes Descartes mainly on two issues. Firstly, Hegel holds Descartes' introduction of God into his method is not proved but merely asserted. God is made to be believed by ascribing to him the quality of Omniscience and Benevolence. Descartes has chosen the idea of God as being most certain and clear only to

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have it as a mediating principle between subjective knowledge and actuality. Hegel holds that the idea of God is invented in order to show the transition of the subjective into the objective. Hegel regards Descartes' conception of perfect being, the universal thought, which is treated as the cause of everything objective, " simply as one found ready to hand ".[6]

Secondly, Hegel contends that Descartes' transition of thought (I or God or thought) into truth or the determinate being is naive. That is, Descartes ' way of uniting thought and Being, through the ontological proof of the existence of God, is empirical in the sense that involves investigation, and experience. The Being is not philosophically proved but it is brought about in an empirical manner. Descartes deduces the world by asserting that we must believe what is revealed to us by God, who is never fallible and untruthful. But Hegel holds that though Descartes has very plausibly set forth the deduction of the world from God, it " is still indeterminate, formal and shallow ".[7]

In the problem of the external world, Hegel felt that Descartes' method of deriving the world from God who is considered to be the unity of thought and Being is based on the certainty and undersanding but not on the necessity of deducing the world from reality which is Reason. Descartes has merely made the world to be believed instead of proving its existence by logical necessity. Hegel says that the objectivity distinguished from the subjectivity of the I or God is one of faith but not of speculation. The external reality is accomplished through the method of physics consisting of many observations. Hegel holds that Descartes mingles empirical observations with metaphysics and hence there is obscurity in the transitions from the subjective to the objective, that Descartes has therefore failed to distinguish clearly between philosophic and scientific knowledge. His method is dominated by empical reflection and reasoning from particular

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grounds, facts and phenomena, and the thinking treatment of empiricism is predominant whereas the sense of speculation is almost absent.[8] Descartes' reason is one of understanding but not of philosophical speculation.

According to Hegel, Descartes has never been highly speculative which is desirable in philosophical analysis. For Hegel, speculation is uneffected by the limitations of the senses. He calls this speculative method as an immediate and non-discursive technique which is the same as intuition. Anything that is not direct and immediate is distortive. Science which relies heavily on the mundane techniques of observation and experiment as to accept the distortives that accrue out of the limitations of the sense knowledge, philosopical knowledge should be free from limitations and distortions. It should be not mediated through senses for the obvious reason that it will be coloured by all limitations peculiar to them. It should be a technique which is direct, immediate and non-discursive and which can take us to the absolute certainty. This is the realm of philosophy. It is the same as intuition and is this that constitutes a royal road to reality.

To Hegel, Descartes has relied on more observation, experiment than on the critical intellectual method. The limbs or precepts of Descartes' method in our search for knowledge, which are stated earlier, show that this method is not in any way different from the methods of physics and mechanics and mathematics It is more hypothetical than certain, since it involves the laying down of hypotheses in the treatment of the conceptions of universal determinations, viz., substance, phenomena, order of things. Descartes hypothetically draws up a list of their conceptions and passes on to them as something found in our consciousness. There is obstinacy in Descartes stopping short at the assertion that there is self-consciousness, the certainty that the

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human mind is finite and God is infinite. There is caprice in Descartes' saying that certainty is given to us as a fact by God.[9]

Hegel says that the doubting method is not sceptical in its true sense. To Hegel scepticism means an inquiry ending in doubt. But the cartesian method, though it starts with doubting, ultimately ends in certainty. Hegel also holds that Descartes' method of doubting everything leads us to confusion. Ascribing uncertainty of matters related to everyday life leads to complete inaction.[10]

As the result of the above shortcomings in Descartes' method Hegel has not considered it as an ideal method in philosophical analysis. Hence, Hegel established what he felt was an ideal method i e, Dialectic method in philosophical pursuits, which would overcome inadequacies of the Cartesian method.

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MEANING N AND MEANING NN–AN EXPOSITION OF THE UNFORMED GRICEAN INTENTION.

Using the subscript 'NN', H. P. Grice abbreviates his notion of " non–natural " meaning to " Meaning$_{NN}$." For Convenience, I abbreviate " natural " meaning to " meaning$_{N}$ ". This dichotomy of ' meaning ' is founded on the distinction between the *two senses* of the word ' mean ' – ' mean ' determined by some natural symptoms (e.g. my (spontaneous) coughing means (symptomizes) that I am suffering from chest cold.) and ' mean ' determined by the Intentions of the utterer (e g. by uttering ' I am suffering from chest cold ' I mean (intend to convey) that I am suffering from chest cold.)[1] – the ' natural ' sense and the ' non–natural ' sense (henceforth, ' N–sense ' and ' NN–sense ') respectively.

It is the context, not the text, that Grice takes as primitive to meaning. The analysis of linguistic meaning is to be undertaken on the ground of a concrete situation–which involves the utterer, the audiance and the utterance. Explication of meaning, as he regards, is to be carried out in terms of the intention of the utterer which ' accompanies or precedes ' the utterance in the process of transferring the message (a description, a request, a promise, or an order etc;) to the audience. Meaning of an utterance, to be more general, is the way it is used in the concrete situations, thus being dependent on a particular ' form of life.' It is not merely a description of a state of affairs but a kind of act wiith certain intentions involved in the way of communicating. Thus, in a sense, the later Wittgensteinian approach to ' meaning ' seems to be the fundamental and the speech act theory, advocated by Austin and Searle, the intermediate way to the development of Grice's account of meaning.

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However, Grice's account is a transvaluation of the earlier 'communication-intention'[2] theories in the sense that he puts forth utterer's intention as the *central* and *fundamental* factor which is there with 'Meaning is in Use' and 'Speech act Theory' but remains implicit or peripherial in the analysis of meaning.

'Intentionality', seems to Grice, as being 'embedded in the very foundations of language.'[3] The notion of 'Meaning$_{NN}$' is primordial in his analysis of meaning. He tries to explicate different *types*[4] of meaning in our linguistic communication on the basis of Meaning$_{NN}$. And pointing out 'utterer's intention 'as the fundamental and central factor in the analysis of Meaning$_{NN}$ he claims that the concept of meaning is and can be analyzed in terms of utterer's intention.

The vital role of the distinction between "Meaning$_{N}$" and "Meaning$_{NN}$" is to put forth the crude (unformed and unrefined) 'intentionality' factor that he later formulates, refines and rerefines to show how the explication of 'meaning' is possible in terms of 'utterer's intention.' Thus, the distinction, being the first step to understand Grice's account of meaning, merits its exposition–to what exclusively I concentrate here upon. The five differences[4] Grice points out can be sketched out in a questionary table to make them more handy.

('X' is to be replaced by a noun phrase and 'p' by a sentence)	(For the N–Sense of 'mean' (or in the case of Meaning$_{N}$))	(For the NN–Sense of 'mean' (or in the cases of Meaning$_{NN}$))
1. Does the utterer (normally) imply that someone	No	Yes

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	meant that p by x when he utters 'x means that p'?		
2.	Does 'x means that p' entail p?	Yes	No
3.	Can 'x means that p' be paraphrased to 'what is meant by x is that p'?	No	Yes
4.	Can a sentence of the form 'The fact that... means p' be an approximate restatement of 'x means that p'?	Yes	No
5.	Can 'x means that p' be restated as "x means that 'p'"?	No	Yes

Put, for example, the noun phrase 'Those spots' and the sentence 'you have got measles' in place of 'x' and 'p' respectively. And, with the form 'x means that p' we get an example (a) 'Those spots mean that you have got measles' – for meaning $_{N}$. Similarly, get another example (b) 'Those three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the bus is full' – for Meaning $_{NN}$. The underlying thought behind all the five differences (to be illustrated by the help of the two examples, (a) and (b)) is that 'intentionality' is the basic important factor with Meaning $_{NN}$ which is absent in case of Meaning $_{N}$. Hence, what rightly follows in Grice's subsequent works, 'utterer's intention' is the basic ingredient of meaning transferred or conveyed in all types of linguistic communication.

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Exposition of the five points of difference :

1. Some one who utters '(b)' does (normally) imply that somebody (viz-the conductor) means that the bus is full. But one who utters '(a)' does not imply that somebody meant that he has measles. It is so due to the different applications of 'mean.' In the NN-sense of 'Mean', not in its N-sense, it applies to something deliberately created by some human being (i.e., the utterance presupposes certain *intention)*. The three rings of the bell, not the measles, are created by some intelligent being with some communication-intention. From my spontaneous coughing you may infer of my having a chest cold but I don't mean anything by that, even if this coughing means (symptomizes) that I have a chest cold. But when I utter "I have a chest cold", with some intention to communicate you, I mean that I have a chest cold.

   A person (viz-I am), rather than an event or fact or state of affairs (viz-my spontaneous coughing) means (in the NN-sense) that p (viz-I am suffering from chest cold),

2. Although by uttering '(a)' I do not imply that somebody means that you have got measles, I cannot say "you have not got measles" at the same time. For '(a)' entails "you have got measles". If you don't have the measles then 'it is false that those spots mean that you have got measles'. That is, "$\sim$P entails $\sim$(x means that p)" as well as "'x means that p' entails p". In other words, the N-sense of of 'mean' connects its antecedent part (A) and consequent part (B) in such a way that it is contradictory to assert 'A' and deny 'B' at the same time. "His temperature of 102°F means that he is sick but he is not sick" is a contradiction. On the other hand, '(b)' does not entail "The bus is full". For it is possible for the bell to ring three times

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even when the bus is not full, if, for example, the conductor mistakes or rings the bell unintentionally. The 'intentionality' factor there with 'mean', in the NN–sense, exempts us from the *logical obligation* (i.e., to assert the consequent part) which we cannot avoid in case of meaning$_N$. For production of an action without some intention of communicating something is possible, the 'mean' flanked by the *act* and the *communicative meaning* supposed to follow in case of Meaning $_{NN}$ is free from the said logical obligation (which is with meaning$_N$.)

3. From '(a)' we cannot proceed to "what is meant by those spots is that you have got measles" because the latter is incoherent. It is incoherent in the sense that a natural symptom is not a natural cause. The red spots are just the natural symptom from which the inference of having the measles is drawn. To have measles necessarily implies to have the spots but not the *vice versa.* As often we are entitled to infer imperfectly indicated state of affairs with probability only we can assert '(a)'. '(a)' is not equivalent to "what is meant by those spots is that you have got measles". On the other hand, the three rings of the bell in the bus is not a natural symptom (nor a natural cause) of the fact that the bus is full. It is an intelligible response from a human being (viz., the conductor) to communicate something (viz, the bus is full). What is meant here is meant by somebody with some intention and distinguishes it from a natural symptom's meaning nothing in a *communicative sense.* In a communicative sense, a symptom means nothing, even an utterance itself does not mean anything if it is devoid of being uttered by an utterer with some intention.

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However " 'x means p' entails p " (that we dealt in our 2nd point of difference) snould not be confused with " 'x' entails 'p' " (something similar to what we discussed in our 3rd point of difference). In the former case, and not in the latter case, it is contradictory to assert the antecedent part and deny the consequent part when 'mean' is used in N-sense and " 'x' entails 'p' " is supposedly due to 'x means that p'.

4. '(a)' can be paraphrased to " The fact that you are covered with those red spots means that you have measles ". But '(b)' cannot be paraphrased likewise. There is very much coherence between ringing of the bell for three times and the bus's being full, yet the paraphrasing does not hold. For '(b)' being paraphrased so (i.e., to " The fact that the bell rang three times in the bus, meant that the bus is full ") implies a natural connection between two facts – ' ringing of the bell for three times ' and ' the bus is full '. But, such an implication is absent in '(b)'.

Thus one should not be confused that " 'x' entails 'p' " holds good for meaning NN and not for meaning N (that we discussed our previous point of difference) is due to any perfect causal relationship between 'x' and 'p' for cases of Meaning$_{NN}$. It is rather the 'intentions' there with meaning$_{NN}$ that the relationship between 'x' and 'p' presupposes, makes them to be related so. Only when 'x' is a production along with certain communication–intention, then only it gets related by a phrase preceding it as like " what is meant by " with 'p'. For 'p' is essentially, being a sentence in our communition, having the ingredient of communication–intention.

However, if a natural connection can be found, by quite accident, between the rings of the bell and the bus's being full (for example,[6] due to certain physical facts about the bulk of

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human beings, the volume of the bus and resilence of its springs, suppose a bell is hooked up to the suspension system of the bus rings three times when the bus is full and not otherwise) then '(b)' can be paraphrased to "The fact that the bell rang three times in the bus meant that the bus is full." But presence of such a natural connection excludes bell-ringing from being a case of meaning NN. 'The fact that the dog obeyed the master means that it was faithful' is obviously different from 'the fact that the servant obeyed his master means that he was faithful'. In a strict sense, the former is paraphrased correctly but not the latter.

5. Now it is clear that 'x' itself may not be an utterance in 'x means that p' when 'mean' is used in N-sense. For it is merely a natural symptom, not a production which presupposes some intention of the utterer. On the other hand, 'x' itself is an utterance, its production being dependent upon the utterer's intention, in 'x means that p' when 'mean' is used in NN-sense. This gives the reason for our fifth point of difference that passage from '(a)' to "Those spots mean 'you have the measles'" is not acceptable whereas, from '(b)' to "Those three rings of the bell in the bus mean 'The bus is full'" is acceptable. For there is a *level-distinction* in the language between what follows and what precedes to 'mean' when 'mean' is used in the NN-sense. In the N-sense of 'mean', in 'x means that p', both 'x' and 'p' (viz. 'those red spots' and 'you have measles') refer to the same fact (of the material world). Here 'x', not being an utterance itself, cannot be distinguished as having a different level of language. In the NN-sense, 'x' (viz 'the three rings of the bell in the bus') and 'p' (viz. 'the bus is full') do not refer to the same fact (of the world). Here 'x' being an utterance itself, is distinguished from 'p' – by a level-distinction – in the sense that 'x' being the first level of utterance

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means 'p', the 2nd level of utterance. In a sense, 'x' pertains to an object-language where as 'p' pertains to a meta-language in 'x means that p'.

In the way of exposing, I have tried to point out the unformed, gross or impolished (which is without any particular formulation) *intention* in our linguistic communication-that Grice's account of meaning presupposes-from each of the five differences. The *gross intention,* which Grice refines or polishes later to formulate in certain ways as to put forth the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning something in linguistic communications, is the basic factor with 'Meaning$_{NN}$' that distinguishes 'Meaning$_{NN}$' from 'Meaaing$_{N}$'. If 'the core of Gricean theory is', as Andrew Jones points out, the 'distinction between natural and non-natural meaning'[7] then the kernel of that core is nothing but the unformed intention.*

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NOTES

1. Example taken from N. L. Wilson's "Grice on Meaning : The Ultimate Counter-Example", *NOUS* vol. IV, 1970, p. 298.

2. By 'Communication-intention' theories I mean the theories which take, 'Communication' as the ground of the analysis of meaning and 'intention' as, somehow, central or peripheral in the frame work of the analysis. It is in this line that Strawson distinguishes between 'theories of communication and intention' and 'theories of truth condition' in in his paper "Meaning and Truth". (See his *Logico-linguistic Papers,* Methuen, 1971, pp. 71-72).

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3. H. P. Grice; "Utterer's meaning, Sentence- Meaning and Word Meaning" in (ed) Searle, *The Philosophy of Language*, Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 69.

4. For these types of meaning and the strategy for their explication, see Grice's "Utterer's Meaning and Intention", *Philosophical Review*, LXXVIII, 1969, pp. 147–77.

5. H. P. Grice; "Meaning", *The Philosophical Review*, LXVI, 1957, pp. 377–78 (I have changed his order of pointing out the differences to illustrate more consistently. My order of pointing 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 corresponds to that of his 3, 1, 2, 5 and 4 respectively.

6. Example taken from A. P. Martinich's *Communication and Reference*, Walter de Gruyter : Berlin, New York, 1984, p. 114.

7. Andrew J. I. Jones; *Communication and Meaning*, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Synthesi Library Vol. 168, p. 110.

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THE BIRTH OF GOD

God is one of the most outdated and yet relevant concepts of the present age. Outdated, because humanity with its bewildering achievements in various fields has outgrown the need of a God to give it solace and sleep in its hard times; and relevant, because majority of the population the world over is still under its sway. It is, however, somewhat outrageous to talk about God to the exclusion of religion with which it is invariably associated. Inspite of the fact that there have been many religions without a God, and many gods without a religion, the emergence of God is most often a corollary of the emergence of religion. It would be expedient, therefore, to discuss in this context the birth of both religion and God.

" Anything short of God is not rational, anything more than God is not possible," said William James. Yet to some of the great thinkers of all times, God is an irrational and impossible idea; religion, too, is very roughly handled by these thinkers. For Marx, " Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." [1] For Freud, it is " a return of the repressed," and "...the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity." [2] For Bertrand Russell " Religion is based primarily and mainly upon fear. It is partly the terror of the unknown, and partly the wish to feel that you have a kind of elder brother who stands by you in all your troubles and disputes. To allow oneself to entertain pleasant beliefs as a means of avoiding fear is not to live in the best way." [3] Before coming to our general conclusion as regards the emergence of religion and God, we shall first discuss the views of this secular kind of thinkers who are neither theologians nor believers in God.

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Theories to account for the origin of religion and God are numerous. Animism, which is connected with the names of Edward Tylor and Herbert Spencer, takes us back to primitive times. It points out that the savage views anything active as alive an object or animal has within it the same sort of spirit which man recognises in himself, say in dreams as performing the acts abroad. However, this theory loses sight of the fact that the most primitive savage did not have so clear an idea of spirit as different from body. Besides, the case of direct worship of natural phenomena cannot be accounted for by this theory. The second theory namely Naturalism, often connected with the name of Max Muller, is based on the tendency of the primitive man to fear and worship the objects of nature which were seemingly very powerful and beyond his control. Thus, man personifies all objects of Nature and revers what is awesome. However, this theory ignores animism altogether and is too simplistic to explain the successful survival of religion down to the present day. Sufficient generality as these theories lack, they are not mistaken in recognising the material origin of religion.

We may now turn to more important and more thorough theories about the origin of religion and God. Of these theories, those developed by Emile Durkheim, a sociologist, Sigmund Freud a psychologist, Ludwig Feuerbach a philosopher, and Karl Marx a sociologist and philosopher, are of much significance. Durkheim's theory "appeals to a generation which is acutely conscious of the power of society to mould for good or ill the minds of its members."[4] This theory assumes totemism as the earliest form of religion. The totem is a symbol of the community. As it is the symbol both of the society and the God, the God and society must be the same. The God is, in fact, the society personified.[5] When men have the religious feeling of standing before a higher power, they are, in fact, facing the greater

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environing reality. This reality, according to Durkheim, is not however a supernatural Being; it is the natural fact of society, the symbol of society. The tribal customs, beliefs requirements, and taboos in the past were sovereign and bore collectively the awesome aspect of the holy. One can also draw a parallel between the complimentary sense of God as man's final succour and security, and the way the individual is supported in all the crises of his life by the society. According to this interpretation, it is the human animal who has created God in order to preserve his own social existence. It is obvious, however, Durkheim's theory is an exaggeration. While it must be admitted that religious ideas in general reflect a man's habitat and group, it is a serious error to imagine that the habitat or group in which he is born produces religious state of mind. Religious emotion, like the savage's fear of a power suddenly apprehended, is not a product of group influence. Nor can a sociological theory explain the fact about a prophet who is at variance with his society as he 'marches to a different drum'. The prophet cannot have the support of God against society if God is simply society in disguise.

While for Durkheim God is an abstraction out of the prersures of society, for Ludwig Feuerbach, God is an abstraction out of the finest qualities of man himself. He argues that the belief in God was an outcome of man's tendency to abstract these qualities of human nature and to project this artificial perfection of being onto an ideal realm beyond the buman realm, and to call this 'God'. Hence is the division in man, alienation from his own true being.

Despite being a meterialist and a preacher of sensuousness, Feuerbach gives an idealistic tinge to religion. As Marx points out "Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into human essence. But the human essence is not abstraction inherent in

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each single individnal. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations." [6]

Feuerbach stops short of the qnestion why we abstract finest qualities in human nature and project as forming the nature of God. Sigmund Freud tried to answer this question. Religion, for Freud, is a mental defence against more threatening aspect of nature--earth quake, fiood, storm, disease and inevitable death. Thus, man comes to believe that " over each of us watches a benevolent providence, that the harshness of the silent heavens is only appearance; in reality we are under the protection of a father who will not suffer us to become the plaything of the stark and pitiless forces of nature ". [7] Thus religion is "... the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity " which may be dispensed with when at last man learns to face the difficulties of life in this world relying no longer upon illusions but upon scientifically authenticated knowledge.

Freud has also tried to understand the nature of religion, i.e., the tremendous emotional intensity of man's religious life and the associated feelings of guilt and of obligation to abey the behest of the deity, with the help of his distinctive concepts of the Oedipus Complex–and Primal horde–a term taken from Darwin and Robertson Smith. But these concepts are controversial and too prone to doubt in the light of recent anthropological studies to be discussed here.

Freud's analysis takes proper note of external reality, interaction with which gave rise to religion. His general view that faith is a kind of 'psychological crutch' is within the limits of acceptance However, his account of religion as a whole is highly speculative. Freud is too obsessed with instinctive impulses in man to account for the nature of religion, instead of paying attention at the same time, to man's social relations and material activity—a direction towards which Marx had thrown light.

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According to Marx, religion is born as an illusory compensation for his needs which he is not able to satisfy through production. Man, not realising that unsatisfied needs are the result of defective modes of production, has always created and imagined another world in which those needs will be met, and religion which is no more than the shadow cast by a defective economic system will pass away with the defections that have produced it. Marx, with Engels, has also tried to unearth the interconnectedness of religion and history – proving that whereas in the earliest stages of human civilization religious beliefs arose and belief in God was the outcome of man's helplessness in the struggle against forces of nature, in a class – divided society, social oppression of the working masses and their apparent helplessness give birth to religion, the belief in a better life hereafter. Religion also becomes a tool in the hands of the ruling class which fosters religion as a means of blinding the masses. This is how history gives birth to new concepts and changing forms of religion.

The idea of God as pure consciousness in religion comes into being when mental labour is separated from manual labour and is put on a high pedastal. This explains how God as pure consciousness becomes the supporter of the ruling class. Marx's explanation seems to be better placed than other theories, as it can explain the changes that have occurred through ages in the conception of God and religion which, in Marx's view, are nothing but fantastic reflection in man's minds in which changing terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces. Marx, however, was more concerned with abolishing the religion rather than theorising about the emergence of religion in the sense that his critique of the use made of religion by the state is more important in his thought than the analysis of its birth.

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Quite near to Freud's thesis of God as a 'psychological crutch' falls the doctrine of J. Krishnamurti. He says, our life is so uncertain, it has no significance, no lasting and enduring meaning. So we want to find something that will give us abiding significance, abiding comfort, a depth to our life. So out of this deep loneliness, misery, uncertainty, we create or put together an idea called God or truth. Krishnamurti also, however, confines himself only to psychological causes giving little attention to the influence of outer reality psychological shortcomings may be overcome in an individual through the understanding Krishnamurti advocates, but change on a wider scale is not possible by singling out few individuals.

After a discussion of all these theories, we may venture now to unearth behind the chaotic diversity of the views of these thinkers and beneath the confussion of this picture, some common factors which bind these theories together. In all of them God has been regarded as a refuge, an escape from the troubles of the world. And we may say that God is a kind of illusory substitute for those aspects of life with which man avoids direct contact and conflict.

God is a substitute, said Durkheim, for the natural pressures of society; God is a substitute, said Freud, for the threatening aspects of nature; God is a substitute, said Krishnamurti, for the loneliness, misery and uncertainity of life; God is a substitute, said Marx, for the real distress of life.

To put it in a coherent manner, it may be said that religion emerged in ancient times as a form of an escape from, and defence, though illusory, against the stress and strains, difficulties and disasters–of social and natural kind, faced by man. This defence takes the form of substitution–a replacement by God and religion for the afflictions of existence. However, this

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replacement can neve be said to be complete as external reality remains the same, the changes occur, at the most, in human psyche in the form of religious surrender before God. That is why, in fact, we see that people who are in distress are more susceptible to the belief in God.

To develop our theory on the common ground of all the theories it may be said that this escape flight or refuge which belief in religion and God suggests, is one of the responses of human consciousness towards the troubles and turmoils of concrete material and social life of man. The interesting point to be noted here is that this religious response instead of transforming the external reality, transforms the consciousness itself to create an illusion of a change outside. This is amply reflected in the intensity of religious life. With the development of man's consciousness through ages this response has assumed as refined dimensions as intricate and complicated our problems have become. But the point to be noted here is that there have been other responses like those of human reason towards the various problems and which, contrary to religious response, have been positive in the sense that human reason with the increased power and penetration into the reality at every succeeding stage of history, has, in concert with the practical activity, tried with considerable success to improve the living conditions of the world. Religious response, on the other hand, shows the frailty of human mind, unable to cope with the existing troublesome and perplexing order of things. God is like a magic wand with which man tries to obliterate the miseries of existence, when it does no seem possible for him to transform the world through reason and activity. To turn to God is, in fact, the admission of defeat. Here we may find a reason why even philosopheres at times turn to God. That is how God takes

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birth in the philosophy of some rationalist philosophers. However, this may not be the only reason as there may be some ulterior motives which serve the interest of these philosophers... Despite these interests, the concept of God enters into their philosophy precisely at a point where reasoned explanation becomes difficult.

We may illustrate the above statement with some examples. Infallibility of distinct and clear ideas of reason is based by a rationalist philosopher on the divine guarantee i.e., on the undeceiving character of God, for otherwise it was not possible for the philosopher to buy the truth of his proposition. Even Spinoza, whose system was, in fact, not in need of any God, to drive home his concept of one single self-determining and all inclusive substance, labels it with ' God or Nature ' (Deus Siva Natura). Similarly, Leibniz, faced with the problem of explaining the causal connections in the face of self-contained character of monads, resolves the issue by introducing God who has programmed all the monads in advance according to the system of Pre-Established Harmony. Even Berkeley, who is a believer in God from the start, seeks God's help at a point where his doctrine is about to sink into solipsism. If to be is to be perceived, the world will cease to exist in the absence of a perceiver. But no, God is always there to perceive it, since ideas are located in his mind.

Thus, we find that whenever philosophers fail to give the ultimate explanation of the world, God comes to their help. In Indian philosophy also, Brahman is the ultimate reality of the world, for how else this mind boggling reality can be explained. Brahman, in Samkara's system, becomes more of a logical necessity as otherwise the whole system loses its logic.

To summarize, God and religion are not only ' psychological crutches ' but also responses, or solutions (?) or devices (?) to

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tackle the problems of the world, but as is obvious, very illusory ones; they tend to put our reason to sleep presisely at the time when we require it most. There may be several ways of solving a problem–through reason, through skill, or through religion. It is clear the solution that religion offers has nothing to do with the concrete problems but merely changes our way of apprehending the world to give us an illusory confort.

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NOTES

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RELIGION AND MORALITY : A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING

I

"Religion" has been associated with a lot of conceptual short comings for which, it appears, no universally acceptable definition of it seems possible. To some it has a great emotional appeal whereas others are totally indifferent or even positively disillusioned with it. An orthodox believer takes religion to be the *summum bonum* of life but a Marxist takes it to be the opium of the masses. All this is due to perhaps the lack of a proper conceptual understanding of what religion stands for. There have been attempts by the social scientists like anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists to make a systematic study of the subject. As a result there are a great variety of empirical theories and within each discipline a multiplicity of theories about the origin, development, history etc., of the leading religions of the world. Unlike these first order activities our purpose here is not to discuss any scientific issue of the immense range of religious phenomena, but ours will be an humble attempt to consider some philosophical issue about religion and morality.

Though a single definition of religion may not be conclusive and comprehensive to include thereby all discourses and beliefs which in common usage are characterized as 'religious', it does not mean that the concept is totally vague and has no conceptual boundary of its own. In case of many terms of the natural language to attempt at an analytic definition is not possible for some intrinsic ambiguity in them. But from this we must not infer that the terms are arbitrarily used without admitting any meaning pattern. Here we can introduce Wittgenstein's[1] notion of 'family resemblance' to maintain that a term may

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not have a unitary meaning nor the things it denotes must have some common essence. Thus the term religion may not have strictly a unitary meaning nor does all the religions must share some common essence to be denoted by it. There might be, as is the case, a large number of characteristics which in common usage, are characterized as religious and these characteristics may overlap and criss cross among all the religions that we find in the world. This approach of family resemblance is not completely free from difficulties as endless similarities may result in a large family making specific discourse about a particular concept difficult, but this is none of our purposes to discuss here. But ours would be an attempt of laying bare the minimal and the functional features of religion as it is understood in the context of the leading religions of the world such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and so on.

Before examining these minimal features of religion, it will not be out of point to see how the various religions came up and mingled with the cultures of different societies. We know that there are historical account of the origin and growth of the leading religious traditions. As known, after 1000 B. C. a number of prophets appeared in different parts of the world and a number of local religions came to be advocated. There are also empirical studies on the cultural development of the primitive man to determine man's social and psychological conditions for religious tendencies to grow in those remote past. The sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists, inspite of their individual differences, maintain that religion was a response to some felt need within human environment. That is the wonders of the natural phenomena, the cause and purpose of its existence did create an intellectual need for an explanation. So also the obdurate presence of death and human suffering caused coneern to man in the primitive societies. Of course it cannot

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be said that religious beliefs and habits are the necessary outcome of such felt needs. Though there may be specific responses to certain needs. Man's response to the above needs can be regarded as a favourable condition for his religious beliefs and practice. In course of time such beliefs and practices might have received the sanction of a larger community thereby becoming inherent part of man's religious culture. Further the primitive man's sense of fear and insecurity must have been compensated by a firm faith in some supernatural agency to provide him necessary providence. In course of time there have been attempts to rationalise these beliefs. When such states of affairs continued, a number of revelations occured in different parts of the world which gave rise to a multiplicty of local religions. Because of the differences in forms of religious experiences and as a result of the conceptualisation of these various modes of experiences many theological doctrines emerged. Social and religious interaction came at a much later stage. Hence before it, each religion developed separately within its own social environment. As a result of the philosophization upon religious beliefs over centuries sharp differentiation amongst the various religions was felt.

Much before the great religious traditions developed there were religious legends, myths, stories and rituals in every society as a response to the problems experienced by the primitive man. From their worship and prayer the prevalence of their religious emotion is known. Thus to secure a sense of security and to resolve in their own way the wonders of the natural world there were intellectual, emotional and practical responses which gave rise to religion.

Whatever may be the causes of the growth of religious consciousness, all the leading religions of the world, in spite of their

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empirical diversities, are based upon some theological doctrines and practices. These theological doctrines can broadly be analysed into some religion–making characteristics. The first important characteristic, which every religion embarks upon is, a cosmology; and it is an intellectual response to the inexplicable problems of the natural world. Every religion in its own way solves the problems of the natural world, the cause of its existence and purpose. So every religion propounds, however unreal it may be, ideas of the general order of existence like what is the nature of the ultimate Reality, whether the cosmos is manifested or created etc. attempting to handle the deeply disturbing issues. Similarly every religion in its own way tries to to solve the causes of human suffering, death and the peculiarities of human conduct by bringing metaphysical beliefs like the ideas of disembodied existence, rebirth, liberation, mode of divine activity etc. These metaphysical beliefs are supposed to solve the perplexities that go with human life. The cosmological and metaphysical doctrines which are at the foundation of a religion as an intellectual response to the obdurate problems experienced by man evoke certain dispositions and attitudes. These dispositions give rise to different rituals which necessarily go with every religion. Every religion has its own rituals which are handed down from one generation to the other establishing a cultural bond among the people belonging to one religion. Rituals are the common religious expressions for ceremonial purity. Every religion has its specific rituals at such moments in life like birth, marriage and death along with some other at different times of the year.

Though the empirical diversities between any two religions are much conspicuous still any institutionalised religion reveals these minimal objective conditions. These characteristics constitute, however loosely, the conceptual framework of every

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religion. Further in the religion we find definite beliefs, attitudes and practices which are, by and large, in agreement with these minimal conditions. Of course some beliefs, attitudes and practices change in course of time because of the impact of social change or of cultural interactions. Sometimes prophets reformers also bring change in religious beliefs and rituals. But such changes in religious behaviour do not alter the conceptual framework of religion. The basic principles of a religion are articulated in its scriptures and treatises. Every raligion has its sacred treatise codifying the basic ideas peculiar to that religion. Thus every religion has a set of theological doctrines articulated in its sacred scripture along with certain attitudes and practices expressed in the various forms of rituals and all these constitute the conceptual framework of a religion.

About the nature of religious discourse it can be said that religious language does not have cognitive meaning as its statements neither can be verified in any actual or possible manner, nor can they be considered analytical. Religious discourse comprises of many categories of expressions for which it cannot fit into one criterion of meaning. Language used to describe one's inner experience of a metaphysical thesis or a myth or a moral prescription follows altogether different logic. And to make all religious language to conform to one pattern of meaning will be an oversimlification. Religious discourse comprises of many language – games, therefore, there can be several standards to determine their meaning.

II

Thus some theological doctrines and ritualistic practices largely contribute to the foundation of a religion. Comparative study of religions no doubt reveals that not only the ritualistic practices of two religions differ, but they speak completely

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ncompatible things on very many issues like the nature of the ultimate reality, the purpose of the world, the nature of human isoul, the mode of divine activity and so on. How compatible answers to the same question can be accepted, is a perplexing phenomenon of the comparative study of religion. If the answer of one religion to such questions is true, then it necessitates that what other religions say is false. Since the views of the different religion cannot all be true, though each religion claims its views to be so, the sceptical thrust goes deeper and cas ts doubts upon the claims of very one of them. The more there is attempt to rationalise the beliefs of a particular religion the grounds to falsify other religions become strong.

Not only the comparative study of religions revealed the doctrinal disagreement among them but with the increasing influence of scientific and rationalistic spirit the veracity and sacredness of religious beliefs were questioned. The scientific inventions and discoveries falsified the cosmological and metaphysical notions comprising the theological doctrines of religion. Similarly philosophical analysis also exposed the antinomical nature of metaphysical thinking and explained the logical fallacies inherent in our attempt to speak upon trans-empirical realities. This was coupled with the attempt to know the needs and psyche of the primitive man for his set of beliefs and practices which in course of time were developed and articulated in the institutionalised religions. All these factors developed the sceptical thrust towards it and even it was considered harmful for the society Bertrand Ressell,[2] for example, writes "... all the great religions of the world – Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Communism – are both untrue and harmful... I am firmly convinced that religions do harm as I am that they are untrue".

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This view that religion is harmful is maintained by many contemporary thinkers and even men of letters. The Marxists, the rationalists, and many secular–minded free thinkers very often endorse this view. They take such a stand perhaps because of some historical factors. In the cultural history of mankind we find that religious restrictions have stood on the way of intellectual search and social change. There are many cruel stories of religious tyranny for which the sage of scientific investigation has suffered and many truth seekers and scientists had to sacrifice their lives. Besides, the communal sentiment has created many hostilities dividing people into warring groups. Thus in this way one may argue, religion has done positive harm to mankind.

But such an assessment of the consequence of religion a theologian may hold is perhaps an exaggeration or at least one–sided. For the religions were the cultural streams to stabilise human society and therefore historically inevitable as means of social control. It also greatly helped to establish code of conduct regulating man's behaviour in a civilized way. Every religion lays down a way of life and leaves how life can be morally led. Thus, morality became an integral part of the religious framework.

This issue whether religion has been harmful or helpful cannot be disputed here and it is left as an open question. But our task will be confined to a limited one of the relationship between morality and religion as most often, and I think very loosely, they are considered non–distinguishable or the former taken to be dependent on the latter. Further I shall not attempt at a comprehensive explanation of all possible relationships in which morality can be dependent on religion. One may show that morality is causally or psychologically dependent on religion which I shall not debate. But I shall attempt to show the con-

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ceptual distinction between religion and morality and point out that the moral principles cannot be justified by being derived logically from religious beliefs or doctrines.

Before considering the issue whether or not morality can be justified on the ground of religious belief, at the out setsome confusions should be avoided relating to the very definition of morality and religion. Sometimes the ethical principles or value-judgements are taken as postulates adopted to regulate human conduct, and again they are considered as acts of religious faith. That is, moral commitments are considered as acts of religious practice, and this makes morality to be dependent on religion. This way of relating morality with religion is purely verbal and not in any way significant. This is because in such a contention 'religion' has been used in a sense so as to include any moral principle as an act of religious faith by its very definition. Such a stipulative definition of religion, even if it is accepted, will not serve any purpose but do show merely a verbal link.

Secondly, in order to show the importance of religion sometimes morality is founded on religious faith. It is argued that morality has no basis of its own if it does not rest on religion, and again contended that religion is so important because of its moral basis. This argument is circular as morality is founded on religion and again the necessity of religion is acknowledged because of morality. Independent grounds should be provided to establish morality on religion, if at all it is possible, and not by making one necessary for the other.

To show that ethics is dependent on religion it has to be shown that every value-judgment can be logically inferred from theological one. Most often and very naively value-judgments are inferred from some religious beliefs. In order to see the

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validity of this claim, let us take a concrete example and examine it. We sometimes argue–

1. (Premise) God is present in every living being.

2. (Conclusion) We ought not to inflict pain upon any living being.

Here our premise is clearly a theological statement whereas our conclusion is an ethical one. But this argument expressed in this form is not valid unless it is interpreted as an enthymeme. Actually this argument expressed in its valid and explicit form becomes–

1. (Premise) We ought not to inflict injury where God is present.

2. (Premise) God is present in every living being.

3. (Conclusion) We ought not to inflict injury upon any living being.

Here, the first premise is an ethical statement which for its justification may not depend on any theological premise. Here the conclusion follows from a moral principle (our first premise) being combined with a factual expression (our second premise). And most often when value–judgements are derived from theological ones the argument is an enthymeme which in its explicit form expresses a moral principle to support the ethical conclusion. Without presupposing a moral principle in the premise no value–judgment can be drawn in the conclusion. To derive a moral conclusion from a theological premise it has to be shown that the latter can itself entail an ethical conclusion. But this is also not possible since a value–judgment expressing a moral obligation i.e., 'ought' cannot be derived from a factual or pseudo factual consideration i.e, 'is.' The very structure of the ethical arguments shows that the 'ought' cannot be derived

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from ' is ' – the violation of which will give rise to ' the naturalistic fallacy.' This shows that every ethical judgement cannot be derived from religious beliefs alone.

It is perhaps not always true that no ' ought ' can be derived from an ' is.' For one can reasonably argue that making an intercaste marriage will hurt my parents, therefore, I shonld not marry in different caste; or I have promised to help my friend, therefore, I ought to help him. Here our premises are factual expressions whereas our conclusions are ethical ones. This shows that ought can be derived from is. But a little reflection will show that this is not true since in each case a moral principle such as ' one should not hurt his parents ' ' promises must be kept ' is presupposed for the argument. Whether these moral principles are obligatory or not is altogether a different question. Thus goes the dictum ' No ought from an Is.' One possible defence can be given to the argument that value-judgments can be logically inferred from religious beliefs and doing away with a moral principle by defining ethical terms by reference to theological ones. In the above argument it can be said that the ethical conclusion can be derived from the theological statement alone (i.e., from our second premise) by defining " ought " as " commanded by God." Thus our above argument becomes-

1. (Premise) God commands us not to inflict injury upon any living being because of His presence.
2. (Premise) What God commands ought to be done.
3. (Conclusion) We should not inflict injury upon any living being.

But this argument does not seem to fare any better since the second premise is a definition or semantical one. For we define ' ought ' in terms of ' commanded by God.' So ultimately the

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conclusion is derived from the first premise and hence fails to avoid the naturalistic fallacy.

To get out of this inconvenient position it may be held that the sharp distinction that is made between a value–judgment (expressing an ought) and a theological one (expressing an is in some sense) is not sound. The religious statements can be taken, one may argue, to include a moral commitment so that a value-judgment can be derived from it. If this is correct, the religious beliefs will be very much complex consisting of an ethical and non–ethical belief. But such an explanation is ridiculous to the thesis that value – judgments are logically derivable from religious ones. For if a value judgement rests on a religious belief which finally turns out to be ethical, then the very proposal to derive value–judgements from religious ones does not hold good.

There are also strong reasons to show that the justification of morality does not at all depend on religion. Suppose a theologian argues that one should be moral because it is the requirement for leading a religious life or it is what God wants, and such reasons are definitely theological. To this one can reasonably ask why should one lead a moral life or do what God wants him to do ? If what religion prescribes or God wants is said to be morally obligatory, this abiding by such prescription is a moral act. A particular moral act cannot be taken as the reason to justify every moral action. And if this act is not obligatory, then it cannot be the ground for justifying the obligatoriness of every action.

Sometimes it is argued that religious beliefs give rise to moral principles. From religious beliefs like 'God loves us' or 'He is present in every form of life' we can have moral principles like 'we must love one another' or 'we ought not to do injury to any being'. But even if moral principles are the

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result of religious conviction, it cannot be logically shown that their justification cannot be done outside the theological frame-work. They may be self-evident or justified by non-theological reasons. As Prof. R. Prasad[3] very befittingly remarks "it is not merely a historical significance that atheistic Jainas consider the principle of non-violence unexceptionable while theistic Saktas consider certain types of killing sacred." This clearly shows that even if a moral principle is accepted on the basis of religious conviction, its justification does not depend upon the latter.

There is an argument that evey value-system or ethical code depends on some ultimate beliefs about man, the meaning of life, the purpose of the universe etc. That is, any scheme of values is finally determined, argued Niebuhr,[4] by the ultimate answers give to these questions. Such a view that every moral code depends on some metaphysical beliefs can very well be disputed. But even if that is ignored and this contention is accepted it proves too little to relate morality with religion. Here the term 'religion' is used so widely that all ultimate beliefs about man, the meaning of the universe, the purpose of human life etc., are not only theistic ones, but become religious. For it is ridiculous to say that the ultimate beliefs of the nontheologians, atheists, naturalists etc., are also religious.

These considerations show that moral discourse cannot be made to depend logically on religious discourse. Moral principles can neither be inferred from nor justified in a theological freme-work. Ethics can have its autonomy following laws of its own and having nothing to do with theological considerations.

Still, it may be argued that ethics based on reason and experience cannot work without some theological leaning. In practice religious convictions inspire for leading morally com-mendable lives. There is nothing to dispute it. For such a view

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does not justify morality on the basis of religion but simply points out that religion provides new source of motivation.

It is true that sometimes religious motives work in a desirable way, but to argue that it alone provides satisfactory motivation can very well be disputed. This is because every moral action is not backed by a religious motive nor every religion leads to a morally commendable action. There can be purely secular reasons which can give motivation for a moral action and for leading a moral life. If one believes that leading a moral life, by and large, social harmony and hapiness can be ensured one may be inclined to lead a moral life. One is likely to desist from immoral practice if that will impair his honour and bring social displeasure to him. Besides, if one believes in the intrinsic value of morality then he will have a strong impulse to lead a moral life. Regarding religious motivation it is not true to say that the motive behind every moral action is religious. For there are many non–theologicans and atheists who lead morally commandable lives. Similarly it is not true to say that a religious motive can inspire for a moral life. Sometimes purely from a religious motive one may do most heinous action. To please one's deity one may fight a war or even sacrifice his son. Thus every religious motive does not lead to morally commendable action. Hence a religious motive is neither necessary nor a sufficient condition argues Dr. Prasad for leading a moral life.

If this analysis is correct then it is reasonable to say that religion and morality are conceptually different and each has a conceptual framework of its own. If morality is not a necessary feature of religion, then the latter will be confined to some theological doctrines, ritualistic practices and some emotional convictions involving ' the sense of the sacred ' or ' the idea of

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the holy' etc. In that case the empirical diversities between any two religions will be underivable and the naive belief that all religions in essence are same is without any ground.

At the present situation of the world when it has become a communicational unity, religions as institutions have no laudable role to play. In the past it might have been a great social force contributing to the stream of culture–which was a necessity during those days–but in the recent time it is losing its hold and has nothing to sway. Over the world to come–Secularism, humanism and cosmo–politanism seem to be the moving forces of the contemporary world. Since all the religions of the world cannot be harnessed together to promote these values, rather they do the contrary by creating bitter communal hostilities, their importance in the future world is very much suspect.

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NOTES

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2. B. Russell: *Why I am not a Christian*, George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1961, p. xi.

3. R. Prasad: "God and Morality : A Conceptual Exploration" in *Indian Philosophy Today*, ed. N. K. Devaraja–Macmillan, 1974, p. 197.

4. R. Niebuhr; *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness*, Scribner, New York, 1950, p. 125.

5. R. Prasad, *Ibid*, p. 199.

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HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER ON THE CARTESIAN LEGACY

I

In the history of western philosophy it is the modern age which becomes distinctive from the ancient and the medieval ages by its concentration on consciousness as a special domain of human being. It is Descartes, to whom the credit goes for the discovery of consciousness and afterwards the discussion on consciousness persists throughout modern philosophy, especially in the classical school of Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and slowly this discussion is carried over to the nineteenth century empiricism. But it is Descartes and following him Locke, Berkeley and Hume are the first philosophers in subjecting consciousness to a systematic investigation,

According to Descartes, clearly and consistently, there are three fundamental realities of philosophy, namely, the self, the God and the material world. His universal doubt, firstly, leads him to the reality of doubting self, which in turn leads him to the certainty of veracity of God, which again, more convincingly, leads him to the objective validity of our idea of the external world of material bodies. Thus, in Cartesian system, the knowledge of God comes in between the knowledge of the self on the one hand and that of the corporeal world, on the other, and this knowledge of God serves as the medium through which one reaches at the certainty of the latter. These three realities i.e. the self, the God and the material world, are called by him as *substances*. For him, a substance means that which requires for its existence the existence of nothing else i.e. that "which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to exist". Understood in this restricted and

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highest sense, God alone is the substance; for he alone has in himself the ground of his existence and is therefore *causa sui* : the cause of himself. No other thing can be called substance in this sense, since it cannot exist even for a single moment without the help and support of God. Hence, the term 'substance' here cannot have an universal application. However, Descartes applies this term to mind as well as to matter by calling them relative substances, which need the support of God for their existence. For him, mind is the thinking substance and matter the corporeal substance. Thus, in Descartes, we find two notions, of sustance i.e., absolute substance (God) and relative substances (mind and matter). Both the relative substances, for their existence, depend upon the absolute substance, but at the same time both are independent of each other. They are fundamentally different from one another and are known through their attributes. The attribute of matter is extension and that of mind is thinking. The two substances are absolutely distinct : mind is absolutely without extension and no body can think. Mind cannot be conceived without thought Thus, the mind is *res cogitans;* "I have a clear and distinct idea of myself in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing. Hence, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, through which I am what I am, is entirely and truely distinct from my body and may exist without it. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of myself as entire without the faculties of imagining and perceiving, but I cannot conceive these without conceiving myself".[1] However, in thought, Descartes includes will and also such higher emotions as are not the results of the union of mind and body. In fact, in *Discourse on Method* he tells us that a thinking thing is one that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, imagines and feels.[2] Understood in such a very comprehensive sense, thought is by no means restricted to the intellectual or

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cognitive activities of mind–it embraces every thing we, now, label as 'consciousness'.

'Consciousness' in Descartes enjoys a double privilege. Firstly, consciousness is indubitable. The self, exclusively as a conscious being *(res cogitans)*, is not engulfed by doubt; rather it withstands such engulfment. From our point of view this is not important. What is important for us is the second privilege which Descartes attributes to the consciousness towards the end of his second meditation. Here, summarizing the famous analysis of the perception of wax, Descartes, more generally speaking, makes explicit the essential reference of objects to those acts of consciousness through which the objects present themselves.[3] To put it in a different way, from Descartes' analysis it becomes clear that consciousness is necessarily involved in confrontation and dealing with the object, may it be of whatever kind. In other words, it is in and through the acts of consciousness that the objects present themselves.[4] It is this momentous and profound insight of Descartes, which we name as the second privilege of consciousness, namely, the insight that consciousness is the universal medium of access.

II

However, in Husserl, this insight of Descartes becomes the central theme of his theory of Intentionality, for it implies the principle of a subjectively oriented philosophy, which, in turn, implies a goal, namely, a generalized expression of the reference of objects to acts of consciousness and to the conscious life as a whole and the formation of that reference in sufficiently radical terms, which was pursued by Descartes as well as by the whole tradition of modern philosophy. But, unfortunately enough, neither Descartes nor the latter could achieve the goal. It is only Husserl and his phenomenology which accomplishes this long

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cherished ideal of the modern philosophy and perhaps, therefore, Husserl aptly speaks of his phenomenology as the secret longing of the whole of modern philosophy.[5]

According to Husserl, Descartes is great for his attempt to radicalize the theme of *cogito*. In *Cartesian Meditations* he tries to renew this cartesian theme of *cogito* by setting aside the historical errors made by Descartes. For Husserl, Philosophy could get victory over its own history and could realize its eternal sense, provided it pursues its end earnestly and honestly. Accordingly, he suggests that the history of philosophy has a sense in so far as it progresses in the direction of true beginning, consequentially supressing its own history. Every philosophy is interpretation of the history of philosophy, an explication of its contradictions and a justification of its possible unity by philosophical activity. Following Descartes, Husserl attempts to investigate this sense in a new-Kantian way by radicalizing the notion of *cogito* and hence he can be said to have traversed far beyond the cartesian project.[6]

However, the basic thrust of Husserl's interpretation of Descartes is that in Descartes the principle of primacy of consciousness is immediately transformed into the assertion of the existence of the mind as a thinking substance. It is this which Husserl means when he say that Descartes betrays his own insight at the very moment when he has grasped it. The validity of the cartesian starting point is that consciousness is the medium of all access to objectivity. This means that every externality is known only by way of the relation of consciousness to it. Taken in this sense the principle of consciousness is an anticipation of the thesis of intentionality of consciousness. But Descartes misunderstands this principle as implying the existence of a thinking substance, which is separated from all other objects.

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It is because he gives this ontical interpretation to the nature of consciousness that the cartesian problem of justifying the existence of objects arises and it is to this end that Descartes brings in the notion of God. But all these metaphysical constructions arise because of a failure to understand the nature of consciousness as by its very essence, i.e., intentional. In other words, the cartesian metaphysics of two substances i.e., *res cogitans* and *res extensa* is the consequence of a failure at the phenomenological level, namely that the truth of consciousness as intentional. If that phenomenological insight had been preserved there would have been no need for a proof of objects; for the directedness to the object is the very nature of intentional act.[7] Only then the relation between the consciousness and the world would be an intentional relation, whereas in Descartes the relation appears to be a relation between two substance. Descartes realized that the relation cannot be a causal one, because the mind and body are radically different and hence there can be no interaction between them. Since Descartes has not grasped the intentional relation between the substance and the object and since he also clearly sees that the relation cannot be a causal one, Descartes' metaphysics is forced to take refuge in the veracity of God. In other words, a theological conclusion is the ultimate price which he has to pay for an inadequate phenomenology.

When we turn to Heidegger we see that although his approach is very different from that of Husserl, yet for Heidegger also the fundamental flaw in the cartesian philosophy is a misunderstanding of human being as a thinking substance. For Heidegger also the very essence of man is to be in the world and hence there could be really no problem of relating the human existence to the world.[8] But since Descartes misinterprets human being in terms of substance an unreal problem arises.

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As we have already seen earlier, for Descartes, there are three substances, namely, God, the *res cogitans* (thinking substance) and the *res extensa* (corporeal substance). According to Heidegger the main lacuna here with Descartes is that although he distinguishes between these three kinds of substances, yet he does not make explicit the governing principle of such a distinction. However, Descartes offers a clue by saying that substances are self–sufficient i.e., they do not depend on any other entities for their existence. In this sense a substance should be fully comprehensible without reference to any other entities. This defining feature of the cartesian conception of substance fits nicely with the intent to discover the entities themselves, without any relation to any context and, thus, leads towards the Heideggerian conception of present–at hand.

In Heidegger's treatment of Descartes both *res cogitans* (thinking substance) and *res extensa* (corporeal substance) are interpreted as present–at–hand entities.[9]

For Heidegger there are various entities in the world and the notion of the world can be best understood by describing our everyday relationship to the entities within the world. Furthermore, he claims that this basic everyday relationship lies in our employment of tools or equipments i.e., those things of which we are making use in order to realize our purposes. In technical jargon, Heidegger refers to those entities or tools as 'ready–to–hand (das zuhandene) entities. Thus, an entity is determined as ready–to–hand equipment by adoption of our certain attitude or relationship to it. But, later, at the root of the epistemological enterprise Heidegger finds a certain special attitude or relation to entities. The attitude may be adopted secondarily on the basis of our concernful Being–in–the world. In this attitude, which may be called as 'theoretical attitude', the entities are known and encountered not as the ready–to–

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hand, but as the present–at–hand (das vorhandene). In other words, an entity can be termed as present–at–hand when it is viewed in theoretical attitude as determinable and isolable. So, an entity which was one equipment in previous occasion is now discovered in an altogether different way i.e, as an object. If it is so, then we can call the concerned attitude as objective attitude, rather than theoretical. But Heidegger himself has never done so.

In fact, Heidegger uses the concept of present–at–hand in two senses i.e., a wider and a narrower one. He uses this notion either for all entities other than Dasein or only for those that are the objects of the theoretical attitude. His crown–work, *Being and Time* supposes the former i.e., the wide class which consists of the present–at–hand in narrower sense as well as the ready–to–hand. But, certainly, the narrower use of the present–at–hand is more common in practice and in this paper too, we will restrict ourselves to this latter sense only.

For Descartes, however, human being is interpreted as thinking substance and this interpretation is of central importance for him. Following him, Husserl, too, makes this concept of *res cogitans* as the fulcrum of his theory of Intentionality.[10] But, astonishingly enough, Heidegger's treatment of Descartes focuses on the characteristics of corporeal substance.[11] Descartes holds that, for each type of substance there is one and only one attribute which defines its kind of substantiality and for the corporeal substance this attribute is 'extension,' which is three–dimensional i.e., consists of length, breadth and thickness. The assumption behind Descartes' saying that extension is the only attribute of corporeal substance is that such extension is presupposed by all other characteristics like shape, motion, hardness, weight, colour etc., which can be assigned to bodies. Each of such attributes are nothing but only a mode of extension.

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Thus, for Heidegger, Descartes' explication of extension is graspable in terms of a system of a coordinates in three equivalent dimensions. More importantly for him, this is the consequence of cartesian pursuit of the present–at–hand and also is due to his founding intent to encounter entities explicitly and in themselves. Such ' pure ' extension can be determined and fixed in isolation from any of the involvements that an entity might participate at one moment (but not at another).

Again, with regard to the cartesian explanation of the thinking substance, Heidegger says that the same intent is responsible for his particular way of grasping human beings as *res cogitans*. But here, Descartes' theoretical intent has an extra-dimension i.e., he explains human beings as present-at-hand and at the top of it he claims that human beings have an ability to theorizing, as one of his states or activities can give transparent access to its objects. And perhaps this fact is partly responsible for his account of various states and activities of human being as essentially conscious and, in the long run, accordingly, this claim, too, becomes partly responsible for the division between thinking substance and corporeal substance.

III

When we consider the cartesian philosophical tradition from point of view of Husserlian phenomenology as well as Heidegger's fundamental ontology, we can observe the essential strength as well as the limitations of the cartesian tradition. For both Husserl and Heidegger the basic validity of the cartesian starting points is that it begins with the human subject. Husserl has particularly recognised the necessity of the first person on the starting point in philosophy, of which the cartesian philosophy is a striking example. For Husserl, all radical philosophising must start with the ego cogito or the ' I think ' of Descartes.[12]

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Husserl would also agree that the cogito is essentially an act of the ego or the subject and not a mere impersonal abstraction such as consciousness in itself. In this sense all genuine philosophy must be, in Husserl's term 'egological' and the greatness of Descartes' insight consists in grasping precisely the privilege of consciousness. As we saw, this privilege is not merely its indubitability but it is rather due to the fact that consciousness is the universal medium of access to whatever can be known. This is the cartesian expression of the intentionality of consciousness, for what it comes to is that anything can be known only in so far as it is related to an act of consciousness which reveals it precisely as that which is known in that act. In so far as consciousness, in this sense, is the universal medium of access, the starting point of all philosophy must be in terms of this 'first person' necessity.

In a very different sense, Heidegger, too would regard this as the valid point in the cartesian philosophy. Of course, here the privilege is not seen in terms of the principle of consciousness, but rather the privilege belongs to the mode of being of the human subject. For Heidegger, the inquiry into the *Being* of all entities must begin with the questioning of the mode of being of that existent which alone is capable of disclosing all other beings. In this sense the privileged point of disclosure is the human being himself, for in Heideggerian terms human being or Dasein is, at once, ontical as well as ontological. It is ontical in so far as it is a being in the world with other beings, but it is also ontological in the sense that the very mode of this being is comprehending other beings. Understood in this sense, all metaphysics must be based on the analytics of human existence and to the extent that Descartes' own metaphysics begins from the mode of being of the human subject the cartesian intention is on the right lines. It may be noted that although God is

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substance in the absolute sense the disclosure of God's existence is not the starting point of Descartes' philosophy, but the finite human subject itself. Hence, both Husserl and Heidegger would agree that the cartesian philosophy gives expression to the radical starting point of all philosophies.

But, however, both of them would also urge against Descartes that this radical intention is betrayed as soon as it is grasped. It is, of course, Husserl who, in the *Cartesian Meditations* has made this the fundamental principle of his critique of the cartesian philosophy as a whole. From Husserl's point of view the two great inadequacies of the cartesian achievement are, firstly, the failure to recognise the privilege of consciousness as consisting in its intentionality, rather than in its indubitability and secondly, to regard the mode of consciousness as akin to the mode of the object of consciousness, The first limitation reinforces the second, for if the intentionality of consciousness is lost sight of, then the conscious being appears to be merely one entity among others and the problem of relationship to other subjects becomes unavoidable. By isolating consciousness from the world to which it is intentionally related Descartes reserves for himself the insoluble problem of dualism. This dualistic temptation is reinforced by the very category in terms of which Descartes describes consciousness as he turns it to a thinking substance. A substance is that which is capable of existing by itself without the need of other things. Hence, the existence of consciousness is seen in terms of its isolation from other objects, rather than in terms of its relationship. The point of this criticism is that the category of substance is totally inapplicable to consciousness precisely because consciousness is intentional. From Husserl's point of view, therefore, the failure of Descartes is the failure to understand the essential nature of consciousness as intentional.

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When we look at the notion of a thinking substance from the perspective of Heidegger's criticism a somewhat similar result emerges. For Heidegger, there is a fundamental distinction between categories and existentials. Categories are modes of description proper to objects, whereas existentials are modes of description of Dasein. The category of substance is, therefore, ontical and as such it applies only to the things in the world. But, a human subject cannot, therefore, be reconciled under the notion of the category of substance. To do so, would be, to precisely regard the human subject as a mere entity; in Heidegger's term this would be to treat man as purely ontical and it would lose sight of the ontological aspect of the human existence. Looked at this way, what Heidegger says comes very close to Husserl, namely, that the basic fault of the cartesian philosophy is a misunderstanding of the nature of the human substance. However, there is a twist to this Heideggerian critique of Descartes which has secondary application to Husserl also. For Husserl, the fundamental starting point is the intentionality of consciousness and it is only after the transcendental reduction that, the essence of consciousness as intentional is properly grasped.[14] But the transcendental reduction i.e., epoche removes all practical concerns or dealings with the world. In Husserlian terms such concern would belong to a natural standpoint and the epoche is a suspension of the entire natural standpoint. Hence, with the epoche, we are at a purely theoretical attitude, whereas one's fundamental relation to the world is one of concern, rather than mere contemplation. The relation between the ready–to–hand and the present–at–hand marks the difference between these two attitudes. From Heidegger's point of view not only the cartesian philosophy but also Husserl's phenomenology itself is philosophizing only at the level of present–at–hand. If so, then Husserl's phenomenology, in spite of its radical

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criticism of the cartesian position, is still very much within the cartesian framework as a whole. Apart from this, of course, it is true that there are many other implications of Heidegger's critique of Husserlian phenomenology, but in this paper I am not elaborating these aspects of the critical relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. As we have already seen, what I am more interested in is to point out how while in one sense there seems to be fundamental agreement between Husserl and Hediegger in their response to Descartes, yet this point of agreement has very different implications for phenomenology on the one hand and for fundamental ontology on the other.

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REFLECTIONS ON ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF FORMS

I

Introduction

The most celebrated doctrine of Plato, his 'Theory of Ideas', which is the centre of his philosophy, faces some acute problems. This theory is very harshly attacked by the critics, and therefore, it stands in need of re-examination. A critic like Aristotle shows the invalidity of the argument in its favour with his contra-argument, viz., the 'Third-Man', which forced Plato either to relinquish his theory as a whole or to declare it invalid This history is as repeated, as the same argument was earlier put forth against the doctrine by Plato himself in one of his late dialogues, *Parmenides*. Plato deserves full credit for the demonstration of the rarest gift of self-criticism. But, then, how is it that inspite of seeing the drawbacks and lacunae in the theory, he does not abandon it ? What is the reason behind it ?. Did the extra-sensitive mind of Plato not catch the point of criticism or not comprehend the problem really ? Certainly he did. He himself was the pioneer of the arguments against his own theory. Yet he stands irrefuted on the grounds of the consistency in his philosophy. A twentieth century philosopher Kurt Godel's famous theorem says that 'No philosophical system can be both complete and consistent'. Plato's theory was consistent but not complete. To be reassured of this claim, let us pursue this interesting issue of the Third-Man argument further.

We shall discuss the issue from the following points of view :

1) Brief account of Aristotle's basic criticism of the theory of forms;

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2) What exactly is the argument of Third–Man
   a) Aristotle's formulation
   b) Plato's formulation in the *Parmenides.*

3) Some contemporary reflections on the Third–Man Argument;

4) Evaluation.

II

Brief Account of Aristotle's Basic Criticism of the Theory of Forms

A brilliant and devout disciple of Plato, Aristotle was in his academy for more than a decade. How greatly he was influenced by Plato and Platonic philosophy is seen in his humble apology, which says, "It is commendable and even obligatory in defence of truth to abandon one's own cherished convictions, especially in a philosopher; for though both are dear to us, it is a sacred duty to give the preference to truth."[1] With such reverence Aristotle proceeds to examine the doctrine of Ideas in his book *Metaphysics.*

To demonstrate the inconclusiveness and invalidity of Platonic theory of Ideas, Aristotle presents the following arguments[2]:

1) Those who first proposed the Ideas as causes were in effect doubling the number of things to be explained, as if a man wished to count a few things, but imagined he could not do so, unless he added to their number.

2) None of the arguments is valid. Some of them are inconclusive, the others would prove there are forms of things of which we maintain there are one. Thus, (a) the argument from the existence of sciences would prove that there are Forms of all things of which there are sciences; (b) the argument of

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One-over–Many would prove that there are forms of negations; (c) the argument that we can think of what has perished would establish Forms of perishables, because we retain a mental image of the latter; (d) some of Plato's more closely reasoned arguments explicity imply Ideas of relative terms, while others mention the 'Third–Man'.

3) The arguments do away with what we value more than the Ideas : they make number prior to the dyad, the relative to the absolute; and they open the doors to all those later developments which conflict with the very principles of the theory.

4) If the Forms are participated, there can be Ideas of substances only; for they are not participated as accidents of a subject that is directly shared in and none can be participated except in so far as it is not predicated of a subject. So the Forms must be substances. But the same words must denote substance in the sensible as in the Ideal world. Otherwise what is the relation between the two worlds ?

5) The main difficulty : What do the Forms contribute either to eternal or to transient sensibles ? For, (i) they cause no motion or change in them; (ii) since they are not in them, they are not their substance, and, therefore, contribute nothing either to the knowledge of them or to their being

6) To call the Forms 'patterns' and to assent that other things 'participate' in them is to take an empty metaphor, for there can be different patterns of one and the same thing. Thus, the species will be the pattern of the individuals, but the genus will be the pattern of the species, so that one and the same thing will be both pattern and copy.

7) It is manifestly impossible for that which is the 'substance' of a thing to exist apart from it. How then can the

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ideas, which are supposed to be the substances of things, exist apart from them ?

8) If Forms are numbers, in what sense are they causes ? If it is because things in this world are other numbers, then how does one set of numbers cause the other, notwithstanding that the former is eternal and the latter not ?

9) One number may be composed of several other numbers, but how can one Form be composed of several other Forms ? If it is produced not from numbers, but from units in them, in what relation will the units stand to one another ?

10) How are the intermediates derived ? Why should they be considered intermediate between things here and ideal numbers ?

11) Each unit in the number two comes from a previous two, which is impossible.

12) What constitutes the unity of the one number understood collectively ?

13) If the units are dissimilar, they should be named, just as those who assume two or four elements name them. And if there is absolute One, the word 'One' must have a variety of meanings. But this is impossible.

14) While tracing substance from their principles we Platonists derive lines from long and short. But how can the plane contain a line or the solid a plane ? From what will the points contained in the line be derived ? Thus, the argument which establishes the line establishes a point.

15) The Platonists have abondoned the search for the causes of sensible phenomena.

16) The Forms have no connection with the final cause, with which sciences are concerned.

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17) How can we obtain knowledge of the objects of a given sense unless we possess that sense ? And yet it should be possible, if the elements of which all things consist are the same.

Aristotle's realism forms itself through the criticism of Platonic arguments. His main criticism was that Plato unnecessarily thought that the universals exist outside the things and separately. The particulars get their names because of their universals and are bound by them in a way of participation or imitation. But participation is not possible because

i) If one Idea participates in many sensibles, then it will be divided In that case, an Idea will exist apart from itself, which is absurd;

ii) The source of Idea will remain inexplicable, because of its division;

iii) If the Idea participates in contrary atributes, then contrary attributes belong to it at the same time. If it does not participate in them, then we cannot account for different attributes.[3]

Thus, the root cause of the matter lies in the relation of participation. The Third-Man Argument is developed from the lacunae in the argument of participation.

III

What Exactly is the Argument of Third-Man ?

Aristotle has coined this term. "If that which is predicated truly of several things also exists in separation from these, there will be a Third-Man. For, if the predicate 'Man' is different from its subject and exists independently of them, and the predicate Man is used in the context of both the particular men and of the Idea of man, there will be a Third Man apart from both particular men and the Idea. Similarly, there will be a fourth

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man, predicated both of the third man, particulars and idea; and similarly a fifth, and so on, *ad infinitum*."[4]

Plato's formulation of this argument in *Parmenides*[5] is very much similar to that of Aristotle, though chronologically it belongs to an earlier date. *Parmenides* also mentions the uselessness and infinite regress involved in the argument for Ideas. Two factors are held responsible for the rise of this argument.

1) The dilemma of participation, i.e., whether the whole or the part of an Idea is participated in the thing.

2) The assumption that as Ideas are separate from sensibles, sensibles are also separate from Ideas.

The latter presumption is found both in the *Parmenides*, and in the *Metaphysics*.

Parmenides starts off with the defence that Ideas are paradigms and participation is only possible with resemblance. Thus, the dilemma of participation resolves itself, since the Ideas are not in their participants. *Parmenides*, the dialogue, does not stop there, but comes up with further arguments, which are as follows :

1) The Symmetry Assumption : If the participant is like the Idea, then the Idea is like the participant. Continual generation of a new character will never stop if the character happens to be like what has a share of it.

2) The One-over-Many Premise : If one thing is like another, those two things must have a share of one and the same Idea. Therefore, it is necessary, that that of which like things have share, so as to be like, should be the Idea itself.

3) The Likeness Regress : It is impossible for anything to be like the Idea or the Idea like anything else; otherwise another

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idea will turn up beside the first, if the Idea is like what has a share of it, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Hence, the claim that participation is resemblance implies the regress. If the regress is absurd, then the premises leading to it must also be rejected.

4) The Third–Man : If a and b are like in respect of c, then a is like c and c like a in respect of d, and so on. This regress requires *some* further Idea at every stage but does not specify *what* further Idea at any stage. Thus, the Ideas are present only where things are like in some respect. In a way, the argument implies the limitation of extent.

Thus, the mistake of Third–Man is committed in the attempt of solving the dilemma of Participation. As in all philosophical problem, we should not look for solutions of the problems, but to know how the problems are presented. Here we see, that Aristotelian presentation of this problem is in coherence with the Platonic presentation. So the data is the same, only the form is different The essence of the argument is the same, only the framework different. Hence, the critics might face another question, as to why Aristotle is given the credit of this argument, when the origin is placed right back in Plato. But we will not go into this problem for the time–being. Instead, we will move to the understanding of some contemporary scholars on this issue.

IV

Some Contemporary Reflections on the Third Man Argument

We may pick up the work of Gregory Vlastos[6] as representative to his era. He talks about the Third–Man Argument, while focussing his attention on the *Parmenides*. He deals more with the technical grounds of the argument as devised in the *Parmenides* than with the essence of the argument or with the the argument as a whole. No doubt, he considers the argument

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as impressive and instructive, but fatal Let us have a brie review of his understanding of the argument.

Out of his two essays, Vlastos divides the first essay, in Text and Logic of the *Parmenides*. In the first part of the essay, he says, the unity of Forms is being taken for granted in the *Parmenides*. When the talk is actually about participation, there is not much discussion about it, i.e., when Parmenides asks Socrates, if there exist certain Forms by participating in which the other things get their names, e g., similar by participating in similarity, etc.

Further, Vlastos constructs a logical hypothesis which he says would be refuted in the Third-Man Argument.

1) If any set of things share a given character then there exists a unique Form corresponding to that character, and each of these things has that character by participating in that Form.

(1. a) a, b, c are F

(1. b) There exists a unique Form (which we may call F-ness) corresponding to the character 'F' and a, b, c are F by participating in F-ness.

2) If a, b, c and F-ness are F, then there exists a unique Form (which we may call F-ness II) corresponding to F, but not identicalwith F-ness, and a, b, c, and F-ness are F by participating in F-ness II

2. a) a, b, c, and F-ness are F.

2. b) There exists a unique Form (which we may call F-ness II) corresponding to F, but not identical with F-ness; and a, b, c and F-ness are F by participating in F-ness II

If *Parmenides* can go as far as 2. b, he will have refuted the claim of the Third-Man. "If one, then infinitely many" is so

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much more impressive, than 'if only one then two' though the latter is as fatal to the refutand as is the former says Vlastos.

The second essay [8] of Gregory Vlastos talks about the Third-Man Argument in a more definite way. The logical formulation of his argument is as follows :

The First Version :

(A. 1) If a number of things a, b, c are all F, there must be a single Form F-ness in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c as all F.

The difficulty here is that another Form will always appear on the scene.

(A. 2) If a, b, c and F-ness are all F, then there must be another Form, F-ness, in virtue of which we apprehend a, b, c and F-ness are all F. To make this argument sound legitimate we need the self predication assumption (A 3).

(A. 3) Any form can be predicated of itself F-ness is itself F.

(A. 4) Non-identity assumption If anything has a certain character, it cannot be identical with the Form in virtue of which we apprehend the character. If X is F, X cannot be identical with the Form in virtue of which we apprehend the character. If X is F, X cannot be identical with F-ness.

(A. 5) If F-ness is F, F-ness cannot be identical with F-ness.

(A 5a) If any particular has a certain character, then it cannot be identical with the Form in virtue of which we apprehend that character.

Vlastos picks up the argument numbered A.5a, and claims that a, b, c are all apprehended as F in virtue of F-ness itself.

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The existence of F-ness would remain unproved, so also the existence of all subsequent Forms. The infinite regress would not materialize. Therefore, he blames Plato for not having identified all the necessary arguments leading to the second argument in the Third-Man, which is the main source. Thereby Plato reveals his innocence of all the necessary arguments as well as his uncertainty about the validity of Third-Man Argument.

V

Evaluation

Finally, the problem still remains as to how do we account for the fact that Plato does not seem to see the Third-Man Argument as fatal to philosophical outlook in the way Aristotle does. We have seen that it has been the fashion to judge Plato's theory from Aristotle's perspective. The arguments presented in this essay earlier have been integral arguments and they try to catch Plato in words on technical grounds. But they do not take the argument as a whole into account knowing the essence of Plato's arguments and knowing the consistency of this theory in Platonic philosophy. We would like to take a different stand, in order to defend Plato on his own merit.

The philosophical force of a logical thesis is partly determined by the conceptual framework in which it is made. Its corollaries are :

1) The same logical thesis may be made in different conceptual systems.

2) The force of the thesis depends on the kind of system in which it is made.

Thus, it is necessary to understand the theory in its own framework. Hence, we will consider our method more clearly,

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so that the way we handle this Platonic problem will be absolutely unambiguous.

The nature of the conceptual system or framework is determined by –

1) the formulation of the basic problem/s,
2) the methodological presupposition/s,
3) the type of regulative analogies or metaphors around which it is built up.

This method will yield results to our problem, on thorough examination of Plato and Aristotle's outlook along with these three dimensions. So. now, without going into the details of their philosophies, let us consider the crux of the matter.

1) *Formulation of the Basic Issue* : Plato's metaphysics is linked with his epistemology. His understanding of Reality can be put forth in the following manner :

" Given that mind can have knowledge (episteme) of reality, what should reality be like ? It is very well agreed that the soul has episteme and episteme is essentially different from doxai." Thus, Plato approaches Reality from the stand–point of man. His process is *authropocentric.*

His theory of knowledge is a good proof for his argument that the soul has episteme. The very life of Socrates is a live instance of it. As we find the reference in the dialogue *Apology* that even the Gods regarded Socrates as the wisest of all men. Secondly, Plato talks about two conditions of knowledge, namely, the universality and certainty. And only Forms could fulfil these two conditions Thus, Plato gives stress on the impossibility of relativism in the process of knowledge, i.e , there is no knowledge of particulars, since knowledge is permanent, whereas particulars are not.

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The second important argument is that the episteme is different from doxai. Knowledge is related to our mental ability, though it is knowledge of something, whereas beliefs are related to the things, though they are beliefs in our mind. Knowledge enriches our mental power, whereas beliefs only make us well-informed. Just as there is only one mind, knowledge can also be only singular. Whether it is knowledge of one Form or many, it is the power of mind or soul to be capable of grasping their nature. In short, the argument is supported by the two factors, namely, (1) conceptual analysis of knowing and believing and (2) the anthropological presupposition that a distinct power has distinct objects. This was the review of Plato's outlook towards the problem.

When we go to Aristotle, we find the whole approach is reversed in a certain manner. The Aristotelian understanding of Reality would be –

"Given that the world is what it is in common experience, how should we understand man". Thus the Aristotelian problem would be how to understand man. His approach is from reality towards man, i.e., cosmocentric.

Thus, the methods of these two great philosophers are exactly reversed and opposite of each other. [9]

Aristotle deals with this problem on three levels, viz., epistemological, logical and metaphysical. The epistemological explanation of the above argument is the primacy of sense perception in the process of knowledge. Aristotle agrees that we have knowowledge of universals. But the universals are not outside the things; we know them, when we perceive the things. So the actual perception is essential. The logical point would be the way every individual thing is treated as a primary substance. Every substance has two aspects – matter and form. The

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one without the other is an abstraction and unreal. These properties make the thing what it is and just this particular thing and not another thing The metaphysical aspect is that the reality of change or becoming implies the notions of potency and actuality. In order to understand the development of substance, we have to reinterpret matter and form as potentiality and actuality. We can explain it with an illustration as, the acorn is the potentiality of there being an oak tree and the oak tree is the actuality of the acorn.[10]

2) *The Methodological Presuppositions* :

Plato : The order of being is modelled on the order of the soul. What is primary in soul is also primary in reality.

The myth of divided line, the Form of the Good and the myth of the Sun are the best examples to illustrate the point. In Platonic philosophy, myths are designed to say what is too subtle and elusive to be said. The myth of divided line explains the notion of ascent and the placement of different souls in an hierarchical order. The Form of the Good shows us the ultimate point a human being could reach and be pure. Like the Sun, the Form of the Good illumines and makes meaningful our level of knowledge. These myths are based on human experiences and are also applicable to the reality. Plato makes full use of the capacity of human being and by drawing our attention to the highest aspiration, he also draws the limits of reality. We find the same idea later in Wittgenstein also, when he says, "the limits of our language are the limits of our world "

Aristotle : The distinction between order of being and order of knowing; the first in itself should also be the first for us. Knowing as an adaptation to being is conditioned by the natural powers of the soul.

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As we saw earlier, the Platonic approach towards Reality is anthropocentric. He thinks in terms of the requirements of the human soul and the ways to its satisfaction. According to his distinction, the sensible or the actuality of sense–experience lies at the lower level, whereas the true Reality or Ideal Being stands on the higher order of Reality, which alone is capable of satisfying the demands of the soul.

On the other hand, Aristotle's cosmocentric point of view states that the man is knower. Man has the natural potency to understand the development as an actualization. This understanding of actual on the part of sense–experience is also ideal, since it corresponds to the reality. It is only in understanding that we can divide reality into matter and form, and also be capable of thinking them as separated substances, which in actuality they are not. Thus, the mind knows the world and itself becomes the expression of the world.

3) *Regulative Categories* :

We can account for the basic difference between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy to the basic temparemental difference between the two of them. Both of them were mainly concerned with the problem of how to understand reality. Plato took the support of epistemology in order to build his metaphysical theory. Aristotle was also a realist. But he made efforts to correct Plato's theory of epistemology, in order to have his theory of realism. Plato was an idealist and found all the answers in the utopian, but perfect solutions. He constructed the ideal theory of other world, but was not much bothered with the fact whether it was practically possible, whereas Aristotle was a down to earth practical person. He could not see the sense in the other world theory. For him, the world of our

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experience was not a remove from the real world, but the real world itself. Therefore, he tried to rationalise the problem of this world, with the assumption that this world is real. And, therefore, we find the explanation for change, growth, becoming, development and embodiment in his philosophy, whereas the terminology in Plato is totally different. For him, the world is static, because the ideals cannot accept any change, since they are perfect in themselves. Therefore, the purity, simplicity, perfection and immutability of Forms are the ways of how we explain the nature of Forms and thereby the world This is the reason why Plato always derives his examples from mathematics, which is the absolute and perfect seience. Aristotle finds his illustrations in biology with imperfect but growing and living entities.[11] Hence it is very natural that Platonic uptopian approach would clash with Aristotle's realistic approach. To summarise, Plato understands actual as standing after the Ideal or as one step removed from reality. Aristotelian outlook is exactly reversed, the ideal is to be understood as what the actual is capable of, i.e., giving substantial importance and primacy to the existence of this world.[12]

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12. I am immensely grateful to Prof. R. Sundara Rajan, who helped me at various stages in writing this paper.

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PROBLEMS OF THE NOTIONS OF 'ENTAILMENT' AND 'MATERIAL IMPLICATION'

The main problems connected with the notions of 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication' are (a) What is 'Entialment'? (b) What is 'material Implication'? (c) How to formalize the concept of 'Entailment'? Can it be formalized? (d) How does the 'Paradox of Entailment' arise? (e) Is there the so called 'Paradox of Implication'? (f) Can we identify the notions of 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication'? (g) What is the distinction between 'Entailment', 'Strict Implication', 'Logical Implication', 'Formal Implication', 'Causal Implication' and 'Presuppositions'?

An attempt is made, here, to deal with these problems briefly.

(a) *What is 'Entailment'?*

It is, generally, believed that '2 + 2 = 4' cannot be entailed by 'Socrates is an Indian philospher', since the former is not a consequence of the latter. T. J. Smiley says that, ordinarily, we have the '*Intuitive* Concept' of Entailment which requires a connection of meaning between premises and conclusion.

However, in the discussions of philosophical Logic, the notion of 'Entailment' stands for special relation introduced by G. E. Moore Moore says that 'p entails q' is the converse of '*q logically follows from p*' or '*q is logicically deducible from p.*' The Moorean example is -- 'This is red' entails 'This is coloured' or 'It is a right angle' entails 'It is an angle'.

While elaborating the notion of 'Entailment', Moore says that though every Entailment is self-evident, 'Entailment' is

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not a name for a self–evident relation. This is because, Moore further says, Entailment is purely objective and logical; hence, no subjective or psychological term like ' selfevident ' can define the relation of ' Entailment '.

(b) *What is ' Material Implication ' ?*

Before discussing the notion of ' Material Implication', I want to mention that in his *Principles of Mathematics,* Russell employs the notion of ' Material Implication'; but in *Principia Mathematica,* he has referred to one and the same relation by calling it simply ' Implication'. In his *Principles of Mathematics* he must have used the term ' *Material*' Implication to be more specific i.e., to distinguish ' Material ' Implication from the rest of Implications.

While defining the notion of ' Material Implication ', Rusell says, ' The relation in virtue of which it is possible for us validly to infer is what I call Material Implication".

Material Implication is, usually, paraphrased as ' If... , then .. ...', ' ... ... not ... ... without ', ' Either .. ...not... ..., or... ...', etc. It has been symbolized in the following ways :–

(i) ' $p \supset q$ ' – by Russell

(ii) ' $p \rightarrow q$ ' – by Hilbert (generally, adopted by Mathematicians)

(iii) ' C p q ' – by polish logicians.

(iv) ' p * q ' – by Moore.

(v) ' p implies q '.

' P implies q' or ' $p \supset q$ ' is defined as *' It is not the case that p is true and q is false.'*

$$\text{So, } (p \supset q) \equiv \text{Df} \sim (p \cdot \sim q)$$
$$\equiv \text{Df} \sim p \vee q$$

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(c) *How to formalize the concept of 'Entailment ?'*

The notion of 'Entailment' has been symbolized by J. Bennett as '$\rightarrow$' while T. J. Smiley uses the symbol '$\vdash$' for 'Entailment'. Moore indicates the relation just by a word 'entails' or 'ent'.

(d) *How does the 'Paradox of Entailment' arise ?*

Anyone who sets himself at the task of formalizing 'Entailment' has to face the following two difficulties pointed out by C I. Lewis and C. H. Langford.

(i) An impossible proposition (or inconsistent statement) entails any proposition whatsoever.

	(1) $p . \sim p$
(1) ents.	(2) p
(1) ents.	(3) $\sim p . p$
(3) ents.	(4) $\sim p$
(2) ents.	(5) $p \vee q$
(5), (4) ents.	(6) q

Thus, $(p . \sim p)$ entails q.

(ii) A necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition whatsoever.

	(1) p
(1) ents.	(2) $(p . q) \vee (p . \sim q)$
(2) ents.	(3) $p . (q \vee \sim q)$
(3) ents.	(4) $(q \vee \sim q) . p$
(4) ents.	(5) $q \vee \sim q$

Thus, $(q \vee \sim q)$ is entailed by p.

These two difficulties create the *'Paradox of Entailment'*. Here, each step is valid and the Entailment is transitiive which yields paradoxical results.

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(e) *Is there the so-called ' Paradox of Implication' ?*

" The most convenient interpretation of implication", says Russell, " is to say, conversely, that if either p is false or q is false or q is true, then ' p implies q ' is to be true ". [2] It follows, therefore, that so long as p is false, or q is true, the material implication is true. This may be stated in the paradoxical fashion that *a false* proposition implies *any* proposition whatsoever, and that a *true* one is implied by *any* proposition true, or false.

e. g. (i) '2 + 2 = 4 ' implies ' Brutus killed Caesar.
(True – True).

(ii) ' The Sun is cold ' implies ' 2+2 = 4 '.
(False – True).

(iii) ' The Sun is cold ' implies ' 2 + 2 = 5 '.
(False – False)

These examples present the alleged *Paradox of Implication* '.

However, the Paradox arises solely because we understand a *technical* term ' Implication ' in its *ordinary* sense In Logic, ' Material Implication ' is *not* the relation of meanings but is the relation to be decideded by *truth values.* Once we realize this, the paradox ceases to exist. It follows, therefore, that the results may seem odd but are *not* paradoxical at all.

(f) *Can we identify the notion of ' Entailment ' and ' Material Implication ' ?*

The notion of ' Entailment ' appears to be, fundamentally, different from the notion of ' Material Implication '. In the former, it ' *could not* ' be true (or, it is ' *logically impossible* ') that p is true and q is false For Example, it *cannot* be the case that ' This is red ' and yet, ' This is not coloured '. On the other hand, in the latter case, it is *contingent* that the antecedent p

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is true and the consequent q is false. Thus, to say 'p materially implies q' is to say that, it *is not, as a matter of fact,* that case that p is true and q is false.

In that case, it can be argued that '*could not be*' is logically equivalent to '*never as a matter of fact is*'. In other words, 'p could not be false ≡ 'p is necessarily true'. Here, we come across an attempt to bridge the wide gap between the notions of 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication'.

As far as Russellian Logic is concerned, it is very difficult to trace the demarcation line separating 'Entailment' from 'Material Implication'. For Russell, '*p entails q*' is logically equivalent to '*p materially implies q*' *provided* '*p materially implies q*' *is an instance of a true formal implication.* According to Russell, propositions of the form "(x) : ϕx implies ψ x" are called 'Formal Implication'[3]. For him, *formal* Implication is the *class* of *Material* Implication, that is to say, it is the '*general* material Implication'.

Russell also says, "When a proposition q is a consequence of proposition p, we say that 'p implies q'".[4] That is why, Russell seems to identify the two notions with each other. The possible identification of the two "embodies a mistake", in Strawsonian words, "which is both peculiarly obvious and yet peculiarly attractive. The very names are evidence of this. One might say that the function of the adjective '*material*' was to conceal the misleading suggestions of the noun '*implication*'. The name incorporates both the error and its correction".[5]

Moore, as contrasted by Russell, unambiguously maintains that the relation between the propositions 'This is red' and 'This is coloured' is that of 'Entailment' whereas the relation between the propositions 'I am in the room' and 'I am more than five years old' is that of Material Implication.

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Moore correctly points out that Russell has committed the mistake of equating 'Entailment' with 'Material Implication'. Moore refers to this error by calling it an '*enormous howler*' in his *Philosophical Studies*. The 'howler' consists in not realizing the difference between the notion of 'Entailment' and the notion of 'Material Implication'.

E. J. Nelson explains the difference between 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication' by saying that 'Entailment' expresses an *inner* connection between the propositions it relates, a *relevance* of one to the other, but the relation of Material Implication can be held merely on account of truth or falsity that the proposition may have on its own. Accordingly, it is said that 'Socrates is a man' materially does imply that 'he is mortal' but it entails that 'he is mortal' only in *conjunction* with the statement 'All men are mortal'.

(g) After the discussion of the distinction between the concepts of 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication', let us turn to the last question mentioned in the beginning of my article. C I. Lewis uses the phrase '*Strict Implication*' and believes that '*p strictly implies q*' is to be symbolized as 'p —ɜ q'. According to him 'p —ɜ q' is true when it is *logically impossible* for p to be true and for q to be false i.e., $\sim M (p \cdot \sim q)$. Thus, Lewis defines strict Implication' in terms of 'Possibility' and 'Negation'.

But, as is correctly pointed out by Stebbing, Lewis does not define the term 'Impossibility' which is less clear than the notion of Entailing.

The next question is – 'Can *Logical Implication* be equated with Entailment?'. The *Logical* Implication is one which does not depend on the truth or falsity of its premises and true or

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false, solely in virtue of its *structure* or *form*. For example, '[(p ⊃ q) · ~ q]' *logically* implies '~ p'.

Following Strawson. Entailment, in the Moorean sense of the term – not in the looser, popular sense – may be equated with Logical Implication

Then, the question – 'Is there any difference between Logical Implication, *Formal* Implication and Entailment?' Cohen and Nagel use these notions synonymously. But Russellian use of the notion of 'Formal Implication' is rather technical, as discussed above Formal Implication, as understood in the Russellian sense of the term is, clearly, not the same as 'Entailment' because it is known *empirically* and it lacks the *logical* necessity which is the very characteristic of 'Entailment'.

The next issue is regarding the relation between 'Causal Implication' and 'Entailment'. In the case of causal Implication, the steps are justified, neither by linguistic rules nor by logical principles, but by the way things habitually happen in the world. For example, if blue litmus paper is placed in acid, it will turn red

Owing to their view of causal relation, the thinkers like Joseph (in his *Introduction to Logic*) and McTaggart (in his *The Nature of Existence*) equate Causal Implication with Entailment.

But I think, the causal relation, say, between a flame and burning is fundamentally different from the relation that holds between the propositions 'This is red' and 'This is coloured'. The denial of the former may be *false*, but is *not self-contradictory*, whereas the denial of the latter does result in self–contradiction. Therefore, it is erroneous, in my opinion, to equate the two.

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The last point connected with the notion of 'Entailment' is that it is likely to be confused with the notion of '*Presuppositions*'. The similarity, if there is any, can be explained with the help of the following two propositions :

(i) The question 'Have you stopped beating your wife? *presupposes* that you have a wife.

(ii) The assertion that 'You are a bachelor' *entails* that 'You are an unmarried male'.

The similarity between these two propositions is, I think, superfluous. In the case of 'p presupposes q', if q is false then both p and not – p are neither true nor false, but in the case of 'p entails q', if q is false, p cannot true; it is necessarily false.

Problem with the notion of 'Material Implication'.

The main problem connected with the notion of 'Material Implication' is whether it can be identified *in meaning*, with 'If...., then...'.

Almost all logicians, except Strawson, identify the two notions with each other. Strawson is against such an identification on the following grounds : Firstly, 'If..., then...' incorporates the notion of *logical necessity*, which 'Material Implication or '$\supset$' does not. Consequently, the proposition '*If* he is a younger son *then* he has a brother' is logically equivalent to (He is a younger son $\supset$ he has a brother) is *logically neccssary* or *analytic*'. To put it differently, the connections in the former case are logical or linguistic, but in the latter case i.e., in case of '$\supset$' they are based on empirical grounds. Furthermore, 'If p..., the q' is *inconsistent* with 'If p, than $\sim$ q', their joint assertion, *in the same context*, is *self-contradictory;* but the joint assertion of $(p \supset q)$ and $(p \supset \sim q)$ is *not* self-contradictory

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though it may be *false*. Lastly, though 'If p, then q' entails 'p ⊃ q', 'p ⊃ q' does not entail 'If p, then q'. As a result, whatever is entailed by 'p ⊃ q' will be entailed by 'If p, then q' but not *vice-versa*. Needless to say that Strawsonian 'If..., then .' is the counterpart of Moorean 'Entailment' and, obviously, not of Russellian 'Material Implication'.

Conclusion :

Cohen and Nagel, no doubt, make a distinction between the notion of 'Entailment' and the notion of 'Material Implication'. They do say that the former is true owing to its *logical form* or to *linguistic rules*, while the latter is true due to its content or matter; the latter has a *factual* basis or *material* evidence. But they also assert that these two notions are not completely unrelated. 'Entailment' means that in every specific instance of the syllogism, there is a 'material implication' between the premises and the conclusion But this account leaves out the fact that, in every syllogism, there is a *necessity*, based on an element of identity, not directly present in all other cases of Material Implication. For example, although there is no connection between the two components of the proposition "Dante was born in 1250 implies that Lithium is a metal", still it is an instance of true Material Implication (because the antecedent is false and the consequent is true). Cohen and Nagel further say, "This also involves a question of *metaphysics*, to wit, whether *all* truths are necessarily connected in the *ultimate* nature of things".[6]

It may be said, here, that it cannot involve sach a question because all truths are *not* connected with each other at all. If they *were*, necessarily, connected with each other the distinction between the *essential* properties and *accidental* properties; between the *relevant* points and the *irrelevant* points would have

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disappeared, immediately. In that case, for knowing, say, whether it will rain tomorrow, or not, it would have been necessary to know whether I am a student of philosophy or not. If such a doctrine were true, the whole of scientific progress would have been endangered. Hence, the doctrine of '*Internal Relations*' is utterly absurd and gives rise to further problems rather than solving those for which it has been put forth.

Accepting the criticism of the *Idealistic* doctrine of Internal relations, I want to hold that what Cohen and Nagel say is correct. They neither justify nor refute the doctrine. What they do say (though not explicity) is that even while criticizing the doctrine, one is doing metaphysics. To believe in *External* Relations is nothing but indulging in metaphysical debate and becoming a '*brother-metaphysician*'.

Hence, I do agree with Cohen and Nagel, who, correctly, bring out the *metaphysical* aspect of the problem. Since not only the defender but also the critic of the doctrine of Internal Relations is engaged in metaphysical discussions, their controversy indicates that there is a *metaphysical dimension,* too, to the problem of the notions of 'Entailment' and 'Material Implication'. *

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PROF. VON WRIGHT ON ACTION

In recent times, the logic of action forms an integral part of the deontic logic, which Prof. von Wright developed since 1953. The concept of action is the basic to this logic. His *Norm and Action* and *Practical Reason* are attempts in this regard. The notion of action has many fundamental implication in the practical areas of concern, such as medical ethics, causality, law of torts and any other area where the nature of responsibility is involved. [1]

We can decipher two different tendencies from the philosophical literature so far as the logical form of the action-sentences are concerned – *extensional* and *intensional*. Prof. von Wright's notion of action can be said to be an intensional. In this paper, I shall try to focus attention on intensional action. To understand the logical significance of 'intensional action', it is necessary to give a brief survey of extensional action.

According to the extensionalist theory, actions are nothing but events, and therefore, the logical form of action-sentences can very well be captured in terms of first-order predicate logic with identity, with certain modifications. Thus, the action-sentence 'Brutus killed Caesar' would take the form :

$$(\exists x)\ Kx\ bc$$

This may be read in quasi-English as "There is an event x, such that x is killed by Brutus of Caesar". An action acquires its designation due to its peculiar position in the causal nexus. An action is preceded by a mental event where there is an appropriate want and desire. Because, for an explanation of the performance of an action, on this view, it is necessary and sufficient to cite the causal antecedents of the bodily movements

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associated with the action namely, the agent's wants, desires, beliefs, etc. An immediate consequence is : an action is not identical with the associated bodily behaviour; and action is a complex event involving at least bodily motions, neurological events and brain events, the wanting and believing are parts of the action performed. The logical form of the action sentences thus becomes : (∃x) (willed to kill (Brutus, Caesar, x) caused (∃y) Killed (Brutus, Caesar. y).

It is usually believed that causes and effects are distinct events. In other words, 'b causes C' is possible only if there is at least some part of the event b which is not a part of the event c and *vice-versa*. Since wanting and believing are wholly parts of the action performed, can wanting and believing be also causes of the action performed ? An escape from this dilemma can be found if one equates actions with the bodily movements. In that case, analysis of the sentences like, 'Brutus killed Caesar' – would be something like a conjunction of a series of sentences of the form :

a) Brutus wanted to kill Caesar.

b) Brutus produced neural explosions in his brain to kill Caesar.

c) Brutur believed that by moving his hand with a daggar would kill Caesar

d) Brutus moved his hand with a dagger.

e) The moving of Brutus's hand with a dagger caused Caesar's death.

Under this modified version of the extensionalist theory of action, the objection is by-passed, since the bodily movement associated with action is not identical with believing or willing. However, this modified version has its own problems, the most serious of them being that of explicating the notion of bodily behaviours associated with actions – Can we call, raising of one's

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arm in sleep' an action ? Secondly, the notion of action becomes too narrow. Consequently, there are no non–basic actions. The sentences like 'Brutus killed Caesar' – are not action–sentences at all, but it is only a sort expression for a causal chain in which only the part 'Brutus moved his hand' is an action–sentence which in turn logically generates the sentence 'Brutus moved his hand with a dagger'. Thus, we shall try to give a short expository survey of the intensional action.

The fundamental units or the building–blocks for an intensionalistic theory of action would be propositions or proposition–like objects and a monadic operator over them. This is the notion that some propositions are *made true* by an agent. The basic syntactical expression, in this language, would be an agent. A performs an act 'a' – such that the proposition 'p' is made true. What corresponds to an event, what is brought about, in this frame–work, is a state of affair and a description of which is made true.

The basic insight of the intensionalistic approach towards the action sentences is that action is to be construed as a change among the states of affairs – a proposition is *made true* by bringing about the corresponding state of affairs.

However, the point to be noted here is that an agent can never do p, which is a sentence; he can only do something which makes the sentence true.

In this context, it is important to make a distinction between *doing* and *bringing about*. By doing certain things we bring about something else. For example, by raising the arm, the police stops the car. The thing done is the *result* of an action and the thing brought about is the *consequence* of the action. The connection between an action and its result is logical. That is, if the description of the action is A and a corresponding

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description of the fact is p which materialises due to the performance of A, then p is known as the *result* of the action A. Here, the relation between A and p is a logical one. In symbols :

$$A \rightarrow p$$

And if the natural consequenee of p is q, then q will be the *consequence* of that action A. If the result does not materialize, then the action simply has not been performed. Thus, it is clear that an action is to be distinguished from bodily movement. An action is essentially intentional; a bodily movement may just occur An unintentional bodily movement may be due to some conditioned reflexes. An element of intentionality is always associated with action – no one raises his hand for nothing.

The requirements of an intensionalistic theory of action are as follows :

(i) The agent's behaviour should eventuate in the result of the act, and

(ii) By this behaviour the agent should have intended or aimed at the result.

So, the "result" of an action will be that event brought about by the behaviour which the agent was intending by that behaviour. The "Consequence" of an action, on the other hand, will be those events which occurred because of the agent's behaviour but which he did not intend or aim at by this behaviour. It is to be noted that the first requirement of an intentional action, according to both the (extensional and intensional) theories are the same. Prof. von Wright thinks that an agent's intending a "result" by his behaviour is not equivalent to that of the behaviour being caused. In his own words :

> "Intentionality is not anything *behind* or *outside* the action. It is not a mental act or characteristic experience accompanying it".[3]

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Thus, in normal cases what we see directly is not mere behaviour but intentional action. Prof. von Wright, therefore, rightly says that the theory of action is to be understood " intentionalistically " and it is to be explained " teleologically ".

Action is to be explained " teleologically " means it will be explained in terms of certain purpose or aim. That is, it may be viewed under the aspect of *achievement*. In other words, an agent achieves a certain result by doing certain thing. For example, 'an agent opens the window'. Here, what he achieves thereby is the opening of the window. It also implies that an agent has " freedom " to act. He is not pre–determined. It may be pointed out that Sartre's notion of freedom also implies an ability to act. According to Sartre, man is free. Only objects are pre–determined.[4] Thus, we may say that action has a counter–factual element. We can express it in the form : 'had there been an action, the possible result too would have been'[5]

One may suspect Prof. von Wright's notion of action as circular. For action may be characterized as an event and therefore it must heve a cause. If that is so, then Prof. von Wright's arguments are obviously circular. It will be circular in the sense that causal relations presuppose action and action in turn presupposes a causal connection.

But this objection does not pose any serious problem for Prof. von Wright. He believes that action is to be explained " teleologically " and not causally. Teleological explanations are to be distinguished from the causal explanations in the sense that the former is expressed in an " in order that " vocabulary and there need not be any *nomic tie* between the *explanandum* and the *explanan* On the other hand, in the causal explanation, there exists a *nomic tie* between the thing explained and the

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thing in terms of which it is explained. And, they are usually expressed in a " because " vocabulary.

The above distinction will be made more clear with the help of a concrete example. For example, Gastric juice and saliva are secreted when a man sees a delicious dish (in order to be able to digest the food). This may be said to be a case of teleological explanation, because the secretion is conditioned by some purpose of enjoying the dish. It is a sort of explanation to the question 'why p?' in terms of the answer 'so that q' or 'in order that q'.

On the other hand, 'lightning causes thunder' – is a case of causal explanation. Here, we not only mean that in a particular situation, when there was lightning there was thunder too, but we also claim that on any occasion or situation even when there was no lightning, 'had there been lightning, there would have been thunder'. However, the distinction may be made more clear with the help of 'practical inference' which forms an essential part of any action situation.

The logic of action is represented by a 'practical inference' of the form [6]:

i) A intends to bring about the state p,

ii) A considers that he cannot bring about the state p unless he does a.

Therefore, A sets himself to do a.

This argument obviously is not a causal enquiry, for the premises, with suitable qualification, entail the conclusion. It is of importance to note that the conclusion of the 'practical inference' describes an 'intentional action' and not mere behaviour. If the conclusion of a 'practical inference' is a true

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statement of what the agent's intentional act was, its premises also constitute an explanation of his action. This type of explanation Prof. von Wright calls "teleological". Teleological explanations presuppose that the agent's behaviour be understood in terms of the "results" which he intends. It implies that there is a necessary reciprocity between an enquiry into the "intentionality" of an agent's behaviour and "explanation" of his action. This reciprocity is the key to Prof. von Wright's conception of the 'practical inference'. The premises of a 'practical inference' imply an intentional action without the addition of any causal or lawlike statement and, therefore, explain the action in a teleological rather than a causal way.

So our analysis of action is different from that of the causal theories. Our aim is not to decompose the concept of "intentional action" into its more basic elements. We regard the concept of "intentional action" and that of "intentionality" as, in a critical sense, irreducible. In is irreducible in the sense that to understand a concept is not to define it in terms of other concepts but to find its relation with other concepts. Prof. von Wright, therefore, truly claims that the concept of action is to be understood *intentionalistically*. *

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NOTES

1. I am deeply indebted to my teacher Dr. C. Goswami for making valuable suggestions which have helped me to write this paper.

2. Since I use the words 'intentional' and 'intensional' fairly often, I take this opportunity to underline the difference between them. 'Intentional' is used where an action is directed to an objective. This is a subclass of the 'intensional', which is contrasted with 'extensional'. In extensionality, if x is identical with y, then every thing true of x will be true of y, and any term substituted for another with the same reference will have the same truth values. In intensionality, expressions contain terms for mental states, and this means that substituted expressions with the same reference may not have the same truth values (this is a logical and not a psychological distinction).

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MARCEL ON THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

When we are concerned with the problem of freedom, the questions which haunt our mind are : To what extent or within what limits am I a free being ? Is desire for freedom inherent in human nature ? Is it to be understood as an end in itself or as a means of getting other things? In existential enquiry 'freedom' occupies the central core of its analysis. It conceives that freedom is to be realised in this life itself and it is not a transcendent ideal to be realised after death by rejecting human existence.

The general stand of the existentialists is that freedom which is inherent to human existence is never totally lost, but is present all through human existence. Drawing a distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic existence', existentialists say that freedom which is obscured in inauthentic existence is disclosed in authentic existence through one's active identification with the fellow being. Man's capacity to choose between inauthentic existence and authentic existence forms the basis for his freedom. In other words, it can be said that freedom is not a contemplated thought, but is to be practised through activity in this world.

Gabriel Marcel emphasises more emphatically this idea of 'being–with–others' than the other existentialists. The core of his thinking can be stated in the proposition "To be is to participate." According to him, participation does not merely imply participation with the fellow–beings, but it also signifies active communion with God. Marcel's reflections on freedom rest on an act of ontological humility or the recognition that man is a created being. As a practising Catholic, Gabriel Marcel considers the relation between man and God to be fundamental, existential and necessary. Aspiration for perfection in human

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existence is fundamental in all philosophical reflections. Marcel claims that the eternal fullness of value is God and argues that the fullness of inter–subjectivity requires communion with God because man's commitment to God is the basis for his authentic existence. Hence, according to Marcel, man's relation with God or realisation of eternal value is not a transcendent ideal, but it is fundamental, existential and necessary.

Dissatisfaction with the present day situation has been the cause for philosopher's reflection. Often their thinking or reflection takes its own course. It is interesting to note that though Sartre and Marcel were contemporary thinkers, reflection on the same human situation takes different directions in Sartre and Marcel. While for Sartre, the human situation is threatened, frustrated and annihilated by the pressures and projects of "the others", for Marcel the free acceptance of the same human situation becomes the source of religious humility And like Jaspers, Marcel finds in the "tension", which exists between human freedom and the limitations, imposed by the human situation the way to transcendence [1]

Marcel says that answers to this problem of freedom depends on our belief regarding the existence of God. He tries to explain this by way of establishing an intimate relation between freedom and grace. Freedom in general is the transition from inauthentic existence to authentic existence. Authentic existence consits in the "active cultivation and enjoyment" of the divine presence. Marcel firmly believes that such encounter with transcendence alone is capable of liberating man effectively from all the physical and social bonds. While discussing freedom and humility he says that freedom and grace are mysteriously dovetailed.[2] This kind of transcendence brings out the total change in one's attitude towards others and the world. Freedom does not exist

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for its own sake, but is a way of achieving our fuller participation in being. According to him, freedom manifests itself as a mode participated being.

But here it should be noted whether freedom and grace can go together. Being a firm believer in God, Marcel raises the question whether freedom attains meaning or value when that good will is not present.[3] He says that in the absence of God it shrinks to an anarchical disposition.[4] He argues further that freedom as a value can be understood only within the axis of intelligible light – a light which is at the root of all and every understanding. In his book *Man Against Mass Society* he observes : " For years past I have not wearied of repeating that freedom is nothing, it makes itself as nothing, at what it believes to be the moment of his triumph, unless in a spirit of complete humility it recognises that it has a vital connection with Grace "[5] In the course of his reflections on freedom, grace and humility he throws light on the fact that freedom does not exist for its own sake, but it is a movement towards the bonds of commitment not only to the fellow–beings but also to God.

Humility which he talks about here has much significance to his idea of freedom. It has already been stated that his reflections on freedom rest on an act of ontological humility. Marcel who gives much importance to participation and inter-subjectivity says that inter–subjectivity gets its fuller significance only with the recognition of God. Such recognition requires humility. But the humility to which he refers is not the same as self–humiliation. It is not a quality, but a mode of being which includes the recognition of our own nothingness and the affirmation of the sacred. " As the root of humility lies the more or less unexpressed assertion, ' By myself, I am nothing and I can do nothing except in so far as I am not only helped but promoted in my being by him, who is everything and is

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all powerful".[6] With this idea of ontological humility Marcel emphasises that freedom cannot signify the fantastic notion about human existence but there is also a receptive aspect of human existence. In man's relation with God, God's grace forms the receptive aspect of human existence, In his relation with others, he is an 'embodied' person existing in a certain relation with others. His existence as being-in-the-world signifies his active involvement in the situation. Man can never free himself completely from his situationality. In this sense his freedom will not be complete but can only be partial subjected to his relation with others. But this idea does not lead to determinism, because Marcel, who accepts Aristotle's notion of potentiality, says that man's powers are potential and that they need to be actuated. Man bears responsibility for his own actions. Marcel maintains that the inter-subjective relation is not a hindrance to man's individuality but entering into the subjective relation with others forms the basis for mutual freedom for the persons concerned. So inter-subjective relation is not an obstacle for human freedom but it is creative of mutual freedom. Determinism and freedom belong to two different planes. What Marcel emphasises in his idea of humility is that "man's freedom is both received and self-originated as befits the action of being which shares in and is according to its proper mode of self-determination,"[7]

Marcel's reflection on humility not only affirms the presence of divine spirit, but also throws light on the fact that freedom cannot be an objective one, but it is a subjective factor which we have to see for ourselves. There is always a distinction between what a man is and what he does. The study of freedom can enrich the idea of freedom; but it cannot throw light on freedom for us. Through such objective study we can see things by its light, but it cannot be the clarity that we see for ourselves

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Marcel remarks : "My freedom is not and cannot be something that I observe as I observe an outward fact."[8] Freedom, being a mode of existence, can be discovered only in the internalised consciousness of the self when it is faced with the choice between commitment and treason. The choice between these two is made in the consciousness, and to choose commitment is a matter of faith. Faith, according to Marcel, is a movement of freedom into the bonds of commitment to God and rises above the objectivity of the world. Though freedom is given for experience, it cannot be objectified and can only be known subjectively. Considering this subjective nature of freedom, Marcel argues that freedom belongs to the realm of mystery and not to the realm of problem. Marcel's reference to mystery does not have any theological significance. A brief explanation of the distinction between "problem" and "mystery" will help us to understand his idea of freedom clearly.

By "problem" Marcel refers to the state of experience in which one considers the thing objectively. In the realm of problem the investigator is not involved personally. By way of contrast, in the realm of mystery there is deep involvement in the relationship between the subject of inquiry and his field. For example, love is a problem in so far as the person concerned seeks to understand its significance by reflection. Here the feeling of love stands as the object distinct from the subject. But in the realm of mystery the subject and the object are transformed into one single whole. Here the duality between the lover and the person loved as "thou" is dissolved into a more comprehensive unity of the subject and the object; and the object of enquiry, i.e., love, becomes a 'mystery'. So mystery, according to Marcel, is neither revealed truth nor the unknown. It is used to refer to that which is given in experience

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but which cannot be objectified. Hence, freedom which is subjective belongs to the realm of mystery.

The realm of mystery is concerned with man's subjective experience in the world. It penetrates through man's objective relation in the world and concentrates on his being-in-the-world. But this unitary phenomenon of being is obscured in the realm of problem. Hence probing this order of mystery is to have its bearing on life, Marcel criticises everything which tends to depersonalise man. According to him, the objectification of human reality is the reason for the crisis in the present day society. Man's inability to be content with this impoverished state of affairs, requires an ontological "need." The "need" according to him, is the desire for a fullness of a human existence which involves inter-subjectivity and authentic community. With this approach Marcel emphasises the fact that man's freedom necessarily implies his being-in-the-world. Hence he criticises the "fantastic notions" about freedom and says that freedom can never be absolute. but only partial. Since being-with-others is essential for human existence, it is an important factor in the study of freedom. Inter-personal relation involves the recognition that the other person should also be respected. So entering into a relation of friendship implies the willingness to trust the other and a commitment to the fellow-beings.[9] The personal acts of encounter are available to us only in freedom, and most generally in the freedom of others. It is only by free choice one can enter into friendship. This implies that one can also refuse to enter into a possibility of friendship and commitment; or having entered, a person can betray the trust placed in him. Thus inter-subjectivity is real only to the extent that it is held in being by willingness and fidelity of its members. Considering the fact that mutual openness and mutual coustitution of one another are essential for the individuals, Marcel

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considers fidelity as the place of being. This view of Marcel that the person is real only in mutual constitution with others does not deny the worth of the individual person, but emphasises the fact that the worth of the individual is real and is needed for others.

In connection with his idea of participation and inter-subjectivity, Marcel's idea of availability is also worth considering here. Personal fulfilment comes not by enclosing oneself in one's own little world, but by dedicating oneself to ideals which transcend the petty self interest. The individual is not an isolated being, but one who is united with others. Only by being available to others and by participating in other beings, the individual's own being will attain its self-fulfilment. If I refuse to do so, I remain alone isolated in my own small ego. It follows that the fulfilment of personal subjectivity requires the fullness of inter-subjectivity. Freedom consists in man's transcendence of the artificial limitations of his 'separative ego' in the direction of active participation in the suffering of others. Marcel says that marriage is the best example for such active participation, because the persons concerned here enter into a personal bond where each self grows into the other. Marcel also emphasises that man's commitment to the other person does not end with the death of that other person. Referring to his own personal experience with the death of his mother in his early years, he writes that "She used to be present with me in a mysterious way."[10] Marcel's idea of participation signifies the fact that freedom does not consist in separating oneself from others, but it should enable one to shed down his ego-centricism and to participate in the creative life of the society. Man's freedom thus unites him with society and does not alienate him.

Marcel's distinction between "being" and "having" is also significant for understanding the problem of freedom. "Having"

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is an external relation, but "being" is an internal bond which implies direct participation or involvement. When we are concerned with freedom we are not dealing with it in the sense of the possessor and possessed, but it is the study of the subject and what he is. Freedom is not the possession of man, but it is a mode of his being. Marcel says : "There is no more fatal error than that which consists in regarding freedom as an attribute."[11] Metaphysical recollection shows that man is not his own belonging, but a being who shares his reality with another.

By way of summary, it can be said that man's freedom consists in his free participation with the fellow–beings. Unlike Sartre, Marcel believes that human transcendence is not merely passing from the present to the future, but passing beyond the finite to the eternal.[12] Self-transcendence takes place when man with humility believes in the existence of God. Though Marcel's conception of freedom is similar to that of Kierkegaard, it differs from Kierkegaard's negative attitude to life.[13] Marcel emphasises the fact that man's commitment to God and to other men are inter–related. This commitment to God and fellow beings is central in the philosophy of Marcel.

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2. Gabriel Marcel; *Mystery of Being*, Vol. II, Harvill Press Ltd., London, 1951, pp. 114–116.
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THE ADVAITA THEORY OF LIBERATION

Liberation or realisation of the *Brahman* is the main concern of *Advaita Vedānta*-its primary aim. Liberation is the ultimate end of our life because it alone is absolute or eternal Bliss. There is a variety of views regarding the process of attainment of *Brahman*. Some prescribe the way of scriptural knowledge, the path of hearing, thinking and meditation. Others maintain that liberation can be attained through devotion. The way of disinterested action has been advocated in the *Bhagavadgītā*. Patanjali has elaborated the eightfold discilpline of *yoga* and so on.

This concept of liberation as blissful *Brahman* or total cessation of suffering is supported by the *Śruti* texts like "He who knows Brahman becomes Brahman Itself" [1] (*Mund.* 3 2. 9) and "The knower of the Self transcends grief" [2] (*Chā.* 7. 2. 3). Attainment of heaven etc. is not liberation, since those worlds, like the one in which we live, are also transitory. All worlds achieved by performance of actions, this-worldly, or other-worldly, are impermanent. Heaven is attained by righteous actions. The merit of such actions gets diminished by enjoyment etc., and when the merit is exhausted, one has to come back from heaven into this world of suffering. *Śruti* says so: "As in this world the comforts gained through one's labours are exhausted, so in the other world the happiness achieved through one's good deeds come to an end" (*Chā.* 8. 1. 6). [3] But one who attains liberation "does not return to this world again" [4] (*Chā.* 8. 15. 1, adapted).

Liberation is eternal in nature. The term "eternal" is used in various senses. There are certain things which undergo changes; nevertheless they are regarded as eternal, the reason being that

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we do not lose the sense of identity in their case. For example, earth, water etc. are believed to be eternal even through changes, and the *guṇas* in *Sāṁkhya* philosophy, which are in constant change, are yet held to be eternal. This is called *parināma nityatā*. There are other things which are said to be eternal as they do not undergo any change; e.g., the sky or space. This is called *kūṭastha nityatā*. "Mokṣa," according to Śaṅkara, "is devoid of all sorts of changes. So it is not *parināmī nitya* but *kūṭastha nitya*, i.e., it is eternal in the strict or highest sense. Liberation is eternal as being immutable and all-pervasive like space, free from all modifications, partless, evercontent and self-luminous."[5] In liberation *dharma* (merit) and *adharma* (demerit) with their results have no place at all. It is self-luminous consciousness, which is eternal. It is nothing but Brahman itself.[6]

Advaita holds that freedom or *mokṣa* is disembodied existence which can never be attained by any kind of action. For, such actions must have their inevitable consequence of pleasures and pains, which have to be enjoyed or suffered only in the body; that is, in a state of bondage. Bodilessness or *mokṣa* is the eternal nature of the self.[7] That the self is without any body is clearly stated in the upaniṣads *(kaṭh* 1. 2. 22).

According to the *Advaita Vedānta*, liberation is without beginning or end, as it is identical with *Brahman* which is eternal. For, if it had a beginning, it would be product and would have an end, as everthing that has a beginning has an end also. But in that case, one who is liberated would have to lose the blessed state sometime and return to this world. This is absurd, as it is at variance with scriptural sayings. An opponent might however say that if *mokṣa* is without beginning, there cannot be any desire for it or any inclination for hearing, thinking and meditation for attaining salvation as it is already achieved. In response

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to this, the *Advaitin* arugues that though liberation, which is identical with *Brahman*, is ever–attained, one can feel inclination to attain it through a mistaken notion about its not having been achieved. The cessation of suffering which is identical with *Brahman* is also a thing already achieved. Liberation is nothing but the attainment of the attained and the avoidance of the avoided. [8]

For instance, a man may be searching for his spectacles, thinking that it is lost, while it is actually on his eyes; and he realises his mistake when someone points out the fact. This is a case of finding what was all along in one's possession and had not been lost at all. Similarly, a man may mistake a garland twining round one's leg for a snake. He becomes free from the fear of the snake when another person points out that it is not a snake at all, but a garland. There was the absence of the snake, but the particular individual was not aware of the absence. In like manner, the attainment of Bliss, though it is already attained, or the avoidance of misery though it is already avoided, is, as it were, attained or avoided afresh, when ignorance is removed.

Liberation is not the result of *dharma* (merit) but that of scriptural knowledge. But the latter is nothing but the knowledge of *Brahman* itself. Just as a lamp removes darkness, knowledge of *Brahman* removes one's ignorance or nescience. Such liberation is a matter of realisation. It is not like religious activities, e.g., worship, contemplation of God *(Upāsanā)* etc. *Śruti* declares, "If that ultimate substratum of cause and effect is seen or realised by domeone then all actions done by him wither away" [10] (*Mu.* 2.2.8) "One who knows that the nature of *Brahman* is Bliss does not get frightened from anything" [12] (*Tai.*2.9) "Oh : Janaka, you have got the fearless" [13] (*Bṛ.* 4.2.4). "He (Janaka) knew *Brahman* in the form "I am *Brahman*" and therefore, he

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became the essence of all things"[13] (*Bṛ.* 1.4.10). "Then the knower of *Brahman* trancends delusion and grief"[14] (*Iśa.* 6). These Śruti texts make no reference to the contribution of the processes like worship, contemplation of God (*Upāsanā*) etc in attaining liberation. There is no intermediate action between the knowledge of *Branman* and the attainment of *mokṣa*. For instance, when it is said that "Someone is singing a song standing at a place", between "singing a song" and "standing at a place" no intermediate action is postulated. Liberation is not the knowledge of *Brahman as a new result*. The knowledge of *Brahman* removes the obstacles in the form of ignorance or nescience (*ajñāna* or *avidyā*) that stands between us and *mokṣa*[15]. One may take the identity of the *Jīva* and *Brahman* in a figurative or symbolic sense. For example, it may be supposed that even though *Jīva* and *Brahman* are different, yet in certain contexts it is enjoined to think them as identical. But if we do so, we shall have to rule out the straight–forward or literal sense of the scriptural statements like "Thou art That" (*tattvamasi*), I am *Brahman* (*aham Brahmāsmi*) etc. and subject them to some forced interpretation according to our will. This would violate the standard principles of scriptural interpretation (*upakrama, upasaṁhāra* etc.) Also, such unrealistic thinking cannot have the result of dispelling ignorance which is said to be the result of knowledge of identity. Hence, one has to take the *Jīva* and *Brahman* as identical a in straight–forward sense and knowledge of *Brahman* as objectively valid. The objective validity of knowledge of *Jīva* or *Brahman* is like any other piece of valid knowledge, perceptual or inferential. It is objective in the sense that it does not depend on any subjective mental act but it is determined by the nature of the thing known. The thing to be known here is the identity of *Jīva* and *Brahman*. We should, however, always bear in mind that *Brahman* is never an object in the sense of an inert material thing. This type of objectivity in relation

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to *Brahman* is completely denied in the *Kenopaniṣad*. According to *Kenopaniṣad, Brahman* is other than what is known *(Kena. 1/4)*. By what means can one know that (*Brahman*) by means of which everything is known ? This question is asked in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Br.* 2 4 14). This (question) implies that *Brahman* cannot be an object of an act of knowledge. In the *Kenopaniṣad* (1 5.) *Brahman* is also denied to be an object of worship.

According to Śaṅkara, liberation is not the result of any kind of action. He lists four kinds of possible actions or results of actions, viz.. production, modification, obtaining and purification, and argues that all these are irrelevant and impossible in respect of liberation. If liberation were something to be produced then some kind of action, whether mental or physical, could be necessary for its production.[16] If it had been modified state of something, some kind of action might have been needed for effecting the modification.[17] But production or modification is possible only in the case of non-eternal things. For instance, a modified state of milk like curd is never found to be eternal or permanent. Nor is a cloth, which is produced or made from threads, is anything everlasting *Mokṣa*, however, is eternal and changeless. Therefore, it is not a result of production or modifiation. *Mokṣa* is not something attainable either. [18] Attainment is exemplified in reaching a place or in getting a thing desired. A fruit or flower may be obtained by the act of plucking, and one may be said to get a place by travel. But activities such as these are utterly inappropriate for the achievement of liberation. For, *makṣa* really constitutes the very nature of the *Jīva* and is thus not something to be attained as it is ever-attained. Moreover, there cannot be any question of reaching or obtaining in respect of that which is infinite and all-pervasive. Obtaining something involves some movement, which is impos-

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sible in the context of what is omnipresent. Liberation, which is the same as *Brahman* is all-pervasive and omnipresent. Being ever-present, it is not a thing to be obtained by any action.

Mokṣa cannot also be the result of any process of purificatory action. We can purify something either through the removal of some defect or through the acquisition of some excellence. But *Brahman* is absolutely perfect and eternally pure. It is, therefore, impossible to add any excellence to it or remove any defect from it. It does not lack any excellence nor does it have any defect.

It might be suggested that although the state of *mokṣa* is immanent in the *jīva*, being hidden in it, its manifestation would require some purificatory act for removal of its concealment. This would be like bringing out the clear nature of a mirror by removing dirt from its sufrace by rubbing. The shining nature of mirror becomes evident when it is cleaned by rubbing etc. But this suggestion cannot be entertained in respect of *mokṣa*. The reason is that it is not possible for the *jīva* to be the seat of any action or *Karma*. If it were so, it would be mutable. Activity implies change. No activity is possible without change. Action changes that to which it is applied, and it changes that in which it is located. So if the *jīva* were to be manifested by some action located in it, it would undergo change. But if it underwent any change it would lose its immutable character i. e. it would be non-eternal. This is obviously not acceptable, since it would go against many clear scriptural statements about the jīva. [19]

Still, the objector may continue thus : Ordinarily, we believe that a person gets purified through bodily activities, of washing, bathing etc. So, what harm is there is suppossing that the *Jīva* gets purified through activities resident not in it but elsewhere? The answer is that the analogy does not hold. Washing etc. which obviously relate to the body, purify only that which is

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identified with the body. So, what is actually purified by these acts is not the *Jīva* itself but something else which is identified with the body. Here body is mistaken to be the *Jīva* through ignorance. For example, when some medical treatment cures some bodily trouble, one naturally feels oneself to be cured. But what is actually cured is the body and not the self which is entirely different from the body. Someone who falsely identifies himself with the body due to ignorance considers himself as ill or cured from illness. But this treatment does not affect the self in any way. In the same way, what is actually purified by bathing, washing etc. is not the *Jīva* itself but one that is identified with the body and considers itself as impure or purified. [20]

Thus, we can speak of an embodied self and of a pure self. The embodied self is the object of our ego-sense. This embodied self accomplishes all actions and enjoys their effects. The pure or true self is different from the embodied self. It (the pure self) does not perform any action and does not enjoy or suffer the consequences of actions. In this context, we can refer to the famous verse in the *Mūnḍaka Upaniṣad* (3. 1. 1) which speaks symbolically of two friendly birds residing together. One of them stands for the pure self and the other for the embodied one. They live on the same tree, that is, are associated with the body. One of the birds takes the sweet fruits of the tree, whereas the other does not, but simply looks on. That is to say, the embodied self considers itself as the doer of actions and the sufferer of its results. The pure self, however, is not involved in any activity but remains like a detached witness (an unchanging spectator of change). So, the pure self is beyond all purificatory acts.

The basic point is that there is no scope for action whatever in respect of *mokṣa* but knowledge alone is necessary and sufficient for it. But one question may arise here : Is not

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knowledge a mental act ? The answer is in the negative. There is a fundamental distinction between an act, even when it is mental, and knowledge. An act depends entirely on man's will or choice. For example, one may be asked to think of or meditate on a particular god to whom some offering is to be made. Here, thinking or meditating is entirely dependent on man's will. One can do it or not do it according to one's will. Knowledge, on the other hand, depends on some evidence or some means of valid knowledge and not on any body's sweet will. Knowledge is not dependent on man's will but is determined by the nature of the thing known. That is to say, when the proper conditions are fulfilled, knowledge arises. It is not dependent on our choice. Thus, it is concluded that knowledge cannot be obtained through any injunction or through any mental act Mental act is entirely subjective, whereas knowledge, as it is, is always objective. The knowledge of the *Jīva* as *Brahman* is also objective and does not depend on man's will or prescriptions.

In *Advaita*, two types of liberation have been distinguished. They are *Jīven-mukti* and *videhamukti*, liberation in the embodied state and disembodied liberation. When ignorance is dispelled by knowledge of *Brahman*, merit, demerit, doubt, delusion etc. are removed. But with the dawn of such supreme knowledge, the body is not immediately dissolved, but may continue for a while. A person who has achieved the liberating knowledge, but yet continues in the body is called *Jīvanmukta*. As liberated, he lives on in the world. A number of Śruti texts have been appealed to in support of *Jīvanmukti*. "When *Brahman* is realised, the knots of the heart are rent assunder, all doubts are removed and actions wither away" (*Mūnd. Up.* 2 2 8). "The delay in his case is only till he is freed from the body" (*Chā. Up.* 7.12.3). The knower of *Brahman* becomes *Brahman*" (*Mūnd. Up.* 3.1.9). "One who knows the self goes beyond

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sorrow" *(Chā. Up.* 7 1.5). *Br. Up,* 4.4.7 says that he *(Jīvanmukta)* attains *Brahman* here. ' If *Brahman* is not known here in this life, greatest is the loss" *(Keno.* Up. 2.5). *Śruti* says, " Although the *Jīvanmukta* has eyes, ears, mind and life, he is as if without eyes, without ears, without mind and without life [21] According to the theory of *Jīvanmukta,* the liberating knowledge may occure in this life, and the body may continue for sometime after the attainment of knowledge. In such residual earthly existence of the *mukta,* the results of the *prārabdha karmas* are experienced. The *prārabdh karmas* are those actions which have begun to fructify, and it is held that they can be exhausted only by *bhoga* or experience. The *Sañcita* and *Kriyamāṇa karmas* are however immediately destroyed by the ultimate knowledge. That is, the *jñānī* does not have a stock of actions which would bear fruits in later lives, for he will not have any later life. Nor would the actions done by him after the attainment ot liberation bind him or produce fruits. For his action are not done any more from personal ego or will, but flow through him for the good of the world. If he acts, he acts only as the instrument of the Lord in a dispassionate way without any attachment to result. If *Jīvanmukti* is not admitted then it might seem that *mukti* is impossible. For so long as one has embodied existence, one has to do actions. And so long as there are actions, there is no advent of ultimte knowledge. For actions always bind. They presuppose doership, are results of desires and produce results which must be suffered. So long as this chain continues there continues the cycle of births and deaths and liberation is not possible. Liberation, if attainable, is attained in man's life in the world and not in some extra — mundane existnce. But there is no guarantee that liberating knowledge necessarily synchronises exactly with the disolution of the body. The body might outlast (i.e., might continue for sometime) after such knowledge. But if the body continues, then actions would also

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continue, nullifying knowledge and perpetuating *saṁsāra*. Thus, either *jīvanmukti* has to be postulated or *mukti* would be impossible. The concept of *jīvanmukti*, therefore, is essential to the *advaita* theory.

The sages point out that the *jīvanmukta* remains like one who is in profound sleep in waking state also, that he sees one ultimate reality without the second even in the multiplicity. Even though he does the worldly activities, he is inwardly inactive. He acts sponteneously or in a mechanical or habitual way but be does nothing by his ago or through personal will.

If there were no *jīvanmukta*, there would be no one to teach the knowledne of *Brahman*. In such matters, the best teacher is he who has realisation or direct experience. The sacred texts which are relied upon, record the direct experience of seers. It is in this faith that the texts are regarded as authoritative. To have direct knowledge of *Brahman* is to be liberated. The seers were such liberated persons, i.e., they were *jīvanmuktas*. They were the right and best teachers of spiritual knowledge. The concept of *jīvanmukti* thus gives authenticity and conviction to the seekers of liberation. It is believed that not only the *ṛṣis* of the *upaniṣads* were liberated persons, but there has been a succession of such souls through the ages. Śaṅkara himself is regarded by his followers as a *jīvanmukta*.

Another reason behind the fact that *jīvanmukti* is possible is that it is the sphere of *anubhūti* or experience. We have inherited the account of these experiences from our ancient sages. The *upaniṣads* are the manifestation of such experiences. Śaṅkara gives much emphasis to *Śruti* in his philosophy. *Śruti* is said to be *pratyakṣa* or experience. According to Śaṅkara, *Śruti* records the intimate experience of the sages. *Śruti* is valid in itself like *pratyakṣa* or *anubhava* since it reveals the experience

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of the sages. Thus, the *upaniṣads* are proof that there is no conflict between knowledge of *Brahman* and embodiment. To deny *jīvanmuktt* is in a way to deny *Śruti*, and to deny *Śruti* is to deny our highest experience.

Besides *Śruti*, *Smṛti* passages also declare that *jīvanmukti* is possible. *Yoga-Vāsiṣṭha* speaks about the uature of *jīvanmukta* very nicely and uniquely : "Inwardly free from all desires, dispassionate and detached, but outwardly full af zeal in action but free from any zeal at heart, active in appearance but inwardly peaceful, behave in this world, O Rāghava ... Unattached at heart but outwardly acting as if with attachment, inwardly cool but outwardly fervent, behave in this world, O Rāghava." The *jīvanmukta* wears his life like a light garment.[22]

There are, however, objections raised against the conception of *jīvanmukti*. It has been stated that the body is the effect of *avidyā* or action, but, liberation as the knowledge of *Brahman* is bodilessness Ignorance should be dispelled with all its effects when *Brahma-jñāna* has dawned. That it, the body should fall immediately on *Brahma-jñāna* and there can be no action thereafter. As light and darkness can never exist simultaneously, so too ultimate knowledge and action cannot go together. Thus, the conception of *jīvanmukti* has been criticised.

In response, it can be said that action as such is not the ignorance and the cause of bondage. The action which blinds man is *sakāma karma*. *Niṣkāma karma* is quite compatible with the manifestation of knowledge. The cause of bondaae and embodiment is *kāma*, not *karma*. Many *Śruti* passages, too, accept the activity of the liberated (*Ch. Up.* 8. 12 3, *Brahma-Sūtra*, 2. 3. 31–32). If activity were the cause of bondage, we cannot explain those *Śruti* passages which speak of the pleasant

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actions of the self and even of the *Brahman*. Thus, we may conclude that it is the desire for result or attachment thereto which is the root cause of bondare, not the mere performace of action.

Śaṅkara points out with much emphasis that it is the highest knowledge which is immediately the means of liberation. But liberation is not a product of the of the highest knowledge, for if it were so, it would be non-eternal like result of actions. Liberation is the highest knowledge itself. Commenting on the *Bhagavadgītā* and *Śikṣāvalli* of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* Śaṅkara writes that liberation is possible by knowledge alone, and neither by action (*karma*) nor by knowledge combined with action (*jñāna-karma-samuccaya*). We have already, discussed why action cannot be the means of liberation. The world of multiplicity and plurality is an illusion imputed on *Brahman*. We cannot even overcome our everyday illusion by action (*karma*) or devotion. Illusion or ignorance can be dispelled by knowledge alone. Therefore, liberation which is overcoming of illusion or ignorance, is possible by knowledge alone.

Śaṅkara criticises the two theories of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* and *jñānottara karma* (the theory that after the dawn of right knowledge something remains for the liberated to be done). *Vaiṣnava Vedāntins* and certain contemporary Indian thinkers, e.g., B. G. Tilak have strongly protested against Śaṅkara's criticism of the two theories. But his criticism of these two theories has been grossly misunderstood. It is supposed by many persons that Śaṅkara has prescribed abandonment of all activities in respect of aspirants for emancipation or *mokṣa*. But this is not the case. Śaṅkara never advocated giving up of action. According to him even the liberated ones are not absolved from all actions. For actions are unavoidable as long as the body lasts or till the *prārabdha karma* is exhausted. But the actions

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of the liberated are totally of a different nature. He has no unfulfilled desire and does not act for satisfaction of any craving. All his activities are the activities of the Lord Himself and he is simply an instrument of Him and his actions are done by him only for the maintenance of the world order *(Loka–saṁgraha)*. If he acts, that sets an example to others. His actions serve the purpose of welfare of people, i.e, he by his example sets others on the right path

Action and devotion are not directly the means of liberation but they are indirectly helpful for obtaining the right knowledge. Action and devotion purify the mind of the aspirant for *mokṣa*. Knowledge may come only after the purification of one's mind. Again, though the sentence "Thou art that" or the pure mind is the instrument for the realisation of *Brahman*, it is not the case that all who have those instruments do attain the knowledge of *Brahman*. If there is demerit which is the obstacle of self–realisation, then the dawn of knowledge is not possible. *Brahman* is realised on the exhaustion of demerits *(adharma)*. Exhaustion of demerits comes from the performance of rites. We know about actions or rites from the scriptures and performance of rites leads to purification of the mind. Such a mind finds fault with the world of objects. This finding again leads to indifference to *bhoga* of this–worldly or other–worldly results of actions. This indifference leads to hearing, thinking and meditation and ultimately to liberation. Thus, actions are indirectly useful for attainment of liberation. Hence *Br*. 4. 4. 22 says, "The *Brāhmaṇas* seek to know it through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices, charity and austerity consisting in a dispassionate enjoyment of sense–objects." [23] and *Smṛiti* says, "When the taint (of the mind) has been burnt by rites, knowledge manifests itself." [24] Thus, though action cannot be directly the means of

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liberation, we can say on the basis of scriptures that it can indirectly be so.

The role of devotion, according to Śaṅkara, is very important for the attainment of *mokṣa*. *Jīva* does not differ from the *Brahman*, which is only its ideal form. Hence, devotion to God is the devotion to one's own higher form. According to Śaṅkara *Bhakti* is " the contemplation of our own real self in a sustained, passionless state of peace. "[25] It is the inquiry of one's own real nature. There is no conflict between knowledge and devotion. Perfect *Bhakti* to God leads to *Braahmabhāva*. *Brahmabhāva* is the knowledge that I am not different from *Brahman*. Nothing is more useful in the realisation of liberation than devotion.[26] According to Śaṅkara, prayer is very useful before the attainment of *mokṣa*.

Śaṅkara's many writing consist of *stotras* to different deities which proves that the aspirant for liberation or the liberated himself should not abandon action and devotion. But it is strange that *Vaiṣnava Vedāntins* suppose that Śaṅkara has preached the abandonment of action for the liberated. Śaṅkara emphasises not renunciation of action but renunciation in action. In Śaṅkara we find a perfect reconciliation of *jñāna*, *bhakti* and *karma yoga*.

Hearing, thinking and meditation also are the processes through which self can be realised. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, yājñavalkya, elaborating on self–relation, says that the self is to be heard of, thought over, and meditated upon "[27] (*Bṛ*. 2.4.5; 4,5,6). Now what is understood by the term 'hearing'? Hearing is a mental process leading to the conviction that the purport of the *vedāntic* texts is the non-dual *Brahman*, that is, the intention of the *vedāntic* texts lies in *Advaita Brahman*. Thinking or reflection is also a kind of psychological activity which produces

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rational knowledge consisting in refutation of any possible contradiction from other sources of knowledge (viz., perception, inference etc.) to the meaning determined by hearing. Meditation is a kind of mental operation through which one can fix one's mind in matters of the Self after withdrawing it from objects, when it is attracted towards them by latent evil impressions that have no beginning. It is the function of meditation to provide one with the power of concentration on self.

Though hearing, reflection and meditation are the causes of right knowledge they cannot serve as coexisting causes, because their simultaneous existence is not possible. The combination of them is impossible. Therefore among the three causes, meditation is the direct cause for the realisation of Self. For it has been stated in the *Śruti* – "After going through the process of meditation they (the wise men) have understood the power of illusion." (*Sv.* I. 3).[18] Reflection is presupposed by meditation. Without going through the process of reflection one cannot have conviction about the truth of the object of meditation. Without such ascertainment meditation is not possible at all. Hearing again is the cause of reflection. Without hearing one cannot determine the intention of *Vedāntic* texts and consequently no verbal comprehension is possible. Due to the absence of the verbal comprehension, reflective thinking for establishment of reasonableness of what has been heard is not possible at all. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the author of *Bhāmati* commentary, hearing, thinking and meditating are the causes in producing the knowledge of *Brahman*.

The *Vivaraṇa* School, however, does not admit the above mentioned view. According to *Vivaraṇa* hearing, is the immediate cause of the realisation of *Brahman*. Reasoning and meditation, although they are subsequent to hearing, serve as subsidiary factors.

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Criticism :

We have attempted above an exposition of the *Advaita* theory of liberation. Now, we shall turn to a few points of criticism.

1. *Mokṣa* is regarded as the ultimate goal. It is said to be eternal, immutable, disembodiedness, Brahman. All such information about *mokṣa* is obtained from Scripture, *Vedāntic* texts etc. So belief in *mokṣa* is based on acceptance of such texts. To those who do not have faith in *Śruti* etc., talk about *mokṣa* may seem to be trash or just wishful thinking Those who accept the authority of scripture etc., however, also maintain that information given in the Vedas etc. are expression of realised truths, and anybody can attain those truths if the proper method is followed. But the method prescribed is not only extremely difficult; it may take many lives to complete. People who doubt whether there is after-life at all will not at all feel encouraged to try the method. Moreover, in philosophic discussion the point is to understand; *mokṣa* is to be theoretically understood, not practically necessarily to be attained. Thetefore, nothing much will be gained by getting involved in the question whether reliance can be placed on *Śruti* in this matter. Rather, we may try to ascertain whether the concept of *mokṣa* is intelligible and rationally defensible.

2. Liberation is held to be the same as *Brahman. Brahman* is changeless. Therefore, liberation must also be changeless. The *Advaitins* assert it as such, i.e., as immutable and enternal. Being *Brahman,* it is ever-present and never-absent. But if somthidg be always existent, can it be a goal of man ? What is a God ? It is that which is not already obtained but sought to be obtained in the future When obtaining is said to be not possible in the case of liberation or *Brahman,* does that not make liberation unfit for being a human goal ? How then is it held to be not

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only an end of human seeking, but the ultimate end as well? Is not a contradiction involved in saying at the same time both that it is the highest goal and that it is there already?

The *Advaitin* tries to avoid this difficulty by distinguishing between two kinds of obtaining : (1) obtaining of what is not already obtained,and (2) obtaining of that which is already obtained. Attainment of *mokṣa* is of the latter type. This is sought to clarified by a number of exampies, viz, those of (1) rope–snake illusion (2) search and finding of an object that was not lost really, and (3) covering and exposure of the sun by passing clouds.

In the rope–snake illution, the rope is at first mistaken for a snake; and later when the mistake is corrected, it is realised that the snake was never there and the rope was always there. Similarly, when after long search for an object, say a wrist watch, it is found in its place, one realises that it was not really lost at all. So also, covering of the sun from vision and restoring its vision by passing clouds makes no difference to the sun. In like manner, it is held that searching for liberation and attaining it makes no difference to it, for it is eternal and immutable.

But the answer by means of the illustrations is unsatisfactory. For the comparisons break down at crucial points. True, the illusory snake does not affect the real rope at all. But it does involve a change from a state of illusion to a state of knowledge. Similarly, in the case of finding a thing supposed to have been lost, the search and the finding are real and involve change. In the sun-cloud example, the clouds and their movements are real. So in each of the instances, change is real, whereas in the case of liberation there is said to be no scope for change.

...2

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Therefore, the examples fail to make changelessness or the getting of the gotton characteristic of liberation clear of intelligible.

3. Liberation is said to be the ultimate *human* goal. This means that it is the supreme end that an individual human being can or should set for himself. Only man can aspire for liberation. *Brahman,* being reality as such, cannot and does not seek liberation. It does not make sense to say that *Brahman* aims at *Mokṣa,* because *mokṣa* is *Brahman* itself and not in any way different from it. One can only seek something that one has not got. It is impossible for anyone to aspire for himself, for one is already it.

But though liberation is set as a goal for the individual, it implies also the annihilation of the individual. When liberation is attained, *Brahman* is realised, as liberation and *Brahman* are the same. There is no difference at all between the two. But when *Brahman* is realised, all individuality is dissolved, for *Brahman* is undifferentiated and homogeneous which does not admit of any kind of difference.

So for an individual, to consciously aim at liberation is to aim at one's own annihilation. According to *Advaita,* all individuality is illusory. This illusion is said to be cancelled on attainment of liberation. But is it possible for anyone to consciously aim at self-annihilation as an ideal? Can I set an ideal for myself which, if realised, will entail my non-existence? Who is to realise the ideal? Not *Brahman* surely. It is the individual, then, who can be supposed to attain it. But how can he attain it, if he ceases to exist in attaining it?

If the individual be illusory, then not only bondage but also liberation is illusory. So liberation becomes an illusory goal for an illusory being, there being neither individuality nor bondage

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nor liberation from the ultimate standpoint. Not only that, our point is that even from the relative standpoint, it does not make sense to set liberation consciously as a goal. For liberation cannot be attained by the individual, as he does not exist in liberation. Suicide can be committed, but it is not an attainment. It is absurd to say that suicide is a perfect state of the individual. It is not the perfection of the individual but total destruction of the individual. If suicide is not an attainment of perfection, liberation also is not so. The case of liberation is even worse, for whereas suicide can be committed, liberation is logically impossible of commitment or achievement, for liberation is illusory and impossible. The *Advaita* ideal of liberation, therefore, turns out to be an unintelligible and impossible ideal.

4. The distinction between *Jīvanmukti* and *Videhamukti* is peculiar to *Advaita*. It may well be doubted if the concept of liberation leaves room for such a distinction. If liberation is conceived as bodilessness or *Brahman*, how can there be any scope for two forms of it... one with the body and the other without the body? The question of one's being embodied or having a body has meaning only so long as one is not liberated. When there is liberating knowledge, one realises that all is one, that there is no difference at all For one who has realised the Self, can there be a distinction between continuance of body and its discontinuance? How can one, who has realised that the world of bodies is illusory, continue to have the body for sometime and relinquish it thereafter? How can he regard himself as *jīvanmukta* for a while and as *videhamukta* thereafter? If *mukti* is realisation of bodilessness, for the *mukta* there can be no varities of *mukti*. From that standpoint, liberation does not admit of stages, with body at first and without it later. There is not even earlier or later for the being in the realm of the illusory.

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The argument that *jīvankukti* has to be admitted on the ground that *prārabdha karma* can be exhausted only by sufferance (*bhoga*) is rather weak and unconvincing. If knowledge of self or *Brahman* can burn (destroy) *sancita* and *kriyamāna karma*, why should it be supposed that it leaves *prārabdha karma*, untouched?

Thus, there seems to be little justification for the distinction between two types of *mukti* from the standpoint of the *mukta*. But this is not to deny that a distinction could be made from the point of view of those who are in bondage. To them a self–realised person may seem to continue in his body and to give up the body at the time of death. Even in this case, however, the postulation of *prārabdha karma* to account for the continued bodily existence of the liberated is unnecessary. For, we need not suppose that one who has attained liberation suffers pleasure and pain like us or is subject to ignorant action. We have already noted that his actions are not egoistic actions. If he acts, it is not for himself, but for general welfare *(lokasaṁgraha)*.

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NOTES

1. Brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati.

2. Tarati śokamātmavit.

3. Tadyathā iha puṇyacito lokah kṣiyate.

4. Na sa punarāvarttate.

5. Idaṁ tu pāramārthikaṁ kutāsthanityaṁ, vyomavat sarvavyāpi, sarvavikriyārahitam, nityatṛptaṁ, niravayavam, svayaṁjyotiḥsvabhāvam [Śānkarabhāsya on Brahma-sūtra, I. 1. 4 (2nd Varṇaka); Vedāntadarśanam, Ed. Swāmi Vishwarūānanda, p. 156].

6. Yatra dharmādharmau snha kāryeṇa kālatrayaṁ ca na upāvartete, tad etat asariratvaṁ mokṣākhyam [Śankara's Commentary on Brahmasūtra, I, 1. 4. (2nd Varṇaka); Vedantadarshanam, Ed. Swami Vishwarupananda, p. 156].

7. Ata eva anuṣtheyakarmmaphalavilakṣanam mokṣākhyam asariratvaṁ nityam iti siddham [Śānkarabhāsya on Brahmasūtra, I, 1. 4 (2nd Varṇaka); Vedantadarshanam, Ed. Swami Vishwarupananda, p. 156].

8. Siddhasyaiva Brahmasvarūpasya mokṣasyāsiddhatvabhrameṇa tatsādhane pravṛttyupapatteb. Anarthanivṛttirapyadhiṣthana-bhūtabrahmasvarūpatayā siddhaiva.
--- Vedānta - Paribhāṣa, Ed. Swāmi Mādhavānanda, p. 204.

9. Kath. 1. 2. 14, Śānkarabhāsya on Brahmasūtra, I, 1. 4, 2nd Vornaka, Vedāntadorśanam, Ed. Swami Visvarupananda, p. 160.

10. Kṣiyante cāsya karmāṇi tasmin dṛṣte parāvare.

11. Anannaṁ Brahmanah vidvan na vibheti Kutaścana.

12. Abhayam vai Janaka praptaḥ asi.

13. Tat ātmananameva vetti aham Brahmāsmi iti, tasmāt tat sarvvam abhavat.

14. Tatra kaḥ moha kaḥ śokaḥ ekatvamanupaśyatah.

15. Iti ca evamādyāh śrutayah mokṣapratibandhanivṛttimātram eva atmajñānasya phalam darśayanti (Śankarabhāsya on Brahmasūtra, I. 1. 4. 2nd Varṇaka, Vedāntadarśanam, Swami Visvarupānanda, p. 160).

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16. Yasya tu utpādyāḥ mokṣa, tasya mānasaṁ vācikaṁ kāyikaṁ vā kāryam spekṣate iti yuktam (Śankarabhāsya on Brahmasūtra, 1. 1. 4, 2nd Varṇaka, Vedāntadarśanam, Ed. S. V. p. 170).

17. Tathā vikāryatve ca (*Ibid*, p. 170).

18. Na ca āpyatvenāpi kāryapekṣa svatmasvarūpatve sati anapyatvāt [Śankarabhāsya on Brahmasūtra, 1. 1. 4 (2nd Varḥaka) ; Ed. Swāmi Visvarupānanda, p. 171].

19. Vide *BG*, 2. 25, " It (the Self) is incapable of change or modification."

20. Śankara's Commentary on *Brahmhasūtra*, I, 1. 4 (2nd Varṇaka), Vedāntadarśanam, Ed. Swāmi Visvarupānanda, p. 173.

21. " Sacakṣuracakṣuriva, sakarnoḥ akarna iva, samanā amanā iva, saprāṇoḥ aprāṇa iva " ityādi Śruteḥ - *Vedāntasarah* of Sadānanda Yogindra, trans. by Kālivara Vedāntavāgiśa, p. 211.

22. Quoted from *Brahma sūtra* - Ed. by Rādhākrishnan, p. 217.

23, Tametaṁ Vedānuvacanem Brahmana Vividisanti yajñena dānena tapasaḥ anāsakena - Br. 4. 4. 22.

24. Kaṣāye karmabhiḥ pakketato jañānam pravarta e.

25. P. N. Shrinivasachari : *A Synthetic View of Vedānta*, p, 17.

26. Mokṣakāraṇasāmagryāṁ Bhaktireva gariyasi - *Viveka Cūdāmani*, 32.

27. Śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ.

28. Tedhyānayogānugata apaśyan devātmaśaktiṁ svagunairnigūdhām.

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FORMULATION OF GRICE'S THREE INTENTIONS

Introducing that the need of some constraints for an utterer's intention follows Grice's distinction between 'Natural' meaning, I focus on these constraints. The focus is mainly on Grice's initial formulation of the three necessary and sufficient conditions or constraints for an utterer to mean something successfully in a communication situation.

H. P Grice's distinction[1] between 'natural' meaning and 'non-natural' meaning (meaning$_{NN}$) basically shows that the presence or absence of 'utterer's[2] intention' marks 'mean' in a sentence (of the form 'x means that p') as being employed in its non-natural sense or natural sense. In respect of non-natural meaning, for example, in 'the three rings on the bell (of the bus) mean that the' 'bus is full", 'mean' has been employed with the presupposition that the utterer (viz; the conductor) has certain intention that precedes or accompanies when he utters some thing (viz; when the conductor rings the bell for three times). On the other hand, in respect of the natural meaning, for example, in "Those spots mean (meant) measles," 'mean' is not employed with any presupposition of an utterer (any intelligent human being) who produces the fact (viz; those spots), event or state of affairs with some intention to communicate something. Roughly speaking (though it is not explicitly said by Grice,) in case of natural meaning, as opposed to non-natural meaning, a sentence of the form "By uttering x, U (the utterer) means that p" makes no sense. For it is in case of the non-natural sense of 'mean,' not in its natural, an *utterer* means something. In a linguistic communication, a person with certain intentions means something, and neither an event, nor a fact, nor a state of affairs means anything. But what kind of

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intentions are there with the utterer, U, for meaning$_{NN}$ (meaning, in the non-natural sense of 'Mean') something by an utterance, x?

All intentions are not *communication-intentions*. I can just intend to help you, but thereby I do not communcicate you anything. Again, I can utter "I shall kill you" intending to help you.[3] Though my utterance, "I shall kill you" is accompanied or preceded by some intention (i.e., of helping you) I do not communicate, if at all, in accordance to that intention. Nor what I exactly mean by uttering "I shall kill you" is that I shall kill you. Even a parrot can utter "I shall kill you," and obviously, you never admit that the parrot does mean anything. Sometimes our uttering something with certain intentions may not mean anything in a communicative sense and may be no better, or rather more obscure, in a sense, than that of a parrot's uttering something without intentions.

Hence, an utterer's intentions are to be conditioned or formulated in certain ways such that they can be qualified as the *necessary and sufficient* conditions for "U's meaning$_{NN}$ something by uttering x." In other words, certain intentions of an utterer are to be shown as necessary as well as sufficient to mean something in linguistic communication; so that 'Meaning$_{NN}$' can determine and be determined by those intentions. Grice's analysis of meaning is mainly directed to provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for meaning$_{NN}$. And, that he tries in terms of 'utterer's intention' with the presupposition that every linguistic communication is fundamentally a kind of meaning$_{NN}$. This paper is mainly concerned with Grice's initial formulation of the three conditions *(intentions)* for (of) an utterer to mean something successfully, in a communication-situation. Some refinements are considered just for the sake of a better understanding of the three intentions; obviously, not to support or

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attack any criticism. And, for this reason, less attentiou has been given to criticisms; more importantly, it avoids the important criticisms/counter-examples of Strawson,[4] Schiffer,[5] Ziff,[6] and Wilson.[7] Grice tries to show that the three conditions[8] are (taken individually) necessary and (taken together) sufficient for an utterer, U, to mean$_{NN}$ something by uttering x.

> The First Necessary Condtion *(intention)* is
> U intends to induce some belief in A.

In a communicative sense of 'mean', when U utters x, U does not mean anything by x if he does not intend some audience (A) to believe something. No speaker speaks something (when he tries to communicate something) with the intention that the hearer should not believe anything of what he speaks Even if U tries to speak or write something unclearly or ambiguously so that A cannot be sure of what U really meant, yet U tries to induce in A some belief, which in effect may or may not be the result of A's being confused.

This first condition excludes cases like a parrot's uttering something, as ant's tracing a line as it crawls on a patch of sand, the noise of waves, winds or of a waterfall etc, to mean anything. It also shows that the cases like a baby's screaming, a child's scribbling on a piece of paper, an idiots shouting and even the conductor's ringing the bell mistakenly etc means nothing in a communicative sense. For these are devoid of 'an utterer's intention to induce some belief in some audience.'

But this first condition is not sufficient for meaning NN something. If, for example,[9] I left the lights on in my house, with the intention of inducing in you the belief that I was at my home, thereby I did not mean$_{NN}$ that I was at my home. For you might not recognize that I had intended so and I, thereby, failed to communicate what I had intended, even though I

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satisfied the first condition (i.e, the belief–inducing intention). By leaving the handkerchief of B, for example, near the scene of a murder in order to induce the belief in the detective that B was the murderer, U did not communicate anything to the detective.

Thus the Second Necessary Condition (intention) is

U intends A to recognize the first *(intention)*. That is, U intends A to recognize that U intends to induce some belief in A.

This 'recognition–condition' shows that communication is, in some sense, 'open.' The act of communication is not surreptitious (as in the act of leaving the handkerchief) nor is it confined to the knowledge of the utterer only (as in the case of leaving the lights on). Though the utterer may be dishonest, as in the cases of telling lies, yet he is to acknowledge that the utterance in question is his own. This acknowledgement he fails to make unless he intends his audience to recognize. He must have intended an audience to recognize the intention that accompanies or precedes the utterance.

The above said two conditions seem to be paradoxical if 'induce' is taken in a 'counter–productive' sense. In a counter-productive sense of 'induce,' if U intends to induce some belief in A, then U does not intend A to recognize this 'belief–inducing' *intention*. For the intended effect, in almost all cases, cannot be produced if such a recognition takes place. In this counter–productive sense, 'induce' may mean something like seducing or persuading (e.g., The father says "I shall bring a toy for you" to stop his son from crying. If the father intends to induce in his son the false belief that he is going to bring a toy for his son, the son does not recognize this assurance as

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false If he could have recognized so, he would have not been convinced and stopped from crying).

A linguistic reformulation that can be considered to avoid such a paradox is to replace 'U intends to induce some belief in A' by 'U intends A to believe something.' That is, for example, the father intends his son to believe that he assures him (son) of getting a toy and also intends his son to recognize that the father intends him (son) to believe the assurance. And, not that the father intends his son to recognize that he intends to *induce* in (counterproductive sense) the belief that he will bring a toy (i.e , to deceive through the false assurance).

If this linguistic reformulation can avoid the paradox then the Two Conditions can be refined.

The first condition

U intends to induce some belief in A

can be refined to

U intends A to believe something.

Consequently, the second condition

U intends A to recognize that U intends to induce some belief in A

can be refined to

U intends A to recognize that U intends A to believe something.

One may argue, as R. C. Gandhi argues, that even the said linguistic reformulation and, therefore, the refinements considered cannot solve the paradox. Of course, I think, it cannot be solved if the only way in which 'U can get A to recognize that U intends A to believe something' is that U should get A to recognize that U is trying to *induce* (in counter-productive sense) some belief in A. 'But it may not be the only way; or

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rather, not the way, at all, in a successful communication, if Grice's analysis is correct.

However, not to further this problem (which is very crucial,[12] in a sense), here I can just quote[13] Grice :

> ...'A meant something by x" is roughly equivalent to "A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention." (This seems to involve a reflexive paradox, but it does not really do so).[14]

Another important problem with the 'recognition-condition' is that A may recognize the first intention of U on the basis of (or because of) something *other than* the utterance, x For example, if I utter "good morning" before a man ignorant of English, even if he recognizes my intention from my particular gesture and the raising of my hand, yet what he recognizes is not due to my utterance (i.e, "good morning"). The same point has been made in J. O Urmson's counter-example[15] of 'bribery,' that S piles fifty thousand dollars on A's desk during a conversation, with the intention that A will favour S. If A recognizes, without considering the dollars but considering some other reasonable evidence, that S intends to get some favour, then S cannot be said to $mean_{NN}$ anything by piling fifty thousand dollars on A's desk.

There should be some *connection* between the utterance itself and the utterer's intention such that the audience can recognize the utterer's intention, at least, partly because of the utterance of x. If I put down a five rupee note before my known tobaconist (shop-keeper) I can $mean_{NN}$ that I am asking for a packet of cigarettes of my regular brand, y. There is certain connection between my 'putting down a five rupee note' and my intention of 'asking for a packet of y' on the basis of what the known tobaconist can recognize my intention. But, the five rupee note,

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shown to another tobacconist unknown to me, itself does not mean$_{NN}$ anything even though he hands over a packet of y after hearing my words "give a packet of y." Here, my utterance (putting down the note) and my intention are not so connected that the audience (tobacconist) can recognize my intention on the basis of my utterance

Thus, the second refined Recognition–Condition can be further refined to

> U intends A to recognize, at least in part, from the utterance of x, that U intends A to believe something.

Although this refinement emphasizes the connection between the utterance itself and the utterer's intention, yet there are cases where the utterance can convey (or be connected with) two or more intentions. That is, the utterance itself may confuse A to think which of the intentions (if two or more things can be intended to convey by the same utterance) is to be recognized. In such cases, as Grice, says, 'we tend to refer to the context (linguistic or otherwise) of the utterance'. For example, 'a man who calls for a "pump" at fire would not want a bicycle pump'. In a non–linguistic situation also we can refer to the context. For example, it is obvious that 'why a man who just put a cigarette in his mouth has put his hand in his pocket'.[16]

The first condition and the second condition (even accounting the refinements) are not sufficient for 'U, by uttering x, means$_{NN}$ something'. For example,[17] if I show Mr. X a photograph of Mrs. X being in a position with Mr. Y which displays their undue familiarity, I do not mean$_{NN}$ anything. For the photograph itself could have made Mr. X to believe or not *I* had shown him the photograph. That is, it is not his recognition of my intention but the incontrovertible evidence itself that

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gives him the reason to believe something. There is a difference between "deliberately and openly letting someone know" and "telling" and between "getting someone to think" and "telling". If I draw a picture before Mr. X which depicts the undue familiarity between Mrs. X and Mr. Y, I $mean_{NN}$ something. Because Mr. X's recognition of my intention works here as a reason for (his) believing that there is something between Mrs. X and Y.

> Thus the Third Necessary Condition (*intention*) is U intends A to be affected at least partly because A recognizes U's first intention. That is, U intends A to fulfil U's first intention on the basis of A's fulfilment of U's second intention.

In a successful communication, it is not only that the utterer intends something and the audience recognizes that, but the audience also responds (i.e, believes something in case of descriptive utterances, answers or accepts or obeys something in case of imperative utterances) to the utterance. And this *response* he gives is, at least partly, because of his recognition of the utterer's intention to produce that *response* from him.

Before the end it should be mentioned that by the response of the audience it is meant here the effect of, what Grice calls, 'the primary intention' of the utterer. In fact, in Grice's analysis of $Meaning_{NN}$, only 'the primary intention' of an utterer is relevant. That is, in Grice's words :

> ...if I utter x, intending (with the aid of the recognition of this intention) to induce an effect E, and intend this effect E to lead to a further effect F, then insofar as the occurence of F is thought to be dependent solely on E, I cannot regard F as in the least dependent on recognition of my intention to induce E. [18]

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To give a concrete example, I informed my friend that his fiancee is in the library with the intention that getting this information he would proceed towards the library. This intention cannot be regarded as relevant to the meaning$_{NN}$, and I do not mean "You proceed towards the library" by uttering "Your fiancee is in the library".

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NOTES

1. H. P. Grice, "Meaning", *Philosophical Review, LXVI, 1957*, pp. 377–388. See pp. 377–378.
2. Following Grice,* by 'utter' (together with 'utterance') it is meant to cover 'any case of doing x or producing x', verbal as well as non-verbal, 'by the performance of which U meant that so-and-so' Accordingly, the scope of 'utterer' is widened too.

   * H. P. Grice. "Utterer's meaning, Sentence-meaning and Word-meaning" in (Ed.) J. R. Searle, *The Philosophy of Language*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press (1971), See p. 55.
3. To give a concrete example. a father never intends to kill his son. But, he utters "I shall kill you", on many occasions, intending to discourage the child from carelessness.
4. P. F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts", *Philosophical, Review LXXIII*, 1964, pp. 446–449.
5. See H. P. Grice, "Utterer's Meaning and Intentions", *Philosophical Review, LXXVIII*, 1969, p. 155.
6. P. Ziff, "On H. P. Grice's Account of Meaning", *Analysis, XXVIII*, 1967, pp. 1–8.
7. N. L. Wilson, "Grice on Meaning : The Ultimate Counter-Example", *NOUS, IV*, 1970. pp. 295–302.
8. The three conditions written in the paper are not quoted from Grice (1957) but interpreted.

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9. Example taken from R. C. Gandhi's *Presupposition of Human Communication* (Oxford University Press : Delhi (1974)), p. 120.

10. Grice (1957), pp. 381-382,

11. R. C. Gandhi (1974), p. 133.

12. See R. C. Gandhi (1974), pp. 119-135. If Gandhi's claim of the ' recognition-condition ' as ' potentially counter-productive ' is established then Grice's claim of the necessity of the 2nd and 3rd condition is challenged.

13. To show that Grice was aware of the paradox but had taken it very lightly. He says nothing more about this reflexive paradox.

14. H. P. Grice (1957), p. 384.

15. See H. P. Grice (1969). p. 153.

16. H. P. Grice (1957), p. 386.

17. *Ibid*, pp. 382-383.

18. *Ibid*, p. 386.

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CAUSALITY, DETERMINISM AND OBJECTIVE REALITY IN MODERN PHYSICS

Of the two great revolutionary theories in Physics in this century, viz Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Mechanics stands in greater contrast to classical physics than Relativity. Relativity, in spite of its revolutionary concepts of space and time, can be incorporated in the mode of thought of classical physics. In fact Max Planck said of it, that it brought classical physics to its consummation as it were, in that by the amalgamation of space and time, it has also united the concepts of mass and energy, and of gravity and inertia, in a single higher point of view. Of quantum mechanics he considered it a dangerous explosive which has caused a gaping rift through and the entire structure of classical physics. It was not a modification but a breach in classical physics.

One reason for such a view is that quantum mechanics is supposed to have thrown overboard the principles of causality and determinism which have been the very basis of all scientific laws (at least the ideal to which all scientific laws aimed at). It has also cast doubt on the ability of physics to comprehend objective reality. Such a radical view has not been without dissent and opposition within the community of physicists themselves and the debate is still current. Its importance is that the results of the debate will determine the direction of scientific research in theoratical physics.

While the formalism of quantum mechanics has been accepted by all, there are, howerver, different interpretations of its laws. Hence, the statement that causality and determinism are no longer valid in quantum mechanics depends on the particular

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interpretaion of quantum mechanics and also on how we define causality and determinism. These principles have evolved with the growth of scientific knowledge, and the meaning and content assigned to them in the context of Newtonian mechanics must be reexamined and reassessed to be in accord with the changing paradigms in Physics.

We have termed causality and determinism as principles. In the hierarchy of empirical knowledge, principles rank above scientific laws which are themselves above results of measurements. Principles permeate and inform the scientific laws and the laws govern the results of measurements. Physics is not satisfied with gathering together of facts and formulating laws. It asks how one law comes forth out of another; it seeks a rule by which thought may be guided from one law to the next. Principle of virtual displacement and principle of least action in mechanics are some examples. Principles of causality and determinism are of even more general validity, that they appear to inform all natural laws and it has been accepted since Descartes that discovery of causal laws of natural events is the real goal of science. Yet their validity must be tested in empirical experience and their definition and content necessary to be modified in the light of experience.

There are many ways of defining determinism and causality. We shall adopt the one suggested by Born, according to which determinism postulates that events at different times are connected by laws in such a way that prediction of unknown situations, (of past or future) is possible. Causality, on the other hand, holds that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity E of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity C of another class, where an entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation or event. C is then called the Cause and E the effect. Determinism is a cosmic condition of lawfulness, a condi-

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tion in which human prediction or retrodiction is possible, if sufficient knowledge of the present is available. Causality is a more particularised connection linking certain designated items in our experience. Sometimes causality and determinism are used interchangeably, for example, by considering the initial state as the cause and the final state as the effect but as we shall see presently causality implies something more than determinism. Not all causal laws need be deterministic and not all deterministic laws need imply causality. Of course, as the concepts evolve with the changing paradigms in physics, the distinction sometimes gets blurred.

At the triumphal peak of Newtonian classical physics, all physical phenomena were expected to be explained by laws operating on the consitituent particles of matter. These were dynamical laws expressed in differential equations such that given the initial state expressed in position and mometum, all its future states can be determined. The present state can be determined with any degree of precision required by refining and improving the measuring technology. Therefore, it followed that it is possible to predict (or retrodict) any future (or past) state with any degree of precision, provided we know the present with a corresponding precision and such knowledge is possible. The purpose of physical science is to determine the forces operating on the elementary particles which will give us such causal deterministic laws.

A very general definition of causality can be expressed as "If C then E" or "C therefore E" or "E because of C." To emphasise that this relation holds always and not sometimes, we can state it as "C then E always" i.e., if C is the case E should ensue invariably, a formula of constant conjunction. The causal bond is conditional and necessary. It is also unidirectional and asymmetrical. This is stated as "if C then (and only) then) E

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always. This still does not imply a genetic connection but only an external association, an invariable coincidence. It says nothing about the active role and productive nature that causal agents are supposed to have. Consider two statements for example; "where there is fire there is smoke" and "red apples are sweet." The former is an openly causal proposition that fire causes smoke, whereas the latter only asserts a correlation as nobody would regard quality like redness as the cause of another quality like sweetness. Still, both statements fit the formula "If C then E always." To express the genetic bond between C and E we must state the causality principle as "If C then and only then E is always produced by it."

The genetic connection between Cause and Effect was rejected by the British empiricist, David Hume, on the ground that there is nothing in our experience that justifies such a connection and it is only custom and habit that invests it. We shall come back to this point later in our discussion.

There are also the aspects of contiguity and temporal precedence in causality. According to the Cartesian view the causal chain should be transmitted from C to E continuosly in space and time so that they are ultimately contiguous. When Newton published his universal Law of Gravitation implying action at a distance his colleagues in the continent were horrified. Leibnitz called the law occult and accused Newton of reverting to middle ages, undoing all that had been achieved since renaissance. Newton himself was worried about this and he hoped till his death that he will be able to explain the action of gravity in conformity with the Cartesian view of transmission through the intervening medium. When Maxwell formulated the Electro-Magnetic theory the EM wave was supposed to be propagated in the medium of ether. Only when the concept of ether became untenable with Michelson and Morley experiment

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and rejected by Theory of Relativity, independent identity of E and H without any material substrate was accepted. The field, nevertheless, became the mode of transmissism from cause to effect.

Since the theory of relativity set the velocity of light C as the limiting speed by which any information can be transmitted, the influence of cause cannot be felt on effect in a time less than x/c where x is the distance between the locations of cause and effect. Cause must have a remporal precedence of greater than x/c.

The causal determinism of Newtonian Mechanics was best expressed by Laplace when he stated that for an all embracing spirit possessing complete knowledge of the state of the universe at any given moment, its development in every detail in the future would be completely determined. Such a spirit knowing all the operative forces in nature, and the exact position and momentum of all the particles that make up the universe, would only have to subject the data to mathematical analysis, in order to predict the future states of the universe in every detail. This was total determinism in both metaphysical and scientific sense. Metaphysical, in the sense that the world is governed by determinate laws whether it is possible for human beings to comprehend the laws or know all the initial conditions of position and momenta and operative forces or the ability to do the uecessary computation. It is scientific determinism in the sense that there is no theoretical limitation to such a knowledge except technological limitations which will be overcome one day. Scientific knowledge was endowed with a kind of omniscience and with that knowledge the Scientist would be a prophet facing forward and backward like Janus for whom the entire universe would be a single fact–one great truth.

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The Laplacean spirit was a subject of intense debate in the nineteenth century since it had implications on free will and predestination when coupled with the belief that every thing including human consciousness could be reduced to Physics i.e., psychology to physiology to molecular biology to chemistry and ultimately to physics. Apart from the doubtful reductionism implied, it was gradually recognised that there is a limitation to the precision of measurement even in classical physics and the errors of measurement which are statistical would be cumulative making accurate prediction impossible. While this put paid to scieutific determinism, metaphysical determinism was believed by physicists in general, Einstein was one of them and remained so till his death despite arguments to the contrary by quantum physicists. God does not play dice was his firm conviction,

According to the determinist view we express some phenomena by statistical laws which are probabilistic and not deterministic, because of our ignorance of all the initial conditions. Let us take the example of the game of dice. We say the probability of any number, say 4, appearing on top of a six faced symmetrical dice is 1/6 which means that if we throw the dice say 600 times number 4 will appear on top 100 times. On the next throw we cannot say which number will appear as any of the six numbers can appear with equal probability. This is so because we do not know all the initial conditions of the throw like the way the dice is shaken, the twist of the arm, etc. These, if known, would enable us to determine exactly which face will appear. The assumption here is that all laws, including Statistical laws, can be reduced to determinate dynamic laws. Max Planck, expressed this when he wrote that only strict dynamic laws satisfy our requirement of our urge for knowledge, while every statistical law is basically inadequate because it offers an indefinite answer in place of a definite one..

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The developments in the theory of Heat and Thermodynamics in the nineteenth century brought gradual transformation in this attitude The second law of thermodynamics led to the concept of entropy and Clausium enunciated the law that the entropy of any closed system tends towards a maximum. This confronted the scientific thought with a fundamental difference in the realm of natural events, a difference which had no adequate expression in classical mechanics. For the first time in Physics a law expressed an irreversible process. There is nothing in the differential equations of classical physics to indicate unique direction of natual events, for according to them the course of any occurrence can be reversed by simply reversing the sign of the velocity vector. The entropy law, thus, became a sort of irrational reminder, a foreigner and an intruder in the securely articulated system of classical mechanics.

Kinetic theory of gasses, developed mainly by Ludwig Boltzman, succeeded in removing the strangeness and paradox of the law of entropy. Starting with the assumption that the ensemble of molecules have a statistical distribution of their initial conditions of velocity, free path, number of collisions, etc. Boltzman could derive the entropy law $S = K \text{ Log} w$ according to which entropy is the logarithm of probability. The fact that in nature entropy tends towards a maximum, i.e. the tendency is from order to disorder proves that in all interactions of real gasses like diffusion, heat conduction, etc. the individual molecules interact in accordance with the laws of probability. Boltzman's solution introduced a new kind of physical conformity to law along side the deterministic dynamic laws. Earlier, every physical law had been regarded as possessing the essential property of an indwelling necessity, a necessity that excluded any exception, a concept which was considered one of the essential ingredients of the principle of causality. (Remember If C then and only

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then E always). Precisely this property would have to be given up if we were to go to probability laws. An event, no matter how improbable, is still not impossible as shown in the experiment of Maxwell's demon. Not only can it occur but will in general occur one day, if we extend our observations over a sufficiently long period of time.

So it appears that there are in nature both dynamic and statistical laws, the latter being irreducible to the former. The dualism cannot be overcome if we adhere to the ideal that statistical laws must be reducible to dynamic laws. It can be overcome, however, if we reverse the procedure and regard statistical law as basic, the comprehensive genus, a concept of higher order than dynamic law and including it as a special case. This view-point is still debated, much more so as a result of developments in quantum mechanics. It is important to remember that the ancestry of the debate is pre-quantum physics, originating in thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.

Let us now consider quantum mechanics. As I mentioned earlier, there are different epistemological interpretations of quantum mechanics depending on the different philosophical viewpoints of the physicists. We shall first consider the dominant Copenhagen interpretation as propounded by Bohr and Heisenberg and take up the dissenting views as they relate to causality, determinism and nature of physical reality.

The basic premises of quantum mechanics are, as per the Copenhagen School, the principle of complementarity, i.e., the duality of the particle and wave nature of the elementary paricles, and Heisenberg's uncertainty relations arising out of the interaction between the observer and the object. As a result, it is impossible to determine both position and momentum (or Energy and time) simultaneously with a precision greater than

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that given by Heisenberg's uncertainty relation $\triangle p. \triangle q, \geqslant h$ where $\triangle p$ and $\triangle q$ are errors in individual measurement; (Not the statistical standard deviations of a numbers of measurements carried out either in space or time ensemble, a point of important difference between the Copenhagen school and the dissenting critical realists).

Since the initial conditions of an elementary particle can never be determined accurately beyond certain unavoidable error inherent in the very process of measurement, the future state cannot be predicted with desired accuracy. Hence, scientific determinism is impossible.

Unlike statistical mechanics, where the statistical laws operate in an ensemble of molecules, in quantum mechanics the laws governing the behaviour of individual elementary particles, are themselves probabilistic. Consider a particle in a state 1. After interaction with a quanta, the particle can transit to a number of possible states 2, 3, 4..... n with probabilities $p_{12}, p_{13}, \ldots, p_{1n}$ such that $\sum_{k=1}^{n} P_{t\,i} = 1$. That means, for an identical cause there are a number of possible effects with definite probabilities. The uniqueness expected between cause and effect as is implied in the traditional concept (in the tradition of causal determinism), is absent. Hence the statement that causality breaks down in the microworld of elementary particles.

Since the error of measurement results only by an observation of a system, the question arises as to what the nature of the trajectory of the particle is when unobserved; whether it is determinate. To this, the Copenhagen school would reply that the question is meaningless. So will be the answer to questions such

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as what happens to the particle during its transition from one orbit to another, how does it know which orbit it will be transting to so as to determine how much of the energy it has to absorb or radiate at the time of interaction, does the absorption or emission of radiation take place before or after transition, etc. These questions cannot be answerd because these phenomena can never be observed Objective reality has meaning only when subjected to observation. Scientific laws have to deal only with relations between events of cognitive experience.

Before we examine the epistemological implication of the above viewpoint, let us examine the consequences of quantum mechanics on causality and determinism a little more closely. We have seen that prediction is not possible since present state can never be exactly ascertained resulting in indeterminism, and because of lack of unique nexus between cause and effect, causality breaks down. However, we see that nature is not so arbitrary that anything can happen or that it is lawless. We see that only definite states are possible and each possible state has definite probability. In an ensemble of N particles we can exactly predict the number of particles transiting from state 1 to state 2 which is $N P_{12}$ as we can precisely calculate the probability P_{12}.

Even in the derivation of Heisenberg's uncertainty relation which is based on Campton's γ ray experiment, all the causal laws of collision such as laws of conservation of momentum and energy, are explicitly assumed. Schrodinger's equation indicates that ψ function is single valued, finite and continuous when the parameters appearing in the differential equation have discrete values. Unfortunately, the ψ function cannot be interpreted to a measurable quantity in space and time, Only $*$, the square of the amplitude of the wave function, corresponds to the probability of finding the particle at a particular place and time. How-

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ever, a mathematical scheme, which is strictly causal, is operative. So, we have an option that we either maintain the principle of Causality and are content with only a mathematical description of the state of things or adopt the familiar space–time description and accept the indeterminism in observation and prediction.

We can conclude that notwithstanding the statement of Heisenberg, made in first flush of enthusiasm at the novelty of his discovery, determinism only of Newtonian dynamics is invalid in quantum mechanics. Statistical determinacy is definitely operative. Similarly, quantum mechanics only restricts the scope of causality without rejecting it entirely. Thus, when we write down the probability for a transition from state 1 to state 2, we assign this transition to some force (cause) usually represented by interaction potential. Only the cause and effect are not here tied down in the constant and unique way as asserted in classical physics. In other words. even the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics does not sweep out causes and effects but only the unique and rigid nexus between them. It does drastically restrict the Newtoninan form of causal determinism of fully determined and precisely defined trajectories in space and time.

What do the physicists of the Coperhagen school mean when they deny causality and determinism in the microworld. To understand this we must look deeper into their philosophical views on objective reality and the nature of scieatific laws. We are all acquainted with the philosophical question of appearance and reality and the divide between idealists and realists. The idealists consider the world as just a mental construct, built out of our cognitive experience and deny objective reality to it. The realists, on the other hand, believe that the world has an objective reality independent of our observation. Another philo-

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sophical problem is about the source of our knowledge. Empiricists believe that sensual experience is the only source of knowledge from which we form our concepts and infer the universals. Rationalists, on the other hand, maintain that in addition to what we know by experience there are certain innate ideas and principles which we know independently of cognitive experience.

There are many shades of views between the extremes of idealism and realism and between empiricism and rationalism. We shall consider two important schools viz, transcendental idealism and critical realism.

Transcedental idealism or empricial realism is the view due to Immanuel Kant according to which the phenomenal world alone is knowable and the objective world, if it exists, is unknowable. It does not deny the objective world, but considers it beyond our ability to comprehend it. The Copenhagen school comes closest to this Kantian view-point. According to them, the presumption of a hard core of reality to which relations and attributes adhere, is a heritage of the mechanistic view-point. Since the interaction between the observer and object is an unanalysable single block, there is no hope of ever hitting upon objective occurrence uninfluenced by observer in space and time or even events from which the influence of the observer can be identified and isolated.

We have, accordingly, no longer objective entities for which we can establish scientific laws and to which we can attach these laws as attributes. What constitutes the content of our empirical knowledge is the totality of our observations, which we group together in definite orders, and which, in accordance with the process of ordering we can represent by theoretical laws. We cannot speak of objects except under conditions of cognition.

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We do not simply read off the laws from the objects; rather, we start with the empirical data available through observation and measurement; which are condensed into laws and thus into objective statements. This is the logic of Heisenberg's Matrix mechanics where the starting points are the frequencies and intensities of the spectral lines that are open to observations. It is not based on assumptions about the substantial interior of the atoms, but rather on the functional relations between observable magnitudes. It is the mathematical form for whatever can be asked about the constitution of the atom. Statements about the electron's position, its period af rotation, or the shape of its orbit, etc. no longer appear. The reality of the electron is not to be based on anything but the radiation laws that we can establish based on our ocservation and measurement. Schrodinger's method was also not very different. He also made it clear that no definition of physicai existence will ever be possible except through the medium of physical laws. No physical reality exists for us, except the one that is mediated to us by physical measurements and by determination of laws based on them. As Cassirer puts it, " The concept of law is now considered prior to that of object, whereas it was earlier subordinate to it. In the substantialist conception there used to be a definitely determined entity, which bore certain attributes and which entered w th other entities into definite relations expressible by laws of nature. In the functional viewpoint of quantum physicists, by contrast, this entity is no longer the self-evident starting point but the final goal and end of the considerations ".

We now understand why the copenhagen school considers all qustions about the state of a system, when unobserved, as meaningless. It is also clear why causality is denied. The genetic bond of causality in the ontological sense is not there because the only bond between two successive states, between C and E,

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is the observer. In the absence of direct objective connections between the consecutive states of a system, it is no wonder every form of causality in the ontological sense is lost with the sole exception of statistical determinacy.

The Empirical Realists on the other hand affirm that the world is real and exists independent of the observer. It is also knowable, though perhaps partially, through successive approximations. We can make apriori hypothesis about the objective reality and deduce its consequences including the influence of the measuring apparatus and test our deductions against experience. If it fails against critical tests, the hypothesis is discarded and a new hypothesis is put up which, apart from explaining all that the earlier hypothesis did, also explains the criticat experiment in which it failed. Thus, by repeated process of conjectures and refutations we will be able to reach the truth about objective reality asymptotically. Meaning is not to be confused with testability.

According to critical realism, quantum mechanics, in its present form, is only an intermediate solution, a half way scheme which needs to be supplemented, in order to deal more adequately with individual observations. An ontic level of explanation to support the phenomenological laws of quantum mechanics is nessary. In its present form, quantum mechanics is not the final discipline, the ultimate level of explanation as claimed by the orthodox school.

Bohm and Vigier have done a good deal of work in this direction. The uncertainty relation is interpreted not as arising out of interference of the observer but the result of probabilistic laws governing individual particles. δp and δq are not errors in a single observation but mean errors in a statistical scatter of a number of observations performed on a single particle in a time

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ensemble. Similarly, probability is not the subjective factor of rational expectation as is interpreted in the orthodox school. Rather a particle in a given environment is said to have a propensity to be in different states. Bohm has tried to explain the probabilistic laws governing individual particles as due to the influence of a subquantal field represented by the wave function. The theory, however, has so far led only to old results but until it predicts new phenomena, which exposes one of the hidden variables, it will not gain general acceptance. Quantum mechanics has been found inadequate to explain phenomena at distances less than 10^{-13} cm or energies greater than 1 Gev and the test of a new theory will be its ability to explain these phenomena.

The critical realists do not presume that the objective reality has to be a substance which can be described in terms familiar to our sensual experience. The problem has arisen in using words like particles and waves, which by association connotes a Newtonian particle or a Huygen's wave. According to this view there is no dualism and no complementarity in quantum physics. The electron is neither a particle nor a wave, even if our accustomed language induces us to use these words. They are strictly speaking metaphorical and allude to the objective reality whose description exceeds the bounds of visual perception and is, thetefore, obliged to discard such concepts as particles and waves, except as imperfect models of reality. Classical physics developed in the aegies of Cartesian clarity and its concepts answered the question: "what can the mind's eye imagine"? Quantum mechanics was born out of concerns characterised by the question "what can be measured"? The time has now come to ask what can be conceived abstractly but with mathematical and logical consistency.

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To conclude, while causality and determinism can be accommodated in quantum mechanics with some modifications to their definition, the nature of objective reality has received the biggest jolt. However, the important question is whether Physics will take the instrumentalist view and consider the present phenomenological explanation as final or probe nature further in an attempt to understand reality at a deeper level.

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SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO KARL POPPER

I

Karl Popper describes Sociology of Knowledge as a 'Hegelian version of Kant's theory of knowledge'. According to Kant our mind is not just a store-house of sense-experience; it rather plays an active role in searching, comparing, unifying, generalising. He held that it is possible to discover one true and unchanging categorical apparatus, which represents the necessarily unchanging framework of our intellectual out-fit, that is human reason. Contrary to Kant, Hegel believes that there is no unchanging intellectual framewotk of human knowledge. For him this framework is constantly changing It is a product of gradual development of society. This implies that an individual cannot transcend his social conditions. This part of Hegelianism forms the basic assumption of the sociology of knowledge (As Popper thinks). Sociologists of knowledge also maintain that our knowledge and opinions about social and political matters depend on our particulr social situation. Social conditions and historical perspectives play an important role in our knowledge about society. Our cognitive framework is caused by socio-historical conditions.

Mannheim is the principal proponent of this view. According to him, the sociology of knowledge as one of the youngest branch of sociology tries 'to analyse the relationship between knowledge and existence'. [1] Moreover it tries to search social ties between theories and modes of thought. Social conditions are not only relevant but vital for thought and knowledge. Particular concepts owe their origin to different social positions.

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Moreover, man's basic categories of thought also differ, because people in different social situations think differently. So the conditions of existence historically affect the origin of ideas.

The sociology of knowledge has one attractive feature, namely the recognition of the activist element in knowledge. It denounces the analysis of knowledge in terms of pure perception. Popper also shares this activist epistemology. According to him, in scientific knowledge, it is observation rather than perception that counts. An observation is perception but is planned one in which we actually participate. It is in this context that Popper criticises the "passivist theory"[2] or the "bucket theory of the mind".[3] This theory, which states that perceptions (sense experiences) precede knowledge, was adopted by the empiricists (tabula rasa theory). Popper argues that the central mistake in this theory lies in the assumption that we are engaged in the quest for certainty. Moreover, as a theory of the growth of knowledge, this theory fails. "The aim of the scientist is not to discover absolute certainty, but to discover better theories or invent better hypotheses which can be put to the severe tests and which yield new experience".[4] The growth of scientific knowledge means the progress of science through 'falsification' of previous theories. The methodological test for a theory lies not in its confirmability but in its refutability. With the help of this method Popper tries to refute Hegelianism, Marxism and Psycho-analysis. For Popper Freudian-psycho-analysis, Hegelianism etc. are not scientific. Because they do not specify the conditions under which they would be regarded as falsified. On contrary, the these theorists 'thought of their theories as unquestionably true'. Doing so, they arrested change (Although not always consciously). Moreover, these theories try to explain away any counter argument with the help of their basic assumption (as, the Marxist with the concept of 'class-interest';

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psycho–analyst with the assumption of 'unconscious element of human mind', sociologist with the basic assumption namely of 'total-ideologies'). [5] These mistakes occur, Popper thinks, because of their misconception about scientific method. For example,, sociologists think that scientific knowledge is a process in the mind of the individual scientist... ...' [6] If considered in this way,... ...scientific objectivity ... ... becomes ununderstandable'.[7]

Now, the question—what is scientific objectivity?–arises. What we call 'scientific objectivity' is not a product of the individual scientists' impartiality, but a product of the "public character of scientific method".[8] Both 'free–criticism' and 'avoidance of talking at cross–purposes' constitute the public character of science. Free criticism implies that any principle of science can be criticized and any body may criticize. And 'in order to avoid speaking at cross–purposes scientists try to express their theories in such a form that they can be tested, i.e., refuted (or else corroborated) by experience'.[9] The defect of the sociologists of knowledge lies here: they fail to understand 'the social or public character of knowledge or rather of scientific method'.[10] To illustrate this, Popper gives one example, [11] suppose Robinson Crusoe has set up scientific laboratories in an island; and with great attention and with hard–labour he has succeeded in inventing some scientific results which later happen to coincide wirh the results of the seientists. Although these results are achieved through experiment and observation, yet crusoenean science is not real science It is 'revealed' science. For, it lacks the most important chara- cter of scientific method, that is, the public character of scientific method. Scientific knowledge and its objectivity is not determined by the result but by its method.

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According to Popper, sociologists of knowledge are right in maintaining that (i) our thinking is influenced by our "social habitat" [12] or by the environment in which we inhabit. (ii) "that we are all suffering under our own system of prejudice (or 'total ideologies', if this is term is preferred)".[13] But they are mistaken in thinking that (i) different systems of thought are equally correct (ii) "no intellectual bridge or compromise between different total ideologies is possible".[14]

If this view (the view of the sociology of knowledge) is true, it would lead to 'anti–rationalism and mysticism' [15] and it would render the notion of scientific objectivity vacuous. For example, Hegel believes in and prefers the existence of contradictory systems rather than eliminating contradictions. His relativism which suggests that contradictory theoretical systems cause the spirit to be propelled upward is automatism and not rational criticism, for rational criticism rules out the possibility of co-existence of contradictory theoretical systems 'If coutradictions need not be avoided, then any criticism and any discussion becomes impossible. Since criticism always consists in pointing out contradictions... [16]

II

Mannheim makes it clear that his idea of anti–individualism is central to his sociology of knowledge. He says about individualism that 'it is incorrect of explain the totality of an outlook only with reference to its genesis in the mind of the individualism'. [17] In his movement from the 'particular' to the 'total conception of ideology' Mannheim says that the former is limited by its individualism. It restricts its attention to segments of the thought systems of specific individuals. The total conception, on the other hand, relates the structure of total outlooks of their social carriers. So, the sphere of subject–matter of the

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total conception is much greater than the other. It allows us to grasp the structure of a group world–view.

At the beginning of the same work, Mannheim adopts the thesis that the structure of a group's thought is determined by how the group as a whole acts upon its sorrounding reality. And the action of the group determines the thought of the individual and also of the group.

Conversely, Popper maintains that all social changes and all social institutions are to be understood as the outcome of aims and actions of individual human beings, and not be understood as stemming from any social whole. This view is called 'methodological individualism'.[18] In his later Philosophy, Popper appears to abandon methodological individualism, arguing not only that sometimes groups can affect the actions of individuals, but also that insitutions develop in part autonomously.[19]

Sometimes we get the impression that Popper rejects all historical laws. This is not the case. He is opposed only to laws of historical determinism. The kind of law that he rejects is the one that claims that capitalistic society must inevitably give place to a society, which in its turn, must evolve into a communist society. In chapter 19 of the *Open Society and its enemies* he speaks about the systematic ambiguity of Marxists' attitude considering the historical background of the age. According to him Marxists failed to carry out the Socialist revolution at a time when there was an opportunity to do so (i.e., end of world–War I). Secondly, they did not resist seriously to the facist power conquest. The ambiguous pratical attitude amounted in both cases, in Popper's formulation, to a policy of waiting and doing nothing. Thus, they missed the opportunity at hand in the first case, and contributing, in the second, to the produc-

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ing of "that anti-democratic reaction of the bourgeoistic" which the theory predicted (with ambiguity) 'to abhor'.[20]

According to Popper, the sociologists of knowledge tries to explain all views by his assumption of 'total ideology' in the similar way in which Marxism tries to explain everything with the hypothesis of 'class-interest.' Marxists believes that our opinions are determind by 'Class-interest' in general and the social and historical situation of our time in particular. Popper calls these views 'dogmatic', because they do not encourage criticism. The popularity of these views lies in the easy application to explain any phenomena.

Even though the Sociologists of knowledge (such as, Marx and Hegel) welcome change, yet this love of change Popper says is little ambivalent. 'For even though they have no intention to arrest change, as historicist they try to predict it, and thus to bring it under rational cantrol, and this certainly looks like an attempt to tame it.'[21] According to Hegel, since change cannot be completety stopped, it should at least be controlled by the state,, whose power is vast. At first sight this view seems to be a kind of rationalism. But Popper's opinion is quite opposite. He argues that 'Hegel's radical Collectivism (i.e., the State is every thing, and the individual nothing) depends as much as on Plato as it depends on Frederick William III, the king of Prussia.[22] According to them in every respect individual has to depend upon the state. They emphasised on the state as real and divine. Each individual must worship the state. Schopenhauer, who knew Hegel personally, describes the political game of Hegelianism in the following way: 'Philosophy brought afresh to refute Kant... had soon to become a tool of interests; of state interests from above, of personal interests from below. Philosophy is misused, from the side of the state as a tool, from the other side as a means of gain..... Truth is certainly the last thing they

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have in mind. Government makes of philosophy a means of serving this state interest, and scholars make of it a trade ...' [23] This, according to Popper, is 'bombastic and hysterical Platonism, which links Platonism with modern totalitarianism.' [24] He is the finest example of historicism.

Ih his paper "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition" Popper maintains that science and epistemology are totolly different from myths and stories. The myths and stories are included in first-order-tradition. For example, the myths or stories about dreams from Homer and Bible to the myth makers of our time, such as Freud and Jung are included in the first-order-tradition. These are not scientific because they lack the element of second-order-tradition, that is, critical method or critical discussion. And there is nothing more 'rational' than the method of critical discussion which is the method of science. Indeed it is true that the social sciences have not yet fully attained this rational method. This is partly due to the intelligence destroying influence of Aristotle and Hegel, and partly to their failure to follow publicity of method. To cure this problem the only course open to the social science is to tackle the practical problems of our time with the help of the theoretical methods which are fundamentally same in all sciences. It means the method of trial and error, of inventing hypotheses which can be practically tested. A social technology is needed whose results can be tested by piecemeal social engineering. "The piecemeal engineer knows, like Socrates, how little he knows. He knows that we can learn only from our mistakes." [25] He gives importance to social experimentation. He tries to solve or reform social problems into an open mind, which is opposite of Holistic or Utopian approach. Unlike piecemeal social engineering, Holistic or Utopian approach aims at remodelling the 'whole society' in accordance with a definite plan or blueprint. Conver-

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sely, piecemeal social engineering does not follow wholesale pattern. He explains different problems differently, for he knows that situations are unique.

Popper sees our knowledge of social life and social life itself in terms of experiments being made by the agents : " The introduction of a new kind of life–insurance, of a new kind of taxation, are all social experiments which have their effects over the whole of society. And our knowledge of society is based on experience gained through different kinds of experiments." [26] This is, for Popper, the basic insight from which his advocacy of piecemeal social engineering against Utopian or whole–sale revolutionary planning follows.

The historicist believes that people's actions and desires (and human nature itself) differ according to the spirit of their particular point in the development of history, and that we can understand them only by grasping the spirit of the age in question. Popper is particularly hostile to such talk, chiefly because of its (1) holistic over tones and (ii) leading easily to proposal of removing those not in conformity with the spirit. Far from having our aims given to us by the spirit of the age, Popper's view is that we are responsible for them, even if holistic and historicist thinking encourages us to avoid this responsibility. He sees people, like atoms, as by and large similar; the differences between them are due to the different conditions in which they execute their piecemeal social experiments.[27]

I want to conclude this section by elucidating Popper's view on ' methodlogical individualism.' Popper's methodological individualism has a positive aspect : that the task of social theory is to explain social events in terms of the attitudes, expectations, actions and relations of individuals. And it has also a negative aspect that is to deny that collectives do anything.

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Referring to O' Hear[38] it can be said that, although Popper's analysis of society is based on individual behaviour, it is not psychologistic, because the behaviour of individual is governed by their social situation as much as their individual motives. A purely psychologistic account of human behaviour may well be historicist, because of its need to explain in psychological terms. For Popper it is possible to explain both institutions and changing motivations in terms of social evironments and unintended consequences of actions. Popperian science, in stressing the unintended consequences of actions, will illustrate the poverty of conspiracy theories of history and society.

The above said view differs from Mannheim's. Mannheim's methodological anti–individualism displays his attitude to psychology. In *Ideology and Utopia* he gives attention to the importance of psychology of thought, for he thinks it important to develop the sociology of knowledge. But he maintains that psychology could offer only a limited perspective. For example, he mentions the psycho-analysis theory of education. It is limited to the partial understanding of the relation between teacher and student.

III

Karl Popper's views of Science and Sociology of knowledge are not free from criticism, however.

Firstly, in response to his view of intersubjective–criticism it might be argued that balanced criticism rarely occurs and critical standards vary from one group of scientists to the other. Moreover, there is no way to ensure that criticism is always free of the influence of special interest of the groups.

Secondly, it is generally objected against Popper that his epistenology is deeply sceptical. For, it rejects the very notion of

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justification, which is generally considered as a necessary condition for knowledge claim. One must give reason to support that his knowledge claim is justified. Popper avoids this requirement of knowledge. According to him all knowledge is fallible and there is no ground which can justify it.

From the abovementioned view we should not conclude that truth is relative. Popper also does not deny the concept of truth. He says, "If an assertion is true it is true for ever." He avoids this concept in his philosophy, for in the domain of science this concept does not get its foot hold.

Thirdly, in a sense it is correct to say that knowledge is relative, especially since in the field of science, scientific assertions are subject to revision – not true for ever. For most scientific results have the character of hypothesis.[30] From this we cannot say that all cases of knowledge–claim are fallible. At least conceptually, we must admit that there is something as certain. Otherwise, the concept of fallibility will lose its meaning.

Fourthly, referring to Michael Schmid we can say that "it serves no useful elucidatory function to declare the goals and knowledge of individual actors to be the sole point of references for the theoretical examination of the collective consequences of action (and thereby of institutional and culturál traditions). Institutions should not be understood in the concrete sense which Popper currently favours (*P. H.* 65, 99). Our theoretical knowledge of action is not necessarily formulated on the level of abstraction at which concrete insurance companies or schools tend to constitute aproblem".[31]

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Schmid of course accepts Popper's reminder that 'we can change our institutions consciously and intentionally and that in this sense 'rationally' via piecemeal procedure.[32]

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SUNIL BARAN MANDAL

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17. Mannheim, K.; *Op cit*, p. 2.

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18. Popper, K. R.; *Poverty of Historicism*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, p. 157, (Abbreviation - P. H).

19. O'Hear, Antony; *Karl Popper : Philosopher's Argument*, p. 169.

20. Feher, J. M.; "Dialectical Elements in Popper's Criticism of Dialectics" *Proceedings of the 3rd Intenational Wittgenstein Symposium*, 13th to 19th August. 1978.

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25. Popper, K. R.; *P. H*, p. 67.

26. Popper, K. R.; *O. S*, Vol. I, p. 162.

27. O'Hear, A.; *Op cit*, p. 161.

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31. Schmid, M.: "The idea of Rationality and its Relationship to Social Sciences : Comments on Popper's Philosophy of the Social Science", *Inquiry*, Vol. 31, No.-4, 1988, p. 460.

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ON METAINDUCTIVE SENTENCES

1. *Self-Reference : Direct and Indirect*

At the very outset, let me try to explain, with the help of examples, what is meant by self-refrence as applied to sentences.[1]

Consider the following examples[2] :

(i) This sentence has five words.

(ii) This sentence is in English.

Both these sentences are self-referential i.e. they talk about themselves. It may well be asked how a sentence could talk about itself. In both the examples cited above, the two words 'This sentence' refere to the sentence which contains them. For example, in the sentence 'This sentence has five words', the two words 'This sentence' refer to the sentence 'This sentence has five words', Thus, the subject 'This sentence' refers to or talks about the whole sentence, which contains the subject 'This sentence'. The same holds for the other example 'This sentence is in English'.

The examples cited above are not only self-referential but are true self-referential sentences, for they state facts obout themselves[3] The sentence 'This sentence has five words' consists of five words and thus states a fact about itself. Similarly, 'This sentence is in English' is indeed a sentence expressed in the English language. Compare these with the following examples :

(iii) This sentence has two words.

(iv) This sentence is in Swahili.

These sentences are self-referential too, but they are false self-referential sentences. In example (iii), the two words 'This

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sentence' refer to the sentence 'This sentence has two words' which has not two but five words. Thus, the sentence states about itself what is not a fact and is a false self–referential sentence. The same holds for example (iv) which though it states about itself that it is expressed in Swahili, expresses that it is in Swahili through the medium of the English language.

All four examples cited above are examples of *direct* self–reference; more specifically, they are all examples of self–referential sentences which use the schema 'This sentence' to talk about themselves. The schema 'This sentence' refers to the sentence which contains it. Thus, the self–reference is direct. There are other varieties of direct self–reference too, but they are not relevant to the present discussion.

Apart from being direct, self–reference can be *indirect* as well. As, for instance, in the following example:–

(v) All rules have exceptions.

Here is a sentence that seems like a rule itself It says that no rule is without exception. Now, if this sentence, i. e. (v) is to be true, then it itself must have an exception. That is to say, that there is an exception to the rule 'All rules have exception'; which is to say that there exists at least one rule that admits of no exception whatsoever. We may safely conclude the following:–

(vi) Not all rules have exceptions.

Thus, we obtain two contradictory sentences,

(v) and (vi).

We find that the sentence 'All rules have exceptions' talks about itself. However, it does not do so, directly by using the schema 'This sentence.' Unlike direct self–referential sentences, the indirect self–referential sentence does not say anything about itself such as 'I am a sentence in the English language'

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(Example (ii)) or 'I am a sentence with five words' (Example (i)). Rather (v), which is an indirect self–referential sentence, says 'All rules have exceptions, but I too am a rule' in an indirect way. This example is self–contradictory. It turns back upon itself to contradict itself. But not all indirect self–referential sentences are self–contradictory. Some of these may be self–consistent e.g, 'All rules are self–consistent'.

Last, but not the least, indirect self–referential sentences may be converted into direct self–referential sentences. For instance, the indirect self–referential sentence 'All rules have exceptions' can be converted to the direct self–referential sentence 'All rules have exceptions *including this one*' by using the schema 'including this one'. Similarly, 'All rules are self–consistent' becomes 'All rules are self–consistent including this one'. Other schemata may be employed to convert indirect self–referential sentences to direct self–referential sentences. For example, 'Nothing is absolute' is converted to 'Nothing is absolute except this sentence' by using the schema 'except this sentence.' But such schemata are not relevant to the present discussion.

To sum up, self–referential sentences are sentences that talk about themselves or refer to themselves. They may do so either directly or indirectly. Indirect self–referential sentences may be converted into direct self–referential sentences by using certain schemata.

2. *Inductive Generalisations and Metainductive Sentences*

By inductive generalisations, I mean sentences obtained through problematic induction. That is, inductive generalisations are obtained through inductive inference in the passage from "certain given (observed) P's are Q" to "All Ps are Q." Any standard text on logic will tell us that inductive generalisations, e.g. 'All men are mortal,' are not certain but only probable

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To quote Johnson,[4] for example " ...the inductive inference is only problematic, and in general of a low degree of probability."

Now, sentences about inductive generalisations I shall call *metainductive* sentences. And the metainductive sentences that will be considered will be sentences such as 'Induction does not certify', 'All inductive generalisations are probable', 'All inductive generalisations are uncertain' etc. Let us take the following sentence M as the prototype of such metainductive sentences :–

Sentence M: All inductive generalisations are probable/uncertain.

The question to be asked with regard to metainductive sentences is '*How do we obtain metainductive sentences such as sentence M*'. Or, in other words, what grounds do we have for asserting inductive generalisations to be probable/uncertain. How do we know that there is a problem of induction. This is the central problem of this paper and an attempt shall be made to solve it.

3. Self–Reference and Metainductive Sentences

Metainductive sentences cannot themselves be inductive generalisations. If metainductive sentences were inductive generalisations, they would face the problem of self–reference. And the self–reference involved would be indirect which could easily be converted to direct self–reference, employing the schema 'including this one' as shown below :–

INDIRECT SELF–REFERENCE (Sentence M: All inductive generalisations are probable uncertain, and other such metainductive sentences are themselves inductive generalisations.

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Thus, we have :

DIRECT SELF-REFERENCE (Sentence M : All inductive generalisations are probable/uncertain including this one.

It is evident, thus, that metainductive sentences cannot be obtained through problematic induction

Apart from self reference, there is another important reason why sentence M cannot be an inductive generalisation. While inductive generalisations are indeed probable/uncertain, sentence M and other such metainductive sentences are not probable but certain. Sentence M is *necessarily* true It cannot be otherwise. There can be no inductive generalisation that is not probable/uncertain. If a sentence is certain, it cannot be an inductive generalisation.

Metainductive sentences, thus, are *beyond* the scope of problematic induction They transcend problematic induction. It is in this sense that they are *meta*inductive.[5] The question raised in section 2. ' How do we obtain metainductive sentences such as sentence M ', however, still remains to be answered.

4. Metainductive Sentences and Intuitive Induction

The solution to the central problem of this paper is *that metainductive sentences, such as sentence M, are necessary truths obtained through intuitive induction.* An explanation of what is meant by intuitive induction is needed here.

Abstractive or Intuitive induction is a kind of inference.[6] The fundamental principles of demonstration are based upon this kind of inference. The word ' intuitive ' is used here to indicate rational certainty *felt* by the thinker. The word

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'induction' is used here to indicate passage from particular to universal. Intuitive induction is different from problematic induction in that while sentences obtained through problematic induction are only probable, accumulation of instances increasing their probability, sentences obtained through intuitive induction are *certain*, accumulation of instances not affecting the rational certainty of such intuitive generalisations.

In intuitive induction, we pass from one instance of a certain form to other instances of the same form and in the passage realize that what is true of the one instance will be true of all instances of that form. Many mathematical and logical formulae are apprehended through intuitive induction.[7] The Distributive Law in mathematics, for example, is known in this manner. We perceive something like:

10 times 4 apples + 10 times 6 apples = 10 times
(4 apples + 6 apples and immediately realize the
Distributive Law intuitively as:
$\therefore$ k times P + k times Q = k times (P + Q)

To take another example, the conversion or particular affirmative propositions in Aristotelian logic is known similarly. Perceiving for example, "Some men are intelligent" implies "Some intelligent creatures are men", we apprehend intuitively that "Some S is P" implies "Some P is S".

Metainductive sentences, similarly, are obtained through intuitive induction. We first perceive an inductive generalisation, say 'All men are mortal' and perceive that it is probablel uncertain. From this one instance, we pass to other inductive generalisations and intuitively apprehend the necessary truth 'All inductive generalisations are probable/uncertain'. Sentence M

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and other such inductive generalisations are, thus, seen to be necessary truths apprehended through the kind of inference called ' intuitive induction.

5. *Concluding Remarks*

While the solution offered to the central problem of this paper may be disputed, the problem itself is genuine and indisputable. It is an epistemic problem how we come to know that there is a problem of induction. The solution offered here may perhaps be disputed on the grounds either that metainductive sentences, like sentences M, can be derived *logically* from orher sentences, or that such metainductive sentences are *hypotheses* or *assumptions.*

The task of a philosopher, perhaps, is to look for genuine problems wherever possible and having found these, to attempt seriously to solve them. This paper is an attempt at fulfilling this task.

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NOTES

1. For the sake of convenience, sentences, statements and propositions have been taken as identical in this paper and the usual distinction between them has not been considered.

2. Some of these examples are taken from *Vicious Circles and Infinity : An Anthology of Paradoxes,* by Patrick Hughes and George Brecht, Penguin, 1975.

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4. W. E. Johnsen; *Logic,* Part III, p. 16; Dover, 1964.

5. Meta (from supposed analogy to metaphysics) – beyond, higher transcending. *Webster's New 20th Century Dictionary*, 2nd edn.

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7. It may be noted that intuitive induction is not restricted to mathematical and logical formulae. According to Johnson, certain ethical judgements as well as certain empirical truths are obtained through intuitive induction.

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

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